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GENDERED VISIONS OF THE BOSNIAN FUTURE:
WOMEN’S ACTIVISM AND REPRESENTATION IN POST-WAR 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Elissa L. Helms, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2003
This is an ethnographic study of women’s activism in Bosniac (Muslim) areas of post-war
Bosnia-Herzegovina. I examine the activities and representational strategies of activists in women’s
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and political parties as they engage local nationalist and
religious discourses, established notions of gender, and the discourses and policies of foreign donors
and international bodies. The work is based on over two years (1999-2000) of ethnographic research
among women activists, who take a range of approaches to gender and ethno-national/religious
identity. I show how women’s attempts to influence the direction of post-war reconstruction often
rely on what I term, following Richard G. Fox, “affirmative essentialisms”– over-simplified but
positive characterizations of women. These attempts are embedded in a moral universe in which
gendered wartime experiences shape much of the possibilities and obstacles to public action. As
women attempt to forge new identities, then, they do so within morally coded hierarchies of gender
and ethnicity established during the war. I show that while affirmative essentialisms in a sense
constrain women from becoming actors of consequence in political processes, in the context of
Bosnia they are an effective strategy for overcoming resistence to women’s political participation.
I also examine the relationship between women’s activism and foreign intervention, showing how
donors both enable and limit women as significant political actors through a similar use of
affirmative essentialisms of women. Donor policies influence the direction of feminist and women-
centered discourses through their emphasis on multi-ethnic state building and on liberal feminism.
Debates over difference with men and among women thus form the core of women activists’
discourses on gender roles and relations.
I relate this analysis to theories of gender and ethno-national identities; strategies of women’s
activism in relation to essentialisms of gender and cultural systems (Orientalism, Occidentalism, and
v“balkanism”). In contrast to social science literature on nationalism that sees women as symbols of
nation, and in further contrast to images of Bosnian women as passive victims of war and nationalist
politics, I argue for and provide a case study of women’s active gendered roles in post-war nation
building.
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CHAPTER ONE
IMAGES OF BOSNIAN WOMEN
Introduction
  A New York Times article (June 14, 1998) lists “a Balkan farming village
under siege” along with other places and times in which the rape of women
has been used as a weapon of war (emphasis added). The accompanying
photo shows an 18-year-old Bosnian Muslim woman who has just undergone
an abortion after having been gang raped by Serb soldiers. Her back is turned
toward the camera as she hides her face. The image implies shame,
victimhood, and silence.
  Eve Ensler’s Vagina Monologues include a sketch on wartime rape entitled,
“My Vagina was my Village.” The piece makes clear that the protagonist is
a Muslim woman from rural Bosnia.1 
 News articles about ethnic cleansing feature pictures of women in Muslim
headscarves crying, mourning the dead, or desperately fleeing enemy troops
(see e.g., New York Times July 25, 1998: A3).
 Dženana [an activist at the Bosnian women’s organization Medica] told us
of her annoyance at two western “experts,” one of whom assumed she had
never heard of Aretha Franklin or the Rolling Stones and tried to “educate”
her. She angrily told him that her mother had listened to the Beatles and all
those bands. On top of that, after drinking beer with her and her colleagues
all night, the other western man had expressed a wish to “meet and talk with
a real Muslim girl.” When a Serb activist gestured to Dženana in her western
clothes, fashionable hair style, smoking and drinking “right in front of him
all night,” as Dženana put it, the man was incredulous.“People have no idea
what Bosnians are like. They have these stereotypes in their heads, especially
of Muslims and women,” Dženana fumed. (edited fieldnote entry from my
first day living in Zenica)
To most people in the world in the early 1990's, the image that immediately came to mind
upon hearing “Bosnian women” was that of the rural Muslim woman as the victim of ethnic
2 “Bosnian” is a regional rather than ethnic designation, referring to Serbs, Croats, and Muslims (Bosniacs)
from Bosnia. Since 1993, B osnian Muslims have been officially known as “Bosniacs.” I discuss these terms in
chapter 3.
3 Scholars of the former Yugoslavia have worked to debunk the “ancient ethnic  hatreds” view from a variety
of angles (e.g. Donia and Fine 1994; Gagnon 2002b; Hayden 1996a; W oodward 1995; Živkovi 2001).
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cleansing and rape.2 As portrayed in the world media, women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter
Bosnia) were victims, silenced by the savage, macho violence of the Serb man and doubly shunned
by the patriarchal, primitive Muslim communities of rural Bosnia. Many observers, including
feminists, used these Orientalized images to claim that Muslim women suffered much more than
other women from rape. This all happened in the not-quite-civilized Balkans where “ancient ethnic
hatreds” erupted uncontrollably every generation or so, as depicted by journalists and politicians.3
These images persist, despite the fact that women of other ethnic backgrounds were also
raped, as were men. Bosnian women experienced many other hardships that are not often talked
about. Yet the focus has been on rape as the emblematic gender crime interpreted as an insult to
nations and men. All evidence indicates that Muslim women indeed made up the largest number of
wartime rape victims, but they have become the only victims, and only victims in the popular
imagination.
The images that Bosnian women presented about themselves, however, are much different.
Many of them have been active participants in social and political processes during and since the
war, which ended in 1995. These activist women also invoke images of female victimhood to
varying degrees, yet association with rape is strikingly absent. Instead, victimhood is based on loss,
innocence, and womanhood. At the same time, there is an explicit effort to counter the stereotype
of rural, Muslim culture as backward, traditional and passive, as represented even by other Muslims.
The predominantly urban, educated women who are active in non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and through political parties aim to show, in the words of one woman politician, that “we’re
not just old peasant women like the world media showed.” Bosnians watched wartime coverage on
CNN, too. They also encountered such assumptions in their contact with foreign journalists, aid
workers, and other visitors to Bosnia, as illustrated in the vignette about Dženana.
Still, since Bosnia broke away from socialist Yugoslavia and plunged into war, there has been
a move by local nationalists to return to “traditional” forms of ethno-national culture, especially to
3religion and patriarchal family roles. For Muslims, called “Bosniacs” since the early years of the war,
this has meant increasing emphasis on Islam and “Eastern values,” combined with campaigns to
strengthen this group’s identity as a nation. As in the rest of what had been Yugoslavia, women were
assigned active roles as reproducers of the nation and nurturers of culture, but passive roles as
citizens, (potential) victims to be protected by the nation’s men.
As they stressed their “modern” and “European” orientations in response to these foreign and
local discourses, many of these women were also wary of embracing neoliberal western models put
forth by aid agencies and representatives of the “international community” that took over as pseudo-
protectorate at the end of the war. Although most women activists were dependent on western aid
for the survival of their organizations, and in many cases also their personal livelihoods, these
models, with their emphases on “democracy,” “civil society,” even “feminism” and “gender,”
seemed at times to clash with the women’s senses of self as Bosnians. While this contested emphasis
on NGOs and “civil society” offered women new opportunities and spaces for a redefinition of
female gender roles and women’s public/political activism, they are constrained and the constrain
themselves by categories of gender, ethno-national identity, and morality that have emerged from
the experience with war.
This study is an ethnographic examination of women’s activism in Bosniac areas of post-war
Bosnia-Herzegovina. I focus on the activities and representational strategies of activists in women’s
NGOs and political parties as they engage local (patriarchal) nationalist discourses, established
notions of gender, and the discourses and policies of foreign donors and international bodies. The
work is based on over two years of ethnographic research among women activists, who take a range
of approaches to gender and ethno-national/religious identity. I show how women’s attempts to
influence the direction of post-war reconstruction often rely on what Richard Fox (1996) has called
“affirmative essentialisms”– over-simplified but positive characterizations of women– based on
women’s wartime experiences and identities. Furthermore, these attempts are embedded in a moral
universe in which gendered wartime experiences shape much of the possibilities and obstacles to
public action. As women attempt to forge new identities, then, they do so within morally coded
hierarchies of gender and ethnicity established through wartime experiences. As gendered actors in
the male-associated sphere of the public and political, women are forced to confront circulating
4discourses on gender and ethnicity/religion (especially Islam), which are produced by local
nationalisms, and foreign interventions. I thus not only examine the dynamics of women’s roles in
a (post)conflict situation, but also the impact of their activism on post-war reconstruction. 
I relate this analysis to theories of gender and ethno-national identities; strategies of women’s
activism in relation to essentialisms of gender and cultural systems (e.g., Orientalism, Occidentalism,
and “balkanism”); and I emphasize women’s active roles in contrast to academic, feminist, and local
nationalist representations of Bosnian women, especially Muslims (Bosniacs), as passive victims of
wartime rape and expulsion, and of post-war political processes.
Why Bosnia? Origins of a Project
In our graduate seminar in ethnographic field methods, we were taught that anthropological
projects were supposed to appear as if formulated first around a theoretical problem with the field
site chosen to best investigate the problem or test hypotheses. As is likely the case with most other
researchers, I went about my project in exactly the opposite order. I entered graduate school in 1995
knowing little about anthropology but sure that I would work with Bosnians in some capacity. I had
just spent two years working for a Croatian NGO with Bosnian refugees in Croatia. I had learned the
language, albeit in a colloquial mishmash of regional dialects and with no formal grammar lessons.
The war in Bosnia was still going on, so I set my sights on a possible project with refugees or other
populations in Croatia. I had long had an interest in both gender and nationalism, and the theoretical
literature I was reading in my courses sparked many questions about how categories of gender,
ethnicity, and sexuality were being constructed and lived, and what mechanisms of state power,
discursive “common sense,” historical legacies, and transnational movements were being brought
to bear in people’s lives. My experiences volunteering at the Prague Gender Studies Center in the
years just after the “Velvet Revolution” had also piqued my interest in transnational feminist
exchanges and women’s activism in the “transition” from socialism to, it seemed, liberal market
democracy.
The Bosnian war ended in late 1995 with the Dayton Peace Agreement, brokered by
American government officials and the nationalist leaders of the warring parties. Not one Bosnian
woman was present (Lithander 2000). Though the issues which had sparked the war remained far
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reconstruction effort could begin. Dayton had “saved” the Bosnian state from being torn apart, yet
it established two internal “entities,” each ethnically defined and controlled: the Republika Srpska
(RS) and the Bosniac-Croat Federation. The Federation, having been created (uneasily) in 1994 with
the Washington Agreement that halted fighting between Bosniac and Croat forces, was further
arranged into ten ethnically controlled (and populated) cantons, and within the two ethnically “mixed
cantons,” ethnically controlled municipalities took on primary significance (see Burg and Shoup
1999).
While humanitarian aid organizations and some international non-governmental
organizations (INGOs) had been operating in Bosnia during the war, Dayton established a quasi-
protectorate role for the (western dominated) “international community” and also ushered in swarms
of development and aid agencies, international administrators, advisors, consultants, trauma experts,
mine clearing specialists, youth workers, feminists, teachers of non-violent conflict resolution,
individual activists, and many others who added to the journalists, humanitarian workers, soldiers,
and other foreigners already in the country. Bosnia was incorporated as another project site in the
networks of humanitarian crisis response, democracy aid to post-socialist countries (mostly in
Central and Eastern Europe), as well as development agencies whose traditional targets had been
“Third World” or “less developed” countries. Though these agencies mainly came from western
Europe and North America, a number of Islamic agencies from Arab and other predominantly
Muslim countries also took up projects in the Bosniac areas of Bosnia.
Jumping onto this bandwagon, I joined a UNICEF “psycho-social” project run by the
University of London in the town of Mostar in the summer of 1996, after my first year of graduate
school. Working with youth and the various other NGOs and international administrators in the
town, I experienced some of the issues, problems, and “disconnects” (Wedel 2001) involved in the
post-war reconstruction process. I also established contacts with local women’s organizations and
saw what kinds of discourses and activities they promoted in the name of “helping women.” When
I returned in the summer of 1997 to do pre-dissertation research, I encountered even more intriguing
expressions of gender, ethnic, and religious identity, as I expanded my contacts at a variety of
women’s organizations including feminists, nationalists, religious Muslims, and secular
6traditionalists. I decided to base my research in Zenica, home of Medica Zenica, one the few self-
declared feminist women’s NGOs in Bosnia.
Bosnia was in fact an ideal place to investigate women’s activism and the intersection of
gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and nationalism. It had just emerged from four years of war in which
ethno-national identities had been mobilized in a bitter struggle to control territory and the character
of the emerging Bosnian state. Gender had been an integral part of this process, both rhetorically and
actually (Žarkov 1999). The use of wartime rape, first and most notoriously by Serb forces and later
by Croats and Muslims, against ethnic others was the most dramatic expression of the ways in which
categories of gender and sexuality were incorporated into nationalistic, militaristic aims. The
publicity generated by the rapes formed the subtext to foreign interventions on behalf of women in
Bosnia, producing specific kinds of initiatives. Rape and the other gendered ways in which women
experienced the war and nationalist mobilizations also spurred Bosnian women themselves to action,
both as members of their ethnic groups and as women. It was this renewed, and for many women
new, cultural introspection into the role of gender, combined with the forging of new identities out
of the rupture of the war which promised fertile ground for a study of women’s activism.
Bosnia also invited parallels with other post-conflict, post-socialist, and post-revolutionary
contexts in other historical and geographical places. Yet the combination of these effects and the
specifics of Bosnian histories, identities, and experiences were producing a uniquely Bosnian
context. Post-war moral status, in public life and everyday interactions, was still very much based
on categories forged during the war: demobilized soldiers, former camp detainees, war profiteers,
army deserters, raped women, refugees, displaced persons (DPs), widows and children of šehids
(Muslim martyrs) and other “fallen soldiers,” those who left, those who stayed, those to went to the
“other side,” those who helped their neighbors, and those who betrayed them, and so on.
As men were cast as political actors and soldiers, their relationship to both political and
military struggles was frequently questioned. Women were seen as victims of the war and politics,
romanticized for their sheer determination to keep their families fed, together, and alive. While male
death and suffering as soldiers was thus “normal,” women’s suffering at the hands of enemy soldiers
was evidence of the barbarity of the enemy. Although Bosniac political and religious leaders urged
compassion toward women rape survivors, the stigma of rape was still strong for individual women
7(and so terrible as to be unspeakable for men). This stigma figured in women activists strategies of
self-representation, as I show in chapter 7. Women NGO activists and politicians endeavored to
“remain feminine,” especially (sexually) respectable in their public images. This was important, as
they sought in various ways to become actors in politics and the Habermasian public sphere.
Feminized victim images other than rape played a significant role, however, for the moral weight
they gave to women as public actors.
Fieldwork and Methods
The data for this study were collected mainly over two years of ethnographic research (1999-
2000), but were also informed by a summer of research in 1997, a stint with an NGO project in
Mostar in the summer of 1996, and continued relationships with former refugee families I had known
during my refugee camp work in Croatia (1993-4). I started out in January 1999 in the capital,
Sarajevo, collecting key documents from international agencies, attending women’s NGO events,
and monitoring the media for portrayals of gender and women’s activism. My time there was
extended longer than I had planned by a broken computer and some other mundane issues, but I
finally moved to my primary field site in June of that year. From that point, I was based in the
Bosniac dominated provincial city of Zenica, an hour’s drive up one of the best stretches of two-lane
highway to the northwest of Sarajevo (see map). The town was less than picturesque with its
concrete highrises and the sprawling, rusting mess of pipes, chimneys, and machinery of the steel
mill that had employed nearly 23,000 workers in its heyday. It was more dilapidated with age than
damaged by the war, in contrast to Sarajevo or Mostar. But it was also bisected by the impressive
Bosna river and surrounded on all sides by green mountains dotted with orange-roofed houses and
fruit trees.
I lived in the upstairs apartment of a house on the edges of a highrise development, at the
base of one of the hills that delimited the town, near Medica and a ten minute walk from the center.
I shared the flat with a Medica team member, a young American woman named Kristen whose role
I discuss in chapter 6. Kristen kept me up on what was happening at Medica and acted as a sounding
board for my thoughts on the interviews and activities I had each day, even as she was also one of
4 Although I try to avoid it altogether, I sometimes use the often disparaged “informant” to refer to the
people I met in the course of this study, though I share many anthropologists’ discomfort with it, especially because I
count many of these people as my friends (see Berdahl 2000b). Given the meanings of “consultant” in the
international aid business, I am even less comfortable with that term as an alternative.
5 Coffee, most often Turkish coffee drunk out of small handle-less cups (fildžani), is an important part of
everyday social interaction in Bosnia (see Bringa 1995; Sorabji 1989).
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my “informants.”4 We saw our landlady, an elementary school teacher, and her family frequently
over coffee5 or as they worked in their substantial garden behind the house. With a pre-war
population of 145,000, Zenica was big enough that I could move through it anonymously, yet I also
found that nearly everyone I met was connected to each other in some way and I frequently ran into
familiar faces on the street.
Project Design (and what it became)
My original interest was in changing articulations of gender and national identities in Bosnia.
Aside from what I could extract from the press, though, it was difficult to know where and with
whom to find my data. I chose to study women’s organizations both because I was already familiar
with and interested in the NGO sector, but also because they were a tangible locus of activity around
questions of gender. It is important to acknowledge the ways in which this circumscribed “field site”
limited the kinds of insights I could access (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Passaro 1997). I quickly
realized I was doing a study of women’s activism rather than of changing women’s identities in
general, though the two were closely linked. The women NGO members and political activists I
worked with represented a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds, yet many of them moved in
circles that were quite different from those available to “ordinary” women.
There were two officially feminist women’s organizations in Bosnia at the time: Medica and
Žene Ženama (Women to Women) in Sarajevo, which had just formed in 1997. Since I did not want
to be in the expensive, foreigner-ridden capital, I set my sights on Zenica. I wanted to contrast a
feminist and anti-nationalist organization, Medica, with a “nationalist” group, or one that concerned
itself with national identity affirmation. As I describe in chapter 5, I had decided in 1997 that
Bosanka in Zenica more or less fit the bill. There were other women’s organizations in the town as
well, which turned out to be an advantage when Bosanka failed to “perform” for my ethnographic
9eye. Zenica was also interesting because of its reputation as a hard-line Muslim town, both in terms
of the presence of religious zealots and for being under the firm control of the Bosniac nationalist
party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA). In this atmosphere, I hoped to find a variety of
gendered expressions of Bosniac and Islamic identity and perhaps opposition to its dominant forms.
Of course, none of this played out in such stark terms– there were “ethnic” tensions and doubts about
feminism at Medica, Bosanka leaders stopped talking about educating Bosniac village girls in what
it meant to be a Muslim woman, and in the spring of my second year of fieldwork (2000) the SDA
lost its hold on the municipal and cantonal assemblies to the secular communist successor SDP
(Social Democratic Party).
Medica remained a key part of my research, especially the information and advocacy wing,
Infoteka. I stopped by Infoteka nearly every day, especially at afternoon coffee time, and participated
in as many discussions and activities there as I could. While Kristen already performed most of the
tasks with which I could have engaged to “give something back,” I made myself available and in fact
did take on sporadic translating, editing, and report writing for Infoteka. Infoteka assisted me in my
media monitoring, as they kept an archive of articles from the local press dealing with women, which
they made accessible to me. These women were also the ones with whom I most watched or
discussed local television (Mankekar 1993). With their feminist training and experiences abroad and
with westerners, these women were perceptive critics of the gendered images and other messages
about local (ethnic) politics and international intervention being conveyed through the media.
As it became clear that Bosanka’s activities were fizzling, I began to visit other women’s
organizations in the town (and in other places, as I explain below), including those profiled in
chapter 5– Naš Most, Merjem, Kewser– and others with whom I had more infrequent contact,
because of the busy schedules of their leaders, such as the Center for Legal Aid to Women. I visited
the organizations’ offices to chat with whatever members could be found there, attended their
activities, and conducted interviews with their leaders.
As I spent time with Šehida, Bosanka’s president, I became, with her, more involved with
the League of Women Voters, of which she was a leading member. This activity led me to the wider
network of women activists from around the country, especially when, in late summer 1999, we
attended a League-sponsored series of round tables (okrugli stolovi) in each of the ten Federation
6 The series was funded by the Westminster Democracy Foundation of London and took place in a different
canton each weekend, culminating in a final meeting and  day excursion in Kakanj, central Bosnia, of all the series’
speakers. I attended six of the ten sessions and spoke at one of them. As the existing laws did not allow NGOs to be
registered in the whole country, the League was forced to form a Federation League and an RS League. Thus the
round table series, organized by the Federation League, it did not include any stops in the RS, though a few RS
women were invited to give presentations.
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cantons on the theme “Towards Equality” (Ka Jednakosti).6 In this, the used 1974 Volkswagen Golf
I had bought became a valuable research tool. Riding through the windy narrow highways of the
mountainous terrain, Šehida and I and various women’s NGO leaders, politicians, journalists, and
judges who were invited to speak at these events discussed all kinds of issues facing women in post-
war Bosnia. They waxed nostalgic about the prosperous days of Yugoslavia, exchanged gossip about
other public figures, shared their satisfaction and frustration about the round tables, and patiently
explained to me why opening the car windows to create a draft (propuh) against the hot summer sun
could be deadly.
Through these events and countless other gatherings I attended with Šehida and the members
of Medica, I began to follow the activities and discourses of advocates for women’s increased
participation in formal politics. Many of these women were politicians themselves and many others
were NGO leaders, journalists, and Bosnians working for the international community. I began to
interview women on candidate lists for the Zenica municipal, cantonal, and Federal assemblies.
There were many of these, as the new quota rules had mandated that women, or the “minority
gender,” make up a third of each list in 2000. (The Women’s Party thus had to field men in one-third
of its spaces.) I followed two election campaigns– those leading up to local elections in April, 2000,
and the national elections of November of the same year. The NGO women were also involved in
these efforts and I paid careful attention to the way in which all of these activists discussed women’s
roles in the sphere of the political (see chapter 7).
In chapters 5 and 7 I also discuss two groups of Bosniac DP women working for return. I
became fascinated by these women’s articulations of traditionalist roles for women, moral
hierarchies of ethnic difference, and quite effective strategies at accomplishing the seemingly
impossible goal of return to areas of particularly strong Serb nationalist control and resistence to
refugee return. As I further describe in chapter 5, in Sarajevo and in Zenica toward the end of my
stay, I also got to know several religious Muslim women working on women’s issues.
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Multi-sited “Deep Hanging Out”
Participating in the activities of these women meant attending countless meetings, round
tables, workshops, and conferences organized by international officials or other NGOs (usually with
funding from a western donor) in all parts of Bosnia as well as Serbia, Montenegro, and Hungary.
These were typically all-day affairs held in the conference rooms of once modern but now fading
hotels accompanied by heavy lunches and frequent coffee breaks. Participants were typically divided
into “working groups” where they went through an activity or held discussions before the whole
group reconvened to decide on a tangible list of “conclusions,” whether consensus had been reached
or not. Some of the gatherings seemed more useful to the women’s cause than others, yet they were
all interesting to me for the opportunities they represented to tap into discourses on women’s roles
vis-a-vis politics, advocacy, and public activism. Many of the activists complained about the constant
travel just to “see the same women and say the same things over and over again.” Others praised the
meetings for their “networking” (netvorking or umreživanje) utility. For my purposes, following
these networks allowed me to compare the “western-looking” activists who operated in western
donor-funded circles (Medica activists, leaders of the Center for Legal Aid to Women, and Šehida)
with those who rarely left Zenica for their organizational activities (Nas Most, Merjem) or who had
no contact with western donors (Merjem and Kewser). Their rhetoric and ideological stances were
markedly different, differences reinforced by the circles in which they moved (see Phillips 2002).
Thus, as much as this study reflects my participation in the community of Zenica as a place,
it is also a multi-sited (Marcus and Fischer 1986) examination of a mobile network of women
activists. As I outline the various groups of women with whom I associated, I fear it will appear too
scattered. To be sure, I did give up some depth in terms of understanding locally place-d dynamics
in Zenica. However, this is not an “ethnography of Zenica” but one of women’s activism.
Furthermore, I managed to do a good deal of “deep hanging out” (Clifford 1997: 188 quoting Renato
Rosaldo) among Zenica and Sarajevo residents outside women’s organization circles, as well as with
most of the groups of women I discuss here. I was drawn out of Zenica and into questions of political
activism (as opposed to a focus on ethnic identity, which was nonetheless present) by the women
themselves. This approach was the best way I saw toward understanding “the cultural unit” of
women’s activist networks, accounting for “outside forces” impinging on the constitution of the
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community(ies) under study (Marcus and Fischer 1986: 77).
This work is not a thorough example of “studying through,” however, as Shore and Wright
have proposed for the “anthropology of policy” (1997), taking Laura Nader’s “studying up” (1974)
a step further. Shore and Wright point out that “anthropologists are in a unique position to
understand the workings of multiple, intersecting and conflicting power structures which are local
but tied to non-local systems” (1997: 13), a condition that fits my project well. Janine Wedel has
reflected that her approach to studying “the strange case of western aid to Eastern Europe” (2001)
entailed “studying up, studying through, and then studying through again” (forthcoming: 25). She
followed relationships and “flows” (Appadurai 1996) of ideas, capital, and people “across levels and
processes” from government agencies and donors to local elite representatives, to local NGOs, to
their beneficiaries and back up the line again (forthcoming, 2001). I did not have the resources to
travel back and forth between Bosnia and Washington, New York, Geneva, Cologne, Stockholm,
and the other centers of western donor financing and policy making. I did, however, talk with many
Bosnia-based representatives of international agencies and donors involved with women’s issues.
I collected their literature and observed the interaction between them and local women activists in
a process that better resembles what Lisa Markovitz, also evoking Nader, has called “studying over”
(2001). This dissertation therefore reveals more about the process of local policy implementation and
self-representation (on the part of foreigners and locals) than it does about the conceptual bases of
policy design. Most of all, however, it is about the women activists themselves and the cultural
context in which they were embedded, regardless of whether those “forces” came from “inside” or
“outside.”
The CIA in Wonderland: The Position of the Ethnographer
I was received in many different ways during my fieldwork. In the Bosnian language, my first
name is rendered phonetically as “Alisa,” a common “modern” first name among Bosniacs and also
the Bosnian (Serbo-Croatian) translation of Alice. So I was often called “Alisa u zemlji udesa” or
Alice in Wonderland. I was indeed in a land of wonders, I was told. Anything can happen here, this
7 A few times I was also called Alice from Wonderland (Alisa iz zemlje uda), which invariably provoked
comments about the otherness of “Amerika” and “the west.”
8 Cornelia Sorabji has noted a marked difference in her reception in Sarajevo after the war, in contrast to the
way she was treated as a novelty in the mid eighties (personal communication 2003).
9 As each ethno-national community had laid claim to its own separate language– Serbian, Croatian, and
Bosnian– out of what was once Serbo-Croatian (Greenberg 1996), international officials referred to “local language”
to avoid offending any of the “locals.”
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is the Balkans.7 This was part of a common narrative of self-orientalism as well as one of several
common “litanies and laments” (Ries 1997) on the “chaos” of life since the disintegration of socialist
Yugoslavia (see Živkovi 2001). As Alice, I was hardly expected to be able to make sense of all of
this when it wasn’t clear even to them, they told me. Bosnians of all sorts, even those living in
remote villages, had become accustomed to foreigners,8 including Americans, busily attending
meetings, inspecting projects, and asking them questions. Most of these aid workers, soldiers, and
administrators, however, (with some very definite exceptions) did not speak “local language,”9 nor
did they know much about the society in which they were working (see Coles 2003). As a result I
was often discussed in the third person by curious strangers when I was introduced as “our
American,” even when I had addressed them in their language. Likewise, I was often treated to
excruciatingly basic, but often instructive, history lessons and sociological explanations of who lived
here and what had happened to them, even by people who knew I was a researcher.
At other times, I was assumed to be a donor representative. Even when I told people up front
that I was a researcher, many were convinced that as a foreigner, I had important connections in the
international community and could affect their chances for funding or get their son/niece/cousin a
job (see Kuehnast 2000). I therefore heard many statements that, to me, resembled what women
thought donors might want to hear. Or I was toted around with pride as a token representative of the
powerful west. At other times, especially in Sarajevo on first contact with a potential informant, as
soon as she heard I was not a donor, she declined to make time to talk with me or changed her
erstwhile upbeat manner. In still other situations, I was received with warm surprise as a foreigner
“with whom we can talk,” in contrast to the parade of foreigners they spoke with only through
interpreters, or in English. In general, I had a difficult time pinning down some of these busy women,
especially in the high-powered atmosphere of donor and NGO circles in Sarajevo.
10 Several articles were in fact written about women’s subordination in Bosnia, though these appeared in
local publications this woman was unlikely to be sympathetic with, or in low-circulation literature produced by
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In what Bosnians attributed to socialist era politics, the “peasant mentality,” or nationalist
paranoia, I was also sometimes suspected of being a spy (see Silverman 2000; Zanca 2000). On one
occasion, after I had attended a women’s Kuranic reading lesson with members of Merjem, I had
asked if any of the women would be willing to meet me for coffee the next day. One of the women
I eventually got to know, Zlata, told me what some of the other women had said: “Oh you go ahead
and talk to the CIA, I sure won’t!” Zlata had retorted, “I’ll talk to her and I’ll even invite her to my
home!” As she rolled her eyes and complained to me about how so many of these women were
nationalists and close-minded villagers (seljanke), I wondered whether she had taken me under her
wing out of spite (iz inata) to show me and herself that she belonged to the “open,” cosmopolitan
world of the city, “even though” she was a devout Muslim (and a fairly radical one at that). This was
another way in which the women I met resisted the standard orientalist constructions of “Muslim
women.” 
There was also the problem of my focus on women as a westerner working in a “Muslim”
society. Many religious women and men seemed to be very defensive in talking to me. As one young
woman told me, she had been reluctant but eventually agreed to meet me because I was not a
journalist. She explained to me, “When you said it was for a dissertation, I figured you would try to
keep to some standards and not twist my words like I’ve seen done so many times when foreigners
come to interview people. Especially in the context of Islam this happens.” Other religious Muslims
sought assurances that I would not misrepresent their words or slander Islam. They seemed to assume
that I was interested in Muslims and women out of a desire to criticize Islam for its terrible treatment
of women (see Abu-Lughod 2002). I discuss this reception further in chapter 5. Non-religious
Bosniacs, who nevertheless identified with their Islamic heritage, likewise often took my focus on
women to mean I was there to document how “primitive and patriarchal” their society was or to
“change Bosnian women” into some western feminist prototypes. Nearly everyone was eager to
convince me that there was no “problem.” One woman who worked for the Islamic administration
(Islamska Zajednica) told me, incorrectly, that “No one here, from Bosnia, is writing about women
and their status, probably because it’s not a problem.10 Maybe this needs to be done by a local and
western funded women’s NGOs (e.g., Andri-Ružii 1999; Beirevi 1999; Šami 2000; Selimbegovi 2000; and
articles by Rada Sesar in Žena 21).
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not a foreigner. But usually, when people write about some topic, it’s because they see there’s a
problem there.” Not surprisingly, my relationship with that woman did not blossom, though she did
grant me two interviews that lasted nearly two hours each.
Fortunately, the women with whom I developed more sustained relationships grew
accustomed to me as a researcher and fellow traveler in the circles of women’s meetings rather than
a member of the donor crowd. Several older women from more traditionalist organizations treated
me with grandmotherly affection, preferring to talk about how I would “be married in Bosnia” over
issues of women’s activism. Long-term fieldwork made it possible for me to follow women’s
activities over time and to witness their interactions in a range of contexts. My status as an American
was never completely forgotten, but this positionality was illuminating as it sometimes prompted the
women to reflect on their activities to me and to compare their views of the situation for women in
Bosnia with that of the U.S. and “the west.” I was at times the audience for Herzfeldian self-
representations towards “the outside world,” but I also blended in and was often privy to much
“between ourselves” talk.
Things were not completely smooth, however, least of all at Medica Infoteka. To be sure, the
women there had welcomed me, though for some it was with reserve. Right away they had offered
to be my “base” and informed me that I should not be offended that no one seemed to take notice of
me when I came into their office. I wasn’t a guest they had to worry about; “you’re ours (naša),”
Nataša told me, “part of the furniture.” Yet several of the women I considered friends began to
teasingly refer to me as the CIA, especially when I seemed eager for them to expand on a particular
point. I knew this was a joke, a message underscored when they bought me “FBI” earrings (there was
no “CIA”) for my birthday, yet over time it began to bother me. It was especially difficult when one
Infoteka member warned me several times after we had discussed issues which I had thought I had
made clear were central to my research that her comments were “spontaneous” and for my “private”
information, even though I had told her I would not use anyone’s real name. Accordingly, I have not
used that woman’s comments. Her reaction startled me, however, as I had expected the women of
Infoteka, having played the roles of researcher and researched on several occasions, would
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understand my methods. I was already sensitive about how I would portray Medica and its activists
and I often refrained from probing when the women seemed to be less than eager to talk. This was
not only out of concern with the dilemmas raised by theorists of “feminist ethnography” (e.g., Abu-
Lughod 1990b; Stacey 1988; Visweswaran 1994) and others (articles in de Soto and Dudwick 2000;
Herzfeld 1997) of balancing (some degree of) research objectivity with the intimate relationships
required of fieldwork, along with the added assumptions accompanying female solidarity. It was also
because Medica had already experienced a major sense of betrayal when another foreign researcher,
one who had not even understood their language, had written about personal details of the women’s
lives. As Nataša told me soon after I moved to Zenica, I therefore had “more responsibilities”
towards them.
I was keen to avoid sensitive personal details or anything that might compromise the
women’s standing in the community or their ability to pursue their activism. Yet some of those
details intersected with the issues of local activism, donor relations, and gender, ethnic and religious
identities that I was exploring (see Stacey 1988). Out of trepidation over how my informants will
receive what I write, I have likely skimped on the details of my informants’ everyday lives in this
study. Of all my informants, the Infoteka women are the most likely to read my work and take issue
with some of my stances (see Brettell 1993). Indeed, they expressed the desire to publish a Bosnian
language version of my “dissertation lite” when it is finished. I had always planned to give them the
opportunity to review what I had written about each of them, but the timing of graduation
requirements may not allow that. I can only hope they are not hurt by anything I write here and that
I have the opportunity in the future to continue to engage in a dialogue with them about this project.
A Note on Terminology and Bias
In writing about these women and others, I have endeavored to use their own words as much
as possible, while at the same time respecting their privacy and anonymity. Where I discuss specific
activists, I use pseudonyms, but I identify their organizations and the places where they operate by
name. Where the first and last name of an individual appears, it is the person’s real name. I do this
with public figures and people speaking in public fora. I also include real names when I discuss
11 This convention becomes awkward with the women of Infoteka whose written work I cite under their real
names. While these women all granted me permission to use their real names, I have retained their pseudonyms both
for consistency and to provide a measure of anonymity where I quote casual statements.
12 One friend with ethnically ambiguous first and last names often found himself privy to “cultural
intimacies” (Herzfeld  1997) and expressions of hostility toward other e thnic groups among people who erroneously
took him for “one of them.” He noticed a marked change in rhetoric when he revealed his “actual” identity in such
situations.
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activists whose work I cite, though I may write about them under pseudonyms elsewhere in the text.11
This compromise allows me to grant credit to the organizations for the work they do and to offer
ethnographic details for other researchers while also protecting the identities of individual women.
In a few cases, I have intentionally omitted names and places in order to afford anonymity to women
and groups whose statements might be interpreted negatively in the sensitive political climate of
Bosnia, despite their having been conveyed to me in good faith. Nevertheless, I realize that the
measure of anonymity this conveys is not complete, as anyone familiar with the communities I
discuss may readily recognize some of the individuals.
Throughout this dissertation, I sometimes specify the ethnic background of informants as it
is relevant to the context. I do this as a regrettable shorthand for categories that are often imposed
rigidly by others, but are experienced in much more subtlety and fluidity than such labels convey.
Ethnicity is presumed through well-recognized cues such as religious affiliation (a reference to
religious rituals, mosque/church attendance, or pendants with religious symbols often give this
away); use of ethnically marked language (Greenberg 1996); ties to geographical location, especially
in reference to wartime movements (e.g., whether a person was expelled from or had stayed in an
area known to have been ethnically cleansed); political affiliations; and above all names. These cues
are not always accurate, however, most obviously in the case of the many people of mixed ethnic
parentage or whose spouses came from a different ethnic background. Some names are ethnically
ambiguous (Dino, Damir, Dijana, Ena), often purposefully chosen by “mixed” or “communist”
parents who believed in Yugoslav “brotherhood and unity.”12 More significantly, dominant
associations with ethnic labels do not necessarily reflect an individual’s sense of identity (see Žarkov
1999: preface). Many of my informants chafed at being judged by their names, and hence by their
purported religion and political stance (see Cockburn 1998: 192-6). Yet, they recognized that such
information was at times important, even to efforts to counteract nationalist divisions. The situation
13 This was the conflict between Bosnian government forces– the  Bosnian Army and its backers in the main
Bosniac political party, the SDA– and the “autonomaši” loyal to local businessman and politician Fikret Abdi who
were in turn allied with Serbs. See Burg and Shoup 1999: 154-9.
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made it obvious that ethnic distinctions mattered. I use them, therefore, but with caution. Readers
familiar with names in Bosnia will also notice ethnicity (or ethnic ambiguity) conveyed in the
pseudonyms I use, as they would with informants’ real names.
A related issue is the ethnic labels applied to territories, especially the entities, cantons, and
municipalities which have gained ethnic markings. When I write about an area dominated or
politically controlled by Bosniacs, such as Zenica, it is important to realize that the population is not
completely homogeneous. About 20% of Zenica’s population, for example, is not Bosniac. Indeed,
many of the women activists working in “Bosniac areas” were not Bosniacs. There were fewer non-
Serbs in the RS or non-Croats in areas controlled by Croat politicians, a result of the more thorough
ethnic cleansing operations there and of the official policy of tolerance among Bosniac officials (see
chapter 4). However, as in Bosniac areas, those (newly defined) “minorities” tended to be well
represented in the NGO sector for reasons made obvious by the structure of ethnic politics and donor
policies discussed in subsequent chapters.
I also follow the practice of my activist informants and refer simply to “the war.” This is
partly out of a tactical desire to remain as neutral as possible, but also because I see it as the only
acceptable term. Some, including most Serbs, have described this as a civil war. This was a civil war
in the sense that it was a conflict among different groups of Bosnians over the future of their
territory; the majority of fighters were Bosnians themselves. In some cases, members of the same
family ended up on opposite sides of the battle lines. In Northwest Bosnia, a whole region was torn
apart by Muslims fighting Muslims.13 However, calling this a “civil war” has become code for the
acceptance of the “all sides are equally guilty” argument. The use of “civil war” is understood in
Bosniac areas as an apology for war crimes committed by Serb and Croat forces. The term favored
by many Bosniacs, however, is “aggression,” meaning the aggression against Bosnia as a state and
idea. Defenders of this view, including many of my informants, cite the fact that soldiers from other
countries (Serbia and Croatia) entered Bosnia after it had been internationally recognized as an
independent state. As Azra put it, “I have the argument that in 1992 Yugoslav National Army planes
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from (rump) Yugoslavia were bombing me in Zenica.” While it is clear that Serbia and Croatia were
both deeply involved– militarily, politically, financially– in trying to carve up Bosnia, and that their
actions and those of their Bosnian allies were certainly “aggressive” (see Ron 2003), the implication
of calling the war an “aggression” is to nullify the legitimate political concerns and real wartime
suffering of non-Bosniac populations.
In explaining this position, I am pleading for a rejection of the simplistic moral narratives
through which the crises of the former Yugoslavia have tended to be viewed, both inside and outside
the region. As Živkovi points out, the various partisan views of these conflicts exist in their own
moral universes which do not only interact in simple binaries– what is good in the Serb universe is
bad in the Bosniac or pro-Bosnian one– but are often “convoluted” in more inter-related ways (2001:
xxv; and see Spasi 2000). I am at the same time sympathetic to Bosniac points of view, having lived
mostly among them and not in majority Serb or Croat areas, and am therefore more critical of the
discourses and practices I encountered in such contexts. My open and defacto criticisms of dominant
Bosniac positions should not be interpreted as an endorsement of anti-Bosniac and anti-Bosnian (i.e.
“Serb” and “Croat”) positions. Rather, I have endeavored to analyze the cultural logics by which
people in Bosniac areas negotiate their many shifting and overlapping identities. 
Having said that, I acknowledge the dangers inherent in deconstructing national myths,
especially when one comes from a place so secure in its national myths that no amount of
deconstruction is likely to harm it (Brown 2000). When I discuss victim images I am not denying
the real suffering or the ethnic identities of the many victims of the Bosnian war. Nor do I question
the right of victims to identify with or reject the very ethno-national identities for which they were
targeted with various forms of violence. Instead, I point to the moral power of those identities within
their specific moral universe and attempt to understand their role in political representation and
identity maintenance. 
Similarly, there is a danger in deconstructing women’s activism at a time when such activities
hold a precarious place in public life in Bosnia. I fear the criticisms I bring out, especially of NGOs
and their internal contradictions, will add fuel to the already healthy skepticism of women’s activism,
especially feminist activism or any activities that challenges dominant notions of gender and nation.
I can only express the wish that any impact my work has will serve to spark debate and strengthen
14 As I outline in chapter 3, women enjoyed a broad range of rights and legal equality with men under
socialism. What emerged in the post-war era was both new needs for rights that disappeared with the introduction of
pluralist democracy, as well as a new conception and language of “women’s rights” used by foreign agencies.
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women’s activism in Bosnia (see de Soto 2000; Spasi 2000).
Outline of Chapters
In Chapter Two I outline the theoretical underpinnings of this study. These span
anthropological and other scholarship on gender, ethnicity and nationalism; essentialist and
Orientalist representations of gender and civilizational geographies; post-socialist “transition;”
development aid, civil society, and non-governmental organizations as vehicles for women’s
activism. I also discuss the place of this project within the anthropology of what was Yugoslavia. 
Chapter Three begins the “story” of women’s activism by reviewing the history of gender
relations and women’s organizing in Bosnia and the wider political entities of which it has been a
part over the past 150 years, with special emphasis on the most recent period under socialist
Yugoslavia. In keeping with this study’s focus on women in what became Muslim/Bosniac areas
after the most recent war, chapters 3 and 4 focus on the position and representation of Muslim
women in the historical record, and the discourses, policies, and agendas circulating in and affecting
those areas. In the first part of chapter 3, I discuss various cultural and historical legacies that left an
impression on gender relations through kinship systems, religion, and state policies, both before and
during socialism. Despite the legal and cultural improvements for women established by the socialist
regime, significant elements of the patriarchal basis of pre-socialist life remained and have been
carried through and even renewed in the post-war period. The second part of the chapter traces the
history of women’s movements and feminism in the region in order to show how socialist era models
of women’s organizing have influenced the shape of wartime and post-war women’s groups. In
contrast to the common assumption that the explosion of women’s organizations in the 1990's
reflects a desire to advocate for women’s equality, I argue that the bulk of these groups were formed
on the basis of models developed during socialist times, and/or as extensions of women’s social
networks rather than on challenges to patriarchal norms. It is only with the arrival of foreign donors
that the language of women’s rights,14 civil society, and NGOs has emerged among women’s group
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members. 
In Chapter Four, I outline the circumstances around the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia
and the subsequent Bosnian war as they pertain to women and understandings of gender. Wartime
events, the debates surrounding them, and the outside interventions they provoked established many
of the categories of identity as well as concrete issues around which women’s organizations began
to organize themselves during and after the war. My aim is to show how those categories were
formed in order to establish the underpinnings of women’s subsequent expressions of identity and
their organizational and representational strategies as activists. I first discuss the politicization of
ethno-national and religious identities encouraged under socialism and expressed through the rise
of nationalist politics and the outbreak of war. I then examine the gendered logic of ethnic violence,
wartime rape, and sexual violence and their impact on women and gender constructions. I also
discuss the debates sparked, mostly among feminists, about the rapes and how they were represented
by nationalists, feminists, and others. The final section of this chapter examines how gendered
experiences of war, especially ethnic cleansing campaigns, mass rapes, and the politicization of
ethnic and religious identities, defined the issues for women’s organizations of all orientations,
propelling them to organize and providing them with a measure of moral legitimacy as public actors.
The intersection of these wartime legacies with those of the socialist and pre-socialist periods,
discussed in the previous chapter, profoundly affected the agendas, possibilities, and limitations of
post-war women’s organizing.
Chapter Five introduces the women’s organizations in this study and the political context in
which they operated, focusing on ethnic, religious, and gender identities. I begin by outlining the
aims and practices of the “international community” of donors and administrative agencies towards
local NGOs. I then give an overview of the political and social climate in Zenica. I introduce the
main organizations I worked with there and in the wider network of Bosnian women’s NGOs. In
terms of approaches to gender, I show how the makeup of women’s groups reflected socialist models
of women’s community involvement, normative assumptions about women’s roles, and ideas pushed
by foreign donors of civil society, the “third sector” of NGOs, social activism, and various other
“hot” issues. In terms of ethnic and religious identities, I show how donors effectively force ethnic
categories upon NGOs even as they attempt to dismantle them. Thus, I argue that international
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intervention has forced a “nation-ing” of gender discourses that otherwise strive to concentrate on
gender issues, and a suppression of dialogue about gender and religious identities.
Chapter Six examines the kinds of articulations of gender ideals which resulted from these
interactions and explores the struggle to define womanhood and a particular “Bosnian feminism.”
I explore conflicting approaches to improving the status of women between self-proclaimed
feminists and a group of conservative women associated with the ruling Bosniac nationalist party.
The tensions, which emerged through a discussion of parental leave and other labor laws, revolved
around questions of women’s difference from men and the role of the state in “protecting” women.
A similar difference in theoretical orientation was visible among those activists who called
themselves feminists, though in different ways, as I show through an examination of struggles to
define a Bosnian feminism among the activists at Medica. I highlight theoretical debates over the
inclusion of other categories of difference in feminist analyses, Medica’s encounter with western
feminists, and their stances toward the 1999 NATO bombing of neighboring Yugoslavia in light of
their earlier support for anti-militarist feminist positions.
In Chapter Seven, I analyze the discursive strategies used by women activists and politicians
to gain support and justify their involvement in the male-associated sphere of the political. To
establish context, I begin by discussing portrayals of women in local political discourses and the
gendering of international community approaches to women. I introduce the concept of “affirmative
essentialisms” to describe the ways in which women activists were effectively portrayed in donor
discourses. Affirmative essentialisms characterize the bulk of women activists’ self-representations
as they positioned themselves outside politics and within traditionally female domestic and nurturing
roles, especially motherhood. I argue that these representations must be seen in the context of locally
produced gendered meanings and a political climate in which moral purity is based on war-
associated victim identities. As female identity was commonly constructed on notions of victimhood
and passive, non-involvement in the public or political sphere, women easily claimed moral purity
when they stressed such qualities. International officials and donors contributed to this view.
However, as I further argue, donor approaches presented a paradox for women: they were charged
with achieving the very political goals of ethnic reconciliation and refugee return, yet the essentialist
constructions used to encourage women’s peacemaking roles effectively marginalized them from
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formal political power. For politically active women, affirmative essentialisms also emphasized
qualities that at first glance seem to inhibit their being taken seriously as political actors. However,
given the strong resistance to the idea of women politicians, including the idea that a woman in
politics is morally (sexually) suspect, women strove to continue to be perceived as women, and
morally respectable women at that. They thus based their self-presentation on affirmative
essentialisms which stressed women’s domestic roles and feminized victim identities forged during
the war.
The Eighth and final chapter discusses reasons why women activists avoid association with
rape and considers the wider implications for women of the importance of morality, victimhood, and
wartime categories for the formation of public identities. I point to the wider significance of such
images in the context of world events surrounding the September 11th attacks on the U.S. in 2001.
I further explore the prospects for women’s activism in Bosnia, pointing to some of the difficulties
raised by international intervention and to the theoretical tools which might be used to evaluate
women’s activities.
Finally, appendices are provided as a reference to the acronyms(A) and organizations(B) used
in this study. I also list major terms of NGO-speak that have entered the Bosnian language in the
post-war period (C); record gender-related jokes heard in the field (D); and offer avenues of further
research suggested by this study (E).
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CHAPTER TWO
REPRESENTATIONS OF GENDERED IDENTITIES IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Gendered Nationalism
Feminist theorists have pointed to the way nationalist projects are constructed around ideas
of gender and gender role ideals (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; Peterson 1994; McClintock 1993;
Verdery 1994), the recognition of which is absent from most (androcentric) studies of nationalism
(e.g. Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; A. Smith 1971, 1986). Gendered
representations wield enormous power. As the roles and behaviors of men and women are often
perceived as natural givens, rather than variable cultural constructions, couching an argument in
gendered terms serves, as Joan Scott has argued (1999), to “naturalize,” and therefore legitimate
ideological positions, whether those positions deal directly with gender roles or not (see Gal 1994;
Luki 2000).  
Nations are often feminized, cast as the woman whose honor must be protected by the
nation’s men (Verdery 1994), while images of the nation’s grandeur are built upon masculine ideals
and heterosexual “respectability” (Borneman 1998; Mosse 1985; Parker et. al. 1992). Scholars have
further shown how sexuality is constitutive of nationalist imaginings, most often manifested in
mechanisms of control over sexual contact with ethnic others (Abu-Lughod 1993; C. Smith 1996)
and the interpretation of cross-ethnic marriage or rape as injury to the nation (Das 1995; Heng and
Devon 1992; Mežnari 1994). These “genderings” are also commonly based on naturalized gendered
dichotomies derived from the common public/domestic dyad: women are assigned to domestic roles
and men to public or political roles. I discuss this below.
Because nationalist images tend to portray women as passive objects of male-dominated
nations (Verdery 1994; Williams 1997:10), much scholarship has focused on gendered discourses
of nationalism from a top-down perspective (Bourke 1995; Chatterjee 1989, 1993; Mani 1987; Stoler
1989; Tohidi 1996). Fewer writers have focused on the actions and lives of those who are made
objects of such discourses. Those who have have offered valuable insights into how women resist,
negotiate and/or actively reaffirm nationalist ideologies that are based on strict gender role
definitions (Moore 1988; Schein 1996; C. Smith 1996) or when nationalist revolutionary movements
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ask women to put their gender interests on hold (Enloe 1990; Chinchilla 1997; Rofel 1994). In this
dissertation, I focus on this lived experience, keeping in mind the possibilities, barriers, and
pressures created for women as objects of nationalist (and other) discourses.
In the case of Yugoslavia and its successor states, feminist activists, writers, and academics
have pointed to the strong gender component of nationalist discourses, especially in Croatia and
Serbia. Nationalists have put forth especially traditionalist, essentialized constructions of women as
reproducers and men as the actors of the nation. From the point of view of feminist observers, this
has had decidedly negative consequences for women as evidenced by campaigns to return women
to the home (Drakuli 1993a), calls for women to “make more babies for the nation” (Bracewell
1996; Mostov 1995), the scaling back of abortion rights and social services in general (Drakuli
1993a; Salecl 1994), increases in domestic violence (Mlapenovi 1993), and the wartime rapes of
women (and men) of other ethnic groups (e.g., Kora 1997; Oluji 1998; Seifert 1996; Sofos 1996;
Žarkov 1995, 1999). Another consequence was that women were portrayed as passive objects of
male actions (Kaši 2000; Spasi 2000). I discuss this further in chapter 4 as it relates to the use of
wartime sexual violence in the Bosnian war. 
Feminist scholarship has, however, been slower to explore women’s agency in the region.
Several have sought to redress this problem by highlighting women’s considerable peacemaking and
anti-nationalist activities (e.g., Benderly 1997b; Cockburn 1998; Cockburn et.al. 2001; articles in
Kaši 1997; Terseli 1995). While this has offered important insights into the logics and appeal of
nationalist discourses, it effectively reaffirms the notion of women’s “natural” nurturing qualities,
their removal from “significant” arenas of power controlled by men, such as politics, and their
association with domestic roles (Blagojevi 1994; Gal and Kligman 2000; Scott 1999; Spasi 2000).
Indeed, much feminist writing, especially on the former Yugoslavia, has implied that feminism, or
even women themselves, are incompatible with nationalism. This is a curious assumption, given the
common linkage of the two in the context of post-colonial, revolutionary movements for national
liberation (Jayawardena 1986) which share many of the same elements of identity formation with
the former Yugoslavia. To be sure, feminist critiques of androcentrism in nationalist movements
eventually put feminists at odds with “their own” nationalist men (Chinchilla 1997; Enloe 1990;
Moghadam 1994; Molyneux 1990). Yet Lois West (1992; 1997) argues for the existence of “feminist
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nationalism” which combines the two in diverse settings, including the former Yugoslavia (Benderly
1997b).
Explanations for what seems to be a greater tendency of women toward anti-nationalist and
peace initiatives (Kaši 1997; Terseli 1995) range from the biological (Papandreau 1997) to claims
that women’s position in society makes them more prone to peace (Walby 1992:92) and more
accepting of ethnic and other Others (Ivekovi 1993). Many of these arguments are reproduced in
the donor and activist representations I discuss in chapter 7. The danger in such assertions is that they
romanticize and essentialize women as victims of patriarchal systems, a hazard inherent in feminist
and subaltern studies which, Lila Abu-Lughod (1990a) warns, only distorts the way that power is
wielded and perpetuated (and see Constable 1997). Instead, it must be recognized that women’s
active roles in nationalist processes can also include enforcement of patriarchal gender norms.
Women “actively participate in the process of reproducing and modifying their roles as well as being
actively involved in controlling other women” (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989:11).
Recognizing this, a few scholars have therefore begun to explore other, “unexpected” forms
of women’s activism in what was Yugoslavia, such as in nationalist and military organizations (Lilly
and Irvine 2002; Žarkov 1999; and see Blee 1991; Koonz 1987). Overwhelmingly, however, it is
Serbian and Croatian nationalisms which have come under feminist scrutiny. The gendered aspects
of local Bosnian nationalisms, especially among Bosnian Muslims, or Bosniacs, have been
conspicuously absent from this literature (with the exception of some mention in Hayden 2000;
Kora 1997). The construction of women in Bosnia, especially Bosniac women, as Orientalized,
exoticized, passive victims of nationalist violence has therefore remained largely intact (Helms 1998;
Mertus 1994; Žarkov 1997). It is my intention in this dissertation to show not only the active roles
of Bosnian women, but the multiplicity of approaches they actively take towards questions of gender,
ethnicity, and nation.
Furthermore, feminist attention to the powerful “international community” of western
governments and aid agencies has only recently begun to surface (on Bosnia: Chinkin and Paradine
2001; Cockburn et. al. 2001; Cockburn and Hubi 2002; Rees 2002; Walsh 2000). As I show, the
discourses of international intervention are also gendered and “nation-ed,” and duly circumscribe
women activists’ possibilities. The power of this set of actors over politics, concepts of gender and
15 Marko Živkovi proposes that Kaplan should be thanked for providing this “precious document” of “the
logic of the stereotypes themselves and the symbolic geography of the Balkans,” for “truly, a more condensed
compendium of negative stereotypes of the Balkans would be hard to find anywhere else.” (2001: 5-6).
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nation, and the lives of women cannot be ignored, as this dissertation aims to show. I take up this
issue below, through a discussion of local women activists’ relationships to western donors and
feminists.
Balkan Nesting Orientalisms
A key element of discursive representations in Bosnia, including those of women activists,
is their invocation of familiar orientalist symbolic geographies, arranged in “nesting” hierarchies
(Baki-Hayden 1995). Like the Orientalism toward the Middle East described by Said (1978), these
constructions can be traced to western representations of Eastern Europe (Wolff 1994) and the
Balkans (Goldsworthy 1998; Todorova 1997) as inferior, backward, primitive, violent, and
indisputably “other.” This otherness was, however, not grounded in the greatness of Eastern
civilization, as was that of Orientalism, but constructed an inferior, failed other within the European
self, where “great civilization” lay definitively in the west (Todorova 1997; Živkovi 2001). The
resonance of these associations was especially evident during the 1990's wars in former Yugoslavia,
most notoriously by the best-selling travel book of journalist Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts (1993),
which has become “a favorite whipping horse for scholars of the region” (Živkovi 2001: 5).15
Kaplan’s popular thesis that ethnic hatreds are embedded in the people and the landscape of the
Balkans is said to have influenced President Clinton and other policy makers in their initial
(non)approach to dealing with the war in Bosnia and Croatia. Establishing that “those people” know
nothing but hatred and violence was the first step towards distancing the western public from
attempting to curtail the atrocities, and later towards justifying certain forms of intervention (see
Herzfeld 2002).
Furthermore, just as the formulation which posits the Balkans as an internal other of Europe
suggests, these oppositions are arranged in hierarchies of “nesting orientalisms” (Baki-Hayden
1995; Baki-Hayden and Hayden 1992) which recur “recursively” (Živkovi 2001) within each
other. Such hierarchies of symbolic geography are thus just as apparent and resonant within the
16 Intellectuals in Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland have also argued for a separate “Central Europe,” setting
themselves off from Russia to the east and the Balkans to the south (see Schopflin 1991; Schopflin and Wood 1989;
Živkovi 2001: 1-56).
17 These processes also demonstrate what Louisa Schein, writing about China, has termed “internal
orientalism,” or “practices of othering internal to the ‘East’” (1997: 3).
18 These categories are O rientalism (essentialist representations of the other by the west), Occidentalism
(essentialist renderings of the self/west by the west), ethno-Orientalism (essentialist representations of the non-west
by the non-west), and ethno-Occidentalism (essentialist representations of the west by the non-west) (Carrier 1992).
19 This expression was used ironically during the socialist period to mock the way in which communist
officials demonized the west. Current usage therefore recalls both this socialist usages as well as nationalist ones.
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Balkans themselves, as well as other parts of Eastern Europe16 (e.g., Gal 1991; Verdery 1996: 104-
29).17 Since the mid 1990's, scholars of the former Yugoslavia, most notably those hailing from the
region itself, have produced insightful analyses of the complexity, power, and material consequences
of such constructions in political, media, and “everyday” discourses (Baki-Hayden 1995; Baki-
Hayden and Hayden 1992; articles in Bjeli and Savi 2002; olovi 2002; Žarkov 1995 ; Živkovi
2001). A scale of purportedly “eastern,” or “Balkan,” and “western” attributes and associations are
presented as evidence of one’s own people as western, while those to the south and east are relegated
to the lesser categories of “Balkan,” “oriental,” “Byzantine:” histories of incorporation into the
(Christian) Hapsburg Empire signal westernness and Europeanness and are opposed to histories of
Ottoman rule; Christianity is western while Islam is Asian, non-European; within Christianity,
Orthodoxy is inferior to Catholicism; and so on. East/west distinctions can also recur nested within
western contexts– Vienna or Paris– or within a place marked as western within the “easternness” of
the Balkans, such as Zagreb (ibid.). 
If the other mechanisms proposed by James Carrier (1992) for the way in which “westerners”
and “non-westerners” alike essentialize both the west and the non-west, each group essentializing
itself and its other,18 endless reconfigurations of Balkan discourses become apparent. Indeed,
incarnations of all of these mechanisms can be found attempting to prop up various national and
political claims, constructing the self on either side of the east/west divide. Thus, Serbs could
represent themselves as both non-European and more European than (western) Europe because the
latter had renounced its spiritual values and become the “Rotten West” (olovi 2002: 39; and see
Živkovi 2001).19 Similarly, various Bosniac discourses (again, as with the case of gendered
20 It is clear from Said’s account that images of gender and sexuality were a constitutive part of Orientalist
representations of the Muslim East. While Said did not develop this element in Orientalism, other scholars have
expanded on various aspects of the gendering of Orientalism (see Abu-Lughod 2001; Lewis 1996; Nader 1989;
Robertson 1995; Schein 1997; Yegenoglu 1998). 
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nationalism treated above, generally overlooked on this topic) have not only sought to re-position
the borders of Europe to include themselves, but in other cases have reversed the negative valence
of “the east” and Islam to contrast with a decadent Rotten West (Helms n.d.; and see Robertson
1995). Despite these variations, essentialist renderings of civilizational oppositions continue to be
reproduced. Such positionings recur throughout the Bosnian narratives presented in these pages.
Importantly for the context of western intervention in the Balkans, local discourses also
reproduce forms of Occidentalism. What Carrier called “ethno-Occidentalism,” or essentialized
representations of the west by non-westerners (1992), occurs in the narratives of Bosnian social and
political actors who constantly invoke comparisons, whether positive or negative, to an essentialized
west as they consider which elements of western systems to adopt in their emerging post-war system.
At times Bosnia or Bosniacs are located within Europe, while at others they are not. Occidentalism
on the part of western officials and aid workers is also present, though not a phenomenon I develop
fully in this dissertation (see Methodology section below). The simplified models of institutions,
policies, and processes in their own societies that westerners put forth as examples for Bosnians to
follow have profound effects on the impact of foreign interventions (see Wedel 2001). 
Until recently, it has been less noticed that these nesting orientalisms also have a strong
gender component, just as nationalist discourses do. As discourses which are often both nationalist
and orientalist/occidentalist simultaneously, Balkan discourses are built on categories of gender and
sexuality which are used to naturalize differences and legitimize the hierarchy between east and west
(Ahmed 1982; Said 1978; Yegenoglu 1998).20 In the case of the Balkans and the conflict over
Bosnia, gender and sexuality have been constitutive elements of nationalisms which are at the same
time infused with (gendered) Orientalist representations (Žarkov 1995, 1999; Živkovi 2001). These
images are at the heart of the dominant image of the Bosnian Muslim woman as passive rape victim
(Žarkov 1997). In keeping with the traditional focus on the masculine in balkanist discourses
21 In contrast to the feminized, erotic Orient described by Said, traditional western representations of the
Balkans are decidedly male. Local women are virtually invisible, while Balkan men are described as rough,
disheveled, violent peasant men who engage in blood feuds and revolts. Todorova cited this difference as one of the
reasons that balkanism cannot be equated with Orientalism (1997: 13-15). For a rather uncritical reproduction of
these masculine stereotypes embedded in balkanist hierarchies, see van der Port (1998). 
22 Such representations have been particularly prevalent in US discourses in the wake of September 11th and
the war in Afghanistan. Images of women in burqas and o ther all-encompassing veils have symbolized the brutality
of the Taliban and the backwardness of Afghan, and indeed all Muslim, culture (Abu-Lughod 2002). Similarly, strict
punishments by the Taliban for homosexuality, too, have been held up as evidence of the  enemy’s inferiority, in
contrast to co lonial Orientalism which depicted rampant homosexuality as the marker of Eastern inferiority. 
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(Todorova 1997)21, orientalist frameworks also inform the construction of masculine roles. Serb men
are especially portrayed as violent, “patriarchal” and destructive (Bjeli and Cole 2002; olovi
2002; Simic 1969; van de Port 1998; Živkovi 2001), as they denigrate (and physically attack) the
men of their enemies as “mama’s boys,” homosexuals, or hyper-men with rabid sexual appetites
(Borneman 1998; olovi 2002; Žarkov 1999), much the way Muslim men of the Orient were
portrayed (Said 1978). 
Bosniac discourses wielded depictions of gender and sexuality, especially of women, to
construct and legitimize nationalist and Orientalist discourses about the ideal character of society and
the nation. Gender and sexuality function as a vehicle by which standard Orientalist models are
inverted. Orientalist discourses portrayed the eastern threat through images of unrestrained female
sexuality and deviant erotic behavior unacceptable to Western patriarchal values. Muslim religious
leaders around the world have for some time recast this construction, describing instead the dangers
of a decadent West. The threat to Muslim purity and values is posed by open displays of female
sexuality and sex outside the sanctions of patriarchal marriage. Although few have remarked on it,
western, Orientalist discourses have also undergone a shift since the colonial era. Whereas Said
described the evocation of the eastern threat through images of deviant, uncontrolled female (and
feminized homosexual male) sexuality, the political threat of the Muslim world is now depicted
through images of strictly controlled female sexuality: “hyperveiled” women in all-encompassing
coverings (Macmaster and Lewis 1998).22
In a separate study analyzing Bosniac media and “everyday” discourses, I show that gendered
balkanist representations have undergone a shift (Helms n.d.). While the image of the Balkan male
remains primitive and violent, his violence is now often directed toward women, in the form of
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domestic violence and the rape of the “enemy’s” women. Women have thus become more visible
as cultural symbols. Indeed, the association of Bosnian (Muslim) women with wartime rape has
overshadowed the way in which gendered images are used to construct various other discourses
within the Bosnian and Bosniac communities. In informal conversation with Bosnians during my
fieldwork, the way in which women were treated by “their” men and the degree to which they were
“emancipated” were used as markers of a society’s relative backwardness or modernity. Such a
standard, reminiscent of Orientalist justifications for Western colonial rule, implies a inherent link
between superior (Western) civilization and purported gender equality (see Chatterjee 1989; Mani
1987). However, as I have demonstrated (Helms n.d.), even when such “primitive, patriarchal”
treatment of women said to be typical of “the Balkans” was rejected in favor of a modern west,
images of women mirrored those common in the west itself: women remained in subordinate roles
to men, becoming symbols of “modern” sexual freedom and objects of (heterosexual) male desire.
These familiar configurations of gender, nation, and civilizational hierarchy infused local
political discourses against which the Bosnian activists depicted in this dissertation operated. Yet
they were not only “political,” or macro-level, discourses but part of a shared idiom of both
(outward) self-presentation and (inward) cultural intimacy (Herzfeld 1997) in which Bosnian women
activists participated.
Women’s Activism and Gender Essentialisms in Times of Flux
Violent conflict and its aftermath has drawn women in many parts of the world into various
forms of public activism, as it has in Bosnia. As the public, political sphere is most commonly
constructed as the sphere of men (Lamphere 1993; Moore 1988: 12-41), women’s activism seems
to pose an implicit challenge to established, patriarchal gender regimes. Still, many women activists,
including many of the Bosnians discussed in this study, have organized around their roles as mothers
and keepers of the domestic sphere, just as they are positioned in male-dominated gender regimes
(e.g. de Alwis 1998a; Ishkanian 2003; Phillips 2002; Samuel 2003; Taylor 1994; Žarkov 2000).
The gendering of nationalist discourses in the successor states of Yugoslavia has been based
precisely on these kinds of gender essentialisms, as is evident in the works cited above. My data also
shows the often overlooked way in which similar gender essentialisms appear in non-nationalist,
23 For discussion of longstanding debates in feminist anthropology over the significance of the gendered
public/private divide, see Lamphere 1993; Moore 1988:12-41; Ortner 1974; Rosaldo 1974, 1980; Strathern 1980.
While these scholars showed that such concepts are not universal, it remains true that gendered dichotomies of
public/domestic and related variations like public/private, modern/traditional (Ishkanian 2000), culture/nature,
technological/spiritual (Chatterjee 1989; M ani 1987), outside/inside (Rofel 1994; Yanagisako 1987), po litics/family
(Afshar 1989; Huseby-Darvas 1996) form the basis of discursive representations of gender roles in many societies.
24 Ivan olovi offers the fascinating example of this recursive reproduction of the male/female dichotomy
in Serbian and Croatian discourses during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. The male warrior is constructed as
heroically masculine, brave in battle and attached to his weapons as to a female lover, yet he is said to have “the soul
of a girl.” olovi interprets this as a mechanism by which the soldier is purified, in preparation of a virginal
sacrifice to the parental nation (2002: 48-56). 
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“civic” discourses, as well as discourses of foreign donors that fund women’s NGO activities (Helms
n.d.). These representations essentialize women as nurturing mothers tied to domestic roles and
outside the male public, or political sphere. As feminist anthropologists have noted, these
domestic/public divisions and the meanings ascribed to them are not fixed (Gal and Kligman 2000;
Lamphere 1993) (nor are they universal23). Like the dichotomies set up by orientalist representations,
their borders can be shifted, meanings altered, and the dyads can be “nested” or “fractal” –
recursively reproduced within each side of a larger dichotomous distinction (Gal and Kligman 2000:
41).24 This can be seen clearly in Cornelia Sorabji’s account (1989) of women’s roles and religion
in an urban Muslim neighborhood in Sarajevo: within the private sphere of the neighborhood, the
public/private opposition reappears in the public (male) space of the mosque and contrasts with the
private (female) home; the home is in turn divided into public areas reserved for entertaining guests
and private family areas; there are public subjects suitable for neighborly socializing and private
topics kept within the family (see also Bringa 1995). This phenomenon is visible in this study
through women’s representational strategies vis-a-vis the “political,” which I present in chapter 7.
Women positioned themselves within the political through their domestic, and therefore feminine,
roles, which they hoped would “clean up” the corrupt (male) side of politics.
Many researchers have been critical of these kinds of essentialisms for reinforcing patriarchal
values and hierarchies (e.g., Basu 1999; Blagojevi 1994; Chatterjee 1989; Drakuli 1993a; Spasi
2000). Essentialisms, they point out, not only restrict females to subordinate roles, but also males,
whose roles are thereby limited to those of aggressors, power-hungry careerists, uncaring parents,
and in all things incapable of dialogue or compromise. Feminist writers have further charged that
25 As I describe below and in chapter 6, very few women’s organizations in Bosnia describe themselves as
“feminist” or use the term publicly.
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“mothers’ movements” women activists’ identification with domestic roles are too easily coopted
by patriarchal, male-dominated and violence-producing nationalist movements (de Alwis 2003;
Drakuli 1993a; Duhaek 1993; Samuel 2003). Because the protesters are women, they are easily
dismissed or overtaken by larger national or ethnic movements, and the potential force of their
movement is diffused. It would seem that feminist groups,25 or any organization favoring the
dismantling of established gender hierarchies to improve the status of women, would avoid such
constructions. But, as I show especially in chapter 7, there are practical reasons for women’s groups
to allow themselves to be portrayed as apolitical and as mothers, and even to embrace and put forth
these images themselves.
Local women’s NGOs in Bosnia take many different forms according to the class and ethnic
backgrounds of their membership, the political and gender ideologies which they represent, and the
activities in which they engage. Their use of essentializing gender rhetoric varies according to the
degree to which they challenge gender hierarchies and the relative importance what they define as
“women’s interests” takes in relation to their other goals. Despite this diversity, however, all of the
women’s NGOs with which I came into contact in Bosnia used some form of gender essentialisms
in representing themselves to their local communities, to themselves, and to (potential and actual)
foreign donors. In contrast to dominant political discourses, however, the gender essentialisms
utilized by women activists stressed positive roles for women, portraying them as peace makers and
nurturers, more non-nationalist and capable of dialogue and reconciliation than are men. Donor
discourses also often constructed women’s roles in this way. Thus, women were essentialized and
confined to domestic roles (the nurturing mother) but with a positive spin, or what Richard Fox calls
“affirmative essentialisms” (1996). 
Fox applied this term to late-colonial Indian nationalism, which Partha Chatterjee (1989) had
earlier argued effectively confined women to less prestigious domestic roles as keepers of tradition
and spirituality. While these essentialisms may have at first reinforced patriarchal hierarchies, Fox
argued that, in the long run, they provided women with opportunities to be recognized and active in
the public, male sphere. Indeed, the positive attributes associated with women mobilized women to
26 While women were welcomed by socialist revolutionary movements into the military as fighters, they
were nonetheless expected to carry out traditionally prescribed roles during and after the revolution, such as caring
for war orphans, cooking and cleaning for male sold iers, and providing sexual “comfort” to male so ldiers (Chinchilla
1997; Jancar-W ebster 1990).
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get involved in the first place. Once involved women’s actions actually “superceded the original
gender stereotypes” (ibid.: 48). Fox may overstate the case for women’s “liberation,” yet it is worth
examining this source of potential empowerment for women. Chinchilla (1997), writing about
revolutionary women in Central America, likewise argues that taking part in national processes is
what put women in the position from which to become conscious of gender hierarchies and women’s
inferior status– in short, by some definitions, to develop a feminist critique of society. Similar
processes have been noted in Argentina (Taylor 1994), Sri Lanka (de Alwis 1998a), Kenya (Tibbetts
1994), and post- World War II Yugoslavia (Jancar-Webster 1990),26 to name just a few. These are
the experiences which lead to organic feminist movements and ultimately, though not necessarily,
to change from within a society. Indeed, as Amrita Basu, writing about contemporary Indian
women’s activism and Hindu nationalism, has cautioned, women’s political activity does not  in
itself necessarily challenge patriarchy (1999). This study of the Bosnian case shows the ambiguities
for women of gaining access to public and political spaces.
What is also very important for the Bosnian case is the moral power of gender essentialisms,
especially of motherhood. Groups of mothers such as the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina
(Taylor 1994) and the Mothers’ Fronts in Sri Lanka (de Alwis 1998a; Samuel 2003) have succeeded
in publicly shaming the state precisely because their engagement  in the public, political sphere was
as mothers and widows in performances (Taylor 1994) of grief and mourning. Their public, activist
identities were based on their belonging outside the male realm of politics, on their relationships with
male kin and domestic roles, and on their association, as mothers, with the innocence of children.
The Bosnian group, Women of Srebrenica, discussed in chapter 7, has in many ways offered a
similar image. In some contexts, this form of women’s protest may be the only way possible for
women to successfully achieve their goals (Samuel 2003), especially under conditions of extreme
state repression (Taylor 1994). In a context very similar to post-war Bosnia, Armine Ishkanian has
found that women NGO activists in Armenia stress an image of “moral motherhood” engaged on
behalf of the nation, to legitimate their activism in the eyes of local elites, even as they utilize
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“modern” discourses of women’s rights and gender equality with their western donors (2003, 2000).
Similarly, given the current political climate in Bosnia, in which politics is perceived as immoral,
and moral status is derived from categories of wartime victimhood, Bosnian women activists achieve
more immediate respect and moral clout– indeed, they avoid outright dismissal– by positioning
themselves outside the male realm of politics and within the roles of mothers and nurturers.
In this study I also follow researchers who argue for the importance of studying and
understanding women activists who choose to embrace patriarchal gender essentialisms and
association with motherhood. To dismiss all gender-essentializing women’s initiatives as “dupes”
of male ideologies or examples of false consciousness is to dismiss the legitimacy of women’s
agency (Basu 1999; de Alwis 1998a; Jeffrey 1998; Žarkov 1999, 2000). 
Furthermore, as Dubravka Žarkov has argued, for feminists to dismiss any women’s agency
which is based on motherhood, or traditional gender essentialisms, is to “surrender motherhood to
nationalism” (Žarkov 1999: 171), a force which, in the Balkans, has notoriously claimed ownership
of the power of motherhood (see Bracewell 1996). Many Croatian and Serbian feminists dismissed
mothers’ movements of late 1980's and early 1990's Yugoslavia for having been coopted by
nationalism (e.g., Drakuli 1993a; Duhaek 1993). Yet Dubravka Žarkov’s study of Croatian and
Serbian discourses in that period reveals a variety of much more intricate meanings attached to
motherhood, and to ethnicity, than either nationalist or feminist ideologies tend to allow (1999, and
see 2000). To wrest motherhood and ethnic identity– elements commonly associated with
patriarchal, essentialist roles for women– from the purvey of nationalist and patriarchal ideologies
is thus a step towards reclaiming what is significant to women in their daily lives, towards
understanding the different forms of women’s agency, including those which utilize essentialist
discourses. As Patricia Jeffrey has written, “only then can we determine what is key to feminist
agency and imagine how women’s agency might translate into feminist political action” (Jeffrey
1998: 223). As I show in this study, Bosnian women activists used gender essentialisms not only
because they are practical, but because they fit into familiar notions of gender relations for the
women themselves as well as for members of their communities. We would do well to understand
why (Basu 1999).
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“Actually Existing Turbulence” and the Anthropology of Western Aid
International intervention in Bosnia has not only been about post-war reconstruction, but also
about “transition” from socialism. Few international officials seem to question the assumed goal–
Bosnia is “going to Europe,” meaning the European Union and the adoption of a western-style
democratic, free-market system. While many Bosnians long for the stability and prosperity enjoyed
by “Europe,” there is little consensus on exactly the kind of system they would like to build. What
is more, as the years since the war go by, it becomes increasingly difficult to accept that every
problem in Bosnia is due to “transition.” Still, NGO activists and others who relied on western
financing took up the language and often the logic of the western powers, including that of
“transition.” It even became a joke among the women activists I worked with. Personal foibles or
organizational flaws were often, tongue-in-cheek, attributed to the fact that they were “women in
transition” (žena u tranziciji sounding like zemlja u tranziciji, or “country in transition”) 
Following many anthropologists of post-socialism, this study takes a critical stance towards
the term “transition” and the body of “transitology” literature which describes it (Berdahl 2000a; Gal
and Kligman 2000; Hemment 2000; Kideckel 1995; Pine 1998; Verdery 1996; Wedel 2001). These
scholars have objected to the capitalist “triumphalism” and western superiority implied by such
studies, along with the evolutionary, teleological assumptions which back them up: it is posed as a
given that post-socialist states are in one-way “transition” exclusively to liberal democracy and free-
market economies. Anthropologists, positioned to reflect on the effects of these processes affect
everyday lives, have instead talked about “transformations” in which the end result is not inevitable
and many different approaches are pursued. They emphasize the perpetual state of uncertainty for
people in these countries (Berdahl et. al. 2000; Bridger and Pine 1998; Kideckel 1995; Verdery
1996), a state that David Kideckel, paraphrasing Rudolf Bahro, referred to as “actually existing
turbulence” (1995: 5). 
As several scholars have also pointed out (Barsegian 2000; Berdahl 2000a), post-Cold War
western aid to the region holds striking similarities to the western “development” enterprise
cultivated in the “Third World.” The west is cast as all-knowing, benevolent parent (even “God”!
[Verdery 1996: 205]) instructing the naive masses whose experiences with socialism (or colonialism)
are either unwanted dead weight or insignificant for the new path (Berdahl 2000a; Verdery 1996).
27 This was the subject of the closing discussion at the 2003 Soyuz meeting of researchers in post-socialist
cultural studies. It was concluded that anthropologists of Eastern Europe had finally begun to take up theoretical
topics representative of anthropology as a whole, rather than the “standard” East European top ics of peasants,
politics, property, and nationalism. 
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It is thus not surprising that similar sorts of cultural “disconnects” (Wedel 2001) and “unintended
consequences” (Ferguson 1994) are being produced in post-socialist Europe (e.g., Hemment 2000;
Ishkanian 2003; Phillips 2002; Wedel 2001) as have been described in anthropological critiques of
“Third World” development (e.g. Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994; Grillo and Stirrat 1997; Hobart
1993). 
In Bosnia, the war and its aftermath created a situation of humanitarian crisis and thus
ushered in many of the same “development” agencies whose working models have been honed in
the “Third World.” I see this experience with both “transition aid” and “development” as an
opportunity to strengthen alternative axes of comparison of Bosnia other than with other post-
socialist European societies. Indeed, there have already been some useful studies connecting
women’s activism in “conflict zones” involving Bosnia with Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine
(Cockburn 1998) and former Yugoslavia with Sri Lanka (Giles et. al. 2003; Giles and Hyndman
forthcoming). Many practitioners in the international community have also looked to compare
Bosnia (both positively and negatively) with other “Third-World” post-conflict situations, to the
chagrin of their Bosnian beneficiaries and colleagues. Academics, however, have tended to include
Bosnia in conferences and collections on Eastern Europe, thus emphasizing socialist legacies and
shared experiences with “democratization aid,” but obscuring links to issues of (recent) war, ethnic
and sexual violence, international military and administrative interventions, Islamic fundamentalism,
and other issues. It is not that these issues do not affect other parts of post-socialist Europe, or that
phenomena brought to the fore through the study of post-socialist contexts are not relevant to areas
outside Eastern Europe. I do not wish to isolate either post-socialism or post-conflict issues as sets
unto themselves. In fact, as Gal and Kligman (2000) have argued studies of post-socialist or
“development” processes should also be in dialogue with studies of state welfare policies and
regional development in the “west.” My point is to reiterate calls for the further dismantling of area
studies boundaries that have tended to dictate many of the issues anthropologists take up.27 
28 This is not to say that donors and international officials have not targeted  other areas. Indeed, pro jects
(Sampson 1996) abound that focus on the “independent” media, religious groups, and community organizing. When
the term “civil society” is mentioned, however, it is usually interpreted to mean NG Os.
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Civil Society and NGOs
One of these cross-cutting issues is the relatively new phenomenon of NGOs and civil society
initiatives, part of a global trend in development and democratization aid (Hann and Dunn 1996;
Fisher 1997; Mendelson and Glenn 2002). Despite the many ways in which this term has been
viewed in various contexts (Gal 1997), the approach of western donors in the post-socialist countries
of Central and Eastern Europe, including Bosnia, has been to see civil society as the sphere of
independent associations which operate in the space between the family and the state (Carothers
1996: 65; Wedel 2001: 85-122). Despite some scholars’ (not to mention local actors) inclusion of
arenas such as the independent press (Gallagher 2000), neighborhood community networks
(Abramson 1999), or religious institutions (Mojzes 1997) into considerations of civil society as
democratic institutions, in practice, the donor approach has been more narrow, focusing almost
exclusively on local NGOs, and as in Bosnia, certain types of NGOs (see Bruno 1998; Carothers
1996; Hann and Dunn 1996; Quigley 1997; Sampson 1996; Wedel 2001). In Bosnia, donors have
thus placed great importance on the number and distribution of these groups, virtually to the extent
of equating the number of NGOs with the strength of civil society (Belloni 2001; Chandler 2000;
Smillie 1996; Stubbs 1995).28
The vision of civil society as an independent sector between citizens and the state is
particularly appealing to the international community, given Bosnia’s political realities. In the
absence of a functioning state, talking about and relating to “the state” is meaningful to local Bosnian
NGOs mostly in the sense of government at the level of the (ethnically defined) entities, and within
the Federation, ethnically defined municipalities and cantons (see e.g., Burg and Shoup 1999;
Milievi 1997; Stubbs 1999). Furthermore, state (government) power has been virtually
synonymous with nationalist political parties, with the exception of the 2000-2002 term when
nationalist parties were substantially weakened including at the local level in Zenica (see chapter 5).
At the time of my fieldwork, therefore, Bosnians tended to equate “state” (država) with the ruling
party and the government (vlada). This can be seen as a continuation of the semantic practice under
29 Exceptions are associations formed under socialist structures that have kept their ties to local
administrative units and organizations formed by ruling political parties (such as Fatma women’s association, a
branch of the SDA). These groups tend to call themselves “associations” (udruženje) rather than NGOs, however,
and do not move in western donor circles (see World Bank 2002).
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the socialist one-party state: despite the newly established pluralist system of political parties, I often
heard the ruling Bosniac party referred to without irony as “The Party” in areas it controlled. It was
understood that a “party person” (stranaki ovjek) was connected to the nationalist party in power
in his/her region.
As Sarah Phillips has pointed out in her work on women’s NGOs in Ukraine (2002), NGOs
are rarely truly independent of the state (see also Gal 1997; Ishkanian 2000). Instead, they exhibit
“blended relationships” in the sense that they must engage the state in both practical administrative
matters and as a “philosophical point of reference” (ibid., citing Uvin 2000). Some “NGOs” are
actually created or financed (partially or wholly) by state organs or ruling government officials,
prompting the creation of such acronyms as GONGOs (government-organized non-governmental
organizations), QUANGOs (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations), and the like
(Abramson 1999: 7; Fisher 1997: 447-48). While Bosnian government officials rarely set aside
money for NGOs,29 it could be argued that international donors as quasi-protectorate, function
“governmentally” (Foucault 1991; Gilbert 2002), or as a sort of state actor. In this sense, then,
Bosnian NGOs had little autonomy at all. Further, many activists I met in Bosnia actually felt they
should be entitled to funding from their local and regional governments, especially since many of
them, especially in women’s organizations, were providing services previously taken care of by the
state (Gal and Kligman 2000; and see Mežnari and Ule 1994). 
However, in the international view, a sector independent of the state or dominant political
structures meant possible opposition to the nationalist parties in power that were obstructing the
functioning of the state structure envisioned in Dayton. Such opposition could both promote the
building of a unified state and offer alternatives to ethnic separatism and chauvinist nationalism.
Civil society (i.e., NGOs) was therefore promoted by donors as a space where the idea of a unified,
multi-ethnic Bosnian state could be nurtured.
Interestingly, western, especially US, strategies for building civil society are so focused in
Bosnia on countering nationalist power that they do not concentrate on encouraging civic advocacy
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in NGOs to the extent that they have in the rest of post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe. Writing
about the Romanian case, Thomas Carothers notes that the American vision of civil society is not
focused on NGOs in general but even more narrowly on “civic advocacy organizations– small, non-
profit NGOs seeking to affect government policy” (1996: 65) because donor concern there is to
prevent a return to communism. In Bosnia, the effort to oppose nationalists has led to, at times
blatant, support of the Social Democrats, the successors to the Yugoslav Communist Party (widely
stereotyped as “old communists”), and NGOs that support its non-nationalist agenda. While an
emphasis on political advocacy is apparent in some donor initiatives, international community
support for NGOs, whether policy-oriented or humanitarian, rests more on an NGO’s approach
toward multi-ethnicity rather than political engagement. Indeed, the present international aim is to
support whomever seems mostly likely to contribute to the ability of the Bosnian state to function
independently, regardless (for the time being?) of ideology. Given this policy, and conflicting donor-
inspired or created descriptions of civil society as a force that does not oppose but shapes and guides
the state, considerable confusion exists among NGO participants and donor representatives
themselves about the role of NGOs and civil society. Kadrija, leader of a women’s NGO from the
Federation town of Kakanj, who believed strongly in the democratic possibilities of NGOs, summed
up this confusion:
People on the street don’t know what an NGO even is. They think it’s opposition to
authorities or else humanitarian work. They don’t know the possibilities or
understand the potential. All those people don’t know that they themselves can
initiate their own activities on their own issues and problems. Citizens don’t see
themselves as actors. And there is also the problem that government doesn’t
understand it. They think (NGOs are) a threat to their authority.
I explore these perceptions further in chapter 5. 
NGOs and Women: Is There a Movement?
The standard claim of early feminist scholarship of post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe
was that women were the “big losers” of “transition,” losing jobs, abortion rights, social safety net
provisions, and public respect (e.g., Corrin 1992; Einhorn 1993; Funk and Mueller 1993; Moghadam
30 Dr. Charles Tauber, an NG O activist for the Center for Work with Psychotrauma and Peace in the war-
ravaged town of Vukovar, Croatia runs a rare program to help men  overcome war trauma (Peter Lippman, personal
communication 2000; see http://www.cwwpp.org for more on the organization). Countless programs offer trauma
recovery to women, due, as I argue in chapter 4, to the publicity around wartime rape of women and the construction
of women as vulnerable victims. Anecdotal evidence from the experiences of several women’s organizations
including Naš Most in Zenica suggests that women in rural and working class sections of the population are coping
much better than men are with the effects of war and economic hardship; women are more willing to take on
undesirable jobs while many men drown their sorrows in alcohol.
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1993; Rueschemeyer 1994; Watson 1993). The women I met in Bosnia often made the same
assertion about the effects of the war, saying that “women suffered the most,” and “women have lost
the most in this war.” While women have certainly been disadvantaged under the “new universality”
(Ivekovi 1997) of post-Yugoslav nationalist and masculinst publics (see Ler-Sofroni 1998 for data
on women in Bosnia), such blanket statements paint too simplistic a picture, ignoring class, ethnic,
and age differences (Gal and Kligman 2000: 114; Ghodsee 2001). In Bosnia, it can certainly be said
that both men and women have suffered from both war30 and economic restructuring, especially the
poor and poorly connected to new elites, though in decidedly gendered ways. Further, as Kristen
Ghodsee’s work (2001) on women’s experiences with “transition” in Bulgaria shows, certain skills
cultivated by women such as knowledge of foreign languages and training for work in the tourist
industry have given women a distinct advantage in the new economy. In Bosnia, with employment
scarce and salaries low, young, educated women have been employed in large numbers by well-
paying international organizations for their foreign language and computer skills (while highly
educated men were often hired as drivers).
Still, as I discuss in chapter 5, women have been marginalized from (or were never well
represented in) most avenues of power such as politics, business, and crime. This has partially been
the reason for their gravitation to the NGO sector, albeit mostly in “humanitarian,” nurturing social
service roles previously covered by the socialist state. While Susan Gal (1997) argues that civil
society has been shaped as a male domain since the fall of communism in Central and Eastern
Europe (and see Watson 1993), researchers have shown the NGO sector in Armenia (Ishkanian
2003), Russia (Hemment 2000), Ukraine (Phillips 2002), and other countries to be heavily populated
with women, even to the point of becoming “feminized” and therefore less prestigious (Ishkanian
ibid.). NGOs have therefore been singled out as a new form of women’s activism (Alvarez 1998;
Costa 2001; Gal and Kligman 2000; Hemment 2000), a phenomenon that became highly visible at
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the NGO Forum held parallel to the UN Fourth World Conference on Women near Beijing in 1995.
In Bosnia, there was no stigma attached to women’s participation in NGOs per se, since most of
these were understood as separate women’s social outlets and/or humanitarian work– in continuity
with patterns of women’s organizing under socialism as I explain in chapters 3 and 5. The stigma
fell, however, on NGO activity perceived as political, a realm avoided by many women for its
association with immorality and males. (I explore this in chapter 7.) Indeed, many women activists
felt there had been a masculinization of the top ranks of the NGO sector, especially after the end of
the war and men’s coinciding military duties.
One of the most negative ways in which women activists in Bosnia, as in other parts of
Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Drakuli 1993a; Goven 1993; Huseby-Darvas 1996), are seen as
“political” is when they are labeled “feminists.” At the same time, as Sonia Alvarez (1998) and
Sabine Lang (1997) have separately noted, feminism has undergone a process of “NGOization,”
bring the movement(s) to a broader political stage but also effectively closing the door to wider
participation of women outside the “increas[ingly] specializ[ed] and professionaliz[ed]” (Alvarez
1998: 306) interconnected NGO circles. Women in post-socialist Europe have been notoriously
loathe to adopt feminism, which most of them see as a negative, western product (e.g., articles in
Funk and Mueller 1993; Gal and Kligman 2000: 103-5; Hemment 2000; Holmgren 1995; Huseby-
Darvas 1996). With or without the use of the term “feminism,” these developments make it less
likely that women will be mobilized in sufficient numbers to see themselves as a “politically
relevant” category and thus affect social change (Gal and Kligman 2000: 106). Indeed, the main
feminist NGO in this study, Medica Zenica, was resented by many women in the town for what was
perceived as Medica’s closed nature and hoarding of donor resources. 
We might more plausibly speak of the development of a women’s “subaltern counterpublic,”
in the terminology of Nancy Fraser (1997: 81). Building on and critiquing Habermas’ theory of the
discursive public sphere as counterweight to state and market (1989 [1962]), Fraser shows the male
and class bias inherent in the idea of a public and points to the formation of separate publics by
disenfranchised groups such as women and African-Americans in the U.S. Such arenas participate
in the dominant public but because their specific modes of communication and cultures are not
validated in that public, their counterpublic arenas enable them to “articulate and defend their
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interests in the comprehensive public sphere” (ibid.). For Fraser, the cultivation of such
counterpublics is the basis for true democratic practices, even in stratified societies. Bosnian
women’s NGOs have been building this kind of counterpublic, although it is heavily supported by
foreign officials and donors.
The relationships across international boundaries, which tend to accompany NGO activism
(Keck and Sikkink 1998), raise concerns about new forms of dominance and local interpretations
of western-associated, though no less indigenous, concepts such as “feminism,” “gender equality,”
“nationalism,” and others (Alvarez 1998; Spivak 1996). Clashes between “western” and “eastern”
women over feminism(s) were rife in the years following the collapse of socialism as western
feminists expected a flowering of feminist activism now that women were free to organize (Gal and
Kligman 2000). Many women from east and west have explored the assumptions and hurt feelings
that went along with these exchanges (Busheikin 1993; de Soto 2000; Drakuli 1998, 1991; Funk
1993; Holmgren 1995; Šiklová 1998, 1993; and see Rofel 1994 on China). This dissertation follows
in the path of recent studies that examine the forms of feminisms and approaches to gender issues
in the context of donor-NGO beneficiary relationships (Hemment 2000; Ishkanian 2003; Phillips
2002). 
The Bosnian context also makes visible the effects of foreign donor policies on feminist
approaches to ethno-national and religious identities, a theme which has been taken up mostly by
women of color and “Third World women” in response to the universalizing rhetoric of white,
middle class western feminism (e.g., Collins 1991; Mohanty 1991; Moraga and Anzaldúa 1981).
Similar negotiations over the meanings of ethnic identity to gender concerns/feminism, and vice-
versa, became contentious issues which split feminists in both the west and the successor states of
Yugoslavia over how to characterize and react to wartime rape in Bosnia and Croatia, as I detail in
chapter 4. As I illuminate in chapter 5, however, local nationalists have not been the only actors that
have forced ethnic categories into the lives and work of women activists. The international
community, with its emphasis on creating a multi-ethnic state, has also effectively forced a “nation-
ing” of gender discourses.
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Studies of What Was Yugoslavia
Finally, a brief word about the place of this study in scholarship on the Balkans and what was
Yugoslavia. As I have noted, studies of the region on women and gender have focused almost
exclusively on Serbian and Croatian nationalisms. Bosnian women have been included largely as
objects of those militaristic, nationalist projects, as victims of wartime rape. Even in this guise, only
Muslim women tend to appear as the quintessential victims, ignoring the other women who live in
Bosnia, many of whom actively engage in political and social processes. Although this study focuses
on a Bosniac majority area, it includes the voices of many Serb, Croat, and “mixed” women who live
there, along with those of Bosniac women. Nevertheless, the area is dominated by Muslims of
various stripes. This research therefore seeks to bring consideration of Islam and its implications for
women and gender relations to scholarship on the Balkans, and the Balkans to scholarship on women
in Muslim societies.
This research also builds on pre-war studies of Bosnian Muslims (Burg 1983; Lockwood
1975; Rusinow 1982), especially those which revealed women’s roles in preserving ethnic and
religious identity (Bringa 1995; Sorabji 1989). However, I go beyond macro level structural analysis
of Bosnia (and former Yugoslavia) which have been common in the post-1990 period (e.g., Bougarel
1996; Bose 2002; Burg and Shoup 1999; Hayden 1999; Woodward 1995) to analyze the less well
understood dynamics of local level activities and cultural understandings. I therefore seek to
recognize continuity with past cultural forms while contributing to the small but growing body of
local level studies of the greatly changed and changing cultural landscape of post-war Bosnia (Bax
2000, 1999, 1995; Lauševi 1996; Maek 2000; Pickering 2001; Stefansson 2001; and other
forthcoming projects from anthropology graduate students such as Kimberly Coles, Andrew Gilbert,
Jennifer Erickson, and others).
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CHAPTER THREE
HISTORIES OF WOMEN AND WOMEN’S ACTIVISM IN BOSNIA
Introduction
In order to situate women’s wartime and post-war struggles, it is necessary to consider
assumptions and habits related to gender roles, women’s organizing and public activities, politics,
social services, and the role of the state, which have carried over from before the 1992-5 war. This
chapter therefore reviews the history of gender relations and women’s organizing in Bosnia and the
wider political entities of which it has been a part over the past 150 years. I place special emphasis
on the most recent period under socialist Yugoslavia and on the experiences and representations of
Muslim women. In the first part of the chapter, I discuss various cultural and historical legacies that
left an impression on gender relations through kinship systems, religion, and state policies, both
before and during socialism. Despite the legal and cultural improvements for women established by
the socialist regime, significant elements of the patriarchal basis of pre-socialist life remained and
have been carried through and even renewed in the post-war period. The second part of the chapter
traces the history of women’s movements and feminism in the region in order to show how the
models developed during socialism of women’s organizing have influenced the shape of women’s
groups formed during the recent war and after. In contrast to the common assumption that the
explosion of women’s organizations in the 1990's reflects a desire to advocate for women’s status
and human rights, I argue that the bulk of these groups were formed on the basis of models
developed during socialist times, and/or on an extension of women’s social networks rather than on
a desire to challenge patriarchal norms in an organized, public way. It is only with the arrival of
foreign donors that the language of women’s rights, civil society, and NGOs has emerged among
women’s group members. 
Women’s Status: Cultural and Historical Legacies
Many accounts of women’s position in the area of socialist Yugoslavia begin with reference
to “traditional” kinship and subsistence patterns, notably the zadruga extended family household and
its variations by zones of pastoralist or agricultural economies (Cockburn 1998: 156; Denich 1974;
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Oluji 1998; Ramet 1992; Woodward 1985). While the “zadruga” term itself has been shown to be
more national myth than a fixed and uniform family structure (Hammel 1972; Todorova 1990;
Vittorelli 2002), elements of the various patriarchal kinship arrangements it described are
nonetheless apparent in the present-day Balkans. In describing some of these elements, I aim to
extend historical and cultural continuity beyond the socialist period to account for part of the
complex web of norms and values surrounding gender relations in the post-war period. 
In pointing this out, however, I do not wish to draw a firm line between “traditional,” pre-
socialist kinship and gender regimes and those which developed after World War II. Such traditions
have varied widely over space and time and have been transformed by and incorporated into the
changing social, economic, political, and demographic realities of the past century (and more).
Nevertheless, many Bosnians and foreign observers tend to chalk up patriarchal practices and norms
to essentialized notions of “backward” traditions surviving unchanged from the past. Areas with
pastoralist traditions such as Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, and parts of Serbia have especially
been singled out by scholars as especially patriarchal, in part because of the longer survival of the
zadruga (Borneman 1998; Denich 1974; Erlich 1966; Ramet 1992; Woodward 1985). Gender
regimes of agriculturalist based areas of Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina have been characterized
in contrast as milder, though they remained distinctly patriarchal (Denich 1974; Gilliland Olsen
1990, Ramet 1992; Reed 1985). 
However this is more difficult to characterize for Bosnia, as elements of “agriculturalist”
tradition have also been identified there (Bresloff 1967), along with urban Muslim family structures
traced to the Ottoman era. Though these distinctions risk simplistic orientalist categorization
common to Balkan rhetoric (Baki-Hayden and Hayden 1992, Bakic-Hayden 1995), aspects of each
tradition can be identified to varying degrees in current family and economic structures. The
terminology of the zadruga, therefore, combined with accounts of especially patriarchal gender
regimes that characterize(d) “tribal” (read: primitive, backward, other) Balkan groups (Denich 1974;
Erlich 1966), lend an “othering” quality to descriptions of the Balkans (Helms n.d.; Vittorelli 2002).
The “zadruga” described both an economic cooperative and a kinship structure in which
patriarchal values undergirded patrilineal and patrilocal practices (Byrnes 1976; Halpern 1970;
Hammel 1972). Women, in the familiar role of brides in patrilocal, patrilineal, and virifocal kinship
31 Denich (1974) makes clear that social sanctions for adultery and out-of-wedlock births varied by region.
She links this variation to differences in the importance of collective honor, or “face,” of patrilineal family groups.
Where collective  honor is most prized– among pastoralist clans that live(d) by codes of the blood feud– women’s
sexuality is most closely policed. Erlich more simplistically links survival of the zadruga to more severe forms of
women’s subjugation (1966).
32 Patrilocality, while not practiced in every case, remains the ideal, especially in villages and smaller
towns. However, this usually means a newly married couple will set up residence near the husband’s parents rather
than in the same household. In smaller towns and rural areas, one hears talk about women who “married in X
town/village” (udala se u X), meaning that she had married a man from another place and naturally moved to where
he was. This pattern was less common in urban areas where couples were happy to get housing where they could.
Some still had to  live with parents, in which case it was more common for the couple to  live with the groom’s
parents, all things being equal. Post-war economic difficulties and housing shortages have complicated these
patterns, preventing many couples from setting up households of their own upon marriage. 
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systems (e.g., Das 1995; Kligman 1988; Fernea 1965; Friedl 1991; Stone and James 1995; Watson
1986), were considered outsiders and were subordinated to the authority of the male hierarchy and
her mother-in-law (Denich 1974; Erlich 1966; Simic 1983). This subordination was reinforced
through symbolic acts of subservience such as women kissing the hands of males, remaining quiet
and standing in the company of elder males (Denich 1974; Erlich 1966; Gilliland Olsen 1990; Oluji
1998; and see Kligman 1988, Whitaker 1981). A woman could improve her standing and security
as the mother of sons, eventually becoming a mother-in-law herself (Simic 1983). Women’s
sexuality was also monitored and controlled in this system, though to varying degrees in different
regions; women were confined to the homestead and related domestic, agricultural, and child rearing
tasks and adultery was severely punished (Boehm 1984; Denich 1974, Erlich 1966, Halpern 1958,
1967, Hammel 1967, Gilliland Olsen 1990).31 Men were also confined to sex roles in the public
sphere and as the authority figure of the household who did not engage in domestic “women’s work”
(Denich 1974, Hammel 1967, Simic 1969). Further, ethnographers described the duty of women to
save their comments and disagreements for private words with their husbands so as not to
compromise the outside appearance of male authority (Erlich 1966, Hammel 1982).
Though urbanization and socialism, and later war, economic collapse and forced migrations,
significantly altered these patterns, many of the values and customs associated with zadruga-like
family arrangements persisted into the socialist period (Denich 1976; Woodward 1985) and
beyond.32 Tone Bringa describes a Bosnian man’s hanging up laundry in the middle of the night so
as to avoid showing publicly that he was doing “women’s work” (1995). I encountered similar
33 Here, it was the place rather than the chore he considered less than manly; husbands often helped  out with
rug beating, as it required physical strength, yet they most often did this in the courtyard outside. The balcony was
too much of a female space.
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behavior on several occasions, both in smaller towns and in cities. One man playfully but resolutely
ordered his wife and me out of the room while he fixed salad for the midday meal. He made it clear
he was only fixing the salad because his wife was having back problems. He wanted no witnesses,
however, to a job he said was not “masculine” (nije muško) (unlike grilling meat outdoors, which
he happily did, even while posing for pictures). For the same reason, another man, who had become
accustomed to helping with many domestic chores while a refugee in Germany, found the need, upon
his return to a town in central Bosnia, to hide from passing neighbors as he beat dust out of the
household rugs on his balcony.33 Coffee made by a male was considered inferior and called “coffee
with eggs (balls)” (kafa s jajama). Not surprisingly, although I encountered plenty of exceptions,
most men, whether in urban or rural areas, did minimal, if any, housework (on gender and
housework in the socialist period, see Woodward 1985). Those who did, especially younger men
who considered themselves to be more cosmopolitan, were eager to point this out as a sign of their
“modernity.”
The “traditional” male prerogative also included the right of men to beat their wives. Halpern
(1958, 1972), Erlich (1966), Filipovi (Hammel et. al. 1982) and others all describe wife beating (but
not “too much” [Halpern and Kerewsky-Halpern 1972]) in Yugoslavia during the pre-socialist and
socialist periods. According to Vera Erlich, though folk sayings and testimony from her village
respondents in the 1930's indicate a quite open acceptance of men’s right, even need, to beat their
wives to keep them in order, wives were being beaten less at the time of her study than had been the
case before World War I (1966: 258-71). This did not necessarily indicate improvements in women’s
status, however, as the younger men who condemned wife beating indicated that “they ‘know other
ways and means’” to keep their wives in line (ibid.: 262). Domestic violence continued quietly in
homes throughout socialism and was one of the first targets of neo-feminist activism beginning in
the 1980s (Benderly 1997a; Jancar 1988). The economic hardships, consequences of wartime trauma,
alcohol abuse, and other problems of the post-war period have exacerbated problems of domestic
violence based on persevering ideologies of male authority (Medica 1999; and see Mladjenovi
34 The original “moj rad se ne prizna” is better translated as “my work is not recognized.”
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1999). 
Dominant patriarchal ideologies have also been reflected in language. Ethnographers of the
pre-socialist period recorded folk sayings about women which indicate a basic misogyny, e.g. “Long
hair, short wit” (Erlich 1966: 262), “Trust neither dog, horse, or woman!” (ibid.: 260), and “Consult
your horse or ox rather than your wife.” (Trouton 1952; and see Woodward 1985). Yugoslav neo-
feminists wrote about curses and expressions using derogatory names for women’s genitalia which
are were in common use by both women and men during my fieldwork (Ugreši 1994). Something
devoid of significance is referred to as pikin dim, “pussy smoke,” and a very common invective
used to imply someone is being stupid or irrational is ženska glava, or “woman’s head.” Croatian
writer Dubravka Ugreši also pointed to the inherent homophobia, and therefore misogyny, in
expressions used to denigrate less than manly men: they are called pizde, or “pussies” (ibid.). To be
sure, many expressions contain references to male genitalia. However, these are generally from a
male point of view or constructed upon notions of aggressive, dominating male sexuality.
It is important to note that women have also participated in and even enforced such gender
ideologies and practices. Erlich’s respondents reported in many cases that women believed in their
own inferiority to men, although some were beginning to challenge this in a few areas. Bosnia was
one of them: women expressed bitterness at their inferior status considering their disproportionate
contribution to household labor (Erlich 1966: 250). When it came to wife beating, however, many
women shared the opinion of a woman from the Bijeljina district who said, “If I am in the wrong,
I hold my tongue and bear it. He has the right for it’s his house I am in, his bread I eat, while my
work is not admitted (sic)34” (ibid. 262). Despite the decline of patrilocal residence, however, such
attitudes persist. In 1998, Medica Zenica found that 20% of women surveyed in the Zenica
municipality agreed with the statement that “It is understandable that a husband (boyfriend) beats
his wife (girlfriend) if she does something wrong.” (Medica 1999). 
Andrei Simi described the incentives women have for upholding the patriarchal order.
Women themselves can build considerable power within the household through their sons, a
phenomenon Simi termed “cryptomatriarchy” (1983). Many of my own informants argued that
35 Because of regional historical differences in legal codes, the new laws represented more drastic changes
for women in some areas than in others (Woodward 1985).
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women were not at all disadvantaged in Bosnian society because of this great power they wield in
the home– as one Zenica man put it, “Bosnia is at the same time a patriarchy and a matriarchy.” On
countless occasions I was quoted the folk aphorism that “a house is held up by four pillars. Three
are the woman, one is the man.” Not only were women’s nurturing roles a path to power in the
family, but women also gained moral authority as respectable, diligent/valuable (vrijedne) women
by demonstrating their self-sacrifice and dedication to their families. Some, both men and women,
told me it was women’s own fault that they were not more visible in public and did not hold more
positions of power, whether during or after socialism (see chapter 7). This was, some observed,
because they refused to give up the time it took to maintain their leading role in the family. Indeed,
I often witnessed or heard about women who would not let their husbands or boyfriends wash dishes
or do other female-associated tasks. The women invariably said the man in question should not do
these things because “he’s male” (on je muško). The damage these feminine tasks did to a husband
or boyfriend’s masculinity was apparently out of the question for many women (see Drezgi 2002).
In general, women did not want to relinquish the power they did have in their gendered roles as
women, even as they strove to achieve positions of status in male-associated realms. (I explore this
dynamic further in chapter 7.)
Socialism and Women
The socialist state of Yugoslavia established after the Second World War made gender
equality part of their agenda. Women were to be emancipated through the uplifting of the working
class. From the outset, women were granted equal legal status, the right to own and inherit property,
equal rights in marriage and divorce, generous maternity and child-care benefits, and equal access
to education and employment (Morokvasi 1986; Ramet 1999; Woodward 1985).35 The various
historically and religiously based family law codes (such as šari’a law governing Muslims) were
abolished so that marriage and divorce were placed under civic authorities and applied equally to all
citizens regardless of sex, region, or religion (Jancar-Webster 1990; Ramet 1999). In Bosnia and
other areas with Muslim populations, the wearing of the face veil (zar and feredža) was outlawed
36 Eight grades of education was mandated by law for both girls and boys with noncompliance punishable
by a fine. However, many families opted to pay rather than send girls to school, especially beyond the fourth grade
when girls would have to travel outside their villages for school (village schools only go up to the fourth grade).
Many saw such education as unnecessary for leading lives as housewives and mothers. A strong fear of
compromising a girl’s sexual reputation or risking her dating and marrying a non-Muslim also underlay such
decisions (Haski 2000). As an elderly Bosniac man I know explained of the early socialist period in his small town,
“A female going to school? Must be a whore! That’s how it was.” (Žensko ii u školu? To je kurva! Tako je bilo .)
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in 1950, “to remove the age-old mark of subordination and cultural backwardness of Muslim
women,” and to allow her to equally participate, along with other women and men, in the building
of the country (Radi 1995: 216; and see Penava 1981; Miliši 1999). Abortion was legalized in
1952 and liberalized in a series of subsequent laws which eventually guaranteed all citizens the right
to decide on family size (Morokvasi 1986; Ramet 1999). 
As women gained education and began to be employed in wage labor outside the home, their
dependence on husbands and families decreased. Marriage patterns were duly altered, as women
began to be evaluated for their potential as wage-earners as well as for their household and
reproductive labor. Urbanization and industrialization also affected women’s possibilities (Denich
1976), though, as Susan Woodward pointed out (1985), these varied widely according to economic
status. Young women whose parents lived in university towns and cities had more support for
completing higher education and thus got better jobs. These women tended to marry men of similar
educational backgrounds, to initiate divorce in the case of problems, and to hyphenate their maiden
names with their husbands’ sir names as a display of independence. In this way, Woodward argued,
“class differences among women [were] rapidly replacing the cultural divisions that [had] formerly
separated women of one region from another.” (1985: 255). This observation becomes significant
when considering the 1992-5 Bosnian war and its aftermath which were accompanied by intense
ethnic divisions and renewed generalizations about differences in gender relations for each ethnic
group, especially when it came to the consequences of rape (see Žarkov 1999; 1995).
Among rural families, however, the changes brought by socialism meant that women were
more likely to be isolated in their villages as men commuted to factories and towns to work (Bringa
1995; Woodward 1985). It was also common in the first decades of socialism for villagers, especially
Muslims, to flout the law by holding girls back from schooling (Haski 2000).36 While this problem
decreased over time, it points to another aspect of the uneven “emancipation” of women in
37 There were token exceptions to the lack of women in politics. Milka Planinc, who served as Prime
Minister in the 1980s, is well remembered as one of the few women to hold significant political office in the history
of Yugoslavia. According to Ramet, she was placed in this position partly in response to feminist criticism about the
lack of women in decision-making positions (1999:102). Other important “exceptions” were Savka Dabevi-Kuar
and Latinka Perovi, both prominent party leaders and eventual renegades in Croatia and Serbia, respectively (thanks
to Dennison Rusinow for pointing out the latter two).
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Yugoslavia (Žarkov 1991) and especially in Bosnia with its large rural and Muslim populations. This
problem has resurfaced since the end of the Bosnian war among the rural poor of all religious
backgrounds, indicating a persistence of patriarchal gender ideologies.
Ultimately, despite many gains for women– including rates of employment and education that
far outstripped those in the “west”– Yugoslav socialism failed to achieve gender equality. In fact,
Žarkov argues that the (deceptive) prosperity of the 1970s contributed more to women’s
emancipation than did socialist policies of legal equality (1999). Patriarchal norms prevailed on
many levels. Although women had moved into paid employment in large numbers, they remained
concentrated in sex-stereotyped jobs of low status and pay (Denich 1977). Despite legal safeguards
and generous maternity leaves, pregnant workers were sometimes laid off and many employers were
up-front about preferring to hire men (Sklevicky 1989b; Woodward 1985). The biggest indicator of
socialism’s failure, in the eyes of Yugoslav and western feminist critics, was women’s continued
responsibility for housework and childcare (Benderly 1997a; Jancar 1988, 1990; Morokvasi 1986;
Woodward 1985). Susan Woodward (1985) pointed to the contradictions in socialist state policy
which simultaneously preached women’s equality in the workplace and politics, i.e. in traditionally
male spheres, and also sought to strengthen the family as the provider of early childhood education
and care of the elderly. These tasks continued to fall to women. As a result, women had less time or
incentive to work for advancement into high-status and higher paying jobs or for active roles in
politics37 (Jancar-Webster 1988, 1990; Ramet 1984; Staki-Domuz 1998; Woodward 1985; Žarkov
1999). Indeed, gender ideologies in which women considered care for their homes and families their
primary purpose persisted (Jancar 1988: 8-9; Mili 1994), even to the extent that motherhood
continued to be equated with womanhood (Žarkov 1999: chapter 1).
Sexual norms also underwent change as a result of socialism and urbanization, but again,
unevenly (ibid.). During my fieldwork, the most liberal attitudes were found in cities and larger
towns and among the educated. Except among the religious and some villagers, virginity was no
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longer demanded of brides, though it was often assumed. The sexual double standard was alive and
well, as were enduring suspicions about female sexual activities. Unmarried women were careful not
to develop a reputation as “easy” (rospija); married women were seen as respectable when they
restricted their outings to work, performing domestic duties (shopping, accompanying children), or
going to respectable places in the company of their husbands or other women. In the following
chapters we will see how women of all ages faced various social restrictions in their freedom of
mobility and association.
Histories of Women’s Organizing and Feminism(s) in Bosnia
Many of my informants told me that women’s organizing and especially feminism were
completely new to Bosnia since the recent war and its aftermath. Of course, they told me, there had
been the AFŽ (Anti-fascist Front of Women), but they dismissed this as a quaint, comical detail from
the socialist past, a state initiative (originating outside Bosnia) lacking any relevance in the present.
While women’s activism and the degree to which the concept of feminism has been accepted and
considered have truly mushroomed in the 1990's, there is much women’s history in Bosnia which
seems to have been erased in the public consciousness. Indeed, the history of women’s political
organizing has been largely forgotten with each successive change in social and political systems
throughout the recent history of Bosnia and Yugoslavia (see Sklevicky 1989b).
Women’s history in Bosnia has been overshadowed by movements in the larger cities of
Belgrade and Zagreb. Similarly, the participation of Muslim (Bosniac) women is all but absent in
the literature. This could partly be because Muslim women were not quite as active in public
campaigns as their Serb and Croat counterparts, especially before World War II. However, it is more
likely that studies of women’s activities written before the most recent war did not pay significant
attention to ethnic differentiation among women as the primary issue was gender. In any case,
participants in socialist women’s initiatives were unlikely to have been involved as “Muslim
women,” but simply as “women.” 
According to Serbian woman’s historian Neda Božinovi, women in Bosnia-Herzegovina
first began organizing themselves into societies and associations in the middle of the second half of
the 19th century, about the same time that women in other parts of what was to become Yugoslavia
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began organizing similar groups (Božinovi n.d.: 2). These societies mostly engaged in educational
and humanitarian work and many of them were organized on the basis of religion or ethnic
membership (ibid.). During the period between the two World Wars, societies of intellectuals began
to concern themselves with the “emancipation” and education of Muslim women, offering, as did
the Sarajevo and Belgrade branches of Gajret, scholarships and female dormitories to enable female
students to attend university (Miliši 1999: 228). In this period, women’s organizations continued
their humanitarian work but also branched out into political and feminist campaigns through which
they joined international feminist movements of the 1920's and 30's (Božinovi n.d.; Slapšak 2000).
Among several initiatives of socialist and bourgeois feminists formed on the level of Yugoslavia
(and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), many included branches in Sarajevo. These
groups were the first to agitate for civic and political rights for women, including voting rights
(Benderly 1997a; Božinovi n.d.; Emmert 1999).
Muslim women are seldom mentioned in these accounts, despite the fact that there did seem
to exist a few urban, educated Muslim women in Sarajevo and other towns who did not veil or
confine themselves within the high walls of their houses (see oilas and Gae 1995) as many Muslim
women did at the time (Božinovi 1996: 92; Erlich 1966). The absence of Muslim women in these
initiatives was so striking that a lone Muslim woman, Rasema Bisi, who came from Sarajevo to
attend a Yugoslavia-wide women’s congress in Zagreb in 1920, caused delighted surprise and
prompted praise from the other women activists in one bourgeois feminist organization for her
bravery in defiance of threats of harm upon her return to Sarajevo (Emmert 1999: 42). 
Socialist feminists gained strength as part of Tito’s Partizan movement during the Second
World War. The Partizans held as a matter of socialist principle that women were equal with men
(Jancar-Webster 1990). Indeed, many female Partizans (Partizanke) fought, were killed and
captured, and became National Heroes during the war. It was then that the Anti-fascist Front of
Women (AFŽ) was formed at a congress in the Bosnian town of Bosanski Petrovac (Božinovi 1996;
Jancar-Webster 1999, 1990; Kecman 1978). However, the AFŽ could only draw support in areas
under Partizan control during the war. As many Muslim communities were suspicious of the
Partizans, the AFŽ remained weak in these areas (Jancar-Webster 1990: 157). Still, Bosnian Muslim
women did participate in the AFŽ, though not in top leadership positions. They were especially
38 Ironically, Sklevicky pointed out, the demands and goals of the AFŽ differed little from those of the
“bourgeois feminist” groups of the pre-war period, which were soundly denounced by the  socialists. T he main
difference between these two camps, she argued, lay in their tactics and strategies (Sklevicky 1984; 1989a).
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active after the war in campaigns to abolish the wearing of face veils and the confinement of Muslim
women (Achkoska 2002: 187; Miliši 1999).
The AFŽ as a whole was a strong movement of committed women’s activists whose goals
were decidedly political. Yugoslav women’s historian Lydia Sklevicky argued that before it was
disbanded, the AFŽ had been developing into a significant autonomous women’s organization with
political goals which were separate from the broader socialist movement (Sklevicky 1984, 1989b).
Official socialist doctrine, however, held that the “woman question” could not be separated from
class issues (Benderly 1997a; Jancar 1988; Ramet 1999).38 The AFŽ activists struggled, often
contradictorily, with maintaining their separate women’s agenda within the larger socialist cause.
There is no denying that AFŽ activists were committed to the socialist cause, nor that the AFŽ was
an arm of the Party, which used the organization for its own purposes. Indeed, the AFŽ was used to
achieve many of the Party’s goals including civilian and military support to the Partizan fighters
(Jancar-Webster 1990), educating women to support the building of a post-war socialist society
(Sklevicky 1989a), and the campaign for de-veiling of Muslim women (Achkoska 2002;
Penava1981; Radi 1995: 214-218; Miliši 1999). As this benefit began to be outweighed by the
dangers the AFŽ posed as an autonomous organization dealing separately with a specific issue, Party
officials gradually broke up the AFŽ’s organizational structure into smaller, more ineffective units,
and the political (feminist) elements of their program were sharply curtailed. Ultimately, the AFŽ
was disbanded in 1953, its name ceasing to officially exist (for more details see Benderly 1997a;
Jancar-Webster 1990; Sklevicky 1984; 1989a). The name has remained, however, in colloquial
speech as a pejorative label for any independent women’s political initiative or often even merely
gatherings of women, unaccompanied by males, in public places.
Since political activity could only be tied to the Party, the end of the AFŽ left little
opportunity for any mass movement or activities of women on gender/women’s issues. Indeed, when
it dismantled the AFŽ, the state declared the “woman question” to have been solved (Jancar-Webster
1990: 166). Men and women were now equal and any challenge to the contrary would be an intrusion
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by bourgeois feminist ideas, an ideology unnecessary for the emancipated women of Yugoslavia
(Benderly 1997a; Drakuli-Ili 1984; Slapšak 2000: 36). Furthermore, the process of integration of
women’s activities into the rest of the party/state apparatus meant, according to Sklevicky, that
“emancipation became something ‘practiced’ on women, as inarticulate objects of the social-political
process, instead of making them its legitimate subject.” (Sklevicky 1989a: 105). This “top-down”
model was to leave a lasting impression on women in Yugoslavia, including many of my Bosnian
informants in 1999-2000.
After it was disbanded, some of the work of the AFŽ continued, though in much diluted
form, through the Union of Women’s Associations and later (from 1961) the Yugoslav Conference
for the Social Activity of Women (Jancar-Webster 1990: 166). The latter was a highly decentralized,
loose grouping of regional organizations, including the localized, unconnected “women’s actives,”
or aktivi žena, organized through Party units at various levels (Sklevicky 1989a: 103). These groups,
as well as some charity and cultural societies, continued throughout the rest of the socialist period
as the main form of women’s community action in Bosnia until just before the recent war. It is these
groups which, I argue in the following section, established a model for much of the way women’s
organizing developed during and after the 1990's war.  
An aktiv žena acted as a sort of women’s auxiliary section to local Party cells. They were a
structure through which women, like youth, undertook collective action in their communities–
cleaning up parks and streams, collecting clothing for orphan children, cooking for community
events– and also went on sightseeing and leisure excursions together. These groups supported party
policies but they did not engage in political debates, reflection, or activities on any issue, including
those of women or gender. Since the party had declared women sufficiently emancipated, there was
no need for any special attention to women’s lives or problems. Several of my women’s NGO
informants recalled the activities of Aktiv Žena groups with disdain, as social and charity groups at
best and tools of the party-state at the worst. One NGO leader explained this lack of political
awareness saying, “They never talked about what other women in the world did, what things were
like for them.” In short, these groups had lost the gender-critical edge and autonomous activism of
the early AFŽ and had turned into a social outlet for women in an essentially patriarchal socialist
society (see Jancar-Webster 1990; Sklevicky 1989a).
39 Ramet (1995) dates the beginnings of the neo-feminist activities to the mid 1960s in Zagreb, though most
accounts begin with the 1970's.
40 The term “movement” may be misleading, as some observers have questioned whether feminist activities
of this period were strong enough and organized enough to earn this characterization. The late Belgrade feminist and
anthropologist, Žarana Papi, wrote that “before 1989 and before the war in Yugoslavia, we could say that although
we didn’t have a feminist movement in ex-Yugoslavia, we had feminists.” (Papi 1995: 19, emphasis added).
However, as Žarkov points out, the fact that feminists enjoyed visib ility in the press and other spaces of public
discourse, and that first socialist and later nationalist governments “considered them important enough to fight
against,” (1999: chapter 1, p. 20) was an indication that feminism had achieved some level of influence.
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In the larger cities of Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana, in the meantime, there seem to have
been many women still interested in AFŽ-like activism. Slapšak reports that in Belgrade in the
1970's,39 veterans of the AFŽ era appeared at meetings of the burgeoning new Yugoslav feminism,
“eager to explain how their movement had been repressed after the war, and how they [had] waited
for something similar to happen again” (2000: 37). These meetings in Belgrade, Zagreb, and
Ljubljana were the beginning of a “neo-feminist” (Jancar-Webster 1988, 1990) or “second wave”
feminist movement40 which was to develop a gender-based critique of socialism (Benderly 1997a;
Drakuli 1993a; Ramet 1999). The women involved mostly belonged to an educated, urban elite;
many of them were social science academics and journalists. While this movement grew modestly
in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana, it did not take hold in Bosnia, although women from Sarajevo,
notably Nada Ler-Sofroni, participated in feminist conferences and published feminist articles in
the local press (Slapšak 2000: 58). Furthermore, many women and girls in Bosnia read the writings
of Zagreb and Belgrade feminists in the Yugoslav press, a fact that must not be forgotten when
considering the antecedents of feminist or woman-centered consciousness in wartime and post-war
Bosnia.
While it is beyond the scope of this project, it would be interesting to explore the reasons for
the non-development of feminist groups in Bosnia, beyond stereotypical assumptions implied by
many outside observers that Bosnian society, especially Muslim society, was (and is?) too
conservative and patriarchal for women to attempt such a critique. The answer is more likely to be
found in the prevailing political climate in Sarajevo in the 1970's, which was much more closed than
in the other cities at the time due to attempts to suppress Bosnia’s political cleavages and the
republican government’s strict loyalty to the party-state (Friedman 1997; Rusinow 1985; Slapšak
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2000). This atmosphere also encompassed the universities. In fact, many people left Sarajevo for
Zagreb and Belgrade at that time seeking wider intellectual and professional opportunities (Slapšak
2000). 
This second-wave feminist movement did, however, contribute to the specific development
of women’s organizing and feminism in Bosnia after the collapse of socialism and especially after
the war. The academic feminist movement of the 1980's spawned a generation of feminist activists
who initiated domestic violence hotlines and political pressure groups in the late 1980's and early
1990's in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana (Benderly 1997a; Slapšak 2000; Žarkov 1999). These
groups were in place when Yugoslavia began its violent break-up. They led the efforts to aid women
victims of war and to publicize the news of mass rapes of women happening in Bosnia (see Benderly
1997b; Devi 2000; Kesi 1994; Mladjenovi and Litricin 1993). Some feminist organizations,
mostly in Zagreb, took the side of local nationalists on this issue, declaring Croatian and Muslim
women victims of a uniquely Serbian campaign against the Croat and Muslim peoples (Benderly
1997b; Kesi 1994; Žarkov 1999). These groups forged links with Bosnian women refugees, who
were in turn inspired to form their own women’s organizations (such as Žena BiH and Biser) and
later to carry these initiatives to Bosnia. Srcem do mira, discussed in chapters 5 and 7, was one of
the groups these women formed when they returned to Bosnia.
Most of the veterans of second-wave Yugoslav feminism remained staunchly anti-nationalist.
Feminist groups in Belgrade and anti-nationalist feminists in Zagreb included many such veterans
as well as members of the newer generation of feminists. These groups coalesced around their
opposition to nationalism, militarism, and sexism. They endured harassment from local nationalist
governments and media for their positions, especially on the wartime rapes in Bosnia and Croatia
(Kesi 1994). They refused to see the rapes only as ethnic attacks and instead insisted on the gender
aspect– these were first and foremost crimes against women, though they did not deny the ethnic
component. (I discuss these stances further in chapter 4.) As a reflection of their anti-nationalist
convictions, these women determinedly maintained contact with each other despite many obstacles
and hostile borders between Serbia and Croatia (Benderly 1997b; Teršeli 1997; Žarkov 1999). It
was this motive and their concern for what was happening to women in the war zones which led
these anti-nationalist feminists to organize aid for Bosnian refugee women in their local communities
59
and to contact women in Bosnia even during the war. These contacts– through the Zamir (“for
peace”) email network, sending packages and letters, and even some visits– formed a bond that
would be nurtured after the war as the number of Bosnian women’s groups, including those that
accepted feminism, grew.
Historical Legacies
During and after the most recent war, foreign and local observers alike frequently assumed
that the accompanying explosion of women’s organizations, including some that embrace feminism,
was the sole product of international intervention, especially from the west. However, as I show
below, much of the way in which current women’s groups are organized and the philosophies by
which they operate can be traced to women’s initiatives of the past and attitudes about them. I refer
mostly to the AFŽ and the system of aktivi žena under socialism, but there are also elements which
can be traced to the “bourgeois” women’s movements of the 1920's and 1930's and simply to general
social patterns.
During my fieldwork, I often heard disparaging references to the AFŽ. Women and men alike
seemed to dismiss it as a long-past element of socialist kitsch and utopian campaigns. For some it
represented a more threatening image of “aggressive” women making demands. On one occasion
during my fieldwork, during a League of Women Voters round table in the west Herzegovinan town
of Široki Brijeg, the mere appearance of a large group of women in a hotel restaurant normally
dominated by men was enough for some men gathered there for a long lunch (complete with wine
and brandy) to condescendingly intone, “Ugh, here’s the AFŽ” (Uf, evo AFŽa) for everyone to hear.
One man who had apparently seen a poster advertising the round table theme “Towards Equality,”
approached one of the women organizers and said, “So you’re the group for equality, huh? What do
you need that for? You’re already more than equal!” (E, vi ste ona grupa za ravnopravnost, je’l? Šta
e vam to? Vi ste ve nadravnopravne!). The women participants, who came from various towns
nearby as well as other areas of Bosnia, were amused but irritated and began exchanging stories
among themselves about similar attitudes toward their organizing they had endured from men in their
communities. As we finished our coffee break and began to file back into the hotel, there were
several loud, purposeful belches from the men’s table. Clearly they were threatened by the women’s
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“invasion” of “their” space, both in the restaurant and as political actors. The women were equally
dismissive of the men’s behavior, chalking it up to men’s consistent efforts to exclude women from
the political arena.
Despite these associations, the impact of the AFŽ, and that of all socialist policies of sex
equality, was substantial. Svetlana Slapšak, in arguing for a gendered history of conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, writes of the immediate post-war period and the activities of the AFŽ:
I cannot underline enough the positive effects this politics [sic] had for Yugoslav
women: gaining rights, equality, liberty and self-confidence, assured basic health and
family protection, the will and possibility to work, a high level of feminine
consciousness and a sense of initiative. Although this privileged epoch for women
was relatively short, the results in the collective women’s attitude remained much
longer. (2000: 34)
While I found much evidence of women’s reluctance to engage themselves in the public sphere,
especially politics, I nonetheless agree that some degree of confidence and sense of entitlement
existed for women, at least in the realms of employment, education, and social benefits (see Gal and
Kligman 2000: 111). Even among women and men who embraced very patriarchal notions about
women’s roles (as mothers, homemakers, care-givers and wives) or who emphatically rejected
communist/socialist ideas, the presence of women in the workplace and the many rights they enjoyed
under socialism were often taken for granted. In one sense, then, the legacy of socialism on gender
relations is that women have gained the freedom and social validation to pursue high levels of
education, to work outside the home, and to be active in the public sphere. However, as  we have
seen, socialism did little to dislodge traditional patriarchal values and practices. These attitudes
among women and men have persisted in the recent post-war period.
Furthermore, in terms of women’s activism and political initiatives, after the dilution of the
AFŽ’s agenda and its ultimate demise, women were left with virtually no channels through which
to engage society on the “woman question” or any questions of gender. The rich history of women’s
organizing and feminist social critiques was obscured and labeled bourgeois by the socialist
authorities, while the sharp political edge of Party-related women’s activities has also been largely
41 Skevicky notes that the image of the socialist woman, for which the AFŽ and the Party professed to be
fighting, underwent a drastic change between the 1940's and 1950 onward. Though never made explicit, the
emphasis moved to “traditionally ‘feminine’ issues...: family, housekeeping, fashion, popular medicine,
entertainment, cultural life, etc. The ‘ serious’ subjects, i.e. general political themes, gradually faded away. The
image of the ascetic combatant-cum-worker-cum-political activist was gradually and silently being abandoned.”
(Skevicky 1989a: 104).
42 On the other hand, the fact that most socialist policies towards women gained such wide acceptance, at
least among the secular, urban middle-class and elites, meant that there was little support in Bosnia for nationalist
and religious calls to roll back rights and provisions benefitting women as happened in so many other post-socialist
states (see e.g., Gal and Kligman 2000; Funk and M ueller 1993).
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forgotten in the collective memory (Sklevicky 1989b).41 To be sure, the memory of the AFŽ and
women Partizan fighters (Partizanke) are still very much alive. However most people I encountered,
including many women and women activists, viewed those activities as no longer necessary since,
with the AFŽ and the Party, women achieved formal equality, the right to vote, access to education
and jobs, social benefits, etc. (though some felt socialism had gone too far). The impression was
widespread that there was thus no need for women’s activism or feminism in Bosnia. I repeatedly
heard that “women have all their rights” and that “there is no discrimination against women.” Indeed,
I met many members and leaders of women’s organizations who maintained that women only needed
support in carrying out their familial duties, recovering from wartime trauma, and in making ends
meet financially. In other words, women need help to overcome the consequences of the war– as
victims– and in fulfilling their domestic roles, but not in fighting for improved social status or
political rights. This impression made it more difficult for feminists or any activists who publicly
challenge the patriarchal underpinnings of the present system, just as it had for the second wave
feminists of Yugoslavia. What were they agitating for when women had complete equal rights?42
It is precisely this model of state-directed “emancipation” that was carried over to the
generations born under socialism who would become members of women’s organizations in post-
war Bosnia. Azra, a Medica activist in her mid 20's, conveyed both the widespread sense of
entitlement for women (to certain rights, social benefits, and legal recognition) and also the
impression she and the other women of Medica had had about their possibilities for engaging in
women’s activism:
With us it was a spontaneous reaction. We didn’t think about it. We had our rights
43 Here she refers to March 8 th, International Women’s Day, which was promoted by the socialist
government. It remains a popularly observed holiday even in the post-war period, despite clamorings from Islamists
(in Bosniac-majority areas) that it be  ignored for being “communist” and “un-Islamic.”
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and holidays43 under socialism. When we met the German women we realized that
in the west, they had had to fight for this kind of thing! ... I never realized before that
something could be organized on these issues, some kind of struggle. I knew about
the AFŽ but I thought that was for the state to organize because under socialism
women did have some sort of valued status. But now, many women don’t know
about feminism, their rights, or even the fact that they took over a powerful role
during the war without the men. 
Feminism and activism for Azra were thus spontaneous, a response to the conditions of women’s
suffering during the war. I return in chapter 6 to the specific articulations of Bosnian feminism.
Still, when the war began in 1992 and again after Dayton, there were models for women’s
community engagement: the aktivi žena, and the women’s cells of the AFŽ organized in villages and
towns to support the military. Indeed, in some places the same women from the socialist era aktivs
were the ones who organized themselves during and after the recent war. In wartime, the women
performed many of the same tasks as their WWII predecessors (see Jancar-Webster 1990; Sklevicky
1989a). They cooked hot meals and knitted sweaters for the soldiers at the front, cared for the
wounded, and gathered donations to help the elderly and the most needy in their communities. Some
of these organizations even called themselves “Aktiv Žena.” Many post-war women’s organizations
proudly displayed the certificates they had received from the army for supporting the war effort and
aiding soldiers. When the war ended, many of the wartime groups stayed together, and some new
groups formed, on the model of the socialist era aktivs, functioning mainly as a social outlet and
source of mutual aid but also undertaking various charity initiatives. The activities of these
organizations were, however, altered to accommodate the post-war situation of women and the
donor-driven NGO economy. I take this up again in chapter 5. First, however, we must turn to the
events of the war.
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CHAPTER FOUR
WARTIME: GENDER, NATIONALISM, AND MASS RAPE
Introduction
This chapter outlines the circumstances around the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia and
the subsequent Bosnian war as they pertain to women and understandings of gender. Wartime events,
the debates surrounding them, and the outside interventions they provoked, provided the basis for
many of the categories of identity and concrete issues around which women’s organizations
organized themselves during and after the war. My aim is to show how those categories were formed
in order to establish the underpinnings of women’s subsequent expressions of identity and their
organizational and representational strategies as activists. Because this study is based on women
activists in Muslim/Bosniac dominated areas, I concentrate on discourses, policies, and agendas
circulating in and affecting those areas. I leave a similar examination of Serb and Croat dominated
areas of Bosnia for another study.
In this chapter, I first discuss the politicization of ethno-national and religious identities
encouraged under socialism and expressed through the rise of nationalist politics and the outbreak
of war. I then examine the gendered logic of ethnic violence, wartime rape, and sexual violence and
their impact on women and gender constructions. I also discuss the debates sparked, mostly among
feminists, about the rapes and how they were represented by nationalists, feminists, and others. The
final section of this chapter examines how gendered experiences of war, especially ethnic cleansing
campaigns, mass rapes, and the politicization of ethnic and religious identities, defined the issues
for women’s organizations of all orientations, propelling them to organize and providing them with
a measure of moral legitimacy as public actors. The intersection of these wartime legacies with those
of the socialist and pre-socialist periods, discussed in the previous chapter, profoundly affected the
possibilities, limitations and agendas of post-war women’s organizing.
Ethnic, National, and Religious Identities
Ethno-national identity and its primary marker, religious identity, quickly became the
dominant categories of identity in Bosnia as part of the process of the dissolution of socialist
44 Nikolai Botev (Botev and W agner 1993; B otev 2000) argues that rates of mixed marriage in Yugoslavia
were actually quite low and therefore did  not signal social cohesion (see also S imic 1994). This persuasively
underscores the observation that an all-encompassing “Yugoslav” identity never took hold in significant numbers in
Yugoslavia. However, as V.P. Gagnon (1993, 1994) pointed out in response to Botev and Simic, looking at
Yugoslavia as a whole, with its many regions of ethnic homogeneity, is misleading. He argues that levels of mixed
marriage in mixed ethnic regions such as much of Bosnia-Herzegovina were quite high in relative terms, even though
overall Yugoslav levels remained lower.
45 Differing percentages have been calculated for mixed marriages in Bosnia: Burg and Shoup give the
number 15.3%  for 1981 (1999: 42), Bogosavljevi calculated 16.8% for the same year (1992:32-3); John A. Fine
asserts that 30-40% of urban marriages were mixed as of 1990 (1993: 2). Nikolai Botev (2000) offers the following
percentages: 1962-64 1970-72 1980-82 1987-89
11.4 9.5 12.2 11.9
46 In fact, several scholars point out that most Bosnian mixed marriages involved Serbs and Croats rather
than Muslims. Bogosavljevi calculated that 95.3% of Muslim women and 92.9% of Muslim men married other
Muslims (Bogosavljevi 1992: 32-3).
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Yugoslavia. For many urban Bosnians, who had not taken much notice of others’ ethnic or religious
affiliations under socialism, it seemed that such awareness was suddenly thrust upon them with the
election of nationalist parties, disputes over the future of Bosnia, and the outbreak of ethnic war.
Parents told of their shock when children came home from school during the build-up to the war,
wanting to know “what am I?” I was told over and over that ethnicity had not mattered “before,” that
members of all groups had “lived side by side without problems.” For some, this was entirely
accurate. In general, however, it was an over-simplification, told to foreigners, to other Bosnians,
and to the speakers themselves (see Živkovi 2001), as a way of countering images of Bosnia (and
the Balkans) as a nationalist hotbed where ethnic hatred ran deep (e.g., Kaplan 1993). It was also a
claim to moral superiority, refusing to succumb to what, in Bosniac areas, was seen as the evils
encouraged by Serb and Croat nationalisms, i.e., separatism, ethnic exclusion, and genocide. 
Muslims, Croats, and Serbs had lived peacefully in the same communities, sharing their lives
with each other, even intermarrying.44 Bosnia-Herzegovina had the highest rate of “mixed marriages”
of any Yugoslav republic.45 Yet this applied more to the secularized, urban population. Villages
remained ethnically homogeneous, or were divided into ethnic neighborhoods. As Tone Bringa’s
work (1995) shows, village relations of exchange and mutual help crossed ethnic and religious
boundaries, yet intermarriage was rare.46 The many stories I was told about pre-war life in smaller
towns and villages confirmed this. Milica, an educated woman of Serb background living in Bosniac-
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dominated Zenica, grew up in a central Bosnian market town. In attempting to explain to me a
different quality “in the mentality of Bosnia” (in contrast to Serbia and Croatia), she characterized
this as “a kind of tolerance which means putting up with others.” She continued:
I’m thinking about this in the context of the pre-war, multi-ethnic Bosnia that I grew
up in. You knew what you could say to whom and what you couldn’t, what subjects
not to pursue with neighbors of other ethno-religious groups (nacije). You tolerated
lots of things because you knew it was better not to push. This was especially true in
terms of putting your neck out in public and exposing your position, especially in any
criticism of the government. And women were especially not used to having deep
conversations.... Most of all national and religious things were off limits to really
probing conversations, which is a good thing I think. 
Others told of a profound respect for members of other nacije, of attending each others’ religious and
cultural celebrations, and of enduring cross-ethnic kinship and exchange networks. There was a clear
sense of differences marked and maintained among groups (Bringa 1995; Lockwood 1975),
simultaneous coexistence and competition (Bringa 1995: 17-18; Hayden 2002). As Xavier Bougarel
writes, “the words ‘tolerance,’ ‘hate,’ ‘coexistence,’ and ‘fear’ are all equally applicable. In essence,
they are complementary or consecutive rather than contradictory.” (1996: 87).
Under socialism, with urbanization and secularization, such differences had significantly
diminished in importance, yet they were still present. Cornelia Sorabji’s ethnography set in a Muslim
mahala (quarter) in Sarajevo (1989) makes clear that ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods and
moral communities existed, even in the capital. Like the differences Bringa describes between the
village and the wider world (towns), the inscription of space in the city also delineated the “ethnic,”
private space of the mahala from the non-ethnic (and multi-ethnic), public space of the city center.
Still, until the breakdown of state authority, the institution of komšiluk, or good neighborliness,
promoted smooth relations despite ethno-religious differences, especially in the mixed urban
apartment high-rises in the newer parts of the cities and towns (see Bougarel 1996).
On the political scene, however, ethno-national differences were actually fostered, despite
official state doctrine of “brotherhood and unity” among nations (narodi) and nationalities
(narodnosti), and in contrast to the assertions of many scholars and journalists that socialism had
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“frozen” nationalist consciousness (Bougarel 1996). National (ethnic) differences were maintained
and even reinforced through census categories and carefully balanced power-sharing mechanisms
that reserved positions in governing bodies for members of each nation, or nationality (the klju, or
“key,” system of ethnic quotas) (Bringa 1995: 12-36; Bougarel 1996; Burg 1983; Rusinow 1982,
1985). Žarkov thus points out that, under socialism, “ethnicity became the most significant channel
through which power was distributed,” and concludes that, “nationalism in former Yugoslavia did
not replace socialism, but actually grew out of it” (1999: chapter 1, p. 9).
For Bosnia, one of the most significant measures undertaken by the Yugoslav state was the
official creation, in time for the 1971 census, of a Muslim narod, or nation/people, designated
Muslimani with a capital “M” (distinct from the religious muslimani with a small “m”). This placed
Bosnian Muslims on par with the other five narodi of Yugoslavia, which included Serbs and Croats.
Before this designation, Muslims went through several different census categories through which
they declared themselves– as Serbs or Croats, “undeclared,” or “Muslims, ethnic adherence” (Bringa
1995; Bougarel 1996; Burg 1983; Irwin 1984; Ramet 1985; Rusinow 1982, 1985). For some, this
change indicated a long overdue validation of the collective cultural identity of the Bosnian Muslims
and a hope that the designation would silence longstanding claims by Serbs and Croats that the
Muslims were “really” Islamicized Serbs or Croats, respectively. The move was mostly made for
political reasons, to satisfy Bosnian Muslim demands, impress Muslim allies in the Non-Aligned
Movement, and because the socialist state hoped to introduce a balance to competing claims to
power in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bringa 1995; Burg 1983; Rusinow 1982; Sorabji 1989). Žarkov
argues that the name “Muslim” as an ethnonym confirmed the impossibility of imagining religiously
diverse ethnic categories in Yugoslavia. In other words, from that point forward, all Croats were
necessarily Catholic and all Serbs were necessarily Orthodox (1999: chap. 1, p. 9). I would argue that
this categorization merely confirmed a social reality (Bringa 1995; Sorabji 1989) which at the time
would have been difficult to reverse in the way Žarkov suggests. Nevertheless, this religious-ethnic
categorization was to have political and social consequences during the break-up of socialist
Yugoslavia and contributed to the politicization of religion as the primary marker of ethnic
difference in Bosnia.
Nationalism and ethnic consciousness were thus alive and well when Yugoslavia began its
47 A full outline of the events leading up to the outbreak of war in Bosnia is beyond the scope of this study.
Among many accounts, see e.g. Bougarel 1996; Burg & Shoup 1999; Woodward 1995.
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final slide into disintegration in the 1980's. After the death in 1980 of President for life Josip Broz
Tito, power devolved more and more to the republics, most of which were defined in ethnic terms
as the homeland of one of Yugoslavia’s six peoples. Bosnia-Herzegovina was the only republic not
associated with one dominant ethnic group; “Bosnian,” a common term of identification, was strictly
a regional distinction. Because Muslims held a plurality of the population in Bosnia, some Muslim
leaders began arguing as early as the early 1980's that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be redefined as
the national republic of the Muslims (Rusinow 1985: 151). The dwindling of a strong central
authority and a “nationalist transfer of economic and political frustrations” to the republics and
regions led to a reevaluation of national identities, religious revivals, and an increasing reliance on
“communitarian,” or ethno-national, political thinking (Bougarel 1996).
Thus, when the first multi-party elections were held in 1990, the majority voted along ethnic
lines (ibid.). The national(ist), or ethnically based parties in Bosnia were thus in a position to contest
dominance in the republic, against each other and among themselves. Serb leaders called for Bosnia
to remain in Yugoslavia (with their fellow Serbs in Serbia) or have it partitioned along ethnic lines;
Muslims concluded they could not remain in a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia if Croatia seceded (which
it did) and insisted on an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Croats went along with plans for
independence until they could launch a military campaign to wrest predominantly Croat lands from
Bosnia and join them to Croatia (Bougarel 1996; Burg & Shoup 1999). The war broke out when
political negotiations failed and Bosnia declared independence (after Serb representatives had walked
out of the parliament).47 The logic of ethnic control of territory, enshrined in European ideologies
of the nation-state, led to brutal campaigns of “ethnic cleansing” waged by Serb and then Croat
forces, but to a lesser extent by the Muslim-led Bosnian Army. Ethnic cleansing was aimed at
clearing ethnic others and all symbols of their ethnic otherness, especially mosques and churches,
from the land (Borneman 1998; Denich 1994; Hayden 1996a). These campaigns had a specifically
gendered component, which I explore below.
Independence and war also brought an attempt on the part of the Muslim leadership to
strengthen the ethnic identity of the nation over the religious while simultaneously strengthening the
48 This term had been promoted during the Austrian occupation and annexation of Bosnia (1878-1917) by
the Hapsburg governor of the province, Benjamin Kallay. Originally intended as an overarching national category
that would encompass all Bosnians, it only took hold among Muslims (Banac 1984: 360-1).
The term resurfaced in the early 1980's in the rhetoric of “secular” nationalists who advocated a leading role for
Muslims in the  concept of “bošnjaštvo,” or “Bosnianhood” (Rusinow 1985). In the early 1990's, soon after the
founding of the SDA, secular nationalists, who had promoted the term as a communal rather than strictly religious
term, were forced out of the party by the pan-Islamist wing (Bougarel 1997a, 1996). The pan-Islamists nevertheless
began promoting the Bošnjak term, though with a strong Islamic emphasis.
49 See the Dayton Agreement and other governing documents compiled by the international community at
http://www.ohr.int .
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group’s ties to the territory of Bosnia. This was accomplished through the (re)introduction of
“Bosniac” (Bošnjak) as a replacement for “Muslim.”48 Since 1993, the term Bosniac has gradually
gained acceptance, especially in official parlance. The international community, for example,
enshrined the term into the Dayton Peace Agreement and its subsequent documents.49 However, Serb
and Croat politicians tend to retain the term “Muslim,” as do many “ordinary” people of all ethnic
backgrounds, whether for political reasons or because they simply find it difficult to shake the habit.
“Muslim,” therefore, was still understood in cultural/ethnic terms, as before the war. Additionally,
while official usage has made clear that Bosniac refers only to the Muslims, some confusion remains
about this term, as some Bosnians I met defined “Bosniac” as referring to all Bosnians regardless
of religious or ethnic background. When not specifically asked for their definition, however, nearly
everyone used the geographical term “Bosnian,” or Bosanac, when speaking of Bosnians in general.
This usage was also politically charged, as it usually signaled support for Bosnia as a unified state
and was therefore avoided by Serbs and Croats who opposed the state. This was likely part of the
reason for the inaccurate use, especially in the English-language press, of “Bosnian” to refer to
Bosnian Muslims only.
This move away from the religious term “Muslim” did not, however, signal a distancing from
religion. In fact, Islam has remained central to official and dominant definitions of Bosniac identity
(Bougarel 1995; Maek 1997). There has been a marked resurgence in devotion to Islam (Lauševi
1996; Sorabji 1994), actively encouraged by the SDA government, and the Islamic establishment
close to it (Bougarel 1995), even though they are actively promoting the secular term Bosniac.
Nevertheless, substantial numbers of people who readily identify themselves as Bosniacs, or
Muslims (in the ethnic sense), have not embraced Islam (Maek 1997), retaining the secularism
50 In a longer study on wartime rape (Helms 1998), I examine in detail the ways in which rape in Bosnia
was represented by nationalists, feminists, and international legal codes. I summarize some of those points in this
chapter.
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which was widespread among Bosnian Muslims in the pre-war years (Bringa 1995). I return at the
end of this chapter to the ways in which changes in ethnic and religious identities during the war
affected women’s activists in the Bosniac areas of Bosnia. I first turn to one of the most contentious
and highly gendered aspects of the war: rape.
Gender, Nationalism, and Wartime Rape50
The Bosnian war brought the subject of wartime rape to world attention with reports of mass
rapes by Serb forces of Muslim and Croat women. One of the most striking elements was the
existence of “rape camps” where victims were held and repeatedly raped over long periods, often
until pregnant. The targeting of ethnic others was shown to be part of a wider campaign of “ethnic
cleansing” in which gendered bodies of the enemy were targeted for conquest through rape and other
sexual tortures as a key element in driving out undesirables, redefining the ethnicity of territory
(Žarkov 1999; and see Hayden 2000). Although facts and numbers surrounding the rapes have been
highly politicized, contested, and difficult to substantiate (Carr 1993; Kesi 1994; Laber 1993; Neier
1993), evidence does point to Serbs, especially early in the war, as the most frequent perpetrators of
ethnic rape, with mostly Muslim, but also Croat, women as their victims (Amnesty International
1993; Bassiouni 1996; Kesi 1995; Kora 1996; Stiglmayer 1994). However, males were also raped
and sexually tortured, as were Serb females; and Muslim and Croat forces also used rape and sexual
torture as weapons of war and ethnic cleansing (Bassiouni 1996; Borneman 1998; Jones 1994;
Nizich 1994; Žarkov 1999). 
During and just after the war, many academic and feminist activist analyses outlined the
broader gendering of Serbian and Croatian nationalist discourses upon which the use and
understanding of ethnic rape was built (e.g. Denich 1995; Drakuli 1993a; Kesi 1994, 1995; Kora
1996; Mili 1993; Mostov 1995; Oluji 1998; Salecl 1994; Seifert 1996; Sofos 1996; and articles
in Williams 1995). In perhaps the most extensive study, Dubravka Žarkov showed how ethnicity and
nationalism in the Croatian and Serbian media were produced through notions of gender and
51 This logic was reflected in such expressions as the “Rape of Nanking” (Brownmiller 1975) and the “Rape
of Kuwait” (Jeffords 1993). 
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sexuality in the years prior to and during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia (1999). She argued that
notions of femininity and masculinity and norms of heterosexuality... are the basic
ingredients without which ethnicity could never have been produced, without which
the process of production itself would have remained unintelligible. We would make
little out of national myths, practices of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ or stories about [the]
motherland, were they not conveyed through images of chaste maidens, refugee
women, or brave soldiers. (1999: prologue, p. 8-9).
Nationalist projects in what was Yugoslavia have not only targeted the ethnic self and the ethnic
other differently, but also men and women within these two groups, in patterns familiar from many
other contexts of gendered nationalism (e.g. Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; Enloe 1989, 1995;
McClintock 1993; Moghadam 1994; Parker et. al. 1992; West 1997; Williams 1996; Yuval-Davis
1997). While the nation’s men are cast as soldiers, politicians, and active defenders of the nation’s
territory and honor, women come to symbolize and embody the passive (feminized) nation, whose
body/land and honor must be defended by men.51 
Women also become symbols of ethno-national difference through their dress, demeanor, life
choices, and behaviors, just as women and girls reflect the honor of their families (McClintock 1993;
Mostov 1995; Schein 1996; C. Smith 1996; Tohidi 1996). Carol Smith (1996) argues that groups
such as nations which define themselves along ethnic lines rely on specific controls of female
sexuality as a way of ensuring ethnic and cultural purity. One reflection of this imperative are
pronatalist campaigns targeting women of the nation– emphasizing motherhood, providing
incentives for women to bear many children, and restricting abortion and contraception, all of which
happened in the Yugoslav successor states, especially Serbia and Croatia (Bracewell 1996; Drakuli
1993a; Mostov 1995; Salecl 1994; Sofos 1996). Women’s active roles were thus reduced to their
reproductive activities, as bearers and also nurturers of new (loyal) members of the nation, future
male soldiers and female “reproducers of the nation” (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; Bracewell
1996). 
Following from this logic, restrictions on women are also justified to defend them “from the
52 This explanation was also applied to other conflicts, as when the rape of (shorter, darker) Bengali women
by (taller, lighter) Pakistani troops in 1971 was said to be an army policy to “create a new race” (Brownmiller
1975:86). In Rwanda, Hutu soldiers raped and mutilated Tutsi women, often cutting away long noses and long
fingers associated with being Tutsi, as well as mutilating women’s genitals, an attack on their femaleness and
capacity to give birth (N owrojee 1996:62-5). One Tutsi woman reported  Hutu soldiers exhorting each other to, “Kill
them, you have to kill them. They will make Tutsi babies” (Nowrojee 1996:54).
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allegedly insatiable sexuality of other nations’ men” (Verdery 1994: 228). The rape of women is then
seen as loss of control over women’s sexuality by men, a blow to men’s and thereby the family’s
honor. As an ethnic nation is constructed as a “family writ large” (Anderson 1983), violation of “the
nation’s women” is understood as humiliation and pollution of the nation (Das 1995; Lie 1997;
Mostov 1995; Peterson 1994; Seifert 1996; Verdery 1994). Rape is thus meaningful when “the honor
of the group (in which males are the normative actors) is determined by the honor of its women and
by the masculinity of its men” (Hayden 2000:32).
Indeed, as Veena Das noted in the case of inter-communal rapes during the partition of India
(1995), the bodies of women are merely the means through which a message is sent from one group
of men to the other. It is a message of defeat, of bolstered manliness of the self while the masculinity
of the other is wounded, even questioned for failing to protect “his” women. It thus follows that such
messages were also sent via the bodies of other men in acts of ultimate de-masculinization. In the
former Yugoslavia, this took the form of both media representations and physical acts. Ethnically
other men were placed in the feminine inferior, penetrated, and passive role through rape (see Gatens
1996; Lancaster 1995), made to perform homosexual acts on other men, or were genitally mutilated,
all acts, like the rape of women, which demasculinize men and render them unfit for nationhood or
dominance over any other group (Borneman 1998; Žarkov 1999). These images, especially of Serb
rapists in Croatian media and of Muslim rapists in Serbian media, also conformed to patterns of
“nested” Orientalist positioning common to the former Yugoslavia (Baki-Hayden 1996; Baki-
Hayden and Hayden 1992) and the feminization of the male other as described by Said (1978; and
see Borneman 1998; Žarkov 1995, 1999).
Mass rape has also been understood and portrayed in the post-Yugoslav states in a
“sociobiological” sense (Borneman 1998): committed with the aim of impregnating victims to spread
the seed of the aggressor and/or contaminate the gene pool of the victims’ ethnic/national group.52
Women’s role as reproducer of nations was in this way taken to it logical conclusion. Non-Serb
53 Žarkov found that representations in the Croatian media d iffered from those of the Serbian media, due to
their differently constructed nationalisms. While Serbian media emphasized injury to the nation/Serb men, Croatian
media emphasized the state. Thus, in the Croatian media, Muslim women appeared  as the only victims of rape, thus
preserving the purity of Croatian women (see also Kesi 1995; Lie 1997); Serb  men were depicted as the only
perpetrators of rape, solidifying the evil of the enemy; and  Muslim men were portrayed as the only male victims of
rape, allowing the (heterosexual) masculinity of Croatian men, and therefore of the nation, to remain unquestioned
and unviolated (1999: Chap. 5).
72
survivors reported being told by Serb rapists during the rapes that they were being impregnated with
the enemy’s seed and that “you will give birth to a etnik (Serb warrior)!” (Mežnari 1994a:77; and
see Ajanovi et. al. 1999; Stiglmayer 1994). One woman reported being warned that her child would
one day kill her, with the implication that the nationality of a child comes from the father while the
mother is merely a carrying vessel (Mostov 1995). Even though a mother raising such a “mixed”
child was likely to bring it up with her own ethnic identity, or, as many are reported to have done,
refuse to keep the children they bore (Stiglmayer 1994:131-7), the idea that “little Chetniks” were
being introduced into the gene pools of non-Serbs was largely accepted according to the patrilineal
rule which assigns children the identity of their fathers (Mostov 1995; Mežnari 1994a, 1994b).
Indeed, women’s rejection of children born of rape may have indicated the women’s acceptance of
this logic, in addition to their rejection of a reminder of their ordeal.
Likewise, in the Serbian nationalist imagination, Serb manhood, and thereby also Serb
nationhood, was most injured by the impregnation of Serb women– not “just” their rape– by Muslim
men and thus their giving birth to the children of the other (Žarkov 1999: Chap. 4: 7-12). The insult
was therefore inflicted on Serb manhood/nationhood through the pollution of the Serb nation/ Serb
men’s capacity to reproduce itself, i.e., the capacity of Serb women to bear Serb children. As Žarkov
concludes from her analysis of Serbian media:
the raped Serb women gained relevance in the representation only in as much as they
were impregnated by Muslim men. Thus, the story about forced pregnancies again
pointed back to the Serb men as the victim. ...hated by the world and deprived of his
[pure Serb] offspring. (ibid.: Chap. 4: 15)53
A final point about the logic of the rapes in Bosnia involves its use as a weapon of ethnic
cleansing. Central to this strategy was the re-imagining of territory, much of which had been
inhabited by ethnic mixtures and the ethnically mixed (mixed marriages, etc.). This meant redefining
54 John Borneman (1998) locates the connection between rape and ethnic cleansing at the intersection of the
territorially based nation-state ideal and normative, institutionalized heterosexuality. This, he argues, is based on
male anxieties towards women’s sexuality and fears of homosexual desire. Violent assertion of the heterosexual
masculinity of the group through rape and sexual mutilation of ethnically other women and men  was used to assert
control for one’s ethnic group over a given territory.
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new states discursively and legally through ethnic exclusion (Hayden 1992), as well as through the
physical violence of ethnic cleansing– expelling ethnic others from territory in a manner that
inflicted as much trauma on the targeted community as possible, ensuring their disappearance and
the re-inscription of the territory as belonging to the ethnic self (Hayden 1996a; Ron 2003; Žarkov
1999). The goal was “making existing heterogeneous [communities] unimaginable” by removing
their existence (Hayden 1996a: 783). 
Hayden later connected the use of rape to this enterprise as a method of severing cross-ethnic
social ties, making continued sharing of the same territory unthinkable (2000). Other scholars
pointed to the symbolic link in nationalist discourses between women, their honor, and the land
(Ivekovi 1993:123-4; Mostov 1995; Peterson 1994; Seifert 1996:39; Verdery 1994). While this link
was certainly present, Žarkov showed that women’s bodies themselves became the actual territory
which nationalist forces aimed to conquer (1999). The raped female body is always ethnic as well
as female, so that meanings of national victimization are embedded into this body. Rape
simultaneously defines the body of women as (conquered) territory while excluding it from territory
that will henceforth be populated only by the rapists’ ethnic group. Thus, rape:
defines the female body as the land on which it resides, and it separates the two,
simultaneously. As such, rape marks the female body as ethnic territory. It is a
founder of the new ethnic geography, remapped, renamed and reclaimed through the
female body. (ibid.: Chap. 4: 48)
The “new ethnic geography” was, however, rooted firmly in the classic, European ideal of
the nation-state, in which the state is made up by and for the nation, ethnically defined, and the
borders of the state match the territory on which the nation lives (Anderson 1983; Borneman 1998;
Gellner 1983; Hayden 1992, 1996b).54
55 Another reason the rapes in Bosnia gained so  much attention may also  be that they occurred in Europe to
white women who could be shown on western television, who look just like ‘Us.’ These rapes have therefore been
noticed in a way that similar patterns of rape in Bangladesh, Ecuador and Kuwait, among many others, were not
(Copelon 1994; and see Brownmiller 1975; Jeffords 1993).
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Representing Wartime Rape in Bosnia
The gendered logic of nationalism thus laid the groundwork both for the use of rape as a tool
of ethnic cleansing and for the appropriation of images of rape by nationalists seeking to vilify ethnic
others and prove the moral purity of the ethnic self (Benderly 1997b; Borneman 1998; Helms 1998;
Kesi 1994; Kora 1996; Žarkov 1997). Although each national project was constructed upon
different elements according to differing historical and geographical realities (Žarkov 1999), each
sought to portray itself as victim and thus morally pure, innocent, and incapable of committing acts
of aggression against others. Each declared it was fighting a purely defensive war for the survival
of the nation. Association with the “Rape Victim Identity” bolstered this overall victim image
(Žarkov 1997; Kaši 2000). I have already discussed the portrayal of the Serb nation as a victim
because of the rape and subsequent impregnation of Serb women by non-Serbs. Biljana Plavši, at
the time Vice-President of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia, complained that most of the women
raped in the war were actually Serbs but that Muslims and Croats were unfairly counting them as
“their victims” (Kneževi 1993:13). Croatian nationalists declared during the war that “A raped
Croatian woman [Hrvatica] is a raped Croatia!” (Kesi 1995), despite the near invisibility in
Croatian media of Croat women as victims of rape– Muslim women appeared instead (Žarkov 1999).
And the Bosnian (Muslim) ambassador to the U.N. during the war appealed to the world for help for
the nation saying, “Bosnia and Herzegovina is being gang-raped” (MacKinnon 1994). The concern
was not with the victims themselves but with their symbolic value for the nation.
Feminists from the Yugoslav successor states and from abroad claimed to approach the issue
differently, out of concern for women victims. International women’s activism together with the
feminist network in place in Zagreb, Belgrade, and Ljubljana since the 1970s made possible the
documentation and publicizing of the rapes as they were still happening (Enloe 1994; Kora 1994).55
Yet the most wrenching debates over how to characterize the rapes ensued among feminists and
women’s groups; the issue managed to split long-time feminist networks in the former Yugoslavia
and their supporters abroad (Benderly 1997b).
56 The women’s groups siding with Kareta  included the feminist organizations Trešnjevka, and Nona
Women’s Center, as well as women’s organizations Bedem Ljubavi (Rampart of Love), Žena BiH (Woman BiH
[Bosnia & Herzegovina]), and the International Initiative of Women of Bosnia-Herzegovina Biser (Pearl), all based
in Zagreb at the time (Benderly 1997b). Elsewhere (Helms 1998), I analyze the letter of protest written by some of
these groups that was directed at an American publicity initiative called “Mother Courage II” which took a global
feminist and anti-nationalist stance (Kareta et al, 1993; and see W ielchowski et al 1993).
57 This attitude, reflected in Kareta and other groups’ refusal to include Serbian (anti-nationalist) women’s
groups in conferences about rape and their denunciation of Serbian and Croatian anti-nationalist feminists as
opportunists who had gained advantages under socialism and were therefore unfit to represent victims of rape
(Benderly 1997b; Carr 1993; Helms 1998). Catherine M acKinnon, who firmly allied herself to the nationalist
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One popular position taken by western feminists with little or no knowledge of the Balkans
was what I have termed the “global feminist” approach (Helms 1998). This saw wartime rape as a
weapon used by men against women in all wars throughout history, yet it left little room for the
specific political, ideological or ethnic contexts in which wartime rape occurs. Objections were
raised, therefore, mostly by feminists in the Yugoslav successor states, who pointed to local
specifics, including the undeniable ethnic character of the war. These “ex-Yugoslav” feminists,
however, were split among themselves over whether the rapes were primarily crimes of gender or
crimes of ethnicity. 
One camp insisted that these were not just “ordinary” wartime rapes but a new, uniquely
Serbian project of “genocidal rape” against Croats and Muslims. This group was made up of
Croatian feminists and Bosnian Muslim refugee women based in Zagreb. Some of their women’s
organizations, especially the Kareta Feminist Group from Zagreb,56 had retained US feminist lawyer
Catherine A. MacKinnon in efforts to prosecute those responsible for the rape of Bosnian and
Croatian women (Hamilton 1993). Kareta and their allies focused their work on aid to Muslim and
Croat women victims of the war and regarded wartime rape primarily as a crime against nation. They
conceded that women had been targeted for rape in all wars, but, they maintained, this Serbian
practice was an organized, deliberate tactic directed at non-Serbs to destroy them or drive them out
of desired territory (Allen 1996; Kareta et al, 1993; MacKinnon 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Trešnjevka
1993). In the view of Kareta and their supporters, the global feminist approach equalized all factions
in the war, thus minimizing the crimes of the Serbs (Kareta, et al 1993; Wielchowski et al 1993).
This camp further held all Serbs, even Serbian anti-nationalist feminists, responsible for the war, and
thus severed all ties with women from Belgrade (Benderly 1997b).57
groups, took on a similar attitude, attacking Serbian anti-nationalist women in public with comments such as her
response to a Serbian feminist at a UN human rights conference in Vienna in 1993: “If you are in opposition to the
regime in Serbia, why aren’t you already dead?” (see Benderly 1997b: 67).
58 Yet, as Žarkov shows, they were so nervous about breaking these bonds that they tip-toed around issues
of their own ethnic and national identities, concentrating instead on their “sisterhood,” or solidarity as women
(1999).
59 An example from Time of the kind of statements commonly made: “The Balkans have become a sort of
Bermuda Triangle into which human decencies vanish without a trace. In  the post-cold war era, it is unsettling to
think that conscienceless tribal ferocity  may catch on around the world” (Morrow 1993) (emphasis added).
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The other camp was made up of anti-nationalist feminists, many of them veterans of the
second-wave feminist initiatives begun in the 1970's in Yugoslavia (discussed in the previous
chapter). These women refused to let closed borders, cut phone lines, and mutually hostile nationalist
propaganda break their feminist ties across newly formed state borders. They kept in touch despite
formidable obstacles, meeting in Hungary or elsewhere abroad and communicating through foreign
friends or by the Zamir (For peace) email network. What bound them together was their feminist
critique of women’s oppression their opposition to nationalism and militarism which followed from
their gender critique.58 
The anti-nationalist approach to the rapes, too, focused on the gender aspect of crimes against
women as women. They did distance themselves from the global feminists by pointing to the dangers
of the “all sides did it” argument as one that supported the common view put forth in the western
press during the war that the Bosnian conflict involved equal combatants acting on “ancient ethnic
hatreds” among “Balkan tribes.”59 The danger in this was to provide an excuse to western powers
for not intervening to prevent atrocities, despite pledges to uphold human rights (Douglas and
Hamilton 1993:12-15; Kesi 1994, 1995; Kneževi 1993; Renne 1993; Ženski Lobby 1992).
However, their most vehement opposition was to MacKinnon, Kareta, and the other women’s
groups insisting on the term “genocidal rape” and on the victim status of Croatian and Muslim
women and thus of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The anti-nationalists saw this position as
supporting the very nationalist projects which so oppressed women and set up the logic by which
wartime ethnic rape was being perpetrated in the first place (e.g., Douglas and Hamilton 1993; Kesi
1994, 1995; Kneževi 1993, 1995; Renne 1993; Ženski Lobby 1992). Anti-nationalist women’s
groups in Zagreb (the Center for Women War Victims, Anti-war Campaign Croatia, and others)
60 Significantly, the women were accused of raping “Croatia” rather than also Bosnia. As Žarkov (and
others less extensively: Kesi 1994; Mertus 1994:19-20; Mostov 1995:525) has shown, the Croatian media put forth
images of Bosnian Muslim women as victims of rape in order to show the barbarity of the Serbs, while “saving” the
pure image of Croatian women (see Lie 1997). Yet, when it came to using the rapes to show the victimization of the
nation, “Croatia” was the victim (Žarkov 1999: 177-287).
61 Articles in the Serbian media in 1995 also denounced feminists who spoke out against the government
and its nationalist policies as “witches” (Kajosevi 1995:44).
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noted with alarm that the nationalist media and authorities in Croatia began to embrace Kareta and
the other “nationalist” or “patriotic” women’s groups (Benderly 1997b; Kesi 1994). This was
especially striking given the usual hostility toward women’s issues and feminists that were normally
expressed in the media and by a regime that had vigorously promoted a return to “traditional” gender
roles, especially for women (Drakuli 1993a; Kesi 1995, 2001; Kneževi 1995; Salecl 1994;
Žarkov 1999). Despite Kareta’s radical feminist approach, which blamed men for oppressing women
when it came to domestic issues, the group was suddenly given prominent placement in the media
for its message condemning “the Serbs” for rape (Žarkov 1999). 
This was further vexing to the anti-nationalists because of the way the Croatian nationalist
media had treated them for advancing the opposite argument. The best known example of this was
the attack in the Croatian weekly Globus on five prominent women writers, Slavenka Drakuli,
Vesna Kesi, Rada Ivekovi, Jelena Lovri, and Dubravka Ugreši, calling them “witches” for
criticizing the nationalist government (Globus, December 11, 1992: 33-4). Drakuli, Kesi, and
Ivekovi had written specifically about the rapes in Croatia and Bosnia as crimes of men against
women instead of (only) Serbs against Croats and Muslims. Even more revealing was the headline
of the Globus article, which read “Croatian Feminists Rape Croatia!” The women were accused of
“concealing the Serbian rape of Muslim and Croatian women” (Kora 1994:505) and the article went
on to attack the five women’s physical appearance, choice of (non-Croatian) marriage partners and
ties to the west (Kora 1994; Mostov 1995:521; Tax 1993).60 The women’s home addresses and
phone numbers were also published and the five were “‘witch hunted’ throughout the national media
for almost a year and a half” afterwards (Kesi 1994).61
Thus, the anti-nationalists condemned the nationalist women’s stance because it upheld the
claims of nationalists. This disagreement was not only a disagreement with nationalism, however,
but because of what was seen as the sexist, traditionalist, and ultimately anti-feminist nature of
62 Furthermore, as Hayden has argued (2000), consensual sexual relationships between men and women
belonging to different warring ethnic/religious groups become suspect under the fuzzy boundary between rape and
marriage which was especially apparent in the conflicts in India during partition (Butalia 1993; Das 1995, 1996;
Menon and Bhasin 1993) and Rwanda in 1994 (Nowrojee 1996).
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nationalism in disintegrating Yugoslavia. Anti-nationalist feminists therefore criticized the
nationalist women for undermining feminist causes, even though some of the most vocal proponents
of the nationalist/patriotic position, such as Kareta and Catherine MacKinnon, were staunch
feminists (Kesi 1994, 1995; Kneževi 1993; Ženski Lobby 1992; Lepa Mlapenovi quoted in
Douglas and Hamilton 1993). As Vesna Kesi argued in a strong rebuttal to MacKinnon (1993a,
1993b, 1994), the aim of calling attention to and stopping “genocidal rape” can hardly be realized
since this approach reinforces the logic by which the rapes were committed and understood in the
first place (Kesi 1994; and see Borneman 1998; Copelon 1994; Kora 1996; Žarkov 1999). In other
words, focusing on whether rapes were “genocidal,” or perpetrated on the basis of ethnic differences,
assumes precisely the relation of women to the nation which is assumed by the very perpetrators of
rape– the equation of women’s honor with the honor of the nation. The ready embrace of the
genocidal rape thesis by the nationalist media (discussed above) was a case in point. The national
identification of the victims was the most important criterion in these reports: women were more
members of the nation than women (see Helms 1998; Žarkov 1999). 
Insisting on “genocidal rape” therefore implied that “only certain [ethnic] victims count”
(Kesi 1994: 276). In other words, the crime is to be condemned, or more harshly condemned, when
it is committed as part of a genocide, or campaign of destruction of another ethnic group. War rapes
by members of the same ethnic group as the perpetrator are thus dismissed, and a “hierarchy of
rapes” is created, followed by a “hierarchy of victims” (Carr 1993:29) which “places the violation
of nations ahead of that of women” (Mladjenovi 1999: 87; and see Helms 1998; Žarkov 1999).62
This was the same logic used by Serbian/Yugoslav nationalist leader Slobodan Miloševi in the
1980's when the category of “ethnic rape” was introduced in response to accusations that Albanian
men were raping Serbian women in Kosovo (Mežnari 1994a, 1994b; Žarkov 1999). The new
category of crime carried harsher punishments than “non-ethnic” rape and was thus understood as
a threat to the nation rather than an injury to women (Mežnari 1994a). This case shows the link
between the understanding of ethnic rape as insult to the self nation and as weapon against the other,
63 Almasa, a Bosniac refugee and member of Žena BiH in Zagreb was wary of feminist groups but worked
with Kareta because of their stance emphasizing the ethnic character of the rapes. In Almasa’s words, “organizations
like Kareta, Bedem Ljubavi, etc., were more like feminists who would fight, even using force, for human rights.
They were against men. They thought that only the men were guilty, even though many of them were married. So
some of them left the groups at the end, some of the more reasonable ones, mostly the ones with husbands. While our
organization was there precisely because of what was happening in the war, not just to women but all human rights
that were violated.” 
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an easy conceptual shift that made the accusations of ethnic rape against Serbs in Kosovo “a prelude
to rape as a strategy of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia” (ibid.:77; and see Mili 1993; Sorabji 1993).
Feminist anti-nationalists from Zagreb and Belgrade therefore stressed the gendered logic of the
rapes and that they were perpetrated by men against women (rather than e.g. Serbs against Muslims).
However, as Žarkov shows, this contributed to the identification of the The Rape Victim with
females, and females as therefore vulnerable and “rapable” (1999).
Representation and Bosnia
Throughout this discussion, I have said very little about Bosnia or Bosnians themselves. This
is because the overwhelming majority of texts about wartime rape in Bosnia (and Croatia) were
written and debated by those in Croatia and Serbia (and Slovenia) and from outside the former
Yugoslavia. The exception was with Bosnian Croat and Muslim refugee women in Zagreb who sided
with Kareta and the other “nationalist” women’s organizations. Many of those women returned to
Bosnia after the war ended to live as close as they could to their former homes which were now in
Serb or Croat held areas. These women took their Zagreb experiences with women’s organizing with
them and started new women’s NGOs focused on helping other refugee women recover from trauma,
make a living, and return to their homes. They also carried with them their ideas about rape as an
ethnic crime against Muslims, and a few of them continued campaigning publicly for the acceptance
of this view. I will discuss some of these women and their organizations in later chapters.
Despite the presence of the “nationalist” Bosnian women in Zagreb, Croatian feminists were
quite vocal in speaking for the Bosnians (even though many of the Bosnian women rejected the
Croatian women’s feminist ideas).63 Those from outside the region, too, tended to look to Serbian
and Croatian women to speak about, and often for, victims of wartime rape in Bosnia, not only
silencing the voices of Bosnian Muslim women (as members of the group most affected by war
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rapes) but also obscuring Serb and Croat women from Bosnia (Helms 1998).
Of course, it stands to reason that, during the war, Bosnian women in Bosnia had little access
to world media and scholarly journals, not to mention that they were too consumed with survival and
helping other war victims to have the luxury of reflection and writing. However, there were many
Bosnian women refugees in Zagreb and Belgrade working with both nationalist and anti-nationalist
women’s groups. Even after the war, however, only a few Bosnian women activists who had been
working with women war survivors got their work to wider audiences (e.g. Andri-Ružii 1997;
Ostoji 1999; Senjak 1997; Giles et. al. 2003). Such texts tended to focus more on therapy,
overcoming trauma, and the problems of service provision, however, than on analysis of the rapes
themselves. Moreover, they appeared after the major debates about rape, which had occurred during
the war. On top of this, the lack in Bosnia of feminists or academics specializing in gender, and who
spoke English or had the right contacts outside Bosnia contributed to this effect. As we will see in
the chapters to follow, too, Bosnian activists were anxious to move on and deal with current
problems after the war, rather than dwell on rape and ethnic cleansing.
To be sure, Croatian and Serbian women had much to offer, especially to audiences
unfamiliar with the former Yugoslavia. They were (and are) insightful analysts of the historical and
current circumstances of what was Yugoslavia, which they shared with Bosnia. And they had worked
with Bosnian war survivors and experienced many of the same effects of living under dominant
nationalisms that the women in the war zones had (e.g. Bori 1997; Mladjenovi 1999; Terseli
1997; articles in I. Williams (ed.) 1995). I am not arguing, therefore, that Croatian and Serbian
feminists were out of line in speaking out– on the contrary, their voices were crucial at a time when
many ill-informed observers made all kinds of well-circulated pronouncements on the rapes.
Still, many feminist texts and initiatives expressed the goal of making the voices of women
war victims heard. When women from Zagreb and Belgrade were chosen, for example, to represent
Women from Ex-Yugoslavia on a speaking tour of the U.S. designed to draw attention to the issue
of wartime rape, none of them had experienced war directly and the only Bosnian woman selected
was a Muslim who had not lived in Bosnia for ten years (Helms 1998). At the same time, there were
(are) many professional women and activists from Bosnia, of all ethnic backgrounds and living in
Serb, Croat, and Muslim dominated areas, who would have been eloquent speakers and analysts
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about their own experiences in the context of the war. On this point the initiative’s organizers and
other western observers showed a similar “homogenizing” tendency towards the diversity in the
former Yugoslavia for which “Third World” women have criticized western feminists in general
(e.g., Mohanty 1991). Because there was no representation from Bosnia on a subject that
predominantly dealt with Bosnian Muslim women, The Muslim Raped Woman could remain the
“archetypal victim,” forever the Orientalized, secluded and silent Muslim woman whose only role
is as passive victim of male power (Mohanty 1991:58; Žarkov 1995, 1999). 
Texts about the rapes furthermore left Bosnian Muslim/Bosniac nationalism almost
completely unexplored. Accounts that recognized the wider patterns of gendered nationalism in the
region generally focused on Serbian and Croatian nationalisms as a way of explaining the appearance
of ethnic rape, although Kora (1994, 1996) and Hayden (2000) did include some details of this in
their wider analyses. Wider cultural explanations also centered around Serbian and Croatian histories
and ideologies (Denich 1995; Oluji 1998). There was good reason for this focus, as the Serbian and
Croatian nationalist regimes had made dramatic pronouncements and enacted corresponding policies
infused with “traditional” (patriarchal) gender models, as discussed above. Furthermore, these
nationalisms were deemed worthy of (feminist) criticism in a way that Bosniac nationalism, as
representative of The Victims, was not: Serbian nationalism was held to blame for starting and
perpetrating most of the rapes, and Croatian nationalism was seen, at least by the feminists living
in Croatia, as oppressive to women “at home” and manipulating the rapes of Muslims for nationalist
purposes. 
Again, there are reasons for the absence of local feminist criticism of Muslim/Bosniac
nationalism. In contrast to Serbia and Croatia, neither Bosnia as a whole nor the Muslim dominated
areas of Bosnia had the kind of feminist community or critical women activists who might have
publicly commented on the gendered aspects of Bosniac nationalism. Certainly during the war
women had few possibilities for disseminating the writing they did produce. After the war, a few
texts by local journalists in Muslim dominated Bosnia did emerge about the effects of (nationalist)
government policies and rhetoric on women (Beirevi 1999; Šami 2000; Selimbegovi 2000). And
a few Bosnian women activists have written about their concern over the manipulation of women
war victims’ suffering for the benefit of state authorities (i.e., nationalist politicians), though this was
64 To be sure, some scholars have included examples from Bosniac discourses in wider analyses of the logic
by which rape was perpetrated and understood in the Balkans (Hayden 2000; Kora 1998), and Žarkov (1997) has
pointed to the gendered and  Orientalist elements of the  Muslim rape victim identity as conveyed through academic
texts. Still, there has been no thorough gender analysis of Bosniac national discourses.
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mostly published abroad and in English (e.g. Andri-Ružii 2003). Such critiques, however, remain
unnoticed in most characterizations of gender relations in the Balkans or Bosnia.64 Furthermore, anti-
nationalist women activists in Muslim dominated areas have refrained from publicly subjecting local
nationalist projects to the kind of feminist scrutiny that Croatian and Serbian feminists leveled at
Croatian and Serbian nationalisms. In other words, they have not connected the gendering of Bosniac
nationalism with understandings of wartime rape.
This absence is not surprising, given the construction, both locally and internationally, of
Bosniac collective identity as the victims and only victims of the war. Local constructions of Bosniac
identity revolved around these and other victim images– victims of socialism, of Serbian and
Croatian designs on Bosnia, of genocide, and of an international community suspicious of and
prejudiced against Muslims. As Nataša of Medica (and, incidently, of Serb background) remarked,
those on the Muslim dominated, pro-Bosnia side are rightly seen as the “good guys, the victims.”
Another anti-nationalist Bosnian feminist in Sarajevo, also of Serb background, expressed her
reluctance to publicly single out anything Bosniac or Islamic for (feminist) criticism because, while
she was a strong promoter of a multi-ethnic Bosnia and had a history of opposing Serbian
nationalism in Serbia, she was nevertheless not a Bosniac and thus feared she would be seen as anti-
Muslim. Turning a critical eye to the construction of Bosniac identity was seen as unseemly, both
locally and abroad, due to the real suffering of so many Bosniacs. It is probably also because Bosniac
nationalist policies have not targeted women as dramatically as have those in Serbia and Croatia.
However, I suggest that this is also because any critical discussion of gender inevitably entails a
discussion of wartime rape, which, in turn, has been a powerful symbol of the Bosniac nation as
collective victim.  In this light, I must stress that the scrutiny I bring to Bosniac discourses here is
not meant to take away from the real experiences of war victims, but just the opposite, to strip
nationalist representations of the moral power they gain by appropriating that suffering as belonging
to (the males of) the ethnic nation.
65 A more extensive analysis of the gendering of Bosniac nationalism appears in Helms 1997. For examples
related to Orientalist Bosniac discourses, see Helms n.d.
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Gendering Bosniac Nationalism
Patterns of gender constructions in Bosniac nationalist discourses are strikingly similar to
those of Serb and Croat nationalist discourses discussed above. The differences lie in the
peculiarities of Bosniac nationalist constructions, just as differences in Serbian and Croatian
discourses were reflected in the different kinds of gendered images used in the Serbian and Croatian
media, as Žarkov shows (1999). To be sure, media in the Bosniac dominated areas of Bosnia are not
all “nationalist” (see ICG 1997). Even within nationalist circles, many different approaches to
questions of ethnic relations, national identity, and the role of Islam, have competed for dominance
(Bougarel 1995, 1996; Rusinow 1985). These different streams also carry with them different
approaches to gender ideals. In public discourses, many different images are therefore projected of
Bosnian and Bosniac women, of gender categories and sexuality (see Helms n.d.). My aim here is
not to thoroughly analyze Bosnian and Bosniac political or nationalist discourses but to indicate the
presence of the same constructions of gender and sexuality in relation to the nation as have been
found in Serbian and Croatian nationalist discourses.65 As I have argued elsewhere (1998), the wide
acceptance, among people of all ethnic backgrounds in Bosnia, of the link of female sexuality and
honor to the honor of the nation is what made rape an effective tool of ethnic warfare in the first
place. 
Conservative gender ideals were most commonly put forth by pan-Islamists within the
Bosniac nationalist party, the SDA, and their close allies among the Muslim clergy. Women were
consigned to the home sphere, that of tradition and spirituality, under the same concerns about the
nation’s birth rates that informed discourses in Serbia and Croatia. Alija Izetbegovi, at the time
leader of the SDA, President of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the grandfatherly
figurehead of Bosniac nationalism, summed up his view of the role of women in a public speech in
June 1997, after the male organizers of a Muslim pilgrimage (Ajvatovica) had forbidden women to
take part in the walk to the pilgrimage site:
Women make up half of our nation [narod]. In the midst of the war, together they
shared with us the burden of wartime misfortune: dying, starving and suffering. From
66 Since that year, women have been allowed to take part in the Ajvatovica pilgrimage.
67 I address Medica’s stances toward public reactions in chapter 6.
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them we expect that they bear and bring up a generation of Bosniacs who will
preserve what we have elected and fight to rid themselves of what we are not. Such
a proud and aware generation cannot be brought up by humiliated and excluded
women. (Krehi 1997)
“Us” and “we” were clearly the male actors of the nation. Women’s dignity and right to participate
was upheld, but on the basis of their function as bearers and socializers of new generations of
Bosniacs, first and foremost mothers with primary duties toward the home and family. As Nataša
from Medica pointed out at the time, Izetbegovi’s comment contained both positive and negative
implications for women. On one hand, he relegated women to the role of motherhood and child
rearing. But he also chastised the male organizers of that day’s event for excluding women from the
pilgrimage walk.66 In Nataša’s view, it was better to support the President on this small positive point
rather than attack him for the more fundamental problem of portraying women as worthy only for
the fulfillment of domestic sphere duties, and only in service to the nation.67 Indeed, many Bosniac
women viewed Izetbegovi as a staunch supporter of women and their valuable contribution to the
nation, in opposition to those men who would bar women from full participation in religious and
cultural life. However, several of Izetbegovi’s longtime friends and colleagues– religiously trained
men closely associated with the President and members of the influential pan-Islamist wing of the
SDA (see Bougarel 1997a)– drew no public objections from Izetbegovi when they expressed more
extreme and conservative views about gender as a national/ethnic concern.
A typical example of this pan-Islamist nationalist rhetoric was offered by the deputy Reis-ul-
ulema of the Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica), Ismet Efendija Spahi, at an SDA-sponsored
mosque dedication ceremony I happened to attend in a small Bosnian town in July 1997. In his
speech, Spahi warned  that, “if mini skirts are worn, the shells will fall again. If the etniks [Serb
forces] don’t send them, Allah will find someone who will.” He equated women’s dress, demeanor
and religiosity with maintaining actual differences and awareness of those differences, thereby
suggesting that failure to remain a separate group and mixing with other groups (Serbs and Croats)
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as they had done before the war, would result in renewed hostilities. This draws on a commonly held
view among Bosniacs of their Serb and Croat neighbors that betrayed them in the war– that Muslims
were too trusting of the other groups, they bought into socialist atheism and Yugoslav “brotherhood
and unity,” forgot they were different and therefore did not realize they could be targeted and
attacked as different in war. The common sentiment was that they should have seen it coming.
Spahi did not mention men’s dress, but he did admonish men to attend mosque regularly
and to refrain from drinking alcohol (a very popular, male-associated activity). He also advised the
audience that a man’s honor and worth (as a Muslim) could be judged by looking at his wife and
daughters to see whether they covered themselves and how they conducted themselves. Spahi thus
brought the responsibility for the maintenance and marking of national essence back to women and
their dress and demeanor (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; McClintock 1993; Schein 1996; C. Smith
1996). He also expressed a common nationalist concern with women’s sexuality for maintaining the
purity of the nation (C. Smith 1996). It should be noted that most townspeople present for Spahi’s
speech, Bosniacs who generally supported the SDA, shrugged off the cleric’s statements as extreme,
even ridiculous. They felt he was asking too much from this more secular population, especially that
men give up drinking alcohol and women (especially teenaged girls) cover themselves and forgo the
latest fashions. Indeed, on that summer day, very few women were covered and many teenaged girls
wore mini-skirts and halter tops, oblivious to the deputy Reis’s words.
Other pan-Islamists close to Izetbegovi expressed a similar concern with ethnic
demographics as those in Serbia and Croatia who called for women to bear more children for the
nation and pointed to the damage done to the nation by rapes of “our” women by “their” men (see
e.g. Bracewell 1996; Salecl 1994; Žarkov 1999). The most notorious such statements condemning
“mixed” marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims appeared during the war (summer, 1994) in
the Bosniac press, especially the pro-SDA weekly Ljiljan. The debate was sparked in response to the
statement by Circle 99, an independent club of Sarajevo intellectuals of all ethnic affiliations, that
families of mixed marriages represent a “third nation appearing” within Bosnia. Circle 99 presented
this as a positive sign that all ethnic groups could rebuild a multi-ethnic Bosnia, or “life together”
(zajedniki život) like the co-existence that had existed under Yugoslav socialism (Lati 1994:40;
Šanti 1994). Prominent pan-Islamists reacted with appeals to a sort of separate but tolerant policy,
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publishing repeated denunciations of mixed marriages and the “frustrated” children they produce
(Hadži 1996; Kasumagi 1997; Lati 1994; Spahi 1994). In the words of Džemaludin Lati:
Mixed marriages, a kind of banner to a misunderstood life together, are mostly failed
marriages, serious conflicts arise from them, the children of such a marriage are
frustrated from the beginning, and it would be worth putting a halt to that kind of
destructive message. The differences between Muslims and non-Muslims are so great
that if we suggest to our young people an alternative way, namely that they marry
only those that think like they do, we will more easily build a society without trauma.
(Lati 1994:40)
Example after example of terrible scenarios of mixed Bosnian families torn apart by the war were
raised as proof that Muslims would do better to stick to their own kind. In these examples, children
of mixed marriages were taken to non-Muslim relatives in Serb or Croat held areas and “turned into”
Serbs or Croats, even baptized into Christianity; others were betrayed by a non-Muslim in-law and
ended up in prison camps or dead; and many stories were told of terrible dilemmas faced by mixed
families when Serbs, Croats and Muslims came into conflict (Šesti 1994).
In an article entitled, “Worse Than Rape: The Evil of Mixed Marriages,” another longtime
pan-Islamist went so far as to conclude that:
Even though these rapes [of Muslim women in the war] are difficult,
unbearable and unforgivable for us all, from the standpoint of Islam
they are easier and less painful than mixed marriages and the children
and friendships that result from them. (Spahi 1994:22) (emphasis
added)
Thus, not only were “mixed” people considered damaging to the nation, but social connections and
networks of mutual aid and hospitality between Muslims and members of other ethnic/religious
groups were also frowned upon. Women were especially targeted; as Spahi further wrote, “Every
[male] Muslim [musliman] in a mixed marriage as a rule was a loss for Islam and Muslims. With
girl Muslims [djevojke, muslimanke] who have entered mixed marriages, the situation is even more
drastic” (Spahi 1994:22). Women who marry non-Muslims threatened greater harm to the nation
68 These patrilineal and patrilocal practices common in South Slavic kinship are reflected in language. The
verb “to marry” is, for a man, ženiti se (literally “to take a woman”), and for a woman, udati se (“to give oneself”). In
the less common case that a man marries and goes to live in his wife’s town or with her family, it is also sometimes
said jokingly that he has “given himself” – udao se.
69 One could undertake a much more extensive analysis of the 23 essays, nearly 50 testimonies, and
numerous poems, drawings, letters of support and witness accounts contained in this 484 page book than I have done
here. For the purposes of this chapter, I have excerpted here only a sample of the contents of this book.
70 The word logoraš, a form of logor, from the German Lager, or “camp,”  and is often translated into
English, as it is in this book, as “concentration camp,” as it is meant to  evoke Nazi concentration camps of W orld
War II. Such connections were encouraged by the dissemination of pictures of starving Muslim and Croat men
civilians behind barbed wire in Serb detention camps in the Prijedor area at the beginning of the war (see Gutman
1993).
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than men marrying non-Muslims because, under local patriarchal/patrilocal and Muslim customs,68
women move to non-Muslim surroundings, take on non-Muslim names and bear non-Muslim
children (ibid.). The threat to the nation was clear: if Muslims, and especially women, did not marry
within the fold, the nation would lose them and the children they produced. Moreover, the threat
posed to the nation by mixed marriages took precedence over the actual bodily suffering and desires
of individual men and women.
“I Begged Them to Kill Me”
A similar message was sent through the publication in 1999 of a book of testimonies by
women survivors of wartime rape entitled I Begged Them to Kill Me: The Crime Against the Women
of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Molila sam ih da me ubiju: Zloin nad ženom Bosne i Hercegovine)
(Ajanovi et. al. 1999).69 The book was compiled by the Union of Former Concentration Camp
Detainees, or logoraši,70 of the Bosniac dominated areas of Bosnia. Although logoraši are most
readily associated with male war victims, the organization, prompted by its women’s section (the
Aktiv žena bivših logorašica), decided that its first book of testimonies in a planned series would be
on “the crime against the women of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (ibid.: 14). There was no need to
explain that this meant rape; indeed, other kinds of suffering of women are present in the testimonies
but are not given the prominence of rape. It must be acknowledged that the organizers and authors
of the introduction reject the image of women as passive victims; they write that raped women
should not be ashamed, that they should not be seen as passive objects, but “subjects who speak and
71 An essay in the book by Swanee Hunt distorts and dismisses my conclusions, and those of the other
feminist critics I discussed earlier in this chapter, on this very point (1999: 77). Summarizing in a curious way (a
critique of which I will forgo here) the points raised in my MA thesis, which in turn summarized feminist debates and
literature, the author lists several “problematic issues” brought up by “those people outside Bosnia who were
determined to mount a campaign against rape.” First among these points is the question, “Does the description of
genocidal rape minimize other cases of rape perpetrated by Serbs, or rapes perpetrated by members of the same
ethnic groups, as ‘ordinary’?” (emphasis added). I do not know whether the author (or her assistants, with whom I
had shared my work) inserted the phrase “perpetrated by Serbs” or whether this was added during translation.
However, the author goes on to imply that this question and the o thers raised by feminist critics are inauthentic
because they come from “those people outside Bosnia.” She then effectively dismisses all critical questions by
describing the distress of Bosnian rape victims she met in her capacity as American ambassador to Austria and the
poignancy of the help she offered as a shoulder for them to cry on.
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accuse,” and that this book is a step toward the recovery of women’s dignity (ibid.: 14). Indeed, the
testimonies in the book are quite powerful and, as Medica activists pointed out, it was very important
for the women survivors and for all women that these crimes be documented and validated. It is not
this aspect of the project, nor the real suffering of the war’s victims with which I take issue, but the
constructions of gender and nation embedded in the book’s overall message.
The primary stress of the book is on the meanings of these rapes for the nation, as part of a
wider pattern of Bosniac suffering under persecution and genocide, despite the subtitle’s claim that
the book deals with “the crime against the women of Bosnia-Herzegovina” (my emphasis). Explicit
comparison is made to the Holocaust; the texts and drawings accompanying the testimonies highlight
wider campaigns of ethnic cleansing against Bosniacs (and Croats) by Serbs (and Croats) through
pictures of starving men behind barbed wire in detention camps, of mass graves of Bosniacs, of men,
women, and children lining up for water and bread in besieged Sarajevo, and of women and children
fleeing ethnic cleansing attacks. In all of these drawings, it is made clear that the victims are
Bosniacs. This is done through imagery of (destroyed) mosques, people praying, and women in head
scarves and traditional Muslim (rural) dress, the dimije. The book’s editors claim that Bosniac
women made up 99.9% of the victims of rape (men are not mentioned) (ibid.: 471), and that their
testimony “further contributes to the defense of the women of Bosnia, especially Bosniacs” (ibid.:
14). Rapes of non-Bosniacs and non-“ethnic” rapes are thus demoted in significance; the real victim
is the nation rather than women.71
Upon closer inspection, the Bosniac contributors to the book seem more concerned with
72 Although this author focuses on the Serbs, some “similar characteristics,” we are told, “are found among
some (Herzegovinian) Croats, who have an element of Vlah [pastoralist] ethno-genesis in their origins. All of that is
what has produced the characteristic variant of Serb-dom in the 19th and 20th centuries.” (ibid .: 68).
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documenting the guilt of Serbs, and Croats to a lesser extent.72 One article by the well-known
Bosniac “secular” nationalist (Bougarel 1996; Rusinow 1985) and academic Muhamed Filipovi,
is devoted to a “Socio-psychological and anthropological analysis of criminal character, especially
of crimes committed against Bosniacs and Bosniac women during the Serb Aggression against
Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Filipovi 1999). Serbs are cast as a psychopathic people, as a collective
“prone ... to drastic actions such as slitting people’s throats, killings with axes or violence against
the elderly and women, frequent incestual relations and sexual abuse of little girls and children”
(ibid.: 68). Filipovi asserts there is “ethnographic and ethnological” evidence for violent traditions
among Serbs, especially because of their pastoralist background, which explains the use by Serbs
of types of violence “otherwise inconceivable for normal people.” (ibid.). Rape and sexual violence
is also explained as a strategy solely used by the Serbs as “a people [narod] that has different sexual
and family traditions/habits [obiaje]” (ibid.: 69). It is worth noting that strong pastoralist traditions
and histories among Serbs and other Balkan populations have long been used to essentialize entire
peoples, even in the present, as primitive, uncivilized, warlike (Bougarel 1999a; Todorova 1997;
Živkovi 2001), and violently patriarchal (Denich 1974; Ramet 1996: 119-22; and see Helms n.d.).
Filipovi takes a similar approach, telling us, in case there is any doubt, that these traditions among
Serbs give us a “picture of the sources of those phenomena which were played out during the [recent]
war, and those are sources built into the social psychology of the Serbs as a people [narod].” (ibid.:
68, emphasis added). This is despite evidence the author himself mentions in the same text, that of
the diary of a Yugoslav National Army (read Serb) officer who complains that some of his soldiers
resisted orders to “behave brutally toward their Muslim neighbors” in the area of Prnjavor (ibid.).
If abnormal brutality was “built into” the Serbs, why would there have been a need to force Serb
soldiers to commit such acts?
Similarly, the introduction to the book attempts to place equal emphasis on the perpetrators
of rape, and their communities, as it does on women victims. To the women’s statement rejecting
the notion that they as victims should feel fear and shame, that it is the perpetrators who should feel
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shame and fear justice, the authors add, 
we also want for the communities, the societies that allowed the crime of rape
because the women victims were not “theirs,” not from their own communities, to
awaken their collective conscience and accept what the civilized world accepted long
ago, to condemn the crime of rape and to cleanse itself of it... (ibid.: 12)
As it has been made clear that the perpetrators are Serbs and their communities “the Serb people,”
this passage suggests that Serbs lack honor, morality, and are as a group beneath civilization. Indeed,
other sections of this text imply just that by asking whether the perpetrators feel shame. The Bosniac
people, on the other hand, as the victim, is portrayed as a people whose morals and feelings
“nurtured in us” by “our daughters, sisters, mothers, wives, women of honor” do not allow anyone,
“no real ‘male’” to do such a thing: “a true man [ovjek] cannot do that to a woman, cannot order
others to do that to a woman...” (ibid.: 11). Bosniacs are thus elevated to a morally pure state in
which men are honorable and strong and women nurturing and chaste.
A public promotion for this book in Zenica further confirmed the significance to the book’s
promoters of the nation, rather than of women as women. Prominent Bosniac intellectuals and
politicians, including Filipovi, gave a series of speeches about the long suffering throughout history
of the Bosniac nation, and they emphasized the honor, purity, and piety of Bosniac women. All of
the presenters were men, aside from a well-known Bosniac actress who did a dramatic reading of
two harrowing testimonies from the book. In condemning the rapes, Filipovi warned that there is
evil in humans, that there will always be violence, “But we can know that such things await us and
we can be prepared rather than go along like lambs and leave our mothers, our sisters, and our
children, our daughters, our granddaughters, to the bandits [hajducima] and wolves.” It was clear that
“we” were men of the nation, charged with the protection of “the nation’s” women. This formulation
was no different from those embedded in Serb and Croat nationalist discourses, discussed above.
A male Bosniac friend who generally made a conscious effort to resist nationalist thinking,
“not to hate,” despite his personal experiences as a victim of Serb ethnic cleansing, also attended the
promotion. He remarked that the presentations had seemed to him like a “call to mobilization,”
directed to him as a male and therefore potential fighter, rather than an acknowledgment of the
suffering of the women victims. “This book doesn’t do anything for the women victims,” he said
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afterwards, “it offers them no concrete or material help. It’s pure politics.” Indeed, though the hall
was full of men and women members of the local elite (especially those around the ruling nationalist
party), none of the women activists like those at Medica, who had been working to help women war
victims (including survivors of rape) for years, and who were cited in the book itself, had been
invited to the promotion. Nor had any rape survivors (though they may have wanted to remain
anonymous). The suffering of the women themselves was clearly a secondary issue.
What is more, though there was a consistent insistence on preserving the honor and dignity
of the women victims, the book simultaneously upheld conservative, traditionalist ideals of
womanhood. The speeches at the book promotion and the book’s poetry, drawings, and essays
surrounding the women’s actual testimonies, were saturated with images of female purity, shame,
innocence, and motherhood. The title of the book itself– I Begged Them to Kill Me– made clear that
rape was to be perceived as a crime of honor after which any decent woman would only want to be
killed. This is not to deny that many women experienced rape this way. Indeed, the title is a
quotation from one of the women’s testimonies. However, the choice of this statement as the title
underscores the idea that these rapes were above all crimes against women’s honor, rather than their
physical and psychological well-being. 
Although the authors were careful to recognize women’s agency in speaking out, they
nevertheless channeled those active roles into motherhood and accusations towards the enemy in the
name of the nation. Women’s suffering and sacrifice was equated with the sacrifices of soldiers
fighting at the front lines and of (male) logoraši detained as civilians, all actions deemed as part of
the struggle for Bosnia and Bosniacs– women who had been detained and raped had resisted the
enemy’s attempt “to kill Bosnia within [them]” (ibid.: 14). The women victims are praised for their
courage, yet they are expected to want to remain silent because of the shame of what has happened
to them:
We know that it is very difficult for the tortured women, that they do not happily
speak about the crime that has happened to them, about the trauma they feel. We do
not insist that the abused women give public statements, that they expose
themselves...We just want them to record the truth. (ibid.: 12). 
This could be interpreted as a similar stance to that taken by feminist advocates for women rape
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survivors such as the activists at Medica who refused to discuss individual women’s cases or offer
them up to journalists for interviews. Medica’s concern was with protecting women from re-
traumatization and from manipulation by the press, especially nationalist media (Andri-Ružii
2003). However, the context in which this message is embedded in the book of testimonies points
to different motives.
Post-war Women Activists and the Legacies of War
The war thus created a number of issues for women in the post-war period. Most obviously,
the consequences of war– refugees, rape survivors, humanitarian need, trauma, ethnic divisions–
became areas of activity for women’s groups. In many cases, these needs provided the impetus for
women to organize, for the presence of foreign donors and the availability of funds.
The war also brought forth and even established many of the categories of identity with
which and against which women activists positioned themselves after the war. As with the
population as a whole, women were characterized by newly important categories of ethnicity,
religion, and political orientation vis-a-vis ethnic relations– was she a nationalist, a patriot, a
communist holdover, to which ethnic group did she belong, was she “truly” religious, etc. They were
equally positioned according to what they had done and experienced during the war– did they flee
the country or stay, were they expelled from their homes by ethnic cleansing, did they leave their
towns “voluntarily,” etc. All of these categories were tempered by age, family status, position in
society, and of course, gender. Men were also judged according to whether they had fought and for
which army. Women were not expected to have fought, which offered them both advantages and
disadvantages after the war, as we will see. Women were instead placed in the category of civilians
and, in the eyes of their own ethnic communities, victims, both symbolic (of the nation) and real. As
we have seen, rape and sexual violence gave a specifically gendered tone to women’s victimhood.
However, it was not the only kind of victimhood through which women were portrayed and
understood themselves.
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Images of Rural Victimhood
Several women’s organizations with which I came into contact in the post-war period were
specifically concerned about their image, that is the image of “Bosnian women,” and “Bosniac
women,” in the rest of the world. Bosnians had been watching CNN and the BBC during the war,
as these programs were often the only coverage available. They were therefore quite aware of what
Julie Mertus called the “CNN image” (1994) of distraught and disheveled rural Muslim women
dressed in traditional dimije and head scarves, carrying their children and a few belongings as they
were packed into trucks or marched over mountain trails in the process of being expelled from their
homes. The women shown were inevitably crying, whether in distress or in mourning over a lost
loved one. They thus epitomized the passive, feminized victim.
While such images played into Bosniac nationalist discourses of the victimhood of the nation,
many educated, urban women told me they were hurt and insulted by them. However, their
objections indicate that they were more insulted by the association with village culture and
orientalized images of Bosnia as exotic, distant from Europe, than they were with images of women
as victims. In fact, as I describe in chapter 7, women consciously utilized certain forms of feminized
victim identities as strategies with which to achieve their goals. Hajrija, an Islamic teacher
(mu’alima) who had helped distribute humanitarian aid through a women’s organization during the
war, grew irritated as she told me, 
It’s absurd and wrong that the international community portrayed Bosnian women as
backward, uncivilized, illiterate. This is not reality. They filmed many of our sisters
in the worst times when they were defeated, confused, scared. The communist system
was difficult. Illiteracy grew, especially among our girls. So there were illiterate
women. But these were the only women they showed on CNN– our women fleeing,
always in the worst possible state, completely lost. We’re not Kurds or something,
we have civilization here. And we’re fighting to keep it.
Rural women war victims were thus symbols of primitive  backwardness, the exotic/non-European
Muslim, and the blood- and hatred-filled Balkans. Hajrija here reproduces an orientalizing
representation common to Bosniac discourses, which emphasizes the modernity and sophistication
of Bosnian Muslims as opposed to (backward) rural Bosniacs, Balkaners further to the south and
73 This image coincided with portrayals of Bosnian Muslims, especially in Sarajevo, as “just like us,” i.e.
white, urban, educated, worldly, which accompanied arguments for western intervention.
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east, and most of all Muslims outside of Europe (the Kurds) (Baki-Hayden 1996; Helms n.d.).
Elvira, a Zenica lawyer who was active with the women’s group Bosanka, echoed these sentiments
when she told me, “I wish those foreign journalists had, just once, come into the town and
interviewed one of us. To see that Bosnian women are also educated, sophisticated. This is Europe!”
Countering these images was in fact a major motivating factor for many women to get involved in
women’s organizations and public activities. Mensura, a teacher and parliament representative for
the Bosnian Women’s Party (Stranka Žena BiH), listed this as the first reason for the establishment
of the Women’s Party. In her words, they wanted to show that “we’re not just old peasant women
like the world media showed.”
These women were emphatic about showing women’s capabilities and actions, their
belonging to “the civilized world” (i.e., Europe and the west), and countering the notion of Bosnian
women as passive, helpless victims. However, there were actually other common images of Bosnian
women projected in the foreign press. One appeared in western media (e.g., Cohen 1994) as well as
in the local imagination: that of the Sarajevan beauty, stubbornly refusing to go out of the house
without doing her hair, applying make-up, and donning the latest fashions despite shortages, the
siege and the bombardment of Sarajevo. No Bosnian woman ever complained to me about this urban
image, although it, too, failed to portray women as educated, active or political in any way. However,
it portrayed women as urban and western.73 As a French journalist wrote, “Judging by its streets,
Sarajevo is clearly a European city, not a Muslim capital. Women are more likely to wear miniskirts
than head scarves; men drink alcohol.” (Ourdan 1995). It seems that these women thus objected
more to the association with what was seen as primitive and backward rural culture, than the
portrayal of women as passive and victimized. 
The other image was that of the Muslim woman as rape victim, to which I now turn.
The Image of the Muslim Woman Rape Victim
Although Bosnian women activists associated themselves with certain victim identities, they
generally avoided association with wartime rape for reasons I outline in chapter 8. The image of
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Bosnian women as passive victims, emblematically Muslim and rural, nevertheless endured,
especially in connection to rape (Spasi 2000). Images of the Muslim Woman Rape Victim were
almost as prevalent in the western media as those of distraught, fleeing, rural women. These usually
showed younger women and girls, their faces stained with tears or turned away in shame,
communicating silence (see Gutman 1993). Texts emphasized women’s shame and unwillingness
to talk, despite the obvious fact that the women interviewed had spoken out about their ordeals
(Žarkov 1999). Instead of on their voices, the focus was on the women’s bodies and what had been
done to them (Kaši 2000). Headlines and titles reinforced the association with shame and silence:
“Unspeakable” (in Time Magazine, Morrow 1993), Breaking the Wall of Silence (Vrani 1996), and
“Women Hide Behind a Wall of Silence” (Drakuli 1993b). Many accounts combined rural and
Muslim associations with images of rape. As listed at the beginning of this study, Eve Ensler’s
Vagina Monologues include a sketch on wartime rape entitled, “My Vagina was my Village,” neatly
reinforcing the idea of women’s bodies as territory to be conquered. As the piece and the program
notes make clear, the protagonist is a Muslim woman from rural Bosnia.
Significantly, the Rape Victim was always and necessarily female, despite the striking
number of sexual attacks on men, discussed above. Indeed, rapes of men were not discussed publicly
in any nationalist discourses, as men did not belong to the category of the “rapable” (Žarkov 1999).
Žarkov shows how both nationalist and feminist discourses in Croatia and Serbia perpetuated this
association by focusing on women solely as victims– for nationalists, victims of other nations; for
feminists, victims of men (ibid.; Spasi 2000). The category of “woman” therefore remained the
category of passive objects, outside the (male) realm of political action and military aggression,
vulnerable to rape and therefore in need of male protection (Žarkov 1997). This was to have
consequences for women’s post-war organizing, which we will see in later chapters.
Žarkov also shows how the Rape Victim was constructed as (only) the Muslim woman in
western media and academic discourses (1997, 1999). The few analyses of wartime rape which
mentioned “Bosnian culture” at all usually referred only to the Muslim community and focused on
Muslim women as silenced and shamed rape victims. Many texts commented on what was portrayed
as a predictable, lamentable fact: that rape for Muslim women was especially hard because of the
deeply patriarchal culture from which they came (e.g., Allen 1996; Gutman 1994; Zalihi-Kaurin
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1994). It hardly needed to be explained that  this culture placed high value on female chastity as a
symbol of family and male honor, and that a raped woman would therefore be ostracized and
punished by her own people. Associations with rural and Muslim traditions were emphasized as
explanations in themselves of why Muslim women suffered more (Žarkov 1997). Such
representations drew on familiar, Orientalized images of backward, passive, silent and silenced
Muslim women, victims of their own oppressively patriarchal cultures and irredeemably other (Abu-
Lughod 2002; Ahmed 1982; Mohanty 1991; Žarkov 1995; and see Narayan 1997). 
In contrast to those images, therapists at Medica, who worked with thousands of women rape
survivors, mostly Bosniac women, asserted that none of their patients had been rejected by her
family. While rape was difficult for all women, they reported, it was the very religious women,
whether Muslim, Catholic, or Orthodox, who sometimes had an especially difficult time. For the
urban therapists, the idea that such differences among women would be detectable according to
ethnicity made little sense. As discussed in the previous chapter, urban areas had become largely
secularized and homogenized under socialism, such that differences in class and rural/urban origins
were more pronounced than ethnic differences (Woodward 1985). Rural communities of all religions
in Bosnia tend to be more religious than their counterparts in towns and (thus?) to take an equally
patriarchal view of women’s sexuality and rape. This includes the many people with recent roots in
rural areas (see Simic 1973). Religious communities in the towns likewise tend to be more
conservative in terms of their approach to gender roles (c.f. Sorabji 1989). As Serbs, Croats, and
Bosniacs are all present in both rural and urban settings, nothing about one’s ethnic background says
anything about whether the social milieu one comes from will be rural or urban, religious or secular.
During and after the war, therefore, differences on such issues corresponded more to a person’s ties
to villages and religiosity than to which religion s/he belonged (Žarkov 1999).
Nevertheless, the orientalized image of Muslim women has persisted. Although it is clear that
many Muslim women were raped, and raped because they were Muslims, Muslim women have come
to stand for rape in Bosnia as the only victims and only victims, made more vulnerable and victim-
like through orientalized images of strictly patriarchal Muslim (rural) culture (Žarkov 1997). The
effect of these images was to erase other victims of wartime rape– Serb and Croat women, women
of mixed ethnicity, urban women of all ethnic backgrounds, males, those who were raped by
74 Some foreigners, in solidarity with anti-nationalist feminists in Serbia, did direct funds and efforts toward
projects to help women war victims in Serbia (Mladjenovi 1999). Some, however, were conflicted about offering
“sympathy for the devil” (Meulenbelt 1999).
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members of their own ethnic group– as well as victims of “ordinary” (non-ethnic and “peacetime”)
rape. More immediate for post-war women activists, however, as we will see, was the association
of women with passive victims, outside the realm of action, including public, political, and military
engagement.
Another consequence of these images manifested itself in the approach of foreign donors and
activists. A large number of women’s organizations active after the war had been started by, or
together with, foreigners and foreign donor agencies. While many foreign donors were large
international NGOs with experience in other post-conflict and post-colonial relief and development
contexts, Bosnia also attracted a good many western women, many of them feminists, who,
specifically mobilized by a concern about war rapes, raised money to help Bosnian women,
especially Muslims (e.g. Foeken 1999; Krämer 1999). Zenica, for example, was firmly in the hands
of Muslim dominated political and military forces and was slated to remain that way by all proposed
peace plans (see Burg and Shoup 1999; Woodward 1995). It therefore became a collection point for
thousands of Muslim refugees fleeing Serb, and later Croat, ethnic cleansing campaigns. Because
the bulk of rape survivors were Muslims, but also because the archetypal rape survivor was a Muslim
woman, Zenica and other places with large numbers of Muslim refugees (such as Tuzla and Zagreb)
were chosen by foreign activists for their projects to help women rape survivors.74
Upon reaching Bosnia, several of these groups of foreign women found that the need for
women extended beyond coping with rape (feminists in Serbia reached the same conclusions in their
work with women war survivors, Mladjenovi 1999). This was the case for Monika Hauser, the
German feminist who founded Medica in Zenica, and the other German women of Medica (see
Cockburn 1998; Fischer 1997; Medica 1996). Initially concerned about war rapes, she traveled to
Zagreb where many of the victims of rapes by Serbs had fled. There she learned about Zenica as a
collection point for Muslim refugees within Bosnia. When she arrived in Zenica and gathered local
women who were concerned about helping women war victims, they concluded that the center would
have to tackle more than just the consequences of rape. This was due both to  the multiplicity of
98
kinds of trauma inflicted on women refugees and their children, combined with the need to offer rape
survivors and others a refuge that was not marked specifically as a clinic for “raped women” (see
Cockburn 1998; Medica 1996). Thus, the rapes drew in many concerned activists and facilitated the
raising of more money than may have otherwise been the case.
Ultimately, because rape was an ethnic and national issue, women activists working to
promote understanding for women rape survivors found support, sympathy, and concern for the
victims from the (nationalist party) authorities and from the public at large. It helped that the vast
majority of the rape survivors being treated in a given area belonged to the ethnic group controlling
the town. In Zenica, local authorities supported public initiatives condemning rape as a war crime,
calling for understanding towards the women survivors, and stressing that these women retained their
purity and innocence despite what had happened to them. Muslim religious officials went so far as
to issue a fetwa, or religious decree, calling for understanding towards women victims of rape by
Serbs (Andri-Ružii 2003; Haski 2000). They stressed that the women themselves were not to
blame and urged Muslim men to marry rape victims, especially those pregnant with the children of
rape (i.e., part Serb or Croat) so that the children could be brought up properly as Muslims/Bosniacs.
This eased the minds of many religious Muslim women and helped Medica’s work somewhat. At
the same time, publicizing the rapes also served nationalist causes eager to “prove” the barbarity of
the enemy. Calling for men to marry pregnant rape victims meant re-claiming both the women and
the children for the nation. As was true in Serb and Croat discourses, the nationalist interest in rapes
ended with concern about its implications for the nation. Concrete and sustained support for women
rape survivors (and survivors of other kinds of wartime atrocities) were offered only by local and
foreign women’s organizations like Medica (Hauser 1996: 18).
War rapes affected Medica’s post-war work to combat domestic violence against women. On
the positive side, the fact that rape had become a public issue that was, at least for a time, taken
seriously, made it somewhat easier for Medica to continue discussing rape and violence against
women after the war ended. Some level of understanding for what victims of rape go through and
the gender aspects of the crime had been successfully absorbed by the public. Other aspects of
people’s war experiences provided Medica’s therapists with additional tools for eliciting
understanding for victims’ perspectives. Ivana, a Medica therapist, explained this connection in the
99
context of sensitivity training sessions she helped run for (male) local law enforcement and judicial
officials:
We’ve found the sensibility towards domestic violence can be different when we put
it in the context of things that happened during the war, like prison camps. We show
people the same consequences for domestic violence but apply them to the camp
situation– isolation from the outside, identification with the captor, specific senses
of fear, etc. People in the audience had sympathy for and felt solidarity with the camp
survivors. Then we said, this is the same as with domestic violence. In one group
where there were some camp survivors, the whole room was silent after we made this
comparison, even though before that they had had a much different position on it
[prior to the session]. In this way the war did “help” by giving people examples from
their own experiences or experiences they know more about. We then pose the
question, are we against violence, or only when it’s violence at the hands of certain
people?
Ivana’s last question alludes to some of the problems Medica nevertheless encountered in the
post-war period as they attempted to shift the focus of their work from wartime rape to domestic
violence. As Ivana further pointed out, many people saw wartime rape as something different from
rape in “peacetime.” As her colleague, Esma, put it, “in war, it was also easier to talk about rape
because it was something the enemy was doing to us, they could say, look what they’re doing! And
there was support from the community.” It had therefore been easier in some ways for women to talk
about what they had gone through. “But,” Ivana continued, “when someone feels like a victim in the
collective sense, as part of a group, then it’s seen as a betrayal of loyalty to accuse ‘our’ men of the
same thing.” Thus, although the subject of rape had become more publicly acceptable, it was still
seen in national terms rather than through a gender lens, despite the efforts of women activists. The
support from the community had more been support for “our” victims rather than for women as
victims. To be sure, prejudice against rape survivors was mostly due to standard patriarchal
assumptions about women’s guilt for “allowing” themselves to be raped– as much as their rapes
were deplored as evidence of the barbarity of the rapists (whether because they were ethnic enemies
or the stereotyped primitive peasant man), these women were nonetheless seen as dishonored and
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polluted. I address some consequences of these attitudes in later chapters. Women’s organizations
still had much work to do to convey their gender critique of sexual violence to the Bosnian public.
Indeed, as Esma pointed out, most women were still silent about rape, though Bosnian society was
not unique in this regard since, “women are silent about this all over the world.”
The Politicization of Ethnic and Religious Identities
Women activists, like all other Bosnians, had to contend with the public obsession with
ethnic and religious identities which had been fueled by nationalist politics and deepened by real
experiences of ethnic violence and hostility. Religious practice and identities were given primacy
by nationalists who emphasized outwardly visible devotion to “their” religion as an integral part of
ethno-national membership (Bougarel 1996; Lauševi 1996). Public identities hinged to a large
degree on ethnic belonging, levels of support for ruling nationalist parties and rejection of socialist
(atheist, multi-ethnic, secular) ideals, and outward markers of ethnic orientation, including religious
observance, language usage (especially greetings), dress, and choice of social circles. In Bosniac
areas, markers of Islamic, Bosniac, and anti-communist identities became politically correct among
supporters of the governing SDA, and correspondingly disdained among anti-nationalists. Political
organization, administrative units, government policies, majority/minority relations, the distribution
of state benefits and humanitarian aid, schooling, religious practice, and many other aspects of the
post-war public sphere in Bosnia necessarily required participants in community life to orient
themselves in terms of ethno-national relations. Often such choices became routine, went
unquestioned, or appeared only implicitly in public discourses, but some situations demanded
explicit recognition of a stance on ethno-national issues.
Ethnic labels, too, did not necessarily reflect the feelings, background, or political stance of
individuals, though their use had gone a long way toward solidifying those identities. People of
mixed background were in an especially difficult position. Some chose the identity of one parent or
the other, others adamantly insisted they were neither or both. There were also many people whose
parentage was “pure” (i.e., both parents came from the same ethno-religious background), but who
were married to members of another community, had “mixed” children, or whose extended family
included members of other communities. Again, some of these people willingly chose an affiliation
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while others lived uncomfortably with the contradictions now imposed on their lives through ethnic
categories. Finally, as names acted as markers of ethnic identities, those with the “wrong” names
suddenly found themselves being mistaken for the “wrong” ethnicity, or being seen as suspect. In
other words, although names and ethnic labels were taken to be absolute categories, many people
did not fall into them neatly (see Cockburn 1998: 192-6).
Women’s organizations, along with other types of groups, were generally seen by the public
in ethno-national terms as well. They either had to choose or were assigned (fairly or not) some
ideological position on national identity and ethnic relations in Bosnia, even though most of them
claimed to be completely apolitical. Those who condemned nationalism generally dismissed
organizations engaged in religious activities as “nationalists.” For those suspicious of the
international community’s multi-ethnic state-building policies, NGOs that received foreign funding
to conduct cross-ethnic projects were seen as artificial creations and tools of foreign actors. An NGO
which claimed to be non-nationalist and inclusive could be undermined in the eyes of its community
by a mono-ethnic membership or the personal histories of its leaders if they had ever been a member
of a nationalist political party or had ties to the religious establishment.
In fact, it was especially difficult in Bosniac majority areas, for foreigners or for fellow
Bosnians, to gage people’s commitment to multi-ethnic ideals. This is not to speak about “true” inner
feelings, but to point out that outward statements held many possible meanings. Firstly, geopolitical
factors had compelled most Bosniac nationalists to embrace the idea of a unified, and by necessity,
multi-ethnic Bosnian state. This was also the official position of the SDA, though it often pursued
policies which discouraged non-Bosniacs from feeling at home in the territories it controlled. This
included their insistence on a prominent, public role for Islam and other markers of Bosniac identity.
In this support for a multi-ethnic Bosnia, the SDA differed from its counterpart nationalists among
Serbs and Croats who rejected the state, discouraged members of other ethnic groups from living on
territory they controlled (and had ethnically cleansed), and harbored separatist dreams. Those
Bosniacs who saw a multi-ethnic Bosnia as a practical necessity for the survival of the Bosniac
nation therefore shared many of the same goals with anti-nationalists who advocated a multi-ethnic
Bosnia based on secular democratic principles rather than ethno-national ones (c.f. Bougarel 1996;
Rusinow 1985).
75 Bougarel gives a careful account of these ambiguities as expressed by the SDA just before and during the
war. The SDA tacked between a “civic discourse” of a multi-ethnic Bosnia and “participating fully in the
communitarian dismantling of the state.” (1996: 101).
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Secondly, blatant pressure by foreign donors and international officials for NGOs and
political activists to engage in cross-ethnic cooperation and multi-ethnic activities meant that it was
difficult to determine whether activists publicly espoused multi-ethnic ideals out of personal
conviction or out of a desire to please international officials and garner funding. Support for a multi-
ethnic Bosnia had therefore become “politically correct” both among Bosniac nationalists, the
international community, and in NGO circles, though the reasons differed significantly.
Finally, I heard over and over in Bosniac areas Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs can and must live
together in Bosnia. This sentiment, too, was sometimes a reflection of genuine anti-nationalist
sentiment. At other times it opposed not nationalism in general but specific nationalisms, namely
Serb and Croat nationalist discourses which insisted that the nations could not live together and that
Bosnia must therefore remain divided into ethnic parts. The latter sentiment, in other words, placed
the onus on Serbs and Croats in everyone getting along, with the accompanying reasoning that Serbs
and Croats had been the ones to attack Bosnia and its areas of mixed populations where people were
living peacefully together. Such a stance, however, also frequently carried with it a refusal to look
critically at aspects of Bosniac policies which might make members of other ethnic groups, not to
mention anti-nationalists of all backgrounds, uneasy.75
I outline these discourses and positions to illustrate the many layers of meaning attached to
expressions of support for a multi-ethnic Bosnia and other stances on ethnic relations. My point is
not to essentialize one nation or the other as “nationalist.” Instead, I want to point to the overlapping
set of meanings and discourses on which people draw when they express ideas on how ethnic
relations should be structured. As participants in and objects of these discourses and experiences,
women’s organizations and their individual members held a wide range of opinions about ethnic
identities and related issues. As was true in the wider population, each individual negotiated these
discourses and meanings in different ways in different situations and the same statements by
different people could reflect very different approaches. In this way, suspicions about others’
motives, and therefore conflict, were perpetuated but also often smoothed over. Likewise,
76 This is true despite the rise in women’s political participation since 1998 with the introduction of gender
quotas. I discuss women’s involvement in post-war Bosnian politics in chapter 7.
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international community schemes were complicated by a failure to understand the depth of meaning
contained in outward statements of support or opposition to international goals. I will have more to
say about these issues below.
Women Crossing Ethnic Boundaries
Women’s post-war activism was also affected by the intensified separation of women’s and
men’s roles during the war (see de Alwis 1998b). As one Sarajevan man explained it (in English),
thinking, when I told him that I study anthropology, of physical anthropology’s focus on primate
studies, “We really went back to [being like] the monkey in this war. Man was always fighting and
woman just looked to make some food, carry water, look after [the] kids.” (see Lazarevska 1995).
As males are assigned the role of soldiers and political actors, women as a group fall outside the
category of potential (armed and aggressive) adversaries. Indeed, they were, with very few
exceptions, not among those who have waged war and made political decisions since the dissolution
of Yugoslavia.76 After the war, this allowed women to claim moral purity as new political actors
untainted by the dirtiness of war and nationalist politics. I elaborate on this point in chapter 7.
Women also had an easier time crossing ethnic borders and communicating with those on “the other
side,” especially with other women. This is not to say that such border crossing has been easy or
without problems, especially for women who experienced traumatic personal tragedies during the
war at the hands of ethnic others, but that women as a group were afforded more room to engage in
such activities.
Women could therefore move across borders more safely and sooner after the war ended than
could men, especially younger men. In many cases, older (married) women acted as scouts, testing
the waters for the rest of their families in areas of different ethnic control soon after hostilities had
ended. When I lived in the divided (Croat-Bosniac) city of Mostar in the summer of 1996, just a few
months after the end of the war, it was common knowledge that women could and did routinely cross
the ethnic boundary to the other side of the city where they no longer “belonged.” When there was
some errand that could not be accomplished on one’s “own” side of the city, a woman would
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typically be the one to cross to the other side to get it done. Men, and especially younger men (of
fighting age), crossing the ethnic boundary risked violent assault if they were recognized– either by
their former neighbors and acquaintances, or after being challenged by police or local thugs– as
belonging to the “wrong” ethnic group. 
I knew of only one incident in which a woman was made to feel threatened for being on the
ethnically “wrong” side of town. This was when a young, observant Muslim woman wearing Islamic
dress (hidžab) went to the Croat part of town to catch a bus to Croatia (which was only available
from the Croat section of town) and was verbally harassed. Her head covering and Islamic dress
offered an outward marker of her difference which otherwise cannot usually be determined from
dress or appearance among urban Bosnians. Other women displaying no visible markers of
difference could cross undetected, but the consequence of their being “discovered” was not as severe
and violent as for men. Without outward ethnic markers, in other words, one of the only distinctions
that could be made among people one did not know personally was by sex. Women were not
perceived as significant threats unless they displayed markers of ethnic difference (see Anthias and
Yuval-Davis 1989; McClintock 1993; Schein 1996; C. Smith 1996). Males, though, were seen as
the actors of consequence and were therefore more often noticed and challenged to identify
themselves.
These categories remained important after the war, facilitating the activities of those women
who chose to cross ethnic boundaries. Women such as those at anti-nationalist organizations like
Medica Zenica participated in cross-ethnic feminist networks between Zagreb and Belgrade during
the war. As soon as the fighting halted, despite real fears, these women were among the first to cross
ethnic boundaries within Bosnia to meet women “on the other side,” with whom they had had no
contact during the war. They met with Serb and Croat women who were equally anxious to
(re)establish contacts with the rest of Bosnia. Women continued to lead post-war efforts at
reconciling ethno-national groups driven apart by the fighting. As we will see in the following
chapters, these efforts were encouraged, amplified, and often initiated by donors eager to take
advantage of women’s identities as apolitical actors. Yet it should be remembered that many women
sought out these contacts on their own and were much more successful in establishing cross-ethnic
relationships than were groups of men. As Nataša of Medica put it, “you have to recognize that the
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first initiatives, especially the first exchanges across entity lines, [after the end of the war] were just
women. Like the 1996 NGO Fair in Tuzla. Duga [A Serb women’s NGO] came and that was before
our [later] meeting with them... Maybe this was the donors making it happen but they still came.”
Conclusion
The war, therefore, created many issues which women’s organizations felt compelled to
tackle during and after the war. War-related issues were not the only issues, however. The
dismantling and curtailing of socialist-era social programs, such as maternity leave, state-funded
daycare, health insurance, pensions, and other benefits, also mobilized women to political activism.
Some embraced western free-market models propagated by foreign donors, others encouraged a
return to religion after years of state atheism, while others lobbied to retain socialist-era social
benefits and the rights of women to full time employment and motherhood. These debates turned
on fundamental definitions of gender roles and political ideology. Perhaps the strongest overt force
affecting women’s activism was the international community and the foreign donors, on which most
women’s organizations depended. Nevertheless, as this chapter has outlined, the experience of the
war created firmly entrenched social and moral categories with which post-war women activists were
forced to contend. The following chapters show how such wartime identities and experiences,
together with the legacies of socialism and the effects of international intervention, fundamentally
shaped the discursive arena in which post-war women’s activists operated.
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CHAPTER FIVE
WOMEN’S POST-WAR ORGANIZING AND DONOR AGENDAS
War’s End: The NGO Explosion
Many post-war women’s organizations got their start during the war providing humanitarian
and social services, supporting the armed forces, and aiding refugees and other needy populations.
As we have seen, women were the ones in the position to undertake such initiatives, as men served
in armies or fled. Some of these groups were local extensions of projects begun by foreigners who
wanted to limit their involvement in the region and “leave something behind,” particularly after the
war had ended. Women’s wartime involvement established a foundation for their participation in the
new NGO sector when it emerged in earnest following the end of the war. Women’s NGOs have
been a major category of new organizations formed (Cockburn et. al. 2001: 38-40). This NGO
explosion coincided with the massive international post-war reconstruction effort which actively
promoted the establishment of NGOs (see Belloni 2001; Gagnon 2002a; Stubbs 1999).
Because foreign donors were virtually the only source of funding available to local NGOs,
their demands and policies exerted a profound influence over NGO activities and self-presentations.
While many women’s NGOs, as I discuss below, largely followed socialist era patterns and
understandings of women’s activism, they shaped these activities to conform to donor priorities and
to incorporate attention to social problems produced by the war. Thus, community activities and
social outlets for women became variously “psycho-social aid to traumatized women war victims,”
“legal assistance,” “inter-ethnic dialogue,” and “work with minority women and returnees.” Some
women’s NGOs also reflected newer concerns, not only out of attention to donor demands but also
in response to global and regional changes such as the shift to free market liberalism, political
pluralism, relations with newly created “minorities,” and renewed attention to religious and national
identities (for an overview of activities engaged in by Bosnian women’s NGOs, see Cockburn et. al.
2001; Walsh 1998; and see Gal and Kligman 2000 on post-socialist Central/Eastern Europe). Finally,
a relatively small but vocal group of NGOs were developing feminist practices and ideologies
suitable for the Bosnian context. 
This chapter introduces the women’s organizations in this study and the political context in
77 The major non-western donors to Bosnia were Japan and those from Muslim countries such as Saudi
Arab ia, Kuwait, and  Iran. The latter worked almost exclusively with M uslims and in the M uslim/Bosniac majority
areas of Bosnia and did not promote multi-ethnicity. The same can be said for some religiously based groups
working in Serb or Croat areas. Also present were UN officials and soldiers from various western and non-western
countries.
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which they operated, focusing on ethnic, religious, and gender identities. I begin by outlining the
aims and practices of the “international community” of donors and administrative agencies towards
local NGOs. I then give an overview of the local political and social climate in Zenica. I introduce
the main NGOs I worked with there and in the wider network of Bosnian women’s NGOs. In terms
of approaches to gender, I show how the makeup of women’s groups reflected socialist models of
women’s community involvement, normative assumptions about women’s roles, and ideas pushed
by foreign donors of civil society, the “third sector” of NGOs, social activism, and various other
“hot” issues. In terms of ethnic and religious identities, I show how donors effectively force ethnic
categories upon NGOs even as both donors and NGOs attempt to dismantle them. Thus, I argue that
international intervention has forced a “nation-ing” of gender discourses that otherwise strive to
concentrate on gender issues, and a suppression of dialogue over gender and religious identities.
The “International Community” and “Multi-Multi” Civil Society
To understand how women in NGOs have been targeted by foreign donors and institutions,
it is necessary to outline some of the goals of post-war foreign intervention. During my fieldwork,
it was common to hear both locals and foreigners refer to “the international community.” This term
was sometimes used generally to mean all foreign governments and agencies involved in relief aid
and development,77 but most often referred more narrowly to the group of supra-national bodies and
major aid agencies charged with implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement which ended the war
in late 1995. The latter group in effect represents “western” governments– the United States, Canada,
and European Union (EU) states– either directly, through embassies and country aid agencies
(USAID, DFID, SIDA, etc.[see Appendix C]), or indirectly, in the form of private development
NGOs which implement governmental projects or UN agencies heavily influenced by western
governments (see Gagnon 2002a). Two specific bodies, the Office of the High Representative (OHR)
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), act in a quasi-protectorate
78 I follow local usage by referring to “refugee” return, even though many would-be returnees are in fact
internally displaced persons under international law.
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fashion, to monitor and implement Dayton. These are at the center of what is most often meant by
“the international community,” so that this term, especially when used by Bosnians, can very often
be read to mean “the west,” or “western governments.” Despite the heterogeneity of this group and
the vague boundaries of what the term encompasses, there remains a singularity of purpose, if not
method, when it comes to the broader goal of post-war reconstruction and its attendant aims: ethnic
reconciliation, the return of refugees,78 the creation of a workable, multi-ethnic state with a
pluralistic, democratic and market system (Bose 2002). I therefore refer to international agencies and
donors collectively where appropriate, keeping in mind the complex web of interests, goals, and
power they represent.
International goals in Bosnia include the development of “civil society.” As discussed in the
second chapter, in practice this has meant a focus on “NGO development” as the key feature of civil
society. During my fieldwork, the OSCE’s Democratization Department had an initiative targeting
“Neglected Areas” of Bosnia for the establishment of new local NGOs. In this way, the
“internationals” aimed to “spread civil society” and thereby, presumably, democratize areas of
Bosnia lacking in NGOs/civil society (and democracy?) (see Belloni 2001; Chandler 2000:135-53).
It was no coincidence that the Neglected Areas were those under firm nationalist control, where
refugee return was resisted and ethnic composition was effectively homogeneous. NGOs, especially
those that would be beholden to western donors, were seen as a wedge through which “democratic”
and “civic” (i.e., non-nationalist) values could be injected into these “problematic” areas. Perhaps
coincidently, but also because of the newness of NGOs, local government officials at all levels
viewed NGOs with suspicion. “Non” governmental was often interpreted as “anti” governmental.
In many cases, where civic minded NGOs opposed nationalist governments, this was in fact the case.
It will be remembered that the international community aimed to nurture non-nationalist forces in
the interest of promoting a multi-ethnic state. However, NGOs were not in themselves necessarily
“democratic” or representative of “the grassroots” (see Abramson 1999; Ishkanian 2003). Indeed,
their membership was often closed, or perceived as closed by outsiders, though this varied from
group to group, as we will see.
79 Similarly, Ferguson (1994) discusses “devspeak” in the context of “development.”
80 One Bosniac NGO leader felt Bosniacs were being unfairly targeted to “behave civilly” when for her it
was the Serbs that had instigated the violence and killing. Ironically, the lag in donor attention to NGO development
in the RS had been the result of sanctions meant to punish the Serb entity for resisting the building of a Bosnian state.
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As I outlined in chapter 2, mixed messages from international officials, donors, and local
authorities, combined with varying interpretations among local activists of concepts such as “civil
society” produced much confusion about the role of NGOs. Indeed, I came across many definitions
of civil society among NGO activists themselves, including those who had gone through numerous
“trainings” (trejninzi) by international donors which stressed the need to build civil society through
NGOs. For many, “civil society” was another buzzword of “NGO-speak” (Wedel 2001; and see
Sampson 1996)79 which activists learned in order to garner funding (Ishkanian 2000). Further, there
was an intermediary effect, with concepts being conveyed down the line from donors to various local
actors and back, their meanings shifting in the process (Wedel 2001). Often civil society was
assumed to mean “civilized” or “civilian” society. Translation of the word “civil,” was at times
rendered as “civilno,” as in civil behavior, and other times as “grapansko,” from the word for
“citizen,” or “civic” (see Phillips 2002). Several of my informants objected to what they saw as
donor efforts to get them to behave “civilly” or to “civilize” them, as if they knew nothing but hatred
and violence.80 
Whether they defined civil society the same way donors did, Bosnian activists placed their
definitions squarely into the current Bosnian political context of ethno-national division. Most local
NGO activists defined civil, or citizens’ society as one that rested on the equal treatment of citizens
as individuals, rather than members of ethnic, religious, or other groups. “Civil society is practical,
oriented to the needs of citizens regardless of their membership in certain groups,” explained one
women’s NGO member. The leader of another women’s organization told me that civil society had
existed in Bosnia (Yugoslavia) before the war because ethno-national categories had not determined
one’s treatment by state institutions (but see chapter 4). “It means that there are no differences
between people,” she explained, “each person is respected, valued. People are not differentiated by
religion or nationality, but by their actions.” Both of these women were ethnic minorities in the
municipalities where they lived and felt the onus of being ethnically different in their everyday lives.
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Two Serb women active in a women’s NGO in Banja Luka, capital of the Serb entity,
however, stressed the maintenance of national categories in their definition. But civil society to them
was still multi-ethnic in that the category of citizens superceded that of national divisions. “It is
possible to work around national categories, nationalism. That’s the only way to build a civil
(grapansko) society,” one of the women told me. The other added, “Civil society has to make room
for national identity, but nationalism negates all other things so it’s a threat to civil society.” 
Other NGO activists focused on the role of NGOs. When I asked Nataša, a leader at Medica
Zenica, what civil society meant to her, she responded,
It can mean all kinds of things. I would talk more about the NGO sector, the “third
sector.” This is some sort of link between civil society and the state. It’s kind of a
spokesperson for civil society (to the state). I mean, even neighbors who stick their
heads out of their windows and complain about another neighbor throwing their
garbage in the wrong place is civil society. But the state doesn’t hear that voice.
For Nataša, the NGO sector operated within a larger, undifferentiated space called civil society. But
as she continued her explanation, the specificity of the Bosnian case of a state divided into areas of
different ethnic control was clearly visible:
The third sector is good because it’s not parallel to the structure of the state. You can
have a state that’s divided and which often disregards the general interest. Then the
economy is another sector and that’s also divided (by national group, in Bosnia),
especially when it comes to state firms. ... And then the third sector is concerned with
the needs of the community and not just of one nation. ... Basically in the third sector
it’s easier to cross national borders.
Still other women’s NGO activists focus on the fact that the current system in Bosnia is rife
with corruption and violations of human rights on the basis of ethno-national membership. “How
can we talk about civil society when people don’t have jobs and can’t live in their own homes?”
demanded a woman NGO leader from the Federation town of Tuzla, referring to political obstruction
to the return of refugees to areas of different ethnic control. Another, recalling ethnically motivated
attacks on returned refugees, said, “as long as my neighbor can come and attack me, there’s no civil
society.”
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Not surprisingly, therefore, another key to international efforts was the return of displaced
persons and refugees to their former homes. This effectively meant reversing the “un-mixing”
achieved by the war’s ethnic cleansing– no small task given the great distrust and animosity towards
members of other ethnic groups which was intentionally produced by ethnic cleansing and was
therefore especially strong among the displaced (see Hayden 1996). Reconciliation and
communication across ethnic lines were therefore a priority for foreign organizations working on
refugee return. This, combined with the focus on multi-ethnic civil society, has produced an
overwhelming international emphasis on a western multicultural model (Gagnon 2002b), or what
many Bosnians, having been bombarded with calls for the need for multi-ethnic, multi-confessional,
and multi-cultural everything, have come to refer to as “multi-kulti,” or simply, “multi-multi.”
To be sure, the local NGO sector has been the space where those favoring multi-ethnicity
find room for expression. However, for several reasons it is problematic to assume in every case that
professed support for multi-ethnicity by NGOs was sincere or carried the same meanings as the
liberal multiculturalism promoted by foreign actors (see Belloni 2001; Bose 2002; Smillie 1996;
Stubbs 1999). Some of these were the same problems that kept NGOs from being inclusive,
democratic, and truly representative of “grassroots” opinion. 
First, because of the severe lack of employment in the post-war economy, the NGO sector
attracted people with all kinds of political convictions rather than just what promoters of Western
civil society models would characterize as committed social activists (Stubbs 1999). Secondly,
political climate and the acceptability of public support for multi-ethnicity, even cross-entity
communication, varied from area to area. This meant that a subtle gesture towards multi-ethnic
cooperation by an NGO in an area dominated by separatist nationalists (Serb or Croat areas) may
have reflected a more sincere commitment to multi-ethnicity than more overt advocacy of a unified,
multi-ethnic Bosnia by an organization in an area where such support is officially sanctioned (i.e.,
Bosniac areas).
Thirdly, because donors have openly demanded multi-ethnic membership and/or cross-ethnic
activities from the NGOs they fund, NGOs were just as blatant in their outward declarations of
81 David Kideckel reports an apt reworking of the old socialist phrase (“We pretend to work, and they
pretent to pay us”) related to  East European attitudes towards western aid: “T hey pretend to help us, so we pretend to
be helped” (1995: 6).
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support for multi-ethnicity, or indeed whatever goals current donor policies demanded.81 NGOs that
were, or hoped to be, dependent on western donors– virtually the only available source of funds–
infused presentations of their work with the language of multi-ethnicity, tolerance, reconciliation,
refugee return, and building civil society. NGOs looking for foreign support eagerly pointed out any
members of ethnic minorities in their groups, especially to foreigners. It is therefore not surprising
that some in the NGO sector were more committed to multi-ethnicity and cross-ethnic cooperation
than others.
Finally, donors often required members of different ethnic groups to work together on
projects in the hope that close cooperation would foster the reestablishment of cross-ethnic trust.
Many NGO women complained that donors were putting this requirement above considerations
about what was best for completing a project, even when the project was not specifically about
building multi-ethnicity. In some cases, this strategy even backfired. People unprepared to work with
members of other ethnic groups ended up increasing their distrust through such contact, as any
conflicts related to the project at hand were chalked up to others’ ethnicity rather than individual
characteristics. 
Thus, by placing so much emphasis on ethnicity in NGO activities, donor strategies in many
ways reinforced the “communitarian” logic of ethnic categorization (Bougarel 1996) even as they
sought to dismantle it (see Bieber 1999; Gagnon 2002b; Hayden 1999). As V.P. Gagnon has argued,
international (western) insistence on a liberal multicultural model has reinforced the very European
notion of “the ethnicization of territory and the territorialization of ethnicity” (ibid.: 13; and see
Borneman 1998; Todorova 1997). Rather than being opposites, as donors present them to be, this
“good” kind of liberal nationalism (multiculturalism) and the “bad” exclusive nationalism of the
ethnic cleansers more accurately differ only by degree. Gagnon further points out that the ethnically
based political structure enshrined in the Dayton Agreement has further produced the category of
ethnic minorities within ethnically defined entities, cantons, and municipalities. Donors thus stress
“tolerance” of minorities, people who used to be just regular citizens in a multi-ethnic territory not
82 Later in the war, the Bosnian Army was to amass considerable weaponry despite the embargo, most
notoriously from Iran in shipments tacitly sanctioned by the US, as well as from other Muslim countries (see Burg &
Shoup 1999; Woodward 1995: 338).
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defined by ethnicity. At the end of this chapter, I return to this issue to consider how it affected the
work of women’s organizations.
Zenica as “Mudžahedin Town”
Zenica served as a collection center for thousands of Muslim refugees during the war.
Government at the local and cantonal levels (Zenica is the largest city in the Zenica-Doboj Canton)
was controlled by the SDA throughout the war and up until the anti-nationalist Social Democratic
Party (SDP) won municipal elections in April, 2000. Its reputation as a hardline Islamic town has
been hard for it to shake. During the war, many foreign “mudžahedin” fighters operated in the town
and its surroundings, along with local Bosnian converts to their brand of fundamentalist Islam. These
fighters made the town notorious by patrolling the streets in armed groups (when regular Bosnian
Army fighters were required to leave their weapons at home) harassing couples kissing on park
benches or holding hands in public, and threatening women in clothing they felt was too revealing.
Residents of the town had a mixed reaction to these fighters. Some were grateful for their help on
the battlefield, especially when the Bosnian Army began the war with few weapons and were
(legally) prevented from acquiring more through a UN arms embargo.82 Many others resented the
foreigners’ attempts to impose an “alien” standard of morality and propriety onto secular Bosnian
society. Most of all, Zenica residents resented being labeled as a “mudžahedin town” (mudžahedinski
grad). Nataša, a Medica activist, told the story of her husband’s annoyance while working in the
Bosnian Army’s press office at foreign journalists who would consistently ask to be taken
somewhere where they could film mudžahedin. Her husband, an ethnic Serb, shot back in
exasperation, “Film me– we’re all mudžahedin!” 
Zenica’s reputation has stuck even with the departure of most mudžahedin fighters. When
Miss Bosnia-Herzegovina was stripped of her title after the local press revealed some nude photos
she had had taken some years before, the Sarajevo-based press made knowing remarks about the
irony that she came from Zenica, of all places. Similar inferences were made when the first Bosniac
83 The village, Donja Boinja, was actually about an hour’s drive from Zenica, closer to the towns of
Maglaj and Zavidovii. The presence of the “mudžahedin” in this formerly Serb village and the effort to disperse
them stirred considerable controversy during the time of my fieldwork.
114
woman to appear in Croatian Playboy was a woman from Zenica (see Helms n.d.). Some radical
Islamic groups were still headquartered in Zenica during my fieldwork, and the reclusive community
of foreign ex-mudžahedin fighters who had married Bosnian women had settled in a village within
the Zenica Canton,83 but these groups had little influence on everyday life in post-war Zenica. There
were easily just as many, if not more fundamentalist Muslims and their organizations in Sarajevo
as in Zenica.
Nevertheless, Zenica did remain under the firm control of Bosniac nationalists who
encouraged a prominent role for (their own brand of) Islam in public life and in notions of Bosniac
identity. Many aspects of local governance and everyday life were controlled or influenced by the
local SDA, from the appointment of people for prominent positions in state institutions and private
firms, to housing allocations, private business licenses, and university scholarships. While there was
considerable diversity of public expression, there was a general air of what was “politically correct”
in the eyes of The Party, so much so that many public officials, journalists, artists, and others
censored themselves in public so as not to attract unwanted attention. A small but vocal Croat
nationalist community was also active, albeit largely separately except in its political representation
through the minority party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) of Bosnia. The Serbs who had
stayed in the town during the war were mostly supporters of a united Bosnia or elderly people with
few choices; there was no Serb political presence on the local level. 
The most prominent anti-nationalist political movement was centered around the SDP, a
party with its own image problems as successors of the Yugoslav Communist Party, but which was
genuinely multi-ethnic and had signed on to the principles of the European Social Democratic
movement. These included working to increase the participation of women and youth in politics and
society. The independent art and literary scene, along with informal social networks, also offered
spaces for non-nationalist ideologies. Many, but by no means all, of those who worked in the NGO
sector and with foreign agencies also favored a non-nationalist stance. For all of these groups of
people, however, attitudes and practices vis-a-vis ethnic relations and politics were difficult to pin
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down and even ambiguous or contradictory for individuals, for reasons outlined above. This was the
complex environment in which women’s organizations in Zenica formed themselves during and after
the war.
Women’s Post-war Organizing
In this section, I describe the activities and outlooks of several groupings of women’s
organizations in Zenica and elsewhere as a way of introducing some of the forms which women’s
activism has taken all over post-war Bosnia. I am most concerned with the groups’ approaches to
gender, ethnic issues, the idea of activism, and politics or political and social engagement.
Many outside observers have attempted to classify women’s (and other kinds of) voluntary
organizations by their activities and their ideological orientations. One common classification, which
reflects the international community’s concern with ethnic reconciliation, refugee return, and the
building of a multi-ethnic state, has been by the organizations’ stance on ethnic relations, or how
“nationalist” they were. In addition to obvious ideological statements, foreign agencies look for an
organization’s ties with nationalist political parties or other groups, for the degree of ethnic diversity
among the group’s membership, for whether the group engages in activities with members of other
ethnic groups or in territories of different ethnic control. 
A second type of classification comes from foreign feminist donors and activists concerned
with these organizations’ desire or ability to challenge established patriarchal gender norms. These
observers often asked how “feminist,” an organization was, whether defined by the group itself or
as evaluated by outside observers (but see Walsh 2000). As feminism was a controversial label, this
criterion is often phrased as “having a gender perspective” (Cockburn et. al. 2001: 17), or being
“women-friendly” (see Walsh 1998). Underlying these feminist classifications, too, was the
assumption that feminism and nationalism do not mix– that feminist groups cannot be
simultaneously nationalist, nor nationalist ones feminist. As we have seen from the previous chapter,
this is not necessarily always so (see West 1997).
Despite the neatness of such classification schemes, these two social change aims– work
towards ethnic reconciliation and towards equality of the sexes– indeed, the very definitions of
“nationalism” and “feminism” have been, not surprisingly, subject to substantial variation,
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contradiction, and differences in interpretation. So, too, are the complexities of identities
encompassed within each individual organization, as they are made up of individuals and embedded
in local communities. While questions of nationalism and feminism did arise in organizations’ self-
presentations, often due to perceived donor expectations, organizations also used other standards by
which to judge themselves and other groups. The degree to which an organization was humanitarian,
political, self-interested, or honest were important categories of classification, as was the ability of
an organization to secure (foreign) funding and to demonstrate results in its work. These concerns
reflect the moral categories relevant to local social and political processes in post-war Bosnia.
It must be stressed, however, that the self-presentations of formal organizations, whether
influenced by donor pressures, interaction with outsiders, or foreign sponsored training sessions,
were more than just representations for the benefit of observers outside each group. Women
members, to varying degrees depending on their position within their organization, often felt the
need to uphold certain ideals for which their group stood. In this way, self-presentations by groups
also shaped relations and actions by individuals in their organizations, with other organizations, and
in local communities, families, and social circles. What an organization said about itself was
therefore more than just a statement for donors or others outside the group; it also represented ideals
that could be interpreted and acted out in many different ways by the individuals participating in
these groups.
In the following discussion, I describe four “types” of women’s organizations in Zenica and
a fifth “type” I encountered in other towns. I show how the very categories by which women’s
organizations in Bosnia were judged, by outsiders and locals, are in many ways problematic. By
grouping the organizations in this way, I acknowledge some basis for categorization. However, these
labels should be understood only as loose groupings of the kinds of orientations and activities of
local women’s groups. I do not suggest that the same dynamics among women’s organizations
occurred in all regions of Bosnia. Organizations were highly dependent on the personalities of their
leaders, their histories within their communities, their skill and luck in securing funding, and many
other factors (Cockburn et. al. 2001; Smillie 1996; Stubbs 1999; World Bank 2002). As I have
explained, local politics, geography, and history also played a role in the possibilities and realities
for each group. Nevertheless, in my experience with a wide variety of women activists from all parts
84 The other self-described feminist NGO, Žene Ženama (Women to Women) in Sarajevo, was founded by
two women who had worked for Medica and  a third who had  been an active member of the feminist, anti-nationalist
and anti-militarist Žene u crnom  (Women in Black) in Belgrade where she had spent the war years. Other Bosnian
women’s NGOs such as the Centar za pravnu pomo ženama (Center for Legal Aid to Women) in Zenica, started by
another M edica  activist, Udružene Žene (United W omen) in Banja Luka, Lara  in Bije ljina, Forum F in Posušje, and
Žena BiH (Woman of Bosnia-Herzegovina) in Mostar, sometimes used the term “feminism” or did not always reject
it outright, but did not usually describe themselves as feminist groups. I take up the issue of “B osnian feminism” in
chapter 6.
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of Bosnia, I did see many patterns which are reflected in the Zenica groups.
The fifth grouping describes two women’s organizations not based in Zenica, though I got
to know them through Zenica activists at various women’s NGO meetings. Organizations of this
type, refugee/returnee women’s NGOs, were not present in Zenica but many of the women refugees
had passed through Zenica during the war. I discuss below the ways in which these groups fit and
do not fit into the NGO “types” as I have grouped them here.
Medica: Feminist, Multi-ethnic, Anti-nationalist
Medica is one of the oldest, largest, best established, and best-known women’s NGOs in
Bosnia. It is also one of the few to declare itself a feminist project.84 The organization was founded
in April 1993 when feminists from Germany led by gynecologist Monika Hauser came to Zenica
with the goal of helping women war survivors, especially those who had survived wartime rape (see
Chapter 4). The German women sought out Bosnian women psychologists, medical professionals,
and others with necessary skills to work in a women’s therapy center which would combine medical
and psychological treatment for women who had suffered various kinds of trauma during the war.
Medica’s approach has been to offer holistic treatment of trauma through medical, psychological,
spiritual, and material help. With these goals in mind, the project grew to provide vocational training,
spiritual counseling, material aid, child care, and shelter to women trauma survivors. After the war,
with the immediate issue of wartime suffering receding in urgency, Medica’s focus broadened and
shifted to combating domestic violence against women and children. The residence maintained on
the premises for women war survivors became a shelter for women fleeing abusive home situations.
An SOS Telefon help hotline was set up, as was Infoteka, an office whose job it was to document
Medica’s work, network with other women’s organizations, and represent Medica to the public.
Eventually, Infoteka began conducting research and issuing publications on violence against women,
85 A feminist donor with offices in Bosnia, Delfi/STAR, coached them through their first attempts at
proposal writing, sending it back until it was right rather than rejecting the first drafts.
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as well as leading an initiative to train local police, medical, legal, and social work officials in better
understanding and fighting gender based violence.
To facilitate fundraising efforts, the German women created Medica Mondiale as an
organization based in Germany. Most of the direct involvement by the German women in Medica
Zenica’s activities was during the war and immediately afterwards. Since 1996 there have been no
German women from Medica Mondiale in Zenica; the project became a truly locally run NGO.
Medica Mondiale, however, continued to provide funding for Medica Zenica, even as they later
began work in other conflict zones such as Kosovo and Afghanistan. During my fieldwork, the
specter of an end to the German funding loomed over the project; they had been shielded somewhat
from the volatility and pressures of the regular donor market in Bosnia. Infoteka was the first to
begin learning how to write project proposals and garnering outside funds for various individual
projects.85 In fact, Nataša of Infoteka complained that they had outpaced Medica Mondiale in their
development as an NGO. While the German Medica was still relying on crises and horrifying images
of war to raise money, the Zenica women, Nataša felt, were getting on with life rather than dwelling
on the war.
Contact with foreigners extended beyond Medica’s relationship with Medica Mondiale.
Zenica maintained close contacts with feminists from Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia, though these,
as fellow “ex-Yugoslavs,” were not considered “true” foreigners. Many western feminist activists,
researchers, donors, and volunteers also passed through the project. Infoteka had had several
American volunteers, including two who stayed for two years each and contributed greatly to the
direction of Medica’s work. The second of these, Kristen, was part of the Infoteka team and my flat-
mate while I lived in Zenica. I discuss her role further in chapter 6.
Infoteka was the branch of Medica with which I had the most contact, though I also interacted
with several of the therapists and other leaders most active in public outreach projects. These were
the women who kept in touch with feminists in other countries and women’s NGOs within Bosnia.
They had been through various training courses– in non-violent conflict resolution, feminist theory,
database management, and subjects dealing with NGO development– and had conducted seminars
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for other Bosnian groups in these subjects. I also spoke with and attended meetings with members
of the Center for Legal Aid to Women (Centar za pravnu pomo ženama), which had been founded
by a Medica member and still worked closely with Medica and its clients. The Center’s leaders were
also quite well connected to western donor circles (and thus rarely had time to grant intensive
interviews to a visiting non-donor anthropologist).
The women in Infoteka were more likely than women in the rest of Medica to call themselves
feminists and to incorporate gender analysis into their work and everyday activities. They were also
younger– all but one were in their twenties and thirties– a few having come of age in Medica from
the time they were in their late teens or early twenties. In fact, as women in NGOs in Bosnia tended
to be in their forties and fifties, the Infoteka “girls” (cure), as they were called in Medica, along with
some younger women working in the day care center and SOS Telefon, were among only a few
younger and unmarried women’s NGO activists in Bosnia.
Although Medica was officially a women’s “association” (udruženje), few women belonged
who were not employees or SOS Telefon volunteers. The women had typically come to Medica
because they were recruited for their skills (as psychologists, doctors, nurses, religious counselors,
German speakers, cooks), because a mother, daughter, or other family member brought them in, or
after having been a patient/client. There were also a few men employed by Medica as night guards
and drivers; otherwise it was an all-women organization.
The community viewed Medica with a mixture of gratitude, approval, disapproval and envy.
Many only associated it with “help for raped women” or with the gynecological clinic. This was seen
as a welcome service to the victims of the war and to women. However, some who were more
familiar with Medica’s public activities were put off by their avowal of feminism and their
association with foreign feminists. They assumed that this meant that Medica was teaching women
to “hate men.”
Medica’s feminist orientation had been built into the project from the beginning by the
German women. Contacts with feminists in Zagreb, Belgrade, and further afield were initiated and
nurtured. As they took over the project completely, the leading Bosnian women continued to
embrace these ideals, as did Medica Zenica as an organization, though the rest of Medica’s members
came to different personal conclusions about both gender and national identities (see Cockburn
86 Interestingly, foreigners– the current and former American volunteers who worked closely with Medica–
were the ones to suggest that ethnic differences might be behind some of the tensions in Medica. When such
hypotheses were voiced, however, the M edica  women rejected them, offering explanations which had  to do with
individual characteristics and actions rather than ethnicity. In fact, it often seemed that foreigners, including me, were
much more aware of ethnically based differences among the women than the local women themselves. It could have
been that the women at Medica  refused to consider such explanations in order to be consistent with their anti-
nationalist views. Yet I also suspect this was a product of foreigners having been conditioned to expect ethnic
tensions everywhere by the ubiquitous image of the Balkans as a hotbed of “ancient ethnic hatreds.”  
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1998). Above all, they expressed the desire to get on with their work to help women, regardless of
ethnic or religious background, which was in itself a political stance. I discuss the articulation of
feminisms within Medica further in chapter 6.
Medica also billed itself as anti-nationalist and multi-ethnic, or without an ethnic identity.
Their membership did include women of Serb, Croat, and Bosniac backgrounds, as well as those in
or of mixed marriages. A large majority, however, were Bosniac, as were most of their clients. In
this they closely mirrored the ethnic composition of the town, which was about 80% Bosniac. I
encountered very little discussion among Medica members about ethnic differences within the group.
Ethnicity, religion, and ethnic politics were all subjects of lively debate around the table in Infoteka,
but this was in terms of what was happening in the community and in Bosnia as a whole. Conflicts,
resentment, friendships, and alliances within Medica were based more often on personal attributes
and actions than on ethnic categories.86 Medica activists, regardless of ethnic background, professed
a sense of appreciation for the atmosphere at Medica, calling it, as one activist did, “some kind of
oasis,” from the pressures of everyday life where people were compelled to identify themselves
ethnically and to think in ethno-religious terms. 
Still, ethnicity did become an issue in subtle ways, whether imposed from the outside or as
a subtle subtext to daily activities and debates. In some cases, perceptions influenced by individuals’
own ethnicized subject positions contributed to personal clashes. Within the organization, activists
recognized the need to “count” those who could be classified as ethnic minorities and to encourage
cross-ethnic work in a society that has been so divided by ethnic nationalisms. This was a crucial part
of the effort towards ethnic reconciliation. “[Ethno-]national categories can’t be avoided,” explained
Nataša of Infoteka, “I can’t think like that. But you have to take them into consideration, even if you
want to fight them.” I return to the effects of donor policies on ethnic relations at the end of this
chapter.
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Despite the working relationships that had formed, all the women at Medica had to work
through feelings of animosity toward members of other ethnic groups in whose name armies were
perpetrating terrible acts of violence. They had to work hard to reconcile those feelings with the
presence within Medica of women belonging to those ethnic groups. However, for many of the
Bosniacs who had had their faith in other ethnic groups destroyed by personal experiences during
the war, just the presence of Serb and Croat women, as well as women from mixed marriages and
other backgrounds, allowed them to overcome hatred and mistrust and to begin to view others as
individuals first rather than as ethnic others. This atmosphere also helped the Serb and Croat women
cope with the situation of suddenly being an ethnic minority which was associated with wartime
atrocities perpetrated against Bosniacs, even while they themselves had had unpleasant experiences
because they were not Bosniacs (see Cockburn 1998).
At the end of the day, it was Medica’s common focus on combating violence against women
which held them together, despite their differences on questions of ethnic relations. In Nataša’s
words, “We in Medica have different political orientations. We didn’t unite because of political
conviction but because we were all trying to work on the same problem. That’s the advantage of
Medica.” Because Bosnian politics turned on differing conceptions of ethnic relations, here “political
orientations” encompasses attitudes toward ethnicity and nationalism. Medica thus acknowledged
the differences which might divide its members, yet because its focus was elsewhere, and not in
small part also because many of the women could not afford to lose their jobs in Medica, it managed
to hold itself together. A similar dynamic was even more crucial in cross-ethnic relations among
women’s NGOs, as I discuss in chapter 7.
Gender-conservative “Nationalists”?: The Association of Women Intellectuals “Bosanka” 
As its name implies, Bosanka (the female form of “Bosnian”) saw itself as a group of
educated women whose main task was to help other women and their community as a whole through
educative and cultural activities. The organization grew out of the wartime humanitarian activities
of a group of urban, professional Bosniac women in Zenica. From the beginning of the war, these
women had mobilized themselves through another women’s group called Sumejja to distribute
humanitarian aid to refugees and people in outlying villages. Šefika, a judge and former teacher, and
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others also began organizing language courses and medical aid teams. Edina, a dentist, volunteered
her professional services, often pulling hundreds of rotten teeth each week in exchange for apples
from village orchards, which the women then distributed to wounded soldiers in the hospital. 
After two years of this, in 1994, the educational courses were stopped to make more room
for humanitarian distribution, at which point Šefika and Edina decided to split off and form their
own organization. Šefika explained,
I was impatient. ... We were a little angry because of that and we made comments on
why that kind of work couldn’t be done, since Sumejja after all did have a sort of
heterogeneous membership in terms of professions... so let those women–
housewives– who don’t have any specific knowledge do the most simple tasks. I
don’t know how to do all that weighing, packing, and all that. Let us women
[professionals] do this [educational activities]. ...Then I was the one who suggested,
why don’t we... let’s form an association of intellectual women where our goal will
be just that, but that we don’t just work in the town– there were those seminars and
things in the town then– but let’s go to the villages where women first of all don’t
have any opportunities or transportation. ... Let’s go out to the villages and hold
courses, or lectures, I don’t know, on the subject of law or whatever our specialties
are. So, then– even though the humanitarian and the educative are always linked, but
when you just do the humanitarian, I don’t know, you distribute flour, that’s not
educative.
Educative was the key concept for these women. They felt the burdens of their own privilege as
educated, professional women– among them were a judge, several teachers, a school principal, a
lawyer, and a few doctors– in a kind of noblesse oblige toward their less fortunate sisters in the
villages. These were the women who most vehemently objected to the CNN images of disheveled,
rural Bosnian women “with five scarves on their heads,” as one Bosanka member put it, and wanted
to show their education and sophistication. Bosanka was thus formed with Šefika as its leader. After
the war ended and the Zenica branch of Sumejja disbanded, Bosanka continued to operate on a
purely voluntary basis and with no permanent donors.
When I first conceived this research, I had chosen Bosanka as a same-town counterpoint to
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Medica’s explicit feminism and anti-nationalism. Their name suggested, if not a specifically
nationalist stance, then one which celebrated both Islam and Bosniac traditions as integral to Bosnian
society and statehood, and in a way which might put off many Serbs and Croats. Bosanka’s
membership was all Bosniac; they spoke in terms associated with Bosniac nationalism, though
mostly in the sense of national identity affirmation rather than outright hostility toward ethnic others.
They were also closely linked to a network of women’s organizations based in Sarajevo which had
a reputation for being Bosniac nationalists and included other similarly named women’s associations
such as Bošnjakinja (the female form of “Bosniac”), several branches of Sumejja (named after the
first female martyr to Islam), and of Fatma (a branch of the SDA which works with families of
martyrs [šehids] and fallen soldiers from the Bosnian Army) (Selimbegovi 1995). 
During my preliminary research in 1997, the women of Bosanka had given off all the signals
associated with a Bosniac nationalist position in the post-war period. They expressed great
enthusiasm for promoting and celebrating all things Bosniac and Muslim, and their activities
included workshops with (Muslim) village girls on various topics including “Women in Islam,”
“History of the Bosnian State,” and “Handicrafts in the Function of Preserving Tradition.” Šefika,
was especially keen to take me to the (Bosniac) rural areas, 
to see a real woman in a village, because in cities everyone lives in the same way–
it’s international. ... You have to go to a village to see a real Bosnian woman
(Bosanka). We’ll surprise her so she doesn’t have time to prepare. You’ll see her just
as she lives. There’s nothing like seeing someone in their home to really understand
them.
In referring to a real “Bosnian” woman– Bosanka– in what she had made clear was a Bosniac village,
she elevated Bosniacs to the status of emblematic examples of what it meant to be Bosnian.
Furthermore, her veneration of village culture as authentically Bosniac seemed more a fascination
with the Bosniac past and traditions than a real desire to improve life for rural women. Edina had
talked excitedly about her recent trip to Iran, about solidarity between Bosnian Muslims and the
wider Muslim world, and how she was thinking about starting to wear Islamic dress, “covering.”
Furthermore, when I asked them how their group got started, I got a history lesson which revolved
around the theme of persecution of Muslims by Serbs. Clearly, the “we”  in their perceptions were
87 These fizzled attempts also included a plan to offer English and computer classes in their center, taught
by me (as another of my attempts to “give something back” but also to create another arena for interaction with the
organization and its women members).
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Bosniacs.
Bosanka members explicitly eschewed the term “feminism,” said nothing about women’s
rights or equality, and seemed to advocate and affirm conservative, patriarchal roles for women such
as motherhood, traditional handicrafts, cooking, keeping a warm and nurturing home atmosphere for
husband and children, etc. At the same time, however, these women were eager to portray
themselves as intellectuals, professional urban women with careers, social standing, education, and
sophisticated, “European” ways. I concluded that this group fit roughly into the category of a
nationalist– or at least not explicitly anti-nationalist or multi-ethnic– and non-feminist women’s
organization, even if I expected to find significant variation and perhaps contradictions in the
activities of the group and stances of individual members.
When I returned to Zenica in 1999, I visited Šefika to begin following Bosanka’s activities.
Though Šefika was to mention it to me countless times, I never was able to observe one of their
“educational seminars for village girls and young women” because they were never held again (even
though I gave them a standing offer to provide transportation). In fact, Bosanka had all but ceased
to function as an organization by this time, despite Šefika’s attempts to motivate and organize its
members.87 The group’s, or at least Šefika’s, outlook on questions of gender and ethnicity had also
changed substantially. Edina, who had not donned Islamic dress, was no longer very active in the
organization, as her time was now taken up in her new role as a grandmother, and Šefika had begun
to interact with a wider network of women’s organizations, including NGOs from Serb and Croat
areas, that advocated inter-ethnic communication and challenged many aspects of commonly
accepted gender roles for women. I do not know whether I had come away with the wrong
impression of Bosanka in my initial visit with them, whether their initial self-presentation was
something of an exaggerated performance for me, or whether the group, and specifically Šefika, had
undergone an ideological shift in my absence. I am inclined to think it was a combination of all of
these things, but especially the latter, and that Šefika was merely adding a new layer to her
previously held beliefs. This was not at all incongruous, as it was easy and logical to merge aspects
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of national identity affirmation with those of advocacy for a united, multi-ethnic Bosnia, especially
for Bosniacs as I discussed above. Šefika had never been an official supporter of the SDA, though
she felt strongly about affirming Bosniac national identity. At the same time that more and more
people had grown disenchanted with SDA rule, however, she had directed her sympathies toward
the SDP and anti-nationalist ideologies. Likewise, the group’s stances on individual gender issues
and advocacy for “women’s rights” could easily encompass “traditional” patriarchal values and
“feminist” demands for equality in public life. After all, this had been the familiar mode of women’s
lives under socialism, the system under which these middle aged women had all come of age and
built their careers and families. Still, Šefika was beginning to embrace feminism as a term as she
attended more and more Bosnia-wide meetings at which it was used in a positive way. My hunch is
also that she wanted to show me, as an educated foreigner, how open minded and worldly she was.
Feminism, women’s rights, and anti-nationalism were embraced by western donors, representatives
of “the civilized world,” and many other educated Bosnians who moved in the circles of intellectual
elites to which Šefika felt she belonged.
As Šefika became more and more involved in the Bosnian League of Women Voters and
professional activities unrelated to women’s organizing, she gave up most of her efforts to mobilize
Bosanka’s members to action, complaining that the women were not willing to participate anymore
or to initiate anything without her. While I followed her activities with the League, I was left without
an unambiguously “nationalist” and non-feminist women’s NGO for my study, although I was aware
that these labels meant little in this context. I began to seek out members of other women’s
organizations in the town in my quest to explore as many facets as I could of the intersection
between gender and ethno-national ideologies and identities among women activists.
A “Catch-all” Working Class Ideological Mix: Naš Most
Naš Most (Our Bridge) organized social and income generating activities for a large
membership of women from all kinds of educational and ethnic backgrounds. Most’s leader, Razija,
emphasized that it was this networking of “ordinary women” which distinguished Most from other
women’s organizations. At the time of my fieldwork, Most had over 500 members and was rapidly
growing, owing to a requirement that women joining a foreign-funded micro-credit loan scheme also
88 This expression, using the name of the old Yugoslav currency, the dinar, is still in use despite the
introduction of a new Bosnian currency, the “convertible mark” (konvertabilna marka) in June, 1998.
126
join the association. The micro-credit scheme, financed and designed by the American aid agency
Catholic Relief Services (CRS), was wildly popular, as unemployment rates, especially for those
without higher degrees or elite connections, were very high and families, many of them headed by
women, were struggling to make ends meet. 
Most’s activities ranged from all-women social gatherings, to income-generating projects
with rug weaving, sewing, and traditionally female handicrafts, to micro-credit loan schemes.
Members expressed a firm conviction that women could help each other out, learn from each others’
experiences, and generally become stronger when they band together. As an organization, they were
still struggling to successfully negotiate the world of foreign donors, although they had managed to
win several projects (see Sampson 1996) from foreign donor agencies which helped them pay basic
operating expenses and stipends for a handful of the women. Still, they were frustrated with the
sometimes opaque process of garnering funds. They were learning “NGO speak” and how to tailor
their proposals to donor priorities. As a result, they took on a wide variety of projects and as such
may be classified as a “catch-all NGO” (Belloni 1999; Smillie 1996; Stubbs 1995; World Bank
2002). As one of the administrators told a prospective member who stopped by the office on day,
“Any activity which helps women earn some money (da zaradi koji dinar)88 is good. That’s why we
exist.”
It is difficult to pin down Naš Most’s stance, even an official one, on gender and ethnic
relations. Most of their focus was on helping women survive the post-war economy. According to
its leader, Razija, who joined the group in 1997, the organization had initially been purely Bosniac-
oriented. However, Sadeta, a religious Muslim woman who founded Most during the war, made no
mention of national identity when she told me about its initial activities. Sadeta formed the
organization in 1994 with some other Muslim women when she had had to leave her position at
Medica because of differences with the Medica women about its approach. In 1997, two years after
the end of the war, Sadeta and many of the organization’s original members left Most for various
personal reasons and Razija took over its leadership. Under Razija, the organization underwent
significant changes in membership and activities, as those unhappy with this shift left and new
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women joined.
As Razija tells it, before she arrived the membership of Naš Most was all Bosniac women
and one of their main goals was to affirm and nurture Bosniac identity. “Not that this is bad,” she
said, “but I don’t know that an association like this is the right place for that.” Razija also
volunteered with the local Bosniac cultural association, Preporod (Renaissance), which was tied to
the SDA, because she was “interested in the tradition of the Bosniacs, especially after Miloševi
worked so hard to destroy Bosniac identity.” But she told me that “Identity belongs at Preporod, but
Naš Most should be struggling for the rights of women.” 
She also said she wanted to expand the membership to include more non-Bosniacs. In 1999,
she proudly told me, “25% of our members are not Bosniacs. There’s a certain amount of Catholic
and Orthodox women. But this is not a criteria for this organization. That’s a private thing. There
are even Jehovah’s Witnesses.” There was a general desire among the active members of Most to
cultivate a multi-ethnic or non-nationalist atmosphere. Džehida, the office manager during my tenure
in Zenica, with a recognizably Muslim name, told a woman who had come to inquire about
membership:
All members here are equal, the same (iste), regardless of their nationality,
profession, status, whatever. Here, I’m Džehida and this is Milka [a recognizably
non-Bosniac name] and it doesn’t matter. We’re both sitting here. And it doesn’t
matter that she’s a cook and you’re a seamstress, or whatever. If you want to do
something, if you’re interested in some activity, bring it forth and we’ll all try to
make it happen.
Most’s membership was indeed made up of all kinds of women with many different outlooks
on questions of ethnicity, religion, and nationalism. One Bosniac woman member complained every
time I saw her of the corruption of the SDA, the hypocrisy of those who mix Islam with politics, and
her disappointment with her “own people” in the post-war period. Non-Bosniac members proclaimed
their enthusiasm over being involved and accepted into such a large and diverse group of women.
But Besima, a young, devout Muslim who wore Islamic dress, was clear that she had joined the
organization in order to help other women, especially Bosniacs and war victims, “to tell people what
it’s like in Islam.” She was both moved by the way in which her people (narod) had been attacked
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and concerned with Bosniacs’ generally low levels of religious observance (a common complaint
among religious Bosniacs).
For anyone who was looking for it, the signs of Bosniac domination were readily visible at
Most. Besima was visible in the office in her head scarf and Islamic dress. This by itself should bear
no significance, yet in the post-war climate in Bosnia, covered women signaled what some saw as
a threatening form of Bosniac nationalism, and others saw as a friendly space where Bosniacs could
be openly proud of their identity and faith. It was easy to learn that Razija was also active at
Preporod, a space equated with the SDA, and the well-known large social gatherings for women
(sijela) Most organized were always attended by SDA members and sympathizers. Razija herself
proudly told me she had the approval of the authorities because, “they know how much I’m for
Bosnia.” In other words, they knew she and her organization supported the building of a multi-ethnic
state in a way favored by the SDA.
However there were several enthusiastic and prominent non-Bosniac participants in the
group. Furthermore, the group was actively recruiting non-Bosniac women for its membership and
engaged in several projects to help minority returnees. Granted, much of this effort was in response
to donor demands– one project Most had taken on required them to “find” Croat women to work in
an industrial sewing workshop. Members of ethnic minorities in Zenica also had fewer options for
income generation and employment and little choice but to get along with the majority Bosniacs.
Still, Most could have opted not to pursue such projects, and more non-Bosniacs might have stayed
away had they felt truly unwelcome. Most’s position on ethnic relations, therefore, roughly coincided
with that of the majority of people in the Bosniac dominated areas of Bosnia: open affirmation of
Bosniac identity and cultural heritage along with an insistence that Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats can
live together in a multi-ethnic state. Non-Bosniacs were tolerated, welcomed, and recruited but they
were not expected to espouse non-Bosniac nationalist views (such as challenging the legitimacy of
the Bosnian state) or vigorously affirm their own identities. The ethnic mix was important not only
to satisfy donors but also to conform to the ideological position which supported the idea of Bosnia
as a multi-ethnic state with Bosniacs as its tolerant champions.
Naš Most had always been focused on helping women both materially and in becoming
economically independent, and both Sadeta and Razija held strong opinions about the need to
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establish more equality for women. However, feminism remained a dirty word at Most, as it was
with most of the rest of the population, although Razija and others did talk quite a bit about
“women’s rights.” Razija explained the motivation for her work in Most:
I wanted to do this because of lots of things that came together. There’s a lot of
uneducated people, the mentality here... I had ideas on health, mental health,
especially of women. Maybe I wanted a movement, but that’s too strong a word– an
association. And not the feminist kind but the kind of struggle for women’s rights, for
a complete woman– woman as a mother, worker, etc. (emphasis added)
Like the women professionals at Bosanka, Razija was concerned with reaching “ordinary women,”
because “they have absolutely no clue about their own rights.” Razija’s approach was different from
Bosanka’s, however, in that she did not plan to “educate” them but to gather them into the
organization so they could support each other (c.f. Phillips 2002). As a result, a majority of Most’s
members came from working class and rural backgrounds, and only a few had completed any higher
education. It was important to many Most participants that women stand up for their dignity, for their
rights not to be abused or cheated on by husbands, to collect alimony after a divorce, to be able to
bring up their children in a stable, nurturing environment. Sadeta explained, “for young women
economic independence is really important, regardless of whether they have a family, children,
husband. This was one of the foci of our work.” They all found strength in women’s banding
together. As Razija stated, “women are stronger together, as a group. Together they can educate and
inform themselves, get to know each other and what’s being done for women.” 
However, I never heard any of Most’s members challenge established gender norms for
women. In other words, they never articulated what I would have labeled a feminist stance. They
wanted women to be able to realize their rights within their roles as wives, mothers, and nurturers.
They agreed that women should work outside the home, especially under current conditions of
economic hardship, to avoid being isolated, dependent, and vulnerable to abuse from husbands or
others. On many occasions, members of the organization expressed judgments of other women or
otherwise made it clear that they agreed with, or at least did not consider challenging, patriarchal
concern with women’s sexual honor and assumptions that women’s most important duties were to
motherhood and marriage. Razija described an idea she had for improving literacy and education
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rates for women, especially Bosniacs:
The way to have literate women is through girls’ schools or girls’ dorms. Then more
village girls would be sent to school. This [would be] a complete school with a broad
education– languages, music, and supervision of behavior and morality for ladies.
This is a way for our families to get equality, because mothers that are educated in
this way will bring up children in this way, children who will be the pride of this
country and true carriers of society and not murderers. This is also a way to protect
women and make sure they have the support of the male public. There’s very little
talk in schools about the importance of family, motherhood. Girls’ schools would
work to prepare a girl for life, to be a future mother, wife, worker. She will need to
think about what kind of future husband she will have, her family, kids, house. Girls
have no idea what awaits them. Diapers alone are a huge job, and then what to let
kids do and what to forbid them. (emphasis added)
Razija thus saw marriage and motherhood as women’s primary roles, but also included that of
(female) worker (radnica), precisely the construction of women’s roles that was dominant in the
socialist period. Care of the home was a woman’s responsibility, as was the upbringing and moral
education of children. Razija stressed the importance of acceptance from “the male public,”
suggesting that girls should not be taught anything that might be seen as a challenge to the position
of men, or in a way which clashed with established gender norms. Razija further explained that girls
needed sex-segregated schools so as not to call girls’ (sexual) morality into question, as it was part
of the “mentality and faith” among Bosniacs that girls should be separated from boys from age nine.
Other members of the organization expressed similar acceptance of women’s patriarchal
roles, even as they worked for more female solidarity and justice for women within those roles. The
women of Naš Most thus approached gender issues much the same way they were approached under
socialism. Women were to be “mothers, wives, workers,” and active in their communities, while
taking primary responsibility for the home and the family (Mežnari 1985; Sklevicky 1989). I
discuss the continuity from socialist times further below.
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Religious Muslim Women’s Associations: Merjem, Kewser, and Individual Activists
In my search for the most exclusive and “nationalist” women, I sought out several
organizations which specifically catered only to Bosniac women. Many of these were groups of
religious Muslim women who focused more on religion and, in their words, social, cultural, and
“humanitarian” issues rather than anything “political.” Over the course of my research, I was also
directed to religious women who were or had been active in various other types of associations and
public initiatives which stressed Bosniac and/or Muslim identity.
In seeking out these women, I wanted to understand more about the link between nationalism,
religion, and constructions of womanhood. Though it was not all I was looking for, I wondered
whether there were any challenges from within the religious establishment to male-defined
conventions and expressions of Islam similar to Islamic feminist movements in other Muslim
societies (see Abu-Lughod 1998; Fernea 1998; Mernissi 1991; Ahmed 1992). As with other
women’s groups, my questions for these women were open-ended, centering on the women’s visions
of the ideal society as far as gender, ethnic relations and religion were concerned. This took a
specific tone with religious women, because outward markers of religious practice have become
synonymous in many people’s eyes with support for nationalist political agendas. 
I did not get as close to these women as I had hoped. Most of them were perfectly willing to
be interviewed and they conveyed some very interesting things to me. But I sensed a level of caution
in many of them, probably because I was a westerner, not religious (even in “my own” religion), and
a woman asking about the position of women. Several of these women expressed outright frustration
over the way Islam, Muslims, and especially the position of women in Muslim societies, are
portrayed in the west. Some seemed to assume that I had come to Bosnia to judge them, to prove
how nationalist and patriarchal religious Muslims really are. While I explicitly tried to assure them
that this was not the case, there was nevertheless a sense among many of my interviewees that they
felt the need to disprove western, Orientalist stereotypes about Muslims and assumptions about the
link between religiosity and chauvinistic nationalisms in Bosnia. There was a barrier between me
and many of these women that was absent with the other women’s organizations. As a result, though
I had many conversations with individual women, I did not attend their activities to the extent I did
with other groups; in some cases, I only got to know an organization’s leader. In introducing these
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groups and individuals, therefore, I outline the range of their activities and approaches but do not
present each group in detail.
Merjem, the Arabic name for Mary, mother of Jesus, was one women’s group in Zenica that
was made up strictly of Bosniacs. Their leader, Ramiza, and several of the core women of the
organization were both devout Muslims (Ramiza and several of them wore Islamic dress) and
members of the SDA. Of course, Ramiza was clear that their activities were not “political,” despite
their open support for the SDA, because their activities revolved mostly around religious education
and  “socializing” (druženje). They had formed the group as older women interested in learning more
about Islam and their national identity. They organized women’s excursions, often to religious events
or sites, and frequently joined Naš Most in organizing women’s sijela, especially for March 8th. Like
the women of Naš Most, they stressed that Merjem members were “ordinary” women– “housewives
and villagers” in Ramiza’s words– not “intellectuals” like the women in Bosanka and other groups.
Indeed, Ramiza did not appear to have thought particularly deeply about the role of women, religion,
or ethnicity in society, though other members of the group had very specific ideas. 
Merjem had never been funded by a western donor, nor had they tried to be. During the war
they had received funding for various projects from Muslim donors operating in Zenica at the time.
Throughout my tenure in Zenica their regular Islamic study classes were financed by local Islamic
activists. The rest of their activities were self-financed and they remained a locally focused
organization.
Although the women of Merjem seemed proud of their successes despite a lack of regular
funding, Ramiza seemed jealous of another Zenica women’s organization, Kewser, who had been
financed by “the Iranians.” In fact, Kewser’s leader and most of its religious members had moved
back to Sarajevo when the war ended, and the women who remained in Zenica were running a day-
care center which included Islamic instruction. As this had now become a small business that
charged for its services, the women running it were less concerned with spiritual and social issues
for women than was Aiša, Kewser’s founder who had moved back to her home in Sarajevo. 
In Sarajevo, Kewser organized a variety of religious, educational, and social programs for
women and their children. Although the organization, whose name is Arabic for “source” or “spring”
(izvor), was solely made up of Bosniac Muslims concerned mostly with the spiritual growth and
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social well-being of their members and their families, some of the group’s members had participated
in cross-ethnic dialogues with another Sarajevo women’s association. Aiša, who wears hidžab
(Islamic dress) in dark, plain colors, was open to dialogue with Serb women, though she was less
enthusiastic than many Bosniacs about the return of refugees, especially of Bosniacs to Serb areas.
“I always advise people they shouldn’t return anywhere if it means being humiliated, degraded,” Aiša
told me. She was very clear that there were limits to the future of multi-multi in her eyes:
Many women work on this [cross-ethnic dialogue] to break down barriers because
if we’re not going to live with each other then we can live next to each other and to
do this we still need to value and respect each other. It’s like in a house with family.
If the son marries and his mother and wife don’t get along and the couple moves out,
this doesn’t mean they’re not still family, that they don’t continue to see each other.
There’s a way to get along without arguing. 
Aiša’s words also reflected her stance on gender. Women, because they “see things more
emotionally,” were “more prepared for this [ethnic reconciliation and dialogue], by their nature and
also the situation they’re in. All women, especially mothers, are prepared. Why should a mother want
to send her children to fight?” She stressed women’s biological differences, in line with her Islamic
beliefs, which “naturally” tied them to the home, children, and education. Though she advocated the
participation of more women in positions of decision-making power, Aiša was firm that “from an
Islamic point of view, it’s a bit different. A woman can’t be the head of state. Woman as a biological
creature is of a different nature. Being at the top entails lots of stress and this is difficult for women.
Very few women could handle this well, being something like Margaret Thatcher.” Still, she did not
shy away from “politics” as most women activists did. Her definition was a broad one: 
Everything is faith and religion, ethics. You can’t separate this out. And women are
the ones to deal with these issues. No one can say they are really outside of politics
because it is everywhere, everything is political in some sense. The upbringing of
children, voting, the economy– all of this is politics, and it’s also all connected with
ethics and faith.
Aiša was wary of the SDA and other politicians she considered corrupt and not true Muslim
believers. Thus, she and the other members of Kewser were engaged in political questions, but from
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the standpoint of women leading somewhat separate lives from men, involved more with
“upbringing, children, relations with others.” Their approach to gender was therefore one of
biologically based separate spheres and division of labor, with a strong basis in Islamic teachings.
I met two religious Muslim women in Zenica whose approaches to gender were much more
critical of established norms. Sadeta, the founder of Naš Most and a former Medica member, was
also involved in inter-religious dialogue and various religious education and humanitarian projects.
Halima, who had replaced Sadeta as Medica’s spiritual counselor, was also involved in religious
education for women and mixed groups through the official Islamic administration (Islamska
Zajednica). Both women were young, trained mu’alimas (women Islamic teachers), and graduates
of the Islamic Sciences faculty in Sarajevo. They both wore hidžab. Although neither Halima or
Sadeta was engaged in high-profile, public campaigns, they were nevertheless enthusiastic
participants in community activities and thoughtful analysts of social and political trends. Both
women were critical of male interpretations of Islamic practice in Bosnia and aimed to educate
women and men in a more gender-equal understanding of Islam. Sadeta even described herself as
a “feminist, but an Islamic one” in a local newspaper during the war (Saralji 1993:9). As she
explained to me, the practice of Islam had been tainted by men and Arab customs:
The problem is that for centuries only men have interpreted Islam and of course
they’ve interpreted it the way they want to, to suit them. What we have in the world
now is actually Arab Islam, not Islam in its true form. Women in the Arab world have
no rights as living things, to participate with equal rights (ravnopravno). Their place
is just to stay at home, cover their faces and obey men. But Islam determines rights
for women, it says women and men are equal (ravnopravni).
Halima held similar views: “My goal is to educate women in various problems and aspects, issues
in Islam, so they know their real status, so they can defend themselves from being humiliated, put
on an inferior level, made to listen to men and not use their own brains.”
While Halima and Sadeta had experience working through NGOs and supported the
participation of women in politics, they were more hopeful of influencing social change through
education and community work. Halima was engaged in individual work at Medica but she did more
work on the community level through the Islamska Zajednica. Sadeta hoped to pursue graduate study
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in comparative religion in order to work with university students to affect change. For Sadeta, this
gravitation away from NGOs and politics reflected her criticism of the effectiveness of NGOs and
corruption in politics. However, as I will show later in this chapter, the NGO sector was not overly
welcoming of “covered” women or those wanting to engage in dialogue about women and religion.
Refugee Women’s NGOs: Srcem do mira and Žene s Podrinja
This study also considers the activities and discourses of several women’s organizations
outside of Zenica. I encountered these groups while attending conferences, round table discussions,
and workshops in other parts of Bosnia with the Zenica women activists I was following. Many of
the groups I came across were similar to the Zenica groups I have presented here. One set of
organizations, however, had different reasons and goals for their work. These were groups of women
refugees and displaced persons (DPs) working toward return to their pre-war homes. While such
groups existed to represent women of all ethnic backgrounds (see Cockburn et. al. 2001), the two
such groups I got to know best were made up of Bosniac women who had been displaced by Serbs.
One of these groups, Srcem do mira (Through Heart to Peace), was started by women who
had been refugees in Zagreb working with Žena BiH and allied with Kareta, Bedem Ljubavi, and
other “nationalist” women’s groups that insisted on defining rape primarily as an ethnic crime of
genocide by Serbs. Their home region, around Prijedor in Northwest Bosnia, had been one of the
first to be ethnically cleansed by Serb forces; many of its people had been detained in area camps
where some women were also raped, including some of the members of Srcem do mira. The women
had returned to Bosniac controlled areas of the Federation at the war’s end and were pushing for
return to their hometowns when I first met them. By the end of my fieldwork, the organization and
most of its members had returned to the town of Kozarac, where Almasa, their leader, and many of
the other women were from, and were engaged in a variety of NGO activities in the now Bosniac-
dominated community. 
Srcem do mira had always existed as a women’s group and offered psychological and
material aid to women war victims, though they were clear that they had organized themselves to
oppose all kinds of human rights abuses, not just those against women. They had formed as a
women’s NGO because they were mostly women in their refugee circles, the men having been killed
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or gone to fight in the war. They were wary of feminist groups, even those nationalist groups like
Kareta with whom they agreed on many issues but who, Almasa said disapprovingly, “were against
men.” In contrast, Srcem do mira stressed their relationships to men– husbands, sons, and other
relatives, both alive and those killed during the war– and non-gender specific issues. As Almasa told
me, they existed “precisely because of what was happening in the war, not just to women but all
human rights that were violated.” They therefore concentrated much of their efforts on facilitating
lasting return. Nevertheless, because they were a women’s group, they had been drawn into donor-
linked circles of women’s NGOs and thus into engagement with a variety of “women’s issues,”
including the campaign to increase women’s participation in formal politics. In fact, Almasa was a
leading member of the League of Women Voters along with Šehida from Bosanka.
Another group, Žene s Podrinja (Women of Podrinje) was based in Ilidža, near Sarajevo, and
made up of Bosniac women displaced from towns such as Srebrenica and Bratunac in the Podrinje
region of Eastern Bosnia. While many of the group’s members refused to return after their ordeals,
Zahida, the group’s leader, and some others were determined to push for return and were working
towards this goal. Like Srcem do mira, Žene s Podrinja had been drawn into a variety of women’s
initiatives, mostly through donor networks but also through the League of Women Voters. Through
this exposure, Zahida had become used to the term “feminism” as a term. She did not outright reject
it, though she preferred the term “women’s rights” when describing the group’s beliefs and goals.
Her take on feminism and women’s rights campaigns, however, focused on allowing women
autonomy and freedom to fulfill their roles as mothers and nurturers of their families.
Out of principle, in rejecting the idea that Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats cannot live together
and as a way of denying the ethnic cleansers their “ethnically pure” territory, these NGOs adamantly
supported return and a multi-ethnic Bosnia. However, as refugees and DPs, the women in these
groups had ample reason to be angry and were generally wary of members of the ethnic group in
whose name they had been displaced and lost property, husbands, sons, livelihoods, etc. (the
production of such enmity was, after all, the aim of ethnic cleansing to begin with [see Hayden
1996]). For many DP women, this suspicion extended even to those ethnic others active in NGOs
and cross-ethnic initiatives. Indeed, some of the leaders of DP NGOs attempting to forge cross-ethnic
ties to facilitate return had to struggle with the objections from members of their own organizations
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because this entailed meeting and talking with “the enemy.” Zahida struggled with the members of
Žene s Podrinja over these issues, as she explained:
I have problems with our women. They call Serbs “etnici.” That’s not fair. We have
to make a distinction [between ordinary Serbs and violent, chauvinist etnik forces].
In April we went to Bratunac to vote in 5 buses. In the bus I said if we’re whores then
I’m a whore, too. I’m going! [to talk to the Serb women in the town]. I visited four
or five houses to show women in the bus how normal it was. The Muslim women
said, “screw them- you’re kissing them and they slaughtered our children!” (jeblate
one- ti se s njima ljubiš a one nam djeca pokoljuše). But I don’t want to live alone.
I want to know who my neighbors are. For this you have to kiss and kiss and kiss.
Zahida and the other women who intended to return were therefore walking a fine line between
airing their feelings about how they were treated by Serbs in 1992 and 1995, and knowing that
reestablishing trusting relationships with neighbors required suppressing those feelings at key times.
They felt that since they had been victimized, it was the Serbs, members of the victimizing group,
who carried the obligation to repent and make amends. DP NGO leaders had to constantly balance
their support for return and “life together” in a multi-ethnic society with their personal feelings of
betrayal and humiliation, the sense that they could not concede legitimacy to claims made by women
on “the other side” because this would risk indirect justification for the political programs which
supported ethnic cleansing. Thus, the approach of many DP NGOs toward the ethnic others now
dominating their hometowns was less than conciliatory, though they strategically refrained from
expressing hostility in public forums. The process of return and cross-ethnic cooperation led by
women’s NGOs was therefore fraught with tension, although some progress toward mutual
understanding was being made. Indeed, women’s NGOs had achieved more concrete results in this
area than male-dominated NGOs had. I discuss the representational strategies of these groups and
the reasons for their successes further in chapter 7.
Why a Women’s Organization?: Continuity with the Aktiv Žena Model
The explosion in NGOs is most obviously attributed to the post-war incentives offered by
the international community, to the lack of economic alternatives, and to momentum from
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humanitarian aid activities undertaken during the war. But what explains the formation of so many
women’s NGOs? What reasons do women give for their having organized themselves as women
rather than on the basis of other identities or goals? What assessment of gender relations and
women’s roles do they put forth to explain their existence as women’s groups?
For those women who joined already established groups, the principle factors were the
involvement of other women in their social and kin networks, and personal needs, whether material,
psychological, or social. At Medica and other similar organizations, women joined as professionals,
because a doctor, psychologist, or administrator was needed and because the women themselves
needed an income (whether in cash or, during the war, in access to scarce goods and facilities). These
women got their friends, neighbors, working colleagues, daughters, and even a husband or two
involved as the organization’s needs grew. At Medica, several had stayed on after having been
therapy patients. Only subsequently, through their training and work with other women, did they
develop better informed stances on gender issues and feminism, though many talked about having
thought critically about such issues before. For the women involved in founding women’s
organizations, it is clear that constructions of womanhood in relation to war, to men, and to the
nation played a large role in their motivation. The dominant narrative casts women and the
(feminized) nation as victims. During the war, women were perceived as (potential) victims in their
own right and as symbols of the victimization of the (in this case Bosniac) nation. Depending on
their outlooks, then, some women responded to refugee women’s needs primarily out of loyalty to
the nation, some more out of concern for women, and many out of a combination of these concerns
and other, mostly practical matters.
Many women whose organizations began their activities during the war explained to me that
they had organized as women because women were the only ones left. The men had been mobilized
into armies, some had been killed or captured, and others had fled the country. Aside from elderly
men, young boys, and a few middle-aged men serving logistical duties in the towns, the population
was all female. Indeed, for some organizations like Women of Podrinje, the women truly were
virtually the only ones left from their communities after mass killings of men from Srebrenica and
the surrounding area.
Women were also isolated from men by the stark division between men’s and women’s roles
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created in wartime. There were, of course, exceptions, but for the most part men were soldiers while
women were left to look after families and homes. Women were clearly placed into the category of
(potential) victims, especially of rape by enemy forces, while men’s masculinity was defined by
whether and how they performed as soldiers. As the mood in Zenica was one of being under attack
(by Serb, and later Croat, forces), women felt the need to help out where they could, even if most of
them did not participate directly in the fighting. Though some younger, unmarried women did take
up arms, most women did not consider this an option– it was not something expected of women,
despite the well-known precedent of Partizanke fighters in World War II (see Žarkov 1999).
Women’s wartime roles were to a large degree an extension of their care-giving roles in the
family. To participate in the war effort, women knitted sweaters and socks, cooked hot meals for
fighters on the front lines, and cared for wounded soldiers in the hospitals. For civilians, they
organized aid for the elderly, for households without men, and for others in need. Women were also
concerned with the challenges of keeping their own families safe, fed, and warm under harsh
wartime conditions of scarcity and danger (Lazarevska 1995). 
The massive influx of mostly women and children refugees, presented an overwhelming
need. Women, among whom were many rape survivors, stood out as a category particularly
deserving of help at the time. As Sadeta said of her founding of Naš Most during the war, “We
decided on this category of people to work with, we considered them the most vulnerable, threatened
group, the group with the most need. Zenica was a collective center for refugees at the time– there
was a lot of need and a lot of women.” It was therefore logical that women began doing what they
could to help the refugees. In this way, groups of women began helping other women, not
(necessarily) out of feminist  consciousness but because women were both the ones in a position to
help and in a position of need. This situation further underscored women’s wartime roles as nurturers
(of their own families, of the needy) and victims of male violence (whether real or potential).
Still, this did not fully answer the question of why they had named their groups women’s
organizations. Nearly all the groups I encountered conveyed in their names that they were women
(see Appendix A). Women of Podrinja, for example, could have called themselves “People of
Podrinje” or “Refugees of Podrinje.” Many organizations use the prefix “women’s association.” Why
were they not associations of “citizens” or some other term? Many other women to whom I posed
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this question were at a loss as to how to answer. I inferred that it had been automatic for women to
gather as women because women’s and men’s roles and patterns of social interaction were
conceptually separate, even outside of wartime (see Simi 1983; Erlich 1966). Women had their
activities and duties and men had theirs, so it “went without saying” (Bordieu 1977) that they should
form groups made up only of women or that worked solely with women.
Bosnian society is not strictly sex-segregated, nor was this the case under socialism, as we
saw in chapter 3. Women and men mix and communicate freely in public spaces, in employment,
in schools and universities, at family gatherings, etc. But especially in the working class and rural
segments of the population there is a tendency for married women and men to socialize separately.
Aiša of Kewser explained that:
We are more free among ourselves than if men were around... This is from our
tradition. Even when a family comes to visit, a couple, we sit separately, in a group
of women and a group of men, because each group has their own subjects and
concerns. It’s not only because of the war, that only women were around. It’s like that
now, too. 
Men meet each other in cafes and pubs and have more latitude to go out in the evenings; women
frequent cake shops and markets in towns and visit each other in their homes during the day for
coffee (Bringa 1995). There is less of this kind of separation among younger, more urban, and better
educated Bosnians, especially before marriage. However, most of the women in organizations, such
as Naš Most, Merjem, Srcem do mira, and Women of Podrinje, that took for granted their organizing
as women were married women in their 40's and older and many were from working class
backgrounds, small towns, or villages.
This logic became visible after the war ended and manifested itself in the puzzled looks I got
at several women’s organizations in response to my questions about why they had formed as
women’s groups. Many replied as Zahida, leader of Women of Podrinje, did, looking at me as if the
answer was obvious: “because we are women.” If women were going to be involved in any sort of
group, it seemed to be beyond question that women would organize all-women’s groups and concern
themselves with the specific problems of women and the activities associated with women’s roles.
Men could (and did) form their own groups to address their own concerns and spheres of life.
89 This is in contrast with the kind of “women-only” approach cultivated by some of the feminist groups. I
address this below.
90 From the verb sijediti, to sit. This term is normally used to describe evening gatherings of women (and
sometimes also men) in people’s homes (see Bringa 1995; Sorabji 1989). Coffee and/or alcoholic drinks (except in
religious Muslims homes) are served along with sweet and savory snacks (meza ) on a low table in front of long
couches.
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Forming separate women’s groups also made sense because it is how it had been throughout
the socialist period with the AFŽ and later aktivi žena. oula, an older woman from a large village
in northwest Bosnia had been involved with her local aktiv žena for twenty years and had been active
in several women’s organizations during and after the war. In answer to the question of why
community activities had been separated by sex, she said, the aktiv žena:
never had men in it. It was just like that everywhere in Yugoslavia. We traveled all
over to other chapters and it was like this. We never thought about it.... Men had their
own organizations– chess clubs, hunting clubs, etc., but none of this had anything to
do with social issues or politics. 
Here, “social issues or politics” was partly an allusion to campaigns for women’s political
participation and equal rights which have become major buzzwords for women’s organizations in
the post-war period. 
This apolitical aktiv žena model was replicated by many of the more gender-conservative
women’s organizations of the post-war period that also took for granted women’s and men’s separate
spheres of interest and socializing. Both the nature of their activities and the way the women spoke
about them conveyed the sense that women’s activities should naturally be separate from men’s and
that gender conventions were being left unchallenged.89 Specifically, the idea that women, especially
married women, must guard their sexual reputation by not “walking around” (hodati) and mixing
unnecessarily with men was very strong in these organizations. Some of Naš Most’s most popular
activities, for example, were weekly coffee gatherings for its members and the elaborate, large
women’s gatherings they called sijela90 held two or three times per year and always on March 8th,
International Women’s Day. Women paid a small ticket price to attend a sijelo which included
dinner, coffee, and folk music (narodna muzika) played by a hired band. These events typically
involved a lot of high-spirited socializing, dancing and singing well past midnight. Women really
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let loose, Razija, Naš Most’s leader, said, because for many this was the only social gathering they
were allowed to attend. Therefore, Razija explained, she had three reasons for organizing such all-
women events:
It’s just women because, 1. women are far more relaxed in that kind of social setting;
2. all the married women have an easier time getting permission [from their
husbands] to go out if it’s just women; and 3. the authorities look kindlier on this
kind of gathering. Bosniacs are the majority in the government and they’re more
inclined to think that women are better in groups of only women because in mixed
groups there’s more chance for women to do something they shouldn’t do. Also,
there’s no alcohol at our gatherings.
Razija went on to describe how many men said they loved the sijela because their wives spent the
week before the event being extra nice and “obedient” to their husbands so as to ensure they could
attend.
 oula offered a similar explanation about excursions and other events organized by her group,
adding that the fact that they were a women’s group legitimized many women’s regular participation
in activities outside the home. There was no danger at these meetings that women would come into
contact with strange men, unaccompanied by their husbands or relatives. Thus there was also no fear
of danger to women’s reputation such as was felt by Ferida, another Naš Most member, who told me
the organization had enabled her to be active in the community without being seen as “becoming a
whore” (otii u kurvaluk). Before she joined Naš Most, she told me, she had only gone out to go to
work and then came straight home. Her husband got jealous and angry if she went anywhere else or
spoke with anyone else. Again, such gender norms are mostly present in working class families of
rural and semi-rural background and are not adhered to as stringently in more urban, higher educated
segments of the population. Nevertheless, these attitudes about women and their sexual reputations
were present to different degrees among people of all socio-economic and regional backgrounds.
Women’s organizations, therefore, risked disapproval in many circles if they appeared to challenge
norms of gender and sexuality too forcefully. We will see in chapter 6 how some of the more
political and feminist groups have been criticized along just these lines.
This separation of women’s activities did not mean, however, that these women did not at
91 The mjesna zajednica was a village or  neighborhood unit of socialist self-management introduced into
the Yugoslav system in 1974. Leaders were elected by citizens’ councils and their functions included organizing
public services and community events, and reso lving disputes. They continued to be used for wartime aid
distribution and civil defense, and in the post-war period for community activities, elections, and other administrative
functions, though their power has been markedly diminished (see World Bank 2002).
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times also aim to affirm women’s identities and protect those areas of autonomy that women did
enjoy. Maida, a Bosniac former factory worker in her forties, had just returned to her village, now
in the RS, with her family after having been expelled during the war. I knew her outside of my role
as a researcher and had never known her to place special importance on her identity as a woman or
gender relations in general. So I was surprised when she told me she was involved with the nascent
women’s association of other Bosniac returnee women in her village. So many men had been killed
or had emigrated during the war that it seemed obvious that women were going to have to be
involved in rebuilding the community. Yet Maida’s explanation for why they had formed a women’s
group also showed a keen awareness of gender power relations:
What else could we do? It’s mostly women there [in the village] anyway. And you
know if men were in it they’d immediately want to be at the top, to boss everyone
else around. That’s what they’ve done with the mjesna zajednica [roughly, the village
council]. That’s not a [voluntary] association but it might as well be. That’s where
they base their power. So to make sure they didn’t do that with this association, we
made it just women.
The women were bitter at having been excluded from the mjesna zajednica, or what should have
been a place where both women and men had equal voice in community affairs.91 The main goals
of the association were to help women establish income-generating projects which would ultimately
benefit men as members of their families and the community as a whole. But the women were
determined to preserve what autonomy they could by organizing themselves as women. There was
an explicit recognition of women’s gendered position, especially as non-actors in the public or
political sphere to which the mjesna zajednica belonged. However, this women’s organization also
had political goals towards community development and fostering dialogue with their estranged Serb
neighbors. They knew that the only way to realize these goals was to identify themselves explicitly
as women. I explore this strategy and its consequences in more detail in chapter 7. 
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Women’s Agendas, Donors’ Agendas: 
The Nation-ing of Gender Discourses and the Marginalization of Religious Identities
Feminist scholars have shown that national discourses are commonly gendered (e.g., Anthias
and Yuval-Davis 1989; Gal 1994; McClintock 1993; Parker et. al. 1992; Verdery 1994; Williams
1996; Yuval-Davis 1996, 1997). But the effects on donor policies toward women’s NGOs in Bosnia
show that gender discourses can also be “nation-ed,” forced into ethno-national categories. In this
case, donors women’s NGOs to explicitly reckon with ethnicized political divisions. Furthermore,
as religion was so tightly bound to ethnic identity, the expression of religiosity was equated with
support for nationalism and excluded from western funded initiatives unless they were specifically
concerned with inter-religious dialogue and reconciliation. These policies affected both the practice
and theoretical development of local women’s NGOs.
The “Nation-ing” of Gender Discourses
As we have seen, there is a wide range among women’s NGOs of approaches to ethnic
relations, though most groups professed allegiance to the idea of a multi-ethnic Bosnia. It is difficult
to evaluate the sincerity of these claims, however, as all organizations that received or hoped to
receive western funding espoused multi-ethnic ideals. As Nataša of Medica Infoteka put it:
It’s hard with these organizations, whether they are multi-ethnic by composition or
in terms of contact [across ethnic lines]. Some of them do it out of deep conviction,
because they really want to, while others do it because they will get money easier this
way. So they grab (hvataju) [ethnic] others to make their composition mixed.
It is this pressure from the international community and western donors which forces the nation-ing
of gender discourses and concerns. In other words, even when women’s organizations strive to focus
only on women’s issues, donor pressures oblige them to integrate ethnic concerns into their rhetoric
and activities. 
This was evident through Infoteka’s experiences with several projects to raise awareness of,
and decrease incidences of violence against women. They maintained close contacts with other
women’s organizations that worked on the same issues, including several women’s NGOs in the RS.
These women’s NGOs had created a loose network to facilitate their work, and to exchange
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experiences and ideas, and they often gathered together to strategize on how best to deal with their
common concerns. At such gatherings and in all their dealings with each other, these women
consciously ignored ethnic cleavages. They were able to do this by insisting on their common goals
as women concerned with women’s issues. 
Differences among the women based on ethnicity and residence in ethnicized territories were
constantly present, however. This was visible both in formal situations, as seen through the cracks
of carefully worded statements at multi-ethnic meetings, as well as in informal interaction within and
among NGO members, especially during coffee break discussions at such meetings. These women
had gotten to know and trust each other after having worked together over time and traveling to each
others’ towns and even abroad together. As a member of Udružene Žene in Banja Luka put it when
I asked her how they had been able to discuss being on different sides of the front lines during the
war:
We all know each other and how we think, so it’s easier to talk about those things.
And for sure the situation is now softer, less tense, than before. No one would have
talked about those things in 1996. Now we know each other. Now we can agree to
disagree.
Members of this group also shared a minimum rejection of nationalist divisions, though they
consciously avoided issues they knew they disagreed about, especially on how to represent markers
of national identity and how to characterize the war. The activists from the Bosniac areas of the
Federation tend to think of the war as “aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina” as an internationally
recognized sovereign state by Serb forces with assistance from neighboring (rump) Yugoslavia.
Likewise, most women from the Serb entity adhere to the dominant viewpoint in their entity of the
war as a “civil war” between ethnic groups in Bosnia that could not agree on how to react to the
dissolution of Yugoslavia. Even when avoiding talk about the past, attitudes about the war were
relevant, as they carried implications for the way Bosnia should be structured (or not) in the future.
The women in this network, however, spoke only of “the war” and avoided other linguistic and
symbolic cues which might have been perceived as threatening by the women from other entities and
ethnic groups.
Thus, these women consciously worked at ethnic cooperation through what one Banja Luka
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activist called “strategic avoidance” (strateško zaobilaženje) of sensitive “ethnic” topics. In other
words, they attempted to address ethnic divisions by playing down their importance and playing up
gender in its place. This was possible because of the way they constructed their common identity as
women: not combatants or political decision makers who waged war and fueled ethnic animosities.
The women’s underlying assumption, which they also often articulated was that none of them had
wanted the war, everyone had suffered, and that their husbands and sons had had no choice (being
males) but to serve in the army where they were living. This enabled the women to build trusting,
cross-ethnic working relationships of the kind that western donors seemed to be promoting. Yet, they
avoided probing too deeply. They did not want to find out anything which might compromise their
working relationships. As Nataša explained, “If the husband of one of the women in another
organization was in another army from mine, well, if I think about that, it can only hinder my work.”
Forcing attention to ethnic differences everyone knew were there, even in the guise of superceding
them, was counterproductive in this context.
From Medica’s perspective, therefore, donor demands worked at cross-purposes to their
approach. At one point, western donors began insisting that every project be funded only on the level
of cross-entity (i.e., cross-ethnic) networks or as joint projects of NGOs from different ethnic
territories, rather than by individual NGOs. This frustrated the women who had long been involved
in cross-entity work on their own. One of the issues Medica and other women’s NGOs in their multi-
ethnic network were engaged in during my fieldwork was that of trafficking of young women for
forced prostitution, which has become a major problem in post-war Bosnia. Donors were insisting
that the women’s groups apply as one network for funding for a shelter project for women victims
of trafficking. Nataša saw many problems with this idea, not least of which were the separate legal
systems of each ethnically defined entity and similar variations by Croat or Bosniac controlled
cantons and municipalities in the Croat-Bosniac Federation. Because of the practical realities
presented by this problem, it made much more sense to the women activists involved for an NGO
in each designated shelter town to apply for funding on its own. The rest of the organizations would
refer clients and spread information about this project just as they did with their other initiatives. 
Nataša illustrated this further with an example from a project that had brought together
women working on Medica’s SOS Telefon hotline for victims of domestic violence with women at
92 I identify Nataša’s ethnic background here to show that she was not part of the Bosniac majority trying to
make excuses for  having few non-Bosniacs. I do so, however, keeping in mind the observations about the complexity
of ethnic identity in Bosnia, discussed in chapter 1.
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a Serb women’s NGO with a similar hotline.
It’s like other ridiculous demands the international community has. Like cross-entity
cooperation. This was obvious with the SOS project... The donors insisted we work
together on this, as partners. And, yeah, the program was approved and I’m sure the
donors will talk about this as a big success in cross-ethnic cooperation, but in reality
we really didn’t do anything together. We had the same donor and decided together
on some guidelines for making the reports, but we wrote each part of the report
separately and did the work separately.
Lejla, her colleague who had worked on the project, pointed out that members of all the groups had
also attended a training session together on shelters for battered women. Nataša responded:
That’s true. But after all of that [organizing] we would have done this [held joint
activities] without donors and we’d started working together long before. We already
had contact and knew each other. It’s just annoying if I have a project all worked out
and then a donor insists on expanding it so that other towns, other entities can be
included. That’s all great, but... 
She went on, giving examples of several projects that had not met their potential because Medica
had had to collaborate with women’s NGOs in other ethnic territories in order to fulfill donor
demands.
Donor demands for multi-ethnic membership had also been a problem. Medica’s ethnic
membership mirrored that of the surrounding community: most were Bosniacs but there were several
Serbs, Croats, and women of mixed background at all levels of the organization. As I have indicated,
they also maintained excellent contacts with NGOs in Serb and Croat controlled areas of Bosnia, as
well as in Serbia and Croatia proper. Still, donors demanded they diversify their membership by
ethnicity and were forcing cooperative projects with NGOs in the RS and Croat areas. Again Nataša,
a Serb,92 explained:
We had problems at the beginning. We said we were multi-ethnic but we never
93 I knew of several projects, in fact, where participants of different ethnic backgrounds had been forced by
donors to work together. At times this did create the desired breaking down of barriers, especially when youth were
involved. Just as often, however, such projects created more mutual resentment than reconciliation due to the forced
nature of the projects.
94 What’s more, such policies actually created  the incentive for some NGOs to nurture ethnic tension in
order to show donors that there continued to be a need for funding their projects. Ana Devi has also  noticed this
phenomenon in her work with women’s NGOs in Serbia (personal communication 2000).
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counted exactly how many members we had of which. Donors insisted on having
numbers or proportions by ethnicity and then they said we had a small number of
non-Muslim women. But Medica is concerned with doing its work, with helping
women, so let the ethnic makeup be like it is. I think we have a reasonable recreation
of the ethnic makeup of the town, and we have all kinds of people represented, like
displaced persons, those from Zenica, even došlje [those from other Yugoslav
republics]. But it’s never been something we think about. 
Dženana, a Bosniac Medica activist who has worked with many other women’s and youth NGOs in
Bosnia, pointed to the contradictions this created:
Sometimes it’s impossible to have multi-ethnicity in an organization... Sometimes
you [as an NGO] don’t think about this because you think about what you need to get
your work done, what kind of people you need. There’s constant pressure to include
people from different [ethno-]national groups, but you need certain skills,
professional people. So sometimes members of other ethnic groups are just there for
decoration. Multi-ethnicity looks great but this loses its real value, the positive
picture it could have... Instead it’s something forced.93
In Medica’s case, the professional skills needed were expertise in women’s issues and
domestic violence. Because of their opposition to nationalist ideologies, their approach toward
ethnicity was to attempt to ignore it (or play it down as much as could be done in a context like
Bosnia). Their focus was on women. As Nataša said, “Medica is concerned with doing its work, with
helping women.” Donor policies, however, forced ethnic categories back into prominence, even for
NGOs that were committed to opposing nationalisms and ethnic cleavages.94
One could argue that Medica and the other organizations in their network were just caught
up in a donor policy aimed more toward organizations that lacked an explicit non-nationalist stance.
95 These feminist donors were the Kvinna til Kvinna foundation from Sweden and the American STAR
Project (Strategies, Training and Advocacy for Reconciliation). STAR’s mission statement describes it as a project
which “offers encouragement, technical help and financial support to non-nationalist women’s groups that work
toward social change in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia.” (STAR 1998).
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I now turn, therefore, to an examination of NGOs that appeared in donors’ schemes to be at the other
extreme of approaches to ethnic relations and a multi-ethnic Bosnia.
Donor Policies and Religious and Mono-ethnic Women’s Organizations
Western donors and international community representatives consciously evaluated local
NGOs on the basis of “how nationalist” they were and targeted them accordingly. The two main
feminist donors working in the country insisted on a “non-nationalist” stance from any women’s
group they funded.95 In fact, they were more strict on this criterion than on “how feminist” a group
was. I do not criticize donors for this approach; indeed it was a logical extension of these donors’
ideologies, especially the feminist ones. However, I want to ask how this dominant policy from by
far the majority of possible donors for women’s organizations affected those groups perceived to be
at the nationalist extremes of the spectrum. Specifically, how did this situation reflect upon
discourses of gender and on donors’ stated goals to build civil society and facilitate ethnic
reconciliation?
Organizations of religious Muslims and those organized around Bosniac identity generally
remained outside the circles of Western funded initiatives, round table discussions, and training
seminars. Such groups did not use the buzzwords and concepts of standard “NGO-speak” that
peppered the self-presentations of other groups. Terms like “civil society,” “reconciliation,”
“women’s rights,” “gender,” “project proposal,” “networking,” etc. were conspicuously absent from
these organizations’ written and spoken rhetoric. Even “NGO” was not used; these groups generally
called themselves “associations” (udruženje), though they fit the definition of an NGO as well as
others did (World Bank 2002). Clearly these groups would never win western funding or were not
even interested in it. Muslim religious groups were more likely to seek funding from Islamic donors
(in the case of all-Serb or all-Croat women’s groups, corresponding religious or ethnic sponsors
abroad were solicited). Many of them went with very little or no funding at all. 
Nor did western donors seek out such organizations. In fact, these donors did not fund many
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mono-ethnic groups. Exceptions were made for groups that represented a disadvantaged minority
in their communities, in which case their presence strengthened the goal of multi-ethnicity, or which
operated in an area with few NGOs and showed a strong willingness to work with members of other
ethnic groups. Zahida, the leader of one women’s NGO, told me how she advised another women’s
organization looking for funding. Since the group did not have a multi-ethnic membership, Zahida
advised them to, “go with multi-ethnic cooperation. That’s what’s going now.” Bosanka in Zenica
had tried for years to secure funding from a western donor but had little success. The group’s name
and reputation did not help its chances in this regard. First, they were an exclusively Bosniac group
in a majority Bosniac town, though Bosanka, or “Bosnian woman” could be taken to signify support
for a united Bosnia without ethnic divisions. They had been closely associated, however, with the
Sarajevo leadership of an umbrella organization of women’s NGOs that had a reputation for being
nationalist and exclusively Bosniac. Furthermore, they were constantly struggling against the
perception that they were a branch of the Sarajevo women’s organization called “Muslim Academic
Club, Bosanka.” The Zenica Bosanka did not have “Muslim” in its name (it was simply an
“association of citizens”), yet this compounded their other difficulties in securing western (or any)
funding. Aside from their lack of luck and the right connections, they were perhaps not as good as
other groups that aspired to western funding in censoring themselves on topics concerned with ethnic
or religious identity, and were not savvy enough in injecting their rhetoric with fundable buzzwords
(see Hemment 2000; Sampson 1996; Wedel 2001).
Similarly, western donors generally ignored religious women’s groups because they were
assumed to be nationalist and therefore working against the multi-ethnic state project. It is not that
these donors ignored religious groups altogether. Indeed, there were several donor-supported
initiatives in inter-religious dialogue aimed at emphasizing common values of forgiveness, peace,
and mutual respect among religious communities. When it came to women’s initiatives, however,
religion was seldom integrated into the topic further than in brief references by women who were
not necessarily knowledgeable about religious issues. Although there were a few exceptions, which
I will discuss below, I rarely encountered women from religious organizations at women’s events
sponsored by western donors, international officials, or organizations that aspired to win western
funding. As an indication of how seldom such contacts were, a Bosnian government official who was
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working with a Finnish funded “gender mainstreaming” project told me with some surprise how
enlightening and novel it had been to have a woman from an organization of religious Muslim
women at one of the training sessions they held in a Bosniac majority town. This woman, a
practicing Muslim who wore hidžab, was able to give the gathering “some inputs” (nekoliko inputa)
on “gender and Islam in Bosnia,” “manipulation” of religious precepts towards women, and other
details the group of local NGOs would otherwise not have heard.
Therefore, while all initiatives were about (re)establishing multi-ethnicity, there seemed to
be little connection made between religious initiatives and gender initiatives. In other words, women
could be involved in inter-religious dialogue as Muslims (Catholics, Orthodox...) but not as Muslim
women. Similarly, projects and meetings aimed at improving or analyzing the status of women could
be attended by women, but there seemed to be no need for (religious) Muslim women as the issue
of religion was kept separate from that of gender.
To be sure, many religious organizations tended to keep to themselves on purpose. The full
name of Kewser was The Kewser Association of Muslim Women (Udruženja Muslimanki Kewser).
Its founders had chosen this name out of principle. Aiša, Kewser’s president, explained: “This name
was the result of the atmosphere and conditions of the time. It was war and a struggle for survival.”
They wanted to make a statement with this name about their identity as Muslims, especially in the
face of Serb attacks on Muslim people and markers of Muslim identity. The group’s members were
also religious women. This made it even more important to declare themselves Muslims in both the
ethnic and religious sense, rather than the more ethnic connotations of “Bosniac.” Their choice of
an Arabic word for the group’s their name was a further signal of identification with the wider
Muslim world rather than association with a purely Bosnian identity (see Sorabji 1989). 
Aiša was untroubled by the consequences their name had for the kinds of donors they could
seek: “We were rejected by some donors because of this but this is normal. We knew it would be
harder to get funding from westerners and easier with Islamic donors this way.” Islamic donors, like
the western ones, had their own agendas, of course. Kewser had refused funding from several Islamic
donors who, in the words of Kewser member Fikreta, 
would come and say they would give us money if we all covered ourselves from head
to toe but we didn’t want to do this. We can keep the selam (Muslim greeting) and
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those things that are in our foundation (of our tradition) but we don’t want anything
that’s from outside forced on us.
The religious women in Kewser wore hidžab but their scarves did not cover their faces and their
hands and feet were uncovered. Many Islamic donors favored more all-encompassing traditions of
women’s Islamic dress and demanded that women’s groups they funded conform to these styles. This
often meant covering the face with the nikab veil and wearing long black gloves to hide the hands.
Many Bosnians, including religious Muslims, rejected such styles as foreign, non-Bosnian, and
especially un-European (Helms n.d.). They insisted on keeping their own Bosnian Islamic traditions.
Aiša firmly told me, however, “We didn’t go looking for help from those who we knew would
impose conditions on us that we couldn’t meet.” They were content to operate without funds, which
they were doing at the times I spoke with them, rather than bow to donor demands with which they
did not agree.
Implications of Donor Practices for Women’s Identities
For NGOs like Medica that attempt to privilege gender concerns over ethnic categories,
donor policies promoting multi-ethnicity force a re-entrenchment of ethnicity and thereby detract
resources and attention from the women’s issues these women are trying to address. In this way, they
force a nation-ing of gender discourses. 
Western donors’ further rejection of groups concerned with ethnic heritage or religious
identity has removed ethnicity and religion from the arena of debate on women’s and gender issues.
My point is not to fault religious women, feminists, or other women’s NGO activists in Bosnia for
not communicating with each other. Feminist and other women’s NGOs funded by western donors
were mostly staffed by atheist, non-practicing, or less religious women who tended to hold much
different views on questions of gender and ethnicity from members of religious women’s groups.
There could well have been several areas upon which they might have agreed, however. Indeed, in
casual conversation women at the more civic-minded and feminist organizations often discussed the
impact of religious practices and ideologies on women’s lives, even if this was not often a subject
of public debate. 
There were other religious women who might have been receptive to such a dialogue if
96 In the Bosniac majority areas, where Islam is the religion in question, the danger is heightened by the
presence of radical Islamic groups that identify with the wider Muslim world (see Blumi 2003). By this I do not
mean that Islam as a religion is more dangerous than Catholicism or Orthodoxy. Rather, the nature of these small but
extreme groups of Muslims is different from those of nationalist Serb and Croat groups. While radical Islamic groups
have so far restricted their political activities to issues of Bosnian politics rather than global Muslim struggles
(Bougarel personal communication 2003), many in Bosnia, including religious Muslims, see these radicals as a
potential threat. Furthermore, the position and treatment of women among radical groups is held up as a marker of
their extremism (Helms n.d.). This should  provide even more reason for women’s organizations to engage in
dialogue with Muslim religious women’s groups.
97 This dilemma echoes the concerns of affirmative action activists in the U.S.
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religion were made a serious element of the debate on gender. Women like Halima and Sadeta,
discussed above, might have been logical participants in such a dialogue. The inclusion of religious
women in gender debates would obviously not guarantee agreement and harmony among these
women. However, such inclusion might have opened new channels of dialogue– precisely what
western donors professed to advocate through their policies of multi-ethnic civil society building.
These trends were also affecting theoretical developments in the approach to gender issues
and feminism. As Žarkov argued in the case of radical Serbian feminism during the debates on
nationalism, war, and rape in the early 1990s, feminist discourses which privileged gender and
excluded ethnicity effectively surrendered ethnic identity to nationalism: “Radicalized feminism
allowed nationalism to completely appropriate ethnicity, and thus missed an opportunity to engage
in theoretical discussion about gender and ethnicity.” (1999: 382). In the Bosnian case, as we shall
see in chapter 6, feminism has not been radicalized as in Serbia or among anti-nationalist Croatian
feminists, yet Žarkov’s warning is still relevant. In Bosnia it also relates to religion as a prominent
component of ethnic identity.96 Yet ethnicity is not completely trumped by gender. In fact, it has
returned in the guise of multi-multi. Women activists are forced to consider ethnic identities and
territories and even to emphasize ethnic tensions in order to be allowed to pursue projects towards
erasing ethnic cleavages in public life.97
Ultimately, this separation of gender from religious and ethnic concerns works against
donors’ stated goals, and that of many women’s organizations, of reconciliation and multi-ethnic
civil society, because it ensures that the rift between those advocating multi-ethnicity and those
concerned with their own ethnic identity will likely widen (see World Bank 2002). In the words of
Azra, a Medica activist who supported donor policies despite acknowledging their problems, “Maybe
154
there are single-ethnic organizations that wouldn’t be so nationalist but they’re not funded and they
should be part of society but no one includes them.” In any case, more inclusion might give
“nationalist” organizations a chance to disprove their reputations for ethnic animosity or to consider
more moderate views. And it would inject consideration of religion and ethnicity as legitimate topics
into discourses of feminism and gender.
98 This is, of course, a reference to Tone Bringa’s ethnography, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way (1995), but
was also a common phrasing used by my informants: “I’m a feminist, but in a Bosnian way.” (feministkinja  sam, ali
na bosanski nain).
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CHAPTER SIX
BEING FEMINIST THE BOSNIAN WAY98: FEMINISMS AND ANTI-FEMINISMS
Feminisms and Anti-Feminisms
A central question of my research was how women’s organizations theorized and approached
the task of improving the social and material status of women. How did they envision gender
relations in the ideal? What did they realistically hope to achieve and through what methods? Did
the concept of feminism help or hinder these efforts? What kinds of different “feminisms” were
emerging among women activists and could there be a specific form of Bosnian feminism?
The purpose of this chapter is not to ask whether Bosnian women are “feminists” or even
whether they are “feminist enough” as many western (feminist) observers of women’s activism in
Central and Eastern Europe tend to do (Gal and Kligman 2000). I admit that something like this
question was never far from my own mind. I personally hoped to find women who were critical of
patriarchal norms and who might be doing something to challenge them. To be explicit about my
assumptions, this challenge to ideological and structural systems that subordinate females is what
characterizes my idea of “feminist” orientations. However, I wanted to avoid imposing my own
definition of feminism or even the term itself onto women’s activities. I therefore paid attention to
how women talked about the reasons for their activities and what goals they were striving for as
women. In other words, I looked for ideal visions of how gender relations should operate and
women’s place in those relations. Whether my informants called these activities “feminist” or not
was secondary (see Gal and Kligman 2000: 103-4).
Nonetheless, struggles over and against “feminism”– as a theoretical tool, ideology, label,
or insult– and the issues with which feminisms have concerned themselves were central to processes
of defining social change goals with respect to women. For most women, feminism in the positive
sense was rarely an issue until foreign feminists, including those from Serbia and Croatia, began
asking them about it or introducing it in training sessions. Feminism as a negative concept came up
99 As a general phenomenon, this is due as much to the strength and visibility of feminist movements in
Western Europe and North America as to the long histories of co lonialist-minded  campaigns by western feminists to
“liberate” their oppressed “sisters” (see Abu-Lughod 2002; Ahmed 1982; Mohanty 1991).
100 Internationally led  initiatives to promote western models of democracy, free markets, human rights, c ivil
society, and other ideologies and systems also often produced over-simplified caricatures of western societies and
ignored the specific historical developments of such concepts from the Bosnian context. However, local participants
tended to reject the models offered rather than the concepts themselves, whereas “feminism” was nearly always
rejected outright.
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quite often without such prompting. In the wider community, the label “feminist,” like “nationalist,”
was used almost exclusively in the pejorative. It was hurled around more like an insult, a way to
dismiss or discredit someone, than a description of a legitimate ideological approach. I heard the
term most often from women eager to distance themselves and their ideas from a feminism they
perceived as negative. “Feminism” thus carried a positive charge for many (though not all) donors
and other foreign visitors, while it carried a negative charge in the wider community. In fact, the
terminology itself often became a major obstacle to dialogue, as this chapter will show.
In most cases in Bosnia, women’s (and men’s) notions of western feminism were not based
on direct contact with feminists or feminist literature but drew on often outdated media accounts and
stereotypes which did not reflect feminism’s diversity of thought and approach. As I discussed in
chapter 3, local histories of feminist and other women’s organizing had been largely erased.
Feminism and campaigns for “women’s rights” were widely seen as western imports99 (Gal and
Kligman 2000: 107) and seen in the western forms that reached Bosnia through the media and
through members of the international community. Unlike other “western imports” that many people
were eager to embrace– democracy, civil society, human rights, etc.– very few Bosnians saw
feminism as a positive force. Foreigners in turn often operated with little knowledge of the Bosnian
context and with simplified, inaccurate models of the western societies, democratic systems, and
feminist movements from which they came (Sali-Terzi 2001). Their approaches, which often
assumed that local women “needed” the same things that western women had, reinforced this notion
of feminism as western import.100
Many scholars of post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe have noted
widespread skepticism and rejection of “feminism” by women and women’s activists in the region
(see e.g. Funk and Mueller 1993; Gal and Kligman 2000; Holmgren 1995; Huseby-Darvas 1996;
101 Other women’s groups embraced, or at least did no t shy away from feminism as a concept, though this
varied by group, individual, and the circumstances in which they are expressing their views. Most prominent among
such groups are Žene ženama (Women to W omen) in Sarajevo, the Center for Legal Aid to Women in Zenica,
Udružene Žene (United W omen) in Banja Luka, Lara  in Bijeljina, and Žene BiH  in Mostar (see Cockburn et. al
2001).
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Marody 1993; Occhipinti 1996; Šiklova 1998; and see Rofel 1994 on China). In many ways, this has
been a rejection of the forms of feminism advocated by western feminists whose feminisms grew
out of a different social, historical, and political context. Western feminists’ insistence on
employment as the path to autonomy was inappropriate to women who had lived in the socialist
system of full employment, where most women held paid jobs on top of their domestic and family
duties. The family had become a refuge from repressive states rather than, as western feminists saw
it, the locus of women’s oppression (Gal and Kligman 2000). 
While socialist Yugoslavia was much less repressive in this way than other socialist states,
the family, and women’s roles as mothers and nurturers within it, continued to be held in high regard,
especially by women, even after the fall of socialism (Mili 1994; Žarkov 1999; and see chapter 3).
As these roles were built upon women’s (heterosexual) relationships with men, western feminist
criticism of the patriarchal family and of men’s power over women in the home conflicted with
Bosnian women’s sense of priorities. As Gal and Kligman argue, issues of motherhood and
citizenship, variously defined, may resonate much more with women in post-socialist societies than
those of individualism and autonomy, the central categories of western feminist approaches (2000:
103-4). Indeed, this observation is borne out in the debates over women’s status I discuss in this
chapter, as well as in women activists’ strategies of representation discussed in chapter 7. Above all,
Bosnians said they were wary of “isms” and utopian visions of any kind. As one of Medica’s
activists, a self-professed feminist, wrote, “Is it really worth fighting for an idea of some sort of
utopia, something unrealizable? Haven’t we, in this land, already experienced those kinds of
utopias?– brotherhood, unity, self-management– all those big concepts and then their demise!”
(Staki-Domuz 1998: 94).
Still, a small number of educated, urban women (including a few academics) involved in
women’s NGOs, embraced feminism, though not very publicly or consistently. Medica was one such
organization.101 The fact that Medica described itself as a feminist project was a major factor in my
102 One of the main feminist donors to local women’s NGOs in Bosnia was the ST AR project (Strategies,
Training and Advocacy for Reconciliation). See Gagnon (2002a) for a deservedly favorable appraisal of STAR’s
approach which, also based on my experience, was very effective and appreciated by local women’s NGOs.
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choosing Zenica as a research site. The women of Medica have grappled with the meaning(s) of
feminism and its relevance to their work, even as they defended it to skeptical friends, family, and
members of the community.
An inextricable element of these approaches was the relation between Bosnian women
activists and the various foreigners with whom they came into contact, whether they were
representatives of the international community, donors, feminists, women activists eager to offer
support and to solidify contacts, volunteers, evaluators, or researchers such as myself. The few
feminist donors operating in Bosnia, as well as occasional foreign officials, looked favorably on
women’s groups that embraced feminism, or at least a gender critique which donors could
understand as “feminist.” For the most part, however, these foreign feminists were keen to avoid
imposing labels on Bosnian activists.102 They thus placed more importance on non-nationalist
orientations than (self-consciously) feminist ones among the NGOs they funded. There has also been
considerable dialogue between Bosnian women and feminists from the rest of former Yugoslavia–
now technically foreigners but still considered more familiar, “ours” (naš). In fact, feminist literature
produced and translated in Belgrade and Zagreb, and feminist courses and training sessions offered
by women’s studies centers and activist groups in these two cities, have arguably been the most
powerful mode of transmission of feminist knowledge into Bosnia. 
The influence of donors and the international community was not only felt on the question
of feminism but also in terms of individual commitment to “activism,” or dedication to a cause.
Foreign observers often initially assumed that the proliferation of women’s associations and NGOs
signaled the emergence of a strong “women’s movement” and many were subsequently disappointed
when they realized that many of these organizations did little more than organize knitting and sewing
circles and seemed in other ways to uphold patriarchal norms. These foreigners seemed to take for
granted the political salience of “women” as a category of mobilization (Gal and Kligman 2000:
106). This had yet to be built. Furthermore, as we have seen, not all members and leaders of Bosnian
NGOs were involved only out of dedication to their NGOs’ causes. Many westerners, accustomed
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to the assumed drive of low-paid NGO (or in US parlance, non-profit organization) activists in their
societies, similarly assumed that women’s NGO activists were all dedicated to the cause of working
for gender equality and women’s rights. This was not always or necessarily the case.
This chapter examines the kinds of articulations of gender ideals and womanhood which
resulted from these interactions and explores the struggle to define a particular “Bosnian feminism.”
I explore conflicting approaches to improving the status of women between self-proclaimed
feminists and a group of conservative women associated with the ruling Bosniac nationalist party.
The tensions, which emerged through a discussion of parental leave and other labor laws, revolved
around questions of women’s difference from men and the role of the state in “protecting” women.
A similar difference in theoretical orientation was visible among those activists who called
themselves feminists, though in different ways, as I show through an examination of struggles to
define a Bosnian feminism among the activists at Medica. I highlight theoretical debates over the
inclusion of other categories of difference in feminist analyses, Medica’s encounter with western
feminists, and their stances toward the 1999 NATO bombing of neighboring Yugoslavia in light of
their earlier support for anti-militarist feminist positions.
Gender Discourses in Women’s NGO Circles: Questions of Difference
Regardless of women’s stance on “feminism,” there were discernable differences in approach
to gender and women’s issues among women activists. These differences over how to best improve
women’s lives and over the ideals of womanhood themselves mirrored well-established theoretical
debates in western feminist movements and others around the world (e.g. Collins 1991; Fraser 1997:
173-88; Mohanty 1991; Moraga and Anzaldúa 1981). Most women activists shared a desire to
improve women’s status in society. Yet their definitions of “improvement” and prescription for what
changes were necessary, based on competing notions of women’s difference from men differed
substantially.
As we have seen, many women argued for “protection” for and validation of women’s roles
as mothers and nurturers above all other roles. This stance was often based on the idea that gender
roles, especially motherhood and child rearing for women, were “natural” characteristics of women
and men. Others, including the activists at Medica, argued for a more liberal feminist approach of
103 Given official SDA support for a multi-ethnic Bosnia, it was common to find the name Bosnia-
Herzegovina attached to organizations, initiatives, documents, proclamations, and other forms of discourse, despite
the association with Bosniac identities and nationalist ideologies embedded in many of them.
104 Nevertheless, three women from the RS were there but were greeted as guests since the day’s topic was
the Federation labor law which would not apply to the whole country. The RS women did  not say much except to
express their gratitude at having been invited and their interest in the issue at hand, given that a similar overhaul of
the RS labor law was to be forthcoming.
105 This formulation made fun of Gani from the point of view of male politics– any self-respecting (male)
politician would have no time for unserious diversions like women’s issues. It was also  meant as a barb against his
women supporters. According to several feminist activists who had attended previous Forum meetings, the
government women, charmed by Gani’s masculine charm and attention, had referred to him as “our boss,” while
Gani behaved condescendingly and called the Forum members “my women.”
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equality under the law, based on a theory of gender as cultural construction. These were the positions
that emerged at a meeting of the Women’s Forum of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Forum Žena BiH)  in
February 2000 in Zenica. The Women’s Forum had been established by a male Bosniac SDA
politician, Ejub Gani, and was made up of women in NGOs and in the SDA and other political
parties, including those serving in the government in various capacities. Most of the members were
affiliated with, or sympathizers of the SDA. It’s name indicated its aspiration to become a forum for
women in all of Bosnia,103 but its association with the SDA and Bosniac areas of the Federation
virtually guaranteed that it would never be thought of as all-encompassing or neutral unless respected
women with more neutral credentials were to become more active in the group.104 Such women, even
in Bosniac areas of the Federation, viewed the Forum with heavy skepticism. The women at Medica,
for example, derided the group as “Gani’s chicks” (Ganieve koke),105 as much for its SDA
affiliation as for the profound conservatism of the women members when it came to theorizing
solutions to women’s subordination. 
Despite their awareness of these differences, however, some of the more liberal or
progressive NGO women, many of them self-proclaimed feminists from Medica, Žene Ženama and
other NGOs, decided to attend the Zenica meeting of the Forum. This was because the scheduled
speaker, Sevima Sali-Terzi, a Sarajevo lawyer from the Bosnian office of the International Human
Rights Law Group (IHRLG), was a frequent participant in progressive women’s initiatives. The
IHRLG in Sarajevo, staffed by local legal experts specializing in women’s human rights issues, had
consistently put forth a sharp critique of patriarchal assumptions built into legal codes and had
106 “Previše radnih prava smanjuje uposlenost” (Too many labor rights decreases employment), Dnevni
Avaz 27 August, 1999: 5. This article was an interview with Elaine Petterson, Director of the Permanent Office of the
World Bank in Sarajevo, who explained that Bosnia’s economy was not nearly strong enough to afford such a luxury
and that, “the [maternity and sick leave] laws in force [now] fit into the socialist approach to work and they are
appropriate for that kind of social structure. They are in direct opposition to the system which you have chosen for
the future.”
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vocally advocated the full implementation of international human rights treaties concerning women
(see IHRLG 1999). Their approach, which was made clear at the meeting through Sevima’s analysis
of the proposed new Federation labor law, reflected the liberal feminist stance of the IHRLG’s
American patrons (IHRLG’s Washington office), though Sevima and her co-workers made a firm
effort to adapt these perspectives to the Bosnian context in which they lived. These women did not
shy away from the term feminism, but they also did not usually introduce it into their public
presentations. In fact, during the discussion at the Forum meeting, the only women to mention
“feminism” were those advocating a more conservative approach who used the term as a negative
label, stressing their rejection of “feminist” solutions.
The scene at the Zenica meeting was thus set for a debate over the best legal framework for
helping and protecting women. The most contentious aspects of the labor law for women were
parental leave provisions and the law’s restrictions on women working at night and in physically
demanding jobs. Sevima and her feminist NGO allies, especially Nataša from Medica and Alma
from Žene Ženama, insisted on “gender neutral” (spolno neutralno) protections which would ensure
“equal chances” in the workplace for both men and women. Sevima’s major criticisms were aimed
at prohibitions for women working at night and in jobs requiring physical work for which women’s
“natural characteristics” make them unsuitable (Article 52). She also recommended changes in the
article on “the protection of women and motherhood” that deals with maternity leave. Like all of the
women present, she was opposed to the recent neoliberal economic demands made by the World
Bank that Bosnia limit maternity leave to 14 weeks in order to stimulate job creation and bring its
system in line with “the majority of western countries”106 (Sali-Terzi 2001: 146). Sevima caused
a stir, however, when she insisted that fathers be allowed the possibility of taking “parental leave”
(roditeljsko odsustvo).
Several participants objected to the idea of gender neutral laws. They argued that women
needed to be specially protected by the law, not granted equality. As Mersiha, a professor and former
107 Fatma worked with the mothers of children whose fathers were killed fighting for the Bosnian Army
(šehids, or Islamic martyrs, and pali borci, “fallen fighters”) to ensure proper moral upbringing and the prevention of
juvenile delinquency. 
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parliamentarian from Sarajevo, put it, “I’m not equal with men, I’m just complementary. My
uniqueness just needs to be protected.” Vesna, a parliamentary representative from the Civic
Democratic Party (Grapanska Demokratska Stranka), which was in coalition with the SDA at the
time, echoed this sentiment:
I’m afraid that with our protections for equality, we’ll end up protecting men more.
The first priority needs to be the protection of children and their relation to parents.
Children are our future society.... And what’s this about men? Is my husband going
to breast feed my child? I agree with everything else, but this is the one difference
between men and women that we can’t do anything about. It’s the responsibility of
the authorities to protect us. We have to have time as women. (emphasis added)
The comments turned back toward concerns about women’s unique roles as mothers and child
raisers. Ismeta, leader of the SDA’s women’s association Fatma,107 went even further with this
approach, emphasizing motherhood and child rearing not just as women’s unique role but as a duty:
A mother doesn’t take [maternity] sick leave (bolovanje) for herself but for her child.
[pause] Or a father. But don’t take this right away from the woman. It’s not a
woman’s right just to give birth but it’s her duty to bring up the child. The next
generation is in question. This does not threaten rights. Women should be spouses
and parents, but a child when it is born is not a Barbie doll. We need education of
mothers so that they know how to bring up children. (emphasis added)
Thus, the primary purpose of maternity leave was to benefit children and society by assisting women
in the fulfillment of their duties of motherhood. Interestingly, women did not “naturally” know how
to do this in Ismeta’s scenario, but they needed to be educated. Ismeta’s concern with children can
be read together with Vesna’s comment, above, that “children are our future society,” and with the
concern raised by another Fatma member about the “worrying levels of natality” that were being
further threatened by suggestions for curbing the duration of maternity leave. 
In this view, all of these women echoed the periodic warnings published in the media,
108 Several articles quoting the same experts appeared in 1999-2000 in Dnevni Avaz that warned of a
“drastic” and “alarming” fall in the birth rate, especially among Bosniacs: “BiH e za 20 godina biti zemlja starih”
(BiH will be a country of old people in twenty years) (Dnevni Avaz, 3 February, 2000: 13);“BiH  prijeti drastino
smanjenje broja stanovnika” (A drastic decrease in population threatens BiH), (Dnevni Avaz, 3 December, 1999).
The W omen’s Party, widely associated with the SDA and its ideology, also made a public statement against the
World Bank’s recommendations to  shorten maternity leave on the grounds that children, as the future of society,
need “full parental attention” and that “It doesn’t mean that everything that comes from the west is the best and the
most exemplary” for Bosnia (Dnevni Avaz, 27 August, 1999: 5).
109 “Prijeti li Bosni i Hercegovini bijela kuga?” (Is a white plague threatening Bosnia and Herzegovina?),
(Dnevni Avaz, 1 October, 1999). 
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especially the main pro-SDA daily newspaper Dnevni Avaz (see ICG 1997), about falling birth rates
among Bosniacs and the threat to these low rates posed by recommendations for limiting maternity
leave.108 One even asked whether a “white plague” (bijela kuga) was threatening Bosnia,109 the same
language used by nationalist advocates of pro-natalist policies in Serbia to counter the “threat” of
higher birth rates among Kosovo Albanians (see Bracewell 1996; Drezgi 2000). Motherhood, in
this view, needed to be encouraged for the sake of the nation. Whether this nation was defined
ethnically or as all of Bosnia was frequently left ambiguous.
When Sevima asked Ismeta why they should not call for the education of “parents” rather
than just mothers, Ismeta’s responded, “because mothers are the most responsible. Nine months of
carrying a child is a strong bond between a mother and child I would say. You would have to ask a
psychologist, but I would say it’s very dangerous to break this connection.” Subhija, a middle-aged
professional from Sarajevo, further implied that it would be dangerous to grant men access to the
same roles in the upbringing of children as are now indisputably assigned to women:
I’m a lawyer (pravnik) [the male form] but I’ll say something as a woman.... Our goal
should be to protect children and the family. My nature is more refined. My husband
can’t be like me. Let’s look at what belongs to women... I’m not worried about my
equality (ravnopravnost) anymore. There’s a danger of bringing this down to a bad
level. We are, after all, women. We can’t expect our husbands to care for our
children. They don’t know how. He is a parent, but not a mother. 
Women were here defined by their “nature” as care givers and men as incapable of taking over these
roles. A man was “a parent but not a mother.” Subhija seemed threatened by the prospect of men
encroaching on these roles, an attitude I encountered quite often among married women. This was
110 The distinction here is between two sets of words which are usually translated into English as “equality.”
Jednakost  means equality in the sense of sameness, while jednakopravnost  or ravnopravnost literally mean “equal
rights-ness.” Jednakost was frequently used by those advocating gender equality, often to convey a broader meaning
of equality than just legal equality. The word for “same,” isti, was not used in the context of gender relations or
rights, except in negation by those who stressed men’s and women’s essential differences. Still, these terms were
frequently used interchangeably and those who advocated the maintenance of gender role differences tend to object
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the one area in which women had indisputable authority and the sphere in which they were used to
building their identities and sense of self-worth despite their high levels of participation in paid
employment. Many women I encountered were unwilling to give up this position, even as they
sought equal participation in public life and often complained that they had to do everything at home
and among family. This, many women activists asserted, was one of the biggest obstacles standing
in the way of true gender equality in Bosnia.
Sevima and her allies at the meeting recognized this and sought to lay the groundwork for
at least the theoretical possibility that gender role boundaries might be crossed. Sevima thus
countered the more conservative women by separating women’s biological capacity to give birth and
the social task of raising and nurturing children:
Of course men aren’t going to breast feed. But there are also many women who won’t
or can’t breast feed. I breast fed for six months while there was milk, but my female
cousins both stayed at home, didn’t work, and didn’t breast feed. We’re talking about
caring for and bringing up children, about providing equal rights to each parent to
choose how to do this.
Note that she mentioned her own experience as a mother, perhaps to ward off any criticism that she
was personally neglecting her duties toward motherhood. Nataša jumped in at this point, pointing
out that men are also constrained by gendered assumptions that assign women the primary role in
bringing up children and men the role of sturdy provider and protector (symbolized by a sturdy fence
post):
There’s a saying, “otac kolac” (father [is the] post). Not all men are happy with this
role. They feel limited. Some of them don’t want to be the post. So in the law there
needs to be the same rights for men and women. Not equality/sameness (jednakost)–
men and women are not the same (isti)– but equal rights (jednakopravnost), with a
stress on the rights part. We’re not all the same.110
to all calls for “equality.” Those working to dismantle culturally constructed gender differences, therefore , tended to
stress equality of rights  using “ravnopravnost” or “jednakopravnost,” as Nataša did.
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Nataša’s terminology thus framed gender roles as a social construction rather than something based
on “natural” sex differences. Following from this assumption, a gender neutral legal framework was
needed– men and women were to be given the same opportunities under the law. Sevima likewise
insisted that the law provide men and women with the rights to choose who would perform what
roles:
The point is that each parent needs the same rights to decide and not for us to decide
what’s good for you. Of course we’ll have mostly women who will take advantage
of this. That’s the kind of society we’re in. But we’re saying, you can’t discriminate
against women who don’t want to breast feed, who want to work– not because
they’re bad mothers but because they’ve agreed with their partner that this is the way
they want to do it. Parents have rights and duties but it’s up to them to decide how
to arrange them... The main thing is the right to choice... We’re after equal chances
and possibilities. (her emphasis)
The Forum participants, however, could not agree. Several women pointed out the apparent
difference in approach. Suada, an older woman member of the Mostar women’s NGO Žena BiH
characterized the split as “differences in philosophy” between “a certain feminist approach” and “a
concept of asking for protections of the specificity of women.” She was not using “feminist” as an
entirely negative concept, as she declared that she supported most of Sevima’s suggestions (which,
in Suada’s formulation, belonged to the feminist approach). However, Suada also seemed to be
sympathetic to the idea of protecting women’s specificity. Later in the discussion, Alvedina, a young
woman in her early twenties who worked for an international organization, shifted this
characterization when she observed that “Some of us are saying we need to work for equality but you
think women have more duties. This is a difference of opinion then.” To Alvedina, it was “equality”
rather than a “feminist approach” which was opposed to women’s “duties” rather than their
“specificity.” She was in favor of freeing women from such duties, echoing Sevima’s language about
“the right to choose,” which was evident from a subsequent statement Alvedina made in relation to
whether maternity leave should apply only to women: “the Women’s Forum is supposed to work
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towards the improvement of the position of women and we’re hearing today about the position of
children! I think– and I am very young and not yet a mother– but that we need to have the possibility
to choose.” She took for granted that she would become a mother once she was older, though she
still favored having the “right to choose.” 
The conservative women also linked what they viewed negatively as the “feminist” approach
of gender neutrality with unwanted intrusion of “Europe” or “the west” into Bosnia. The shifting
boundaries of what is considered Europe/west vs. Bosnia or Balkans/east were in this case redrawn
to exclude Bosnia from the rich but morally compromised west (see chapter 2). 
Subhija, the Sarajevo lawyer quoted above, implied that women in Bosnia could not expect
as much help from the state as women in (western) Europe:
We’re talking about getting to Europe. We’re not Europe. We’re in the very difficult
state of dispersed families, women in difficult situations, and many other problems.
We can’t provide the same things to women as in the west. Our goal should be to
protect children and the family... 
“Europe” was a place where there is plenty of money to go around for social programs, where
women had the luxury of being “protected.” The things Bosnia was not in the position to offer
women were thus the conditions under which they could go work and care for small children–
daycare for small infants, time off to breast feed, etc. What Subhija considered a luxury was not long
maternity leaves but a woman’s career and personal aspirations. She saw nothing “luxurious” in
calling for at least a year of leave for women. Because Bosnia was not “Europe,” it should do the
minimum– protect children and the family. In other words, women performing their “natural duties”
by bringing up children was necessary while women pursuing careers was a luxury. This is the
reasoning some Bosnian women’s organizations have used in calling publicly for up to three years
of paid maternity leave.
Mersiha, the Sarajevo Professor who was also a Fatma member, similarly differentiated
Bosnia from “highly developed countries”:
I can’t locate this draft law into a social context without asking, are these in line with
our economic realities? This analysis was done by an international group. They are
always looking to developed countries as examples. They compare our situation too
111 These included USAID, the Netherlands Embassy, the IHRLG Washington headquarters, and the UN
Bosnia Office of the High Representative for Human Rights.
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much with these highly developed countries. Just because we know how women are
protected at work and in motherhood in those developed countries, do we necessarily
understand what that means for those societies?... Economic laws don’t take into
consideration the protection of the person (ovjek). Women haven’t been protected
from these economic laws in highly developed countries. There, women are seen as
absolutely just for profit, so she’s freed from everything else that would get in the
way of making a profit. Our laws will be abstract in our current conditions and
women won’t be able to endure something that’s contradictory. Because economics,
like science, doesn’t look at who is a man and who is a woman, just at where the
profit is. We don’t want to get to the point where the real face of humanism is shown,
like under socialism.
She continued, praising the socialist system for instituting generous maternity leaves and insisted that
the new law should represent “some sort of progress” over the last one. Clearly, a western model
would not qualify as progress. However, she criticized “the feminist and socialist slogan of equality
(jednakost)” for not offering women the right kinds of protection. This was a clear denigration of
both socialism and feminism, a move to discredit feminism by association with a system many
Bosnians, especially the more socially conservative, religious, and nationalist, rejected and
denigrated. Ironically, as we have seen in chapter 3, the socialist state rejected feminism as an alien
and bourgeois ideology. Interestingly, Mersiha decried campaigns for “equality,” for which she used
the Bosnian word jednakost to convey equality in the sense of sameness. A common objection to
feminism lay in the assumption that feminists want to erase all differences between men and women,
to make them the same. “Jednakost” also invoked the socialist ideal of “brotherhood and unity” and
rhetoric which placed everyone on an equal level as “workers.” As indicated above, Bosnians had
had enough of these kinds of “utopias.”
Sevima, Nataša, and their supporters were advocating an approach that fit well into the liberal
feminist ideologies being put forth by the IHRLG’s foreign advisors and donors.111 Most of these
women had worked extensively with western legal experts and international human rights documents
112 Similar assumptions have been dominant in other post-socialist countries experiencing the NGO
explosion of “transition.” See Grunberg 2000; Phillips 2002.
113 A cartoon accompanying an article in the daily Oslobopenje  about parental leave policies ridiculed
women’s efforts to lobby for changes in parental leaves when so many were out of work. The cartoon pictured two
pregnant women demonstrating in the city holding a banner which reads, “W e oppose reductions in maternity leave,”
while one says to the other, “Now all we have to do is find jobs!” (Oslobopenje  2 November, 1999: 7).
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where the language of rights and choice dominated (see Goven 2000; Fraser 1989). They tried,
however, to present their ideas in a way that would resonate with their Bosnian audience, many of
whom saw the problem more in terms of women’s “specific nature” and “duties” and with a wider
view of society and nation rather than of the individual. Sevima did not present her analysis as
“feminist” and she made frequent reference to women’s wartime roles, so as to appeal to a common
experience among all the women present. In arguing against special restrictions on women
performing physically demanding work, she noted that women had performed all kinds of physical
tasks and endured many hardships during the war. “And now someone comes along and says women
are too delicate?” she asked the gathering, “And that’s protection of women?!... Maybe it was
disputable before the war, but after all of that, today women definitely are not the weaker sex.” This
appeal to wartime experiences, along with Sevima’s references to her own motherhood, also placed
Sevima within the “us” of local activists, not a part of the international community of foreigners
bringing alien ideologies.
Still, the majority of the women present at this meeting, and indeed many other NGO women
I encountered adhered more to the notion of women’s specificity as mothers and nurturers.112 This
outlook coexisted perfectly well with initiatives to increase women’s participation in politics,
business, and other decision-making positions in the public sphere. Women’s employment was taken
for granted. Indeed, this was the precondition that made parental leave necessary in the first place.113
Moreover, all of the women putting forth this conservative position at the Forum meeting were
highly educated and had solid careers in politics, government, education, law, and other “public”
fields. The assumption was, as it had been under socialism, that women were capable of performing
all of these public sphere roles, but that such roles should take a back seat to motherhood and
nurturing. In fact, as we will see in chapter 7, women politicians and many women’s NGO activists
framed their participation precisely in terms of their mothering and nurturing roles. Thus, the
114 Very few younger women are even active in campaigns for women’s issues, but the two unmarried
women in their twenties who attended the Forum meeting stood firmly on the side of the gender neutral approach
advocated by Sevima.
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“feminist” approach of insisting on gender neutral laws did not resonate with many Bosnian women,
especially the middle-aged and mostly married group present at the Forum meeting.114 
Gender Separation and Radical Feminist Approaches
Sevima’s approach, with its liberal feminist emphasis on individual rights and gender neutral
structures, was not the only approach favored by feminist activists in Bosnia. Like the differences
which emerged at the Forum meeting, differences among self-proclaimed feminists and progressive
women’s activists also turned on the question of women’s difference, i.e. whether women’s interests
are best served by isolating women’s experiences or integrating them into general experience and
stressing women’s equal status with men.
Nada of Žene Ženama in Sarajevo consistently argued the former position, expressing a view
much more in tune with the more radical feminism of Women in Black, where she had been an
activist during the war while she was a refugee in Serbia. While she did not advocate full separation
of women from men, Nada insisted that there were “specific issues for women” which could not be
addressed through a gender neutral approach. These issues, she asserted, “will not be addressed
unless women themselves are conscious of their position.” At an earlier gathering of Sarajevo
women activists and politicians, Nada disagreed with Lidija on whether women’s issues needed to
be tackled separately or, as Lidija advocated, together with other “more pressing” social problems.
Lidija, a human rights activist, readily participated in women’s initiatives, yet she constantly voiced
her objection to “feminism” and approaches that singled out women and women’s issues from
general social and political problems. Nada and her fellow activists at Žene Ženama felt just as
passionately about developing a gender critique of women’s position. She countered Lidija saying:
Everything around us is political and we know this, and we also know we can’t close
ourselves up into a circle... We’re acting, and doing a lot, on many different levels.
But we also insist on developing women’s consciousness. Anything can be
accomplished when women are aware of their position as women.
115 In the Bosnian language, all nouns are gendered masculine, feminine, or neuter, all modifiers must agree
with the gender of nouns and verbs also indicate gender. Yet masculine forms also convey neutral, universal meaning
(Ivekovi 1997). Bosnian (and Croatian and Serbian) women activists were therefore in a similar position to that of
German feminists who insist on the use of feminine forms, in contrast to the move in English-speaking countries to
use gender neutral nouns (e.g. server, flight attendant, actor, etc.). Many Bosnian women activists therefore insisted
on “feminine language” (ženski jezik) to indicate that a woman held a position (presjednica, psiho loginja, doktorica,
etc.). The first woman elected  president of the Zenica municipal council, who did not identify herself as a feminist,
was said to have made a “feminist scene” when she insisted that she be referred to in the feminine, as presjednica
rather than presjednik . Whether they insisted on women’s difference or on equality and gender neutrality, therefore,
the basic structure of the language forced women to emphasize their difference from men or else to disappear,
subsumed under the masculine “default” form.
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To this end, Žene Ženama organized frequent workshops for women on topics such as identity and
power, female experience, women’s history, and gender studies. Their emphasis was on discussion,
consciousness raising (podizanje svijesti), and the reclamation of “women’s identities,” much in the
pattern of 1970's feminist organizing in the U.S.  Žene Ženama insisted on its identity as a women’s
organization, being the only NGO to call itself an “association of female citizens” (udruženje
grapanki) rather than using the default masculine plural of citizens in their name as others did.115
Nada’s position, like the conservative position put forth by the Women’s Forum, turned upon
women’s unique experiences and roles, though Nada and Žene Ženama were critical of power
differentials embedded in the system of gender divisions celebrated as “complementary” by
conservatives. Both these positions, however, could be seen as opposing the focus on public sphere
equality of men and women that was associated with socialism (and liberal feminism). 
Most progressive women’s activists combined these approaches, working both separately
with women on specifically women’s issues, as well as addressing “general” topics and encouraging
women’s participation with men in public life. In many ways, activists were still working out their
positions on this issue. The members of Medica, for example, were forced to fend off accusations
from members of the local community that they wanted to separate themselves from men. A local
Zenica journalist was furious when he was refused entry to Medica for being a man. He had come
to the entrance of the gynecological clinic rather than to Infoteka, where the press conference he had
been invited to was to be held. Still, the journalist took this as a sign of Medica’s “female fascism”
and its being “against men.” At the same time, Medica’s work demanded a safe, all-female
atmosphere for the recovery of women survivors of violence. The women of Infoteka, too, felt
drawn, especially by the Belgrade and Zagreb feminists, to women’s workshops and “consciousness
171
raising” efforts as a way of exploring women’s identities within established gender systems. Still,
their work was gravitating toward an integrated approach toward helping women victims of violence
by working with mixed (and male-dominated) state institutions like the police, social workers, and
healthcare professionals. When I asked, Milica of Infoteka reflected on this question:
Work exclusively with women is a new experience for us, and through this we’ve
discovered both good and bad sides... I think we need to pursue both tracks: I
personally think that in working only with women we separate ourselves from reality
which is “full of men,” and that we need to wean ourselves from that and learn to
“take it to the limit” with men, too. I know that men are capable of valuing a woman
who affirms herself in her profession as a colleague, and I think that we can achieve
a lot in this area. Men are unavoidable, the world is full of them. 
Difference– women’s difference from the generic and dominant male– was thus a major issue
with which women activists had to contend. Of course, other categories of difference were also
important, especially, as we have seen in the case of analyzing and dealing with wartime rape, that
of ethnic and religious difference. Indeed, major strands of feminism in the west and globally have
been struggling with ways to deal with all kinds of difference over the past thirty years (see e.g.,
Collins 1991; Fraser 1997; Ginsburg 1989; Mohanty 1991; Moore 1988). I turn now to the specific
struggles over the meaning of “feminism” and approaches to difference at Medica Zenica. 
Feminism(s) at Medica
Medica is one of a very few women’s organizations in Bosnia which describes itself as a
feminist project. This terminology was introduced by the German feminists who started the project
and wrote its first documents. However, the Bosnian women who helped to found Medica in Zenica
and who now run it alone as a local organization have kept this feminist identity, having been
compelled by the Germans’ stance to examine their own attitudes toward their identities as women
and the meanings of feminism. Most Medica women to whom I posed the question told me they had
had no problem with the German women’s being feminists and in fact did not give this aspect much
thought because they agreed with the Germans’ approach in helping a segment of the population,
women, that was truly in need. “They never imposed anything,” Almira, leader of one of Medica’s
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sections told me, “There was a need and we accepted the task that they proposed because we saw that
need, too.” Several others told me that the exposure to theories and terminologies of feminism had
merely given form to attitudes they had long held. As Lejla, a young member of Infoteka, put it,
“Medica just helped me give these ideas a name.”
The Germans themselves consciously held back from defining what they meant by feminism
in order to concentrate on the task of helping women. This was as much an effort for the German
women to remain united as it was to maintain their relationship with the Bosnian women. Gabi
Mischkowski, one of Medica’s founders who visited Bosnia in 1999, explained that she and the other
German feminists had been working to keep together a wide network of support from women in
Germany, to “agree on a common minimum,” while maintaining a feminist political stance about
the war and war rapes. As Gabi explained,
We never spelled out what do we mean by anti-nationalist or feminist. But for this
reason it was easier for the Bosnian women to accept feminism... they saw us as
feminists and liked us, so they could be this, too....And in Germany it was important
that we were identified as feminists, that this wasn’t pure humanitarian aid but
something with an alternative position behind it, not part of the big business system
of humanitarian aid.
After some time, through interaction with the German women, with the end of the war, and
as the Bosnian women took over more and more of the planning for the project, the Bosnian women
began to think critically about what feminism meant to them. Some members of Infoteka began to
write about it (Andri-Ružii 1997, 1998; Staki-Domuz 1996) and to discuss it with other
members of Medica (Kova 1998). This was an on-going debate that surfaced periodically
throughout my fieldwork (and continues in the present).
Not all of Medica’s women were comfortable with the term or its implications, especially
those not involved in Infoteka or the therapy side of the work. Amela, a former medical worker at
Medica, vehemently rejected the idea that the Bosnian women could be feminists: “Feminism wasn’t
what guided our work., even though we have nothing against feminism and many foreign women
who came to work with us and help us were feminists.” Rada Staki-Domuz of Medica wrote that,
at first glance, “Bosnia and feminism are complete opposites, or at least two things far removed from
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one another.” (Staki-Domuz 1996: 19).
Though Rada was to conclude that a kind of feminism was possible in Bosnia, her remarks
echoed Amela’s separation of feminism from Bosnia, as if they were two mutually exclusive
concepts. She seemed to regard feminism as a way of thinking that had to be accepted by all of
society for there to be feminism or feminists in that society. In her words:
No woman from this milieu can distance herself from the Balkans as a feminist, to
get to feminism... It can’t be sincere.... The Balkans are the Balkans and here
feminism is alien– women are not valued, not respected, she’s not psychologically
or socially even close to the level of men. Her place is in the home, cooking, etc.
Here when a mother gives birth to a son, she is favored. And then she thinks she is
better, superior because of this. 
In her personal and professional life, Amela rejected this patriarchal thinking and lobbied for more
respect for women and their increased participation in all spheres of public life. Yet she rejected
feminism as an “alien” import of the west where, presumably, society was not so patriarchal as in
the primitive “Balkans.” Her rhetoric reproduced the standard Orientalist framework of “the
Balkans” (Baki-Hayden 1995; Bjeli and Savi 2002; Goldsworthy 1998; Todorova 1997) in
opposition to “the west,” the presumed homeland of feminism (Helms n.d.). It also reflected an
erasure of the history of feminism in “the Balkans,” a history that seems to be obscured after each
sequential wave of women’s organizing (Gal and Kligman 2000; Slapšak 2000).
Many of the women in Medica, thus concluded they were feminists “but in a Bosnian way”
(Kova 1998: 87). I was to hear this repeatedly from women, at Medica and a few other groups, who
did not reject the term outright. Its meaning was harder to pin down. From what these women told
me and from what some of them have written over the course of their participation in women’s
NGOs, Bosnian feminism was defined in opposition to the West, seen as the source of feminism.
The comparison with the west was constantly present, perhaps because I was an American and, to
some, also a feminist, though I tried to confine my questions to meanings of women’s activism and
feminism in Bosnia (see Rofel 1994). While these articulations attempt to take into account the
historical and current cultural and political realities for women in Bosnia and the west, they tend to
essentialize western society along with feminism, which is represented as homogeneous and only
116 This can be seen as an illustration of a broader phenomenon in contexts of development and  “transition,”
where western models are held up to either emulate or avoid (see Wedel 2001; Hann and Dunn 1996; and chapter 2).
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western.116 That said, the women at Medica, especially those in Infoteka, the therapists, and a few
others had acquainted themselves with feminist texts and comparative studies about women and
gender in the west and other places. Several had attended feminist courses led by feminists from
Zagreb and Belgrade, or had attended numerous feminist conferences around the world with
“eastern,” “western,” and “southern” (or “Third World”) feminists. They were therefore more
thoughtful about the comparisons they make between Bosnia and the rest of the world.
What distinguished Bosnian feminism was the importance of family to Bosnian women. In
fact, as was the case with the conservative women at the Women’s Forum meeting, this was also
given as the reason some rejected “feminism.” A radical 1970's feminism and the west were
inextricably linked in these narratives. As one young feminist put it, “The west is a different society
with a more developed sense of individualism while here there’s still much more emphasis on
family, community, society than in the west.” Others were much more blunt, asserting that western
women placed low priority on family, children, and marriage, and that feminists outright rejected
these things. Halima, a member of the therapy team at Medica, implied both these things when she
told me, “Sometimes it was strange to feminists from the west that our women paid so much
attention to their families. But through the work and living here, they saw that was the mentality of
this people.”
Much of this impression of the west can no doubt be attributed to the individual feminists
who visited Bosnia, especially during the war years. The German feminists who came to Medica
were mostly young, unmarried, and without children, as they were best positioned to make long trips
to Bosnia and to risk themselves in the war zone. (Other German women with families supported
the project in Germany but did not travel to Bosnia.) The same can be said for most, though not all,
of the western feminists who have worked for foreign agencies and donors in the post-war period.
Given their dependence on western funding for their jobs and the survival of the project, the
Bosnian women in Medica were wary of being caught in a colonialist relationship with their
supporters in Germany (as were the German women wary of creating one) (Ostoji 1999). This
awareness on both sides influenced the direction of feminism at Medica and kept the donor-recipient
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relationship remarkably balanced. As Milica explained to another western visitor, the differences
between the feminisms of the Germans and the Bosnians had strengthened both sides rather than
having been a one-way transmission of ideas from the west to Bosnia. “We’ve softened them and
they’ve sharpened us,” put in Nataša. Milica further asserted that, 
Without this conflict or tension we would either be kidding ourselves, being
dishonest with each other or else accepting the construction of a colonialist
relationship– and BiH is right now in a prime position for the development of these
kinds of colonialist relations. We’ve stood up pretty well. 
Almira, leader of a Medica project that gives counseling and income-generating skills to rural
women, agreed:
[The German women] never imposed anything. There was a need and we accepted
the task that they proposed because we saw that need, too. And it’s not true we
haven’t taken the context into account. This is precisely one of those things we
disagreed with the Germans on– they didn’t think much of knitting sessions with a
psychologist. But for these rural women, this was the only way they would come
together and talk– and they needed to talk things out, get that support– but they had
big prejudices against psychologists and therapists. They said, we’re not crazy. So
they wouldn’t have gone to seek help.
Many western feminists in Bosnia looked down upon such women’s projects that used
knitting, sewing and weaving as vehicles through which women could work through their traumas
from the war and simultaneously earn some much-needed money. The westerners saw these projects
as reinforcing women’s traditional roles because they used traditionally female-associated tasks (see
Walsh 1998). But for Bosnian women with feminist goals, these tasks were less important than the
opportunity they presented for strengthening and helping women. Indeed, Medica’s vocational
programs in which women learned hairdressing, weaving, and sewing carried a much different
meaning for the Medica activists than did similar programs run by more conservative women’s
groups. For Medica, these activities “contribute[d] to women’s economic independence” and
“strengthen[ed] their self-confidence and their self-reliance” rather than reinforcing gender-typed
professions (Zvizdi 1996: 33). As the coordinator of this project wrote in Medica’s newsletter:
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We are often asked why Medica, as a feminist organisation, trains the women in
“typically female” activities. The reason is that we believe that traditional women’s
activities neither conflict with feminism, nor with the things feminism fights for and
against. These activities simply have to be valued correctly.... When women form
cooperatives or workshops together and develop an organised system for marketing
their products, they are on the way to economic independence. This is why women
must not allow their work to be forced into categories which are defined by men.
(ibid.)
Significantly, the ones who “often asked why” such “typically female” professions were taught were
western visitors and donors.
Almira eloquently summed up the conviction held by most of the Medica women which gave
shape to their particular practice of feminism vis-a-vis their western donors:
There are many feminisms, so it depends on which one you are talking about. We
need to have one for here, for this environment. Each area of the world needs its own
appropriate feminism. You can’t discount the family for women here when it really
means a lot, for example. So you can’t tell women here not to put their families as
important priorities. They’re not like the western women who came. Here there are
other things to work for. We need to give women a chance, improve conditions for
them. We don’t have some of the problems western women have. Women here are
paid completely equally as men, there’s no difference for people with the same
qualifications. But that man in the same position just has his job. At home he’s like
this [crossing her arms over her chest] – he has no duties or responsibilities to keep
him back from his job. If we would share those jobs and responsibilities a bit more,
child raising and house work, conditions would be better for women. Here everything
is perfect on paper, we have complete equality under the law. It’s just the practice we
have to work on. But you can’t come here with some utopian view that you aren’t
even close to having in the west and tell us this is how things should be!
Almira had thought a lot about these issues, as she had had to address these questions many times,
especially with foreign visitors (like me). She showed her keen awareness of the diversity of feminist
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approaches in the west, as well as the continuing problems faced by women there.
At the same time, however, outspoken feminists in Bosnia had to deal with prejudices about
feminism in their own communities where they were assumed to be anti-men, anti-family,
aggressive, and probably also lesbians. In reality, nearly every self-proclaimed feminist was married
and had children or, in the case of younger women, had boyfriends or did not rule out marriage for
their future. Still, for many, as one male acquaintance told me, “the image of feminist and a gentle,
caring female don’t go together.” In this way, attitudes about “feminists” were personalized. The
younger Medica feminists had all been asked, even by women in other women’s organizations, “what
do you need feminism for? You’re pretty!” The older women feared that the younger ones would
never find boyfriends if they were too aggressive, strong, and anti-men, which was what “feminism”
signaled to them. Dženana, an Infoteka activist in her mid twenties, had heard this often. She
complained that:
People think it’s personal. They don’t understand you’re thinking of all women, from
the local community to the whole world. People think it’s too much but in fact it’s
not enough. But whether you use this word or not, you still have to talk about it a lot.
Dženana thus pointed to the common failure to recognize the social and political aspects of feminist
activism, as well as the misperception that “feminists” could not “get men,” i.e., participate in
normalized heterosexual relations.
In reaction to this kind of thinking, Esma, one of Medica’s therapists, told me they avoid the
term, calling themselves a “women’s organization” instead of a feminist one because “feminist here
means that you are against men.” In her words:
This is a macho area and people are really sensitive. We try to talk about what we’re
for, not what we’re against. It’s true that there are types of feminism that are
aggressive and truly against men. But we want to be for the sexes working together,
cooperation, and the consciousness raising of women, the strengthening of women
to recognize their potential, to be aware of themselves and their strengths. Of course,
for men, especially the violent ones, we’re really horrible, ugly and mean women
(baba roge), but for normal men, it’s an understandable thing. (her emphasis)
Esma’s comments point again to the tension between approaches that separate out women and
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women’s issues and those that demand integration into the male-dominated world. Both because of
common stereotypes of feminists and the views of the women themselves toward feminist
movements in the west, it was very important to the Bosnian women that they not “reject men.”
“Rejecting men” meant also rejecting marriage, motherhood, and families (along with
heterosexuality), which Bosnian feminists were keen to avoid.
Together with this insistence that women continue to embrace their roles as mothers and
care-givers in the family, Bosnian feminists also insisted they “remain feminine” in their physical
appearance. This was cited as another mark of Bosnian feminism, again in contrast with the west.
Again, Amela rejected feminism precisely for this reason, explaining that “There’s no femininity in
feminism and I’m very much in favor of women being feminine.” Most people still held to the image
of feminists “burning brassieres” and not shaving their legs during the 1960's and 70's (Andri-
Ružii 1997: 26). This was strengthened by the appearance of western feminists at the first
international feminist conference held in Yugoslavia in 1978. Gordana, one of the few Bosnian
women to have attended that conference, recalled that the western feminists “showed up unshaven,
braless, dressed very casually, with no makeup, natural hair, etc., and they sat on the floor with their
legs spread. We were so taken aback, this was not what we wanted out of feminism.” Even now,
many of the western feminists who visit Bosnia, though they do not appear as the “hippies” of the
past, still seem much less “feminine” in appearance than most Bosnian women who wear more
skirts, high heels, make-up and elaborate hair styles. 
Among Bosnian feminists there were several who opted for a more natural look, or who
rejected conventional styles for women. But there was still a good deal of talk over coffee among
the feminists in Infoteka, for example, about clothing, make-up, hair styles, jewelry, etc., interspersed
with discussions of sexism in the media, current events, and women’s activism. Other western
visitors and I were frequently admonished for not wearing make-up, doing our hair, or wearing skirts
more often. Our appearance, coupled with the preponderance of women without children, no doubt
reinforced the impression of western women and western feminism as less feminine (though for my
part I was making an effort, which obviously did not go far enough, to dress more “feminine” in
order to counter such assumptions). Holding onto femininity and the difference this created with an
117 This difference has also been stressed by women writers and scholars from other post-socialist
Central/Eastern European countries who emphasize their difference as “East Europeans” (Drakuli 1991; Šiklová
1998).
118 As we saw in chapter 3, while women had earned the same pay as men with the same qualifications
under socialism, women tended to be concentrated in lower-paid and less prestigious jobs (Denich 1977; Woodward
1985). In the  post-war period, women have begun to be paid  less than men for the same work in the slowly
expanding private sector, on top of blatant discrimination against women, especially older women, in hiring and a
pattern of women being the first fired and last hired in many sectors of the economy (see Ler-Sofroni 1998: 91-2).
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imagined west were thus strong components of what it meant to be a Bosnian feminist.117
Women activists also stressed the different histories for women in the west and in Bosnia.
This was partly because Bosnians felt that the kinds of issues western feminists talked about, such
as equal pay for equal work, job guarantees, maternity and child benefits, health care, etc., had been
solved for Yugoslav and Bosnian women decades ago under socialism. Recall Almira’s indignant
assertion about Bosnian women enjoying equal pay. This was a claim I heard over and over in
women’s comparisons of their situation to that of women in “the west,” even though this claim did
not represent the whole picture under socialism and even less in the post-war period.118 Despite the
current problems, however, women felt they really had had something under socialism that western
women could only dream of. This was a source of pride that was often held up against the otherwise
privileged and/or more experienced western feminists who visited the Bosnian activists. Bosnians
were eager to counter westerners’ implications that the situation for women was all bad in Bosnia
and all good in the west (see Gal and Kligman 2000: 91-108).
This was also part of the women’s re-evaluation of their own pasts through the newly
recognized lens of gender analysis. Infoteka’s Rada Staki-Domuz, the first in Medica to write about
feminism and Bosnia, connected the current, post-Yugoslav situation with socialist times:
What about feminism in Bosnia? The answer that comes to me: we were legally,
formally equal, that’s a fact I cannot deny. I recall my fourteen years working under
“that system.” I ask myself, while I was working in the schools and foreign trade, did
I feel less valued or paid less because I was a woman? The answer is no. Now I
would say, that society back then dealt with the situation cleverly and cunningly. We
were fobbed off with legislation so that we didn’t open our mouths in complaint, but
frustrations came from other directions. I remember sitting at those marathon self-
119 This translation takes some phrases from the English version in Staki-Domuz 1996, but is in other parts
my own translation, which I feel more accurately conveys the author’s meaning, as expressed in the  original.
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management meetings thinking, “Oh God, when am I going to fix dinner? I have to
vacuum the apartment, do the ironing, diapers...” Patriarchy was the tenacious,
resistant éminence grise of society. And then, we women at some point just gave up,
stopped half way, stuck in the trap of apparent equality and unwritten norms of what
was seemly or not. We’d be satisfied with our kitsch holiday [March 8th], fashions,
and gossip coffee sessions, Dynastys and Dalases, but the basics had hardly changed
at all. We plunged into a trap and, it seemed, were satisfied with it. (1998: 95).119 
These Bosnian feminists were realizing in retrospect what the academic feminists of Belgrade,
Zagreb, and Ljubljana had articulated in the 1980's. (Of course this was also because they read the
work of those Yugoslav second wave feminists.) Most of the Bosnian women, however, were not
academics and had not at first set out to analyze their society or improve gender relations but to
address a specific need they saw being produced by the war. 
In this sense, Bosnian feminism was “feminism out of necessity,” in the words of Duška,
Infoteka’s coordinator: “By doing what we did, we understood that feminism is just what we have
been doing: women for women, women to women, women because of women,” she wrote in a 1996
essay (Andri-Ružii 1997: 26). The war, in other words, and the women victims it created, is what
propelled the Bosnian women into action and ultimately into feminism, which they later recognized
as such with the help of foreign feminists. As Duška told me, “In a way I’m thankful for the war, for
waking up women’s activism in me.” Her wording was significant, for she had written that “every
woman more or less carries feminism inside herself– this is her female nature. My mother will never
say that she is a feminist, but I have learned from her much of what I recognize today as being
feminist theory and practice.” (ibid.: 26). It was a conscious feminism and women’s activism that
had been awakened in her by the war. I now take up these questions of activism and being vocal in
public, which were significant points of contention for Bosnian feminists.
120 OSCE, for example, had a program for promoting women’s participation in politics which sponsored
and produced  a television special on women politicians that was aired for International Women’s Day in 2000. Short
announcements of NGO activities appeared regularly in the daily press, though many activists maintained that the
press was required by its donors to cover NGO initiatives.
121  The rest of the coverage of “women’s issues” appeared in special sections on the family, health, beauty,
fashion, children, romance, etc.
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Public Feminism
In an indication of the struggles Bosnian feminists had with voicing their opinions in public,
Duška had also qualified Rada’s statement, cited above, about Bosnia and feminism being complete
opposites, or “poles apart.”: “I would like to add that an acknowledged and public feminism and
Bosnia are poles apart.” (ibid.: 26).
In November 1999, the Federation Minister of Agriculture publicly compared pregnant
women to pregnant heifers in a statement about a shipment of cows which had given birth to
genetically deformed calves. Edina Beirevi, a reporter for the news magazine Slobodna Bosna,
found this statement shockingly male-chauvinist and called Bosnian women’s organizations to task
for not reacting publicly and demanding the minister’s resignation. She lamented the absence of any
“female public opinion” and accused Bosnian women, “whose ear is not trained to register male
chauvinism,” of supporting patriarchal judgements made in public (Beirevi 1999). Similarly, I
heard from various friends in Zenica outside NGO circles, who were sympathetic to campaigns for
gender equality, that they did not consider the women at Medica “proper feminists” because they
were not vocal enough in public. It was great that they were helping “raped women,” they said, but
Medica was too “closed up inside itself,” and so, it was assumed, the activists there were not truly
committed to the cause. 
The activists at Medica agreed that “female public opinion” was far from developed, and that
women’s organizations need to be “louder” in public discourses. In their defense, the women in
Infoteka pointed out that their frequent letters to news media were rarely printed or answered. In my
regular monitoring of television and print media, I saw very few statements from local women’s
groups. Major features on women’s issues usually had a powerful international agency behind
them120 or were connected to sensationalized stories such as crime, prostitution or human trafficking
and in any case were not usually framed as women’s issues.121
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Furthermore, the nature of Medica’s therapeutic work demanded somewhat of a low profile,
in the interest of protecting women patients using their psychological and gynecological services.
Medica had thus started off quietly helping women war survivors inside its protective cocoon.
Infoteka, however, had been established in part to communicate with the public about Medica’s
work. In fact, Medica’s charter stated that part of its mission was to “advocate for change.” As
Nataša remarked, “you can’t do this without public activity.” This aspect had thus grown into a
major part of Infoteka’s mission by the time my fieldwork began. Medica’s German sponsors (along
with other foreign visitors) and some of the Bosnian women wanted the project to be more vocal on
political issues. However, there was still substantial hesitancy about how “loud” and public Medica
wanted to be. They were concerned about accommodating their public voice to the local
surroundings, not being too shocking. As Nataša put it one day over coffee in Infoteka, the German
feminists “wish we’d howl (lajati, lit. to bark) in public.” But, Milica added, “it’s one thing to live
here and stay here over the long term and it’s another to come here for a short time and then go back
to your safe, secure country where the rule of law is in place.”
Indeed, while Medica was visible and well-known in the town, it’s public profile was modest.
Nataša and several of the therapists appeared most frequently in public– on local television, speaking
out at events on women’s issues, social issues, or crime. The publicity campaign for Medica’s SOS
Telefon, a hotline for women and children victims of domestic violence, was well known, along with
its slogan, “You’re not alone” (Ti nisi sama). But Medica members were divided on the extent to
which they should publicly active. “Public” action was furthermore associated with being “political”
and “feminist.” To those inside and out of Medica who supported campaigns to increase gender
equality, speaking out about this inequality would evidence Medica’s dedication to their cause. This
was perceived as the only way to really be effective in challenging sexism and violence against
women. 
On the other hand, however, going public with such critiques or even bringing up these issues
was also seen as being political. And “loud” and political women were prone to being labeled
feminists, in the most negative sense of the term. In any case, many women were not used to
speaking in public. Women without the right elite connections and supreme confidence in speaking
were frequently told this was not their place. Milica also credited the “mentality of Bosnia” and
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habits leftover from the socialist system in which it was never wise to “put one’s neck on the line”
by speaking in public. There were topics it was best not to probe, and women were “especially not
used to having deep conversations” on social and political topics, especially “ethnic” ones. Even
now, in the unstable post-war era, feminists did not have the necessary confidence to confront issues
of women’s position directly. “We’re all in precarious positions personally and as an organization.
No one is in a secure position materially and you never know what the consequences of your public
actions will be,” Milica explained. Besides, many women pointed out, political institutions were not
very responsive to public outcry. The newspapers were constantly digging up scandals and
corruption but none of the officials involved were ever affected. Many Medica women were thus
personally hesitant to speak out or to initiate campaigns which would attract a lot of attention. Some,
especially the doctors, even felt that public action should not play any part in Medica’s activities.
Their task was medical, therapeutic, professional, not political. 
Nevertheless, most of the women, especially those in Infoteka and the therapy team, agreed
that Medica needed to be more engaged with public opinion, to be more visible, if the were to really
have an impact on society. After transitioning from work with women war survivors to their post-war
focus on survivors of domestic violence, the psychologists began to rethink their public roles and
the potential of Infoteka to help change public opinion and official practices. When I asked therapists
Napa and Ivana about their public or political roles, Napa looked back to the beginnings of their
work:
I never considered this a political job, or that it had a political part. The first step was
for us to get the word out so that Medica was known, that women would come on
their own, and that institutions would refer patients to us, that we were known. Now
it’s true that not everyone knows about Medica but those who need to know do.
This was upheld by my experience in the town. Everyone knew about Medica and many women
came to take advantage of its services, but it was mostly known either as a gynecological facility or
as a place that “helped raped women.” Only a handful of people recognized Medica’s feminist stance
or their advocacy for women’s rights and social change. As Adisa put it:
Medica isn’t so known in its true form among people. At the beginning Medica
didn’t talk about itself much– it was working! And this work was supposed to have
122 It was a struggle with some of these institutions to get them to take this issue seriously enough to make
the training part of their fully paid professional duties. Pressure exerted by the project’s backers, the Bosnian office
of the UN High Representative for Human Rights, was needed to convince employers to go along.
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spoken for itself. But Medica was working with a section of the population that was
invisible, without much voice, and with issues that weren’t talked about in social
company.
Ivana was frustrated with this and pointed out that for all the contact Medica had had with
foreign journalists and other visitors, they had not communicated enough with their local
communities. She said of their therapeutic work with women:
I think it’s not enough. We’re constantly wiping tears. We can’t let it go on this way
forever. We have to act in the community. We can work with a woman to see what
caused her problems, the environment she comes from. But this can create the
illusion of what she can do, what her possibilities are, which might not work at all
back in her environment if nothing there has changed. 
Medica has recognized this and taken steps to counter misunderstandings about what they were
doing, about rape in and out of wartime, and about domestic violence. Many of these projects have
been small, one-time gatherings, however, and their publications have reached a limited audience
of like-minded people. The major project of this nature during my tenure in Zenica in fact involved
very little publicity, yet it was extremely effective. This was a Pilot Project to sensitize and train a
variety of officials who deal with victims of gender-based violence. Medica conducted week-long,
intensive training sessions with the police, social workers, medical personnel, court officials,
journalists, and members of local NGOs that dealt with women’s and children’s issues.122 This
targeted training produced dramatic and very positive results in attitudes and the practice of how
survivors of violence were treated at state and community institutions. One could argue, however,
that this project remained limited in terms of influencing wider public opinion and that its main
effects remained “wiping tears” rather than attacking the root cultural, economic, and social factors
surrounding gender violence.
In Medica’s defense, Ivana pointed to other, more general campaigns, the successes they have
had, and the huge challenges they have taken on. She concluded that, 
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We’ve done a lot and there are many women working here. But still it’s a very small
number of people for the enormity of this problem. We weren’t able to reach this
level [of social change]. This shows not our failure but how huge the problem is...
We lack the time and the people to do this properly. I often say I need to clone myself
eight times to get it all done.
How did these concerns affect Medica’s feminism? In addressing this question, the women
compared themselves more with feminisms in Zagreb and Belgrade than with western movements.
Dženana considered first western feminists and then Zagreb and Belgrade when I asked her whether
a Bosnian feminism existed:
Yes. It’s not so extreme or radical but it’s also not so soft. Other feminists often come
here and they think we’re not feminist enough. Because we wear makeup, short
skirts, and all that. We’re in between. The Zagreb and Belgrade feminists are more
radical, rejecting men, etc. We’ve taken what we want and what we think we can
implement here.
Azra, another young member of Infoteka, was skeptical of the tactics used by feminists in Zagreb
and Belgrade. Was their message really resonating with ordinary women?
Zagreb is a big city and it’s easy to do things in Zagreb, but nothing gets to the
villages there.... It’s easier to work with educated women in the city. If we did that
here it would be a big sensation. But it’s a new thing here so you have to proceed
slowly. BiH was different, more primitive (than the other republics in Yugoslavia,
than Croatia and Serbia). Sarajevo is a small neighborhood (mahala) really. You
even need to be cautious there. You can easily be rejected.
To achieve real change, she said, you have to move slowly, gradually spreading such ideas through
networks of women. “Women in public will achieve their goals only when ordinary women start
hearing this and understanding.” In order to achieve this, part of “being a feminist the Bosnian way”
was therefore the public denial of any connection to “feminism.”
Milica noticed a difference in location and political identity. In Belgrade, Women in Black
openly protested the Serbian regime that gave political and material support to ethnic cleansing
campaigns in Bosnia. Milica explained why Medica was unlikely to take on such a public role:
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We’ll never be like Women in Black or something, first of all. We’re not that kind
of project... Bosnia is in a different position from Belgrade– Bosnia is the victim of
the war so it’s harder to stand up to the powers that be here. In Belgrade they opposed
the regime on the grounds of their personal convictions. Here it’s hard to criticize
those in power because they’re held as victims, heroes. For example, talking about
domestic violence is very difficult. Who are the perpetrators? Local men! But they
are the heroes of the war, our defenders and saviors. 
Medica was encountering this problem more and more as its work turned from helping survivors of
rape to survivors of domestic violence. This limitation affected Medica’s approach because it applied
mostly to the issue of domestic violence, Medica’s focus. During the war, Medica had gained a level
of public acceptance precisely because it had cared for rape survivors and had raised awareness of
wartime rape. Publicly speaking about that issue only boosted the moral standing of the nationalist
cause. With the myriad problems of the post-war period, however, issues of domestica violence and
gender equality seemed even less desirable to the public ear.
Bosnian feminism, then, did not differ from its Croatian and Serbian counterparts “in ideas,
but in practice and approach,” as Lejla, also of Infoteka, put it. Because the Bosnian women had
started later, they were able to learn from the mistakes of the Zagreb and Belgrade women’s
organizations, who Dženana felt had been less successful than they could have been because they
had been too aggressive and appeared to be against men. Instead, she explained, in Bosnia: 
we try to talk about gender roles, i.e., as affecting both men and women, to stress that
we’re not fighting for women to be dominant but for women to have more equality,
that this is good for the whole society. But they still refer to us as feminists.
In other words, their public stance, however cautious, is still taken to be provocative. As Dženana
had put it (quoted above), “People think it’s too much but in fact it’s not enough.” Still, they had to
be cautious. Nataša was strategic about how much of this Bosnian feminism the public could take:
The best way to proceed here at the moment is to be un-aggressive. We can be
aggressive but not too often and in small doses. When I feel, in my mild approach
that someone is really listening to me, then I come in conflict with them, irritate
them, and then go back down to being mild and gentle, to bring things to a level of
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rationality, to make them think and not just dismiss me. It’s hard– how do you say
something like, every man is a potential perpetrator of violence (nasilnik), which I
do believe. You can see it in every man that he sometimes gets frustrated and is
tempted to use violence. But this isn’t because he’s a man, it’s because it’s been
served to him all his life. But how to say that all at once to someone [who’s never
thought about it]? I can speak in public and publicly say I’m a feminist and all that,
but if I get into a situation and I feel the word “feminism” isn’t appropriate, that it
won’t be understood, then I don’t use it. There are prejudices against feminism
everywhere and actually we’re doing well, considering! There are actually some who
are starting to take this seriously.
Nataša was particularly enthusiastic about the strategy they were pursuing with the Pilot Project for
training local officials. This addressed specific institutions, laws, and practices but in a quiet,
systematic way. She wanted Medica to pace itself for achieving long-term and deeper change in
society.
Feminism and Activism
A crucial aspect of the public face of Bosnian feminism was the question of activism. Were
these women truly dedicated to changing society or was this just a job, considering that all but the
SOS Telefon volunteers earned partial or full salaries for their work? For Lejla, this was a negative
aspect of the Bosnian approach. She had attended the Feminist Summer School run by some of the
Belgrade and Zagreb activists including Lepa Mlapenovi from Belgrade, and noticed a different
attitude than what she saw in Bosnia:
Sometimes I have the impression that Lepa is a woman who thinks with her heart and
soul everything she does and says. But here with [she named another Bosnian
feminist] for example, it seems that what she says is important but not because of
women but because of herself and her career. 
This was a delicate issue but one which was raised in not so many words by several
foreigners working for the international community and with women’s NGOs in Bosnia. Could these
women be considered true activists? Was there a women’s movement or was this merely an artificial
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creation of foreign donors that represented nothing more than a job to the Bosnians who worked in
these local NGOs? A representative of the Swedish feminist NGO, Kvinna til Kvinna, which
maintained an office in Sarajevo and channeled donor funds to local women’s NGOs, felt that
women activists in places like the RS, where they had started their NGOs before the delayed arrival
of donors, were more sincere. They had formed their groups out of conviction rather than (also) out
of need for employment. Lejla felt that other women’s organizations were just active in order to
please donors: “In all of BiH I feel that only Medica really wants to achieve some change in society.
Others go from project to project and do just what’s sexy at the moment. They never finish anything,
they just do what donors want.” 
Naturally, it was impossible to gauge who was sincere and a “true activist.”  Indeed, given
the complicated economic and political situation, together with contradictory notions about what
independent and NGO activism was even supposed to look like, the answer to this question was far
from straightforward. It was difficult to expect anyone to dedicate the time and energy it took for
activism on a volunteer basis when the economic situation was so dire. “We’re not a club of rich
women who can afford to do charity work,” as one Infoteka part-time worker explained. It was
equally unrealistic to expect women to put in the kind of hours and to travel as much as foreign
activists did. Most foreigners were in Bosnia on short trips or limited contracts and were without
families. Such a schedule meant a significant sacrifice in family and social lives for the Bosnian
women. Furthermore, even if many women had initially gotten involved in women’s groups
primarily for the money or, especially during the war, for access to scarce resources, this did not
necessarily mean they were not interested in or did not agree with the goals of the organizations they
joined. Indeed, many had found their niche and had become truly dedicated to the work, regardless
of their original motives. Several Medica women have been offered better paying or less time-
consuming positions since the end of the war but turned them down in order to stay at Medica.
Nevertheless, some foreigners expressed frustration at the slow pace of work and many breaks taken
by the Bosnians. The Bosnian women, in turn, often found the western push to “exhaust themselves
with work” irritating and unfair.
123 Kristen would no doubt want me to stress that she quickly adjusted her expectations to the situation at
Medica. She has since begun a graduate program in Anthropology and has begun to write critically about her
experiences (Erickson 2003) and to continue her research on Romani women.
124 When the German author Erika  Fischer visited Zenica to promote the new Croatian translation of Aimée
& Jaguar, her book (2000) about the love affair in Nazi-era Germany between a Jewish woman and the wife of a
Nazi officer, Infoteka decided to hold the promotion in its own office and invite only a few sympathetic members of
the community. They were nervous about encouraging associations of Medica  with lesbianism. W hen a male
acquaintance heard about the event later, he told me he would have been interested in attending, but was frustrated
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Activist Feminism and “Race/Class/Gender”
The presence of Kristen, an American volunteer in Infoteka, brought out some of these
differences, not only in working habits but in the approach to feminism and, as Kristen came to
understand it, in the idea of how to be an “activist.” When she came to Medica, Kristen was 24 and
had been active in various progressive causes in college and after. At first she said she thought it was
her idea of feminism which clashed with the way the women at Medica saw it. To her, feminism
included an outspoken critique of power relations based on gender as well as its intersection with
other categories of difference such as race, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. She also bundled
it with other liberal, “activist” causes, as defined in the North American context. Yes, Medica was
explicitly anti-nationalist and attuned to issues of ethnicity and sexual orientation, but Kristen had
been surprised to find feminists who were not also environmentalists– they did not recycle paper in
the office, for example. They relished watching beauty contests and scrutinizing the contestants’
bodies rather than opposing unrealistic, male-defined physical standards of beauty for women as
Kristen did. Nor, when it came to the bombing in 1999 of neighboring Yugoslavia, were they strict
anti-militarists, another stance Kristen (and others) associated with feminism (Erickson 2000,
2003).123
To be sure, feminism among most Infoteka members included an awareness of heterosexism
and a genuine sympathy for gays and lesbians. Although in Bosnia there was widespread and open
intolerance for homosexuality, and certainly no open homosexual “scene,” in Zagreb and Belgrade
there were small but active groups that were also active in feminist initiatives. The Infoteka women
had good relations with lesbian feminists from Zagreb and Belgrade and supported the idea that
acceptance of homosexuality was connected with gender equality. Of course, they did not mention
this publicly for fear of confirming stereotypes of feminists as lesbians and therefore man-haters.124
that it had not been more openly publicized. This, he told me, was proof that Medica was closed and cliquish, though
this same friend had frequently derided M edica  for being “against men” and too closely associated with lesbians! 
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Such a campaign would have to wait.
Opposing ethnic nationalism was also part of Medica’s feminism, as I discussed in chapter
5. There was also some degree of awareness of class in the sense that Medica purposefully reached
out through their mobile clinic to rural and refugee women who lacked the resources or information
to come to Medica. These issues were not usually discussed in class terms, however, but in terms
of rural/urban or education level differences, most likely owing to a general discrediting of Marxism
and socialist rhetoric after the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia.
After their long experience with the Germans, other visiting feminists, and many discussions
with Kristen and Marie, the previous American volunteer, the Infoteka women were well aware of
the package of issues with which western feminists tended to be concerned. They were amused at
Kristen’s initial reaction and also proud because it highlighted their uniqueness as Bosnian feminists.
As Nataša told it, “When Kristen came, she was confused– here were a bunch of so-called feminists
smoking, not vegetarians, not ecological, not thinking about racism, etc.!” Kristen was in turn
frustrated at this characterization. She was not here on a colonialist mission, she said, but to learn
by working in an activist organization: “As a feminist I can accept the way they are here, their
approach to feminism. It’s perfectly normal that they’re different here. But as an activist, coming
here to learn from them, to do activism, this is why it’s so frustrating.” Kristen wished the Bosnian
women were more driven in their work and more vocal in public.
Nataša was the most concerned with explaining this difference. She did it with a subtle dig
at western progressives and local NGOs that followed donor-determined trends: “I’m not a feminist
because it’s sexy, and I won’t become an environmentalist or whatever because it’s sexy. I have to
feel it down here.” She put her hand on her gut, “Otherwise it’s not real.” On another occasion, in
trying to explain Bosnian feminism to a male visitor, she again brought up the issue of
environmentalism and Kristen’s comments: “We throw away paper, we use it as much as we need
to. But what do I care how much forest there is? I’m concerned about women.”
It was Kristen, however, who led the Infoteka women to broaden their vision of feminism
by pushing the issue of race through a project she initiated with Romani women. Following from her
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interest in understanding and fighting racism in the United States, Kristen had noticed the negative
treatment of the Roma (Gypsy) population and wanted her contribution to Infoteka’s work to be a
research project on Romani women’s lives with an emphasis on domestic violence. This was a group
that was triply disadvantaged, being female, poor and uneducated (or perceived as such), and part
of a racialized and denigrated ethnic minority (see ERRC 2000). For all of Infoteka’s sensitivity to
the ways in which ethnicity and gender had intersected in the phenomenon of wartime rape, the
connection to race was not immediately apparent to most of them. At first, the Bosnians insisted that
Roma were not discriminated against and certainly not in a racial way. There was no racism in
Bosnia anyway since there were no blacks. (This was an assertion I also encountered in many
contexts in Bosnia.)
For months Kristen persisted with support from only a few of her colleagues. However,
through countless discussions with Kristen sharing what she was learning doing background research
on the situation of Roma in Bosnia, the Infoteka women began to come around. Perhaps the most
dramatic moment was the visit of a group of male Romani leaders whose stories dispelled any
illusions the Medica women still held about an absence of discrimination against Roma by non-
Roma Bosnians. As profound as this treatment was, however, the Medica activists also noted the way
in which the Romani men talked about Romani women. One of the Infoteka activists recognized one
of the Romani leaders as the man whom she had seen many times in her neighborhood brutally
beating his wife in public. The dynamics of race, class, and gender were brought home in a powerful
way (Erickson 2003). Gradually, the Bosnians in Infoteka more willingly joined the research,
analysis, and production phases of the book they produced from the project (Medica 2001). I began
hearing Infoteka members list the problems of Romani women when they discussed Medica’s
concerns with outsiders. They spoke about the intersection of race, class, and gender in a way that
showed they had synthesized this aspect of Bosnian reality with the theories and cases they had read
or heard about from other parts of the world.
Feminists, Anti-militarism and the NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia
Medica had always maintained contacts and good relations with the anti-nationalist, anti-
militarist feminists in Belgrade and Zagreb. It was logical and easy for the Bosnian women to
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support the anti-militarism of those feminists, especially those in Belgrade (Benderly 1997b; Women
in Black 1993-1999; Žarkov 1999), because it was directed chiefly at Serbian nationalism and
military forces that had perpetrated ethnic cleansing and mass rapes against the population to which
the Zenica women belonged (Muslims, Croats, and supporters of a united Bosnia regardless of ethnic
background). On a related issue, the Bosnians easily joined Women in Black in Belgrade in
condemning the militarism, nationalism, and racism of the Serbian government in its policies toward
and attacks on Albanians in Kosovo/a (see e.g. Women in Black 1999). The condemnation of
Serbian nationalism remained a common element in both these issues. However, when Serbia itself
became a target of NATO forces in the spring of 1999, the question became what would happen to
Bosnian feminist positions?
I was not yet in Zenica during the NATO bombing but in Sarajevo. There I witnessed the
euphoria of people who had spent four years under a brutal Serb siege, for which they held the
Miloševi regime substantially to blame. The house where I was staying was perched on the hill to
the east above the city center with NATO bombers flying directly over our heads on their way to
Serbia. My Bosnian host, who had survived the entire siege of Sarajevo, spent hours watching BBC
coverage of the crisis, waving his fist at the television and chanting, only somewhat tongue-in-cheek,
“Bomb them! Bomb them!” When I visited the leader of a Sarajevo women’s group in her home to
celebrate Bajram, she was also watching coverage of the bombing and “rejoicing” (radujem se).
Everywhere Sarajevans were toasting the bombers. Parallels were drawn between the targeting of
Albanians in Kosovo and that of Bosniacs (and Croats) in Bosnia, all by Serb forces. The bombing
was seen as necessary to stop Serb atrocities against Kosovo Albanians. The only people I could find
who shared my concern about NATO’s militaristic intervention and its imperialist implications were
a few other foreigners and a handful of Serbs, only some of whom were equally concerned about the
plight of the Albanian population. To be sure, many Sarajevans of all ethnic backgrounds were
uneasy with the way NATO was handling the situation, especially when it began bombing less
obviously military targets. No one was concerned enough to raise objections publicly, however.
A similar atmosphere prevailed in Zenica and other Bosniac majority towns (Erickson
125 The mood in the RS was entirely opposite. Many demonstrated against N ATO and in so lidarity with
their fellow Serbs (see Cockburn et. al. 2001: 110-111).
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n.d.).125 It was easy to understand that the Medica women of all ethnic backgrounds, who had worked
so closely with or were themselves victims of Serb ethnic cleansing campaigns, would be happy to
see the Miloševi regime punished. Still, given their solidarity with Women in Black, their general
stance against war and nationalism, and their concern for civilian populations, it was reasonable to
expect that Bosnian feminists might be critical of the NATO bombing as a military solution to a
conflict.
It is not that feminists in Bosnia claimed to be pacifists. Even Alma, a former Medica
member and the leading Bosnian activist for the rights of conscientious objectors, did not oppose
military action in certain circumstances. After having helped to organize peace demonstrations in
Zenica at the beginning of the war, she told me, she had enlisted in the Bosnian Army:
I did this purely to fight to defend my country, my family and friends, literally to
defend Bosnia. This is how I saw it and I’m still sure that the ideas I went off to war
with were pure and honorable. Yes, pacifists said to me that it did no good, that
violence was wrong. I didn’t like holding a gun, none of us did, and we just hoped
we didn’t have to use it on anyone. But in those conditions, when you are attacked,
it’s ridiculous to talk about non-violence and pacifism, especially in the kind of
conditions like in 1992.
Alma was one of the most critical feminists I met in Bosnia. She was acutely aware of racism, global
injustice, sexism, heterosexism, classism, and was critical of state and corporate power on a global
level. She, like other Bosnian feminists, including those at Medica, supported Women in Black and
their principled stand against militarism and violence. I was therefore somewhat shocked when Alma
said she had also supported the bombings. Seeing my surprise, she exclaimed, “I’ve waited eight
years for someone to bomb Miloševi!” After having suffered so much during the war at the hands
of Serb forces, the point for her and for many Bosnian feminists was that action should have been
taken against Miloševi and Serb nationalists to prevent the atrocities they encouraged or
perpetrated. At the very least, action should have been taken to punish them afterwards. However,
even as they supported the bombing, Bosnian feminists were concerned about the safety of their
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colleagues in Serbia. Indeed, Sarajevo feminists provided shelter to several Serbian women activists
and male conscientious objectors who had been threatened once the bombing began.
In early May I attended a planning meeting of five Bosnian women’s activists and a few
foreign feminists working for international agencies who wanted to gather members of Bosnian
women’s groups to formulate a public statement about the NATO intervention and the atrocities in
Kosovo. The bombing had begun over a month earlier and this handful of Bosnian women felt, as
one put it, that “women’s NGOs cannot be silent anymore.” Indeed, the fact that they had already
waited so long was indicative of most women’s ambivalence. The proposed statement was to
criticize the NATO bombing, the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo, and the fact that “peace”
negotiators had been the same (male) politicians for the past ten years. 
Of the five women present, three from the Federation and two from the RS, two regularly
described themselves as feminists, and the others accepted the term feminism but did not identify
with it publicly. Still, their stance was clearly part of a woman-centered, if not feminist orientation,
as they wanted to make a clear statement as women rather than together with other kinds of NGOs.
It was also clear that they were anti-militarist. Radmila, from the feminist NGO Žene Ženama in
Sarajevo, lamented that “there are so many problems with [NATO’s] approach. It will just end again
in weapons and armed conflict.” Mirsada was concerned about the Bosniac reaction she was seeing
in Mostar, where her organization was based, and explicitly linked peaceful alternatives to war to
women’s stances:
The really important thing is to educate people not to take pleasure in the suffering
of others. It’s been obvious that many women in Mostar were happy when the
bombing started, happy to see them suffering the way we did. But the public should
know that there are women who support peace.
Despite these women’s convictions, however, the initiative fizzled when they failed to follow up
with their plans and events overtook the need for such action. It seemed that the rest of the women’s
NGO community was not united on this issue at all.
Medica had not been involved in this initiative. As they told me later, most of the women in
Infoteka had cheered the bombing as Alma had, as a long-overdue vindication of the victims of
Serbian nationalist campaigns. They kept in touch with their Serbian feminist friends by phone, even
126 Controversy erupted in Germany, however, among the members of Medica Mondiale when Monika
Hauser announced in public that she supported the NATO  bombing. W hile she made her comments as an individual,
they were interpreted as the stance of Medica as an organization. Many of Medica Mondiale’s members did not
agree with her. However, Medica Mondiale was united enough to quickly set up therapy centers for Albanian women
war victims who had fled to Albania and Macedonia. (Medica opened new women’s therapy centers in Albania and
Macedonia where most Kosovar refugees had fled, later moving to Kosovo after the defeat and withdrawal of
Serbian forces. In 2001, they also began work in Afghanistan.)
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if it was to tease them with the Bosnians’ notorious black humor about how it felt to have bombs
raining down on them. They offered the Serbian women advice on how to survive in a war zone,
conveying both sympathy and concern as well as a reminder that Bosnians had been through a
similar situation and for much longer. 
The two Serb women in Infoteka’s office, Nataša and Milica, were silent during most of this,
as was Kristen, who was sympathetic to the Bosnians’ feelings but opposed military solutions and
the NATO action (Erickson n.d.). When asked, Nataša said she understood Bosniacs’ joy after all
they had suffered during the war at the hands of Serbs, but she could not support the bombing. She
was “really torn,” she said, because “part of me was really sorry for people there but the other part
of me thought, eh, screw it. Let it be.” (E, jebiga, neka.) Though it troubled her, it was not high
enough on her list of concerns to risk speaking out. Milica began to voice her opposition to the
bombing around Medica, saying she understood why Serbs felt like perpetual victims, even though
she herself had suffered at the hands of Serb forces during the war in Bosnia. Clearly, there was no
consensus on Medica’s position; they issued no public statements on the bombing.126
The divisions among Bosnian feminists on the NATO action were not only about differing
stances on militarism and feminism. While individual national identities, experiences of war, and
place of residence did not determine stances and reactions to political events, they played a large and
perhaps even greater role than feminist analyses, just as they had for Serbian and Croatian feminists
at the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars (Žarkov 1999). Events such as the NATO bombing, which
shifted the roles of ethnic collectivities and identities of victimhood from the earlier war in Bosnia,
brought out otherwise hidden facets of feminist and other woman-centered approaches. In many
cases, ethnic loyalties built upon personal histories of ethnic-ized war experience overrode
127 A similar dynamic occurred among Albanian women activists in Kosova after the withdrawal of
Yugoslav troops and the occupation of the province by NATO. In Sarajevo in 2002, Nada of Žene Ženama told me
of her recent visit to Kosovo. She had been disappointed with many of the Albanian women who, she said, were “not
critical of their own people”, i.e. Albanians. They were not applying the same criteria to Albanian nationalists as they
had to Serbian nationalists when the latter had been in power. Nada, a former Women in Black activist and of Serb
background who had spent the past decade vocally opposing Serbian (her “own”) and all other nationalisms, had
expected the Albanians to be critical because they were women’s activists and feminists– such a stance should have
been part of that feminist activism in her eyes.
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feminisms,127 even as the women strove to maintain contact across ethnic boundaries and to oppose
nationalist divisions (for an earlier example of this dynamic in Medica, see Cockburn 1998: 216-22).
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CHAPTER SEVEN
“POLITICS IS A WHORE”: REPRESENTATIONS OF WOMEN AND “THE POLITICAL”
A young woman is hanging out by an SFOR [military peacekeeping] base in Sarajevo
practicing the world’s oldest profession. An older man from the community comes
to her and says, “why are you doing this? You’re young and fit, you’re a Bosniac–
surely you can find other things to do. Why didn’t you choose instead to get an
education?” 
The girl replies, “I have an education. I finished university.” 
Old man: “Well, there must be another job you can do.” 
Girl: “But I’m not a member of the party.” 
Old man: “Why don’t you join the party?” 
Girl: “Are you kidding, my mother barely let me do this!”
– joke recorded in Sarajevo, 1999
Introduction
Gender issues and women came in as low priorities for the international community as a
whole in Bosnia, despite the work of a few feminists and feminist donors (Cockburn 2002; Lithander
2000; Rees 2002). Yet international donors and officials sought out women as agents of ethnic
reconciliation and refugee return. Regardless of where they stood on women’s issues, donor
discourses often cast women as nurturers, peacemakers, and anti-nationalists. They encouraged
women’s involvement in society as an extension of their domestic roles, perceived as apolitical: as
mothers and as not-men. While these essentialized portrayals focused on positive aspects of
women’s roles– what Richard Fox (1996) has termed “affirmative essentialisms”– they also risked
reinforcing patriarchal values, trapping women into domestic roles and excluding them from formal
political activities. Nevertheless, many Bosnian women’s NGOs consciously embraced this
association of women with the home, motherhood, and non-participation in “politics.” Women active
in politics likewise stressed women’s domestic and mothering roles, even as they engaged in the
male sphere of politics. Politics, as suggested by the joke which begins this chapter, is considered
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especially immoral for women: as the common phrase went, “politics is a whore.” It was this
gendered moral coding of “politics,” combined with policies and discourses of the international
community and local political actors which shaped the kinds of representational strategies used by
women activists.
This chapter explores the discursive strategies used by women activists and politicians to gain
support and justify their involvement in the male-associated sphere of the political. I argue that these
women’s self-positioning vis-a-vis “politics” must be see in the context of locally produced gendered
meanings and a political climate in which moral purity is based on war-associated victim identities.
As female identity was commonly constructed on notions of victimhood and passive, non-
involvement in the public or political sphere, women easily claimed moral purity when they stressed
such qualities. International officials and donors contributed to this view using similar affirmative
essentialisms of women. However, as I further argue, donor approaches presented a paradox for
women: they were charged with achieving the very political goals of ethnic reconciliation and
refugee return, yet the essentialist constructions used to encourage women’s peacemaking roles
effectively marginalized them from formal political power. For politically active women, affirmative
essentialisms also emphasized qualities that at first glance seem to inhibit their being taken seriously
as political actors. However, given the strong resistance to the idea of women politicians, including
the idea that a woman in politics is morally (sexually) suspect, women strove to continue to be
perceived as women, and morally respectable women at that. They thus based their self-presentation
on affirmative essentialisms which stressed women’s domestic roles and feminized victim identities
forged during the war. At the same time, they argued that women did have a place in politics; their
moral presence would “clean it up.”
In this chapter I outline the discursive context in which women activists operated, first
examining portrayals of women in local political discourses and then discussing the gendering of
international community approaches to women. I then explore the representational strategies of
women NGO activists and women directly involved in formal politics. I conclude with a look at the
effects of affirmative essentialist representations on gender equality and ethnic reconciliation
initiatives.
128 A mevlud (Turkish, from the Arabic for “birth”) is a commemoration of the birth of the Prophet
Muhammed. On mevluds in Bosnia, especially those conducted by women, see Bringa 1995, Sorabji 1989, 1994.
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Gender, Victimhood, and Politics
Images of female victimhood lay just below the surface when women were mentioned in
public discourses. In chapter 4, I discussed the gendering of victimhood in terms of wartime rape and
Bosniac nationalism. As we saw in the case of Bosniac nationalist discourses, when women did
appear, it was more often as a homogeneous group or category (“women”) rather than in reference
to individual actors. In the post-war media, this happened primarily when the subject turned to
righting injustices from the war, or to problems of children, health, and unjust economic suffering.
In other words, women were overwhelmingly the objects of “politics” rather than political subjects
in their own right.
A common image which appeared in the media was that of women, usually rural and/or
religious Bosniac women wearing head scarves, as symbols of (Bosniac) national suffering or
identity. A typical example was an article and accompanying photograph of the widow and two
daughters of a Bosniac fighter in the Bosnian Army who had been killed in the war in 1992. Their
picture appeared both on the front page and on page 9 with the article in the pro-SDA daily Dnevni
Avaz (April 18, 2000: 1), together with the headline “Will the Family of the Hero Safet Hadži be
Evicted?” Of the surviving family members, only the widow, head uncovered, and her two
daughters, dressed in hidžab, were pictured; the son, mentioned in the text, was absent. The hero
himself was pictured in a smaller insert with the caption “Hadži: fighter for freedom.” In the text,
the Safet’s widow is quoted talking about how he was a good, masculine husband and devoted
Muslim, while the author stresses that he was a loyal Bosnian patriot. Three of the four subheadings
emphasize precisely these points: “He loved people,” “The highest [military] honors,” and “Mevlud
in the Švrakino village mosque,” the later indicating that a memorial service128 would be held for
Safet in the mosque in the village from which the family was expelled, presumably by Serb forces.
The fourth subheading refers to the hero’s youngest daughter: “She longs for her father (Vue želja
za ocem).” Only three when her father died, the daughter is described as prone to crying for her father
and craving contact with men. Her mother explains, “I guess she longs for her father.” In another part
of the text, the widow declares (“with a deep sigh”) that she will forget her husband and the good
129 Curiously, however, there is a working mosque in the family’s home village, suggesting that the mosque
was never destroyed or that it has been rebuilt, obviously taking priority over the rebuilding of people’s houses. This
was a common complaint among Bosniacs aimed at both the international community and the SDA leadership– that
money was being supplied, by Arab and Muslim donors, to rebuild and build mosques rather than homes or factories
in which people could find jobs. 
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life she had with him “only when I die,” and indicates her resignation at their predicament saying,
“But that’s the way it is when you are left without your head of household (domain).” Both the
mother and daughter are thus portrayed as helpless and unfulfilled without Safet’s male presence.
Even the son, not pictured but briefly mentioned, is said to be affected, although, in the words of his
mother, “he’s male so he doesn’t show his emotions, but I see it’s difficult for him.” 
The photo of the mother and daughters thus reinforces the image of three grieving but pious
and pure Bosniac women/girls who have lost a noble, manly, and patriotic husband/father. They have
also lost their home and land and are therefore a reminder of territory from which Bosniacs were
expelled, territory which thus ceased to be Bosniac. Furthermore, as the headline suggests, the
women– morally pure, innocent, victims– are to be expelled once again from their flat. The expelling
force is unnamed, though it was common knowledge that the international community was enforcing
deadlines for evictions to further the process of return of DPs to their original homes. Among
Bosniacs there was a good deal of resentment toward the international community because it was
felt that politicians in Croat and Serb held areas were not being pressured enough into forcing
evictions in their areas so that Bosniacs could return. Many Bosniacs, too, like the family depicted
in this article, had no homes to return to, as their houses in villages had been destroyed and few DP
families had the money to rebuild their homes (IBHI 1998: 79-87; Stubbs 1999).129 Yet, it was not
important who or what was expelling this family because the article was about the irony and injustice
of the continued victimization of the innocent family of a national martyr/of the Bosniac nation. The
image of the women’s purity, piety, and victimhood, tempered by the robust (but kind) and patriotic
masculinity of their fallen hero, were made to stand for the predicament of the Bosniac people. In
other words, gendered images were used to naturalize and support a narrative of national victimhood
and moral purity, not to mention upholding “traditional” gender ideals. In the most prominent spot,
it was the picture of women, reproduced twice, which summoned the association with this familiar
narrative of “what Bosniacs tell themselves (and others) about themselves” (Živkovi 2001
130 The word ljudi, plural of ovjek, is commonly used and translated as “people/person,” or the universal
“men/man” (see Ivekovi 1997: 98). I often heard it used to mean only males, however, especially by those of rural
origin, e .g. “naši ljudi” for “our husbands.”
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paraphrasing Fernandez 1986, paraphrasing Geertz 1973).
Political discourses in the media further depicted women as symbols alluding to other
common narratives, such as those positioning Bosnia or Bosniacs in relation to “Europe” and the
west, signifying “modernity” or “tradition” (Helms n.d.), or simply as sexual/beauty objects. An
SDA billboard campaign in the Sarajevo canton leading up to the local elections of April 2000 used
images of young, beautiful Sarajevan (i.e., mostly Bosniac) women to signify beauty, purity, and
prosperity. The young women were pictured in front of recognizably Sarajevan landmarks behind
the slogan, “For a Sarajevo as Beautiful as Sarajevan Women/Girls” (Za Sarajevo lijepa kao
Sarajke). In one image, one of the two young women pictured wore a Muslim head scarf, while the
background featured symbols of Sarajevo’s multi-religious and multi-ethnic past: the mingling of
minarets, church towers, and synagogues in the old section of town. The message mixed symbols
of Muslim piety with modernity (the uncovered girl) and a multi-cultural Bosnia (in which Islam was
nonetheless prominent– the uncovered girl may be Bosniac or of another ethnic background).
In contrast, the same campaign featured billboards of actual male SDA politicians, each
labeled with their full name. The politicians stand confidently, serious in their dark suits and ties.
Men are therefore specific political actors while women are beautiful but anonymous symbols. The
caption accompanying the male politicians reads “Vote for Your Own People/Men (ljude),”130
indicating that it was men who would obviously be the ones doing the job of politics.
To be sure, women did make the papers as individual political actors from time to time.
However, as so few women held prominent positions, these images were less common, though they
began to increase as women’s participation in formal politics increased. An overview of women’s
participation in parliamentary bodies since the late 1980's shows both the level of male-dominance
and the effects of various quotas for women (Table 1). Due to economic and political factors,
women’s participation had already been on the decline in Yugoslavia since the 1970's (Žarkov 1999:
chapter 1: 20). Women’s participation in politics was thus not a new phenomenon. 
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Table 1: Women and Election Results in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Pre-war Elections: 
% women in elected body number of women / total number of seats
1986 
(with socialist quota)
1990*      (first multi-party elections)
(no gender quota)
Republic of BiH Assembly 24.1% 2.92%                                 (7 of 240)
Municipal Assemblies 17.3% 5%                                (315 of 6299)
Post-war General Elections:
(through 2000) % women in elected body
women elected / number of seats
1996
(no gender quota)
1998
(3 in 10 rule)
(closed lists)
2000
(1/3 women on open
lists, evenly spaced)
BiH House of
Representatives
2.38%  
                (1 of 42)
26.19% 
                  (11 of 42)
7.14% 
                     (3 of 42)
Federation House of
Representatives
5% 
              (7 of 140)
15% 
                (21 of 140)
17.86%  
                 (25 of 140)
Republika Srpska
National Assembly**
2.41% 
                (2 of 83)
22.89%  
                  (19 of 83)
19.23% 
                   (16 of 83)
Source: OSCE 1998 citing SR BiH Statistical Institute data (1989 and 1991, Sarajevo), and see Ler-Sofroni 1998: 91
* in 1990, a woman, Biljana Plavši, was one of three members of the BiH collective Presidency
** in 1996, B iljana Plavši was elected President of the RS
131 The quota rule (Rule 7.50) mandated that 30% of candidate lists, including three out of the first ten, be
“members of the minority gender,” which generally meant women in all cases aside from that of the W omen’s Party
(Stranka Žena BiH ). (The Women’s Party was required to list men in 30% of its candidate slots.) In the elections of
2000, however, a system of open lists was instituted, allowing voters to choose ind ividual names from one party’s
list. Women activists feared that this would induce many voters to skip over women’s names even though they
appeared evenly distributed throughout the lists. In the end, only 18% of those actually elected were women,
indicating that voters did no t completely reject female candidates.
132 In a typical article from the daily Oslobopenje  (16 April, 2002), a Bosnian woman election official is
quoted saying, “Only women are to blame for the present state and no one else... Rather than women, who make up
57% of voters in BiH, voting for their representatives on the lists, they would rather vote for men an that’s why they
[women] aren’t in parliament in such large numbers.” By “their representatives,” the official suggests that women
should logically be voting for other women.
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However, even under socialism, female participation never exceeded 17% and very few women
served in high level positions, with the prominent exception of Milka Planinc, Yugoslav Prime
Minister during the 1980's (see Chapter 3). Women’s participation in politics fell drastically,
therefore, with the demise of socialism and its quotas, as it had in other parts of the post-socialist
world (Gal and Kligman 2000; Watson 1993; Ruschmeyer 1994). Again, in Bosnia there was one
high-level exception: Biljana Plavši of the SDS, who served as the Serb member of the three-person
collective Presidency of Bosnia in 1990 and then again after the war when she was elected President
of the RS in 1996. Both Plavši and Planinc stood out, however, as exceptions to the rule. As soon
as socialist quotas were abolished in the 1990 elections in Bosnia, women’s participation fell
drastically. Percentages remained low until 1998 when the OSCE, with the support of local women’s
NGOs, pushed through a series of quota rules for women’s representation on party ballot lists did
women’s presence in formal politics increase again, this time to 18% (Ler-Sofroni 1998).131
The data available does not indicate whether women were not voted for or whether they
declined to stand for election in the first place. Indeed, many Bosnians, including many women,
blamed women themselves for not joining political parties and running for election, and, as voters,
for voting for male candidates.132 After the post-war quotas were introduced, many parties had
difficulty finding enough women who would agree to stand for election, though women in some
parties complained that “quality” women were being passed over for top spots on election lists in
favor of the wives and cousins of male leaders who would presumably be easy to manipulate into
following the parties’ men. However, these assessments ignore not only women’s continued time-
consuming domestic roles which preclude participation in politics for many, but also the larger
133 Julie Hemment notes a similar attitude in post-Soviet Russia, pointing to the irony that, now that
democracy has arrived, people view politics with suspicion (1998).
134 Gani had forged  a reputation of sorts for supporting women in politics and women’s initiatives,
reportedly because he had two daughters with whom he sympathized. The Women’s Forum, discussed in chapter 6,
was also Gani’s initiative. This penchant, however, contributed to his reputation as a less-than-manly politician and
no doubt to the laughter his suggestion provoked in the parliament.
135 While Gani’s suggestion was reported briefly and without comment in the press, the reaction of the
delegates was described to me by a Bosnian woman media analyst who had witnessed the event.
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context of gendered associations with “politics,” which was commonly likened to “a whore.”
 
Politika je Kurva / Politics is a Whore
Ordinary Bosnians generally view politics with a large dose of skepticism (except in the
increasingly rare case that they saw political policies as working in their own interests). Politicians
were derided as corrupt schemers, only out for personal gain and engaged in dark deals and morally
compromising activities. Since the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia, politics have also been reviled
for producing the politicized ethnic hatred which preceded and fueled the war and which continues,
in the eyes of many Bosnians, to underlie obstacles to the (re)establishment of peace and prosperity.
Of course, there was no consensus on which politicians are guilty of this obstruction, as members
of one ethnic community were likely to regard the politicians representing rival ethno-national
groups as the worst nationalists rather than “their own” politicians. 
Despite such negative associations, however, when the question arose as to whether women
should or could be effective politicians, it became clear the extent to which politics were
nevertheless regarded as a source of prestige and power, and one meant primarily for men.133 In a
typical example, delegates at the opening session of the Federation Parliament in early 1999 were
deadlocked after having elected a Muslim, or “Bosniac,” (from the dominant Bosniac party, the
SDA) and a Croat (from the main Croat party, the HDZ) for two of three executive parliament
positions. When the leading Bosniac politician, Ejub Gani, suggested that the third post be given
to a woman, the delegates burst into laughter.134 The few women representatives present chuckled
nervously but said nothing and when the laughter died down, parliament got back to business and
elected a man for the post.135 Despite the serious political differences between the two ethnically
based parties, they were in perfect agreement that the only serious candidates for positions of power
136 Suzana Andželi, “Žena u politici danas nije retkost, ona je incident,” Žena 29.10.1999: 5. Interview
with Senka Nožica.
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and prestige were men. As Senka Nožica, a prominent opposition politician, observed, “A woman
in politics today isn’t a rarity, she’s an incident.”136 
One man I knew in Zenica, Mirza, revealed these assumptions in a different way when,
stopping in the street to chat, he began to complain about the corruption of the politicians in power.
Knowing I was interested in female politicians, he declared:
I’d love to see a woman win at the top of the canton. This would show those asshole,
if you’ll excuse me, politicians who go around acting all important, you know those
manly (muškobanjasti) ones all puffed up (sve napumpani). [He swelled out his chest
and arms to demonstrate.] They act so important. But if the voters picked a woman
over them, that would put them in their places. [It would say to them,] We’d rather
have a woman in office than you!
Mirza was eager for me to recognize him as an enlightened male who supported women’s
participation in politics and who was morally offended by the corruption of the politicians in office
(above the “primitive,” Balkan fray). The way he expressed this, however, showed not only the
common association between powerful masculinity and politics, but also the misogynistic
presumption that choosing a woman over a man should be a big insult to the man.
It was said that women have no place in politics, not only for the usual reason that they lack
men’s strength of character necessary to endure its demands, but also because women’s role is in the
home raising children and keeping house. This view was not necessarily incompatible with the
general acceptance, among both men and women, of the considerable presence of women in the
public realm of paid employment, even in positions of authority, which has been the rule since the
socialist period (see Denich 1977; Woodward 1985). Working women still cared for the home and
their children and were thus seen as respectable, while politics was nevertheless seen as too
demanding and “dirty” for women. 
For women, this dirtiness implied not only dishonesty but also sexual immorality. Monika,
a nineteen-year-old political activist and candidate for the Zenica municipal assembly, told me that
her boyfriend was now resigned to her involvement in politics but that, “at the beginning he would
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make [critical] comments, he thought it wasn’t right. You know, they say politics is a whore and a
woman in politics is therefore a whore.” In this very common formulation, politics is feminized, but
as a disreputable, immoral female– the whore. “She” corrupts men, compelling them to engage in
immoral acts. Politicians were similarly cast as prostitutes who sell themselves and their moral
principles for personal gain. Male politicians, however, do not lose their masculinity by participating
in politics. Indeed, they engage in some of the most quintessentially masculine arenas: the public and
the political. Even metaphorically, men’s masculinity (virility) is enhanced rather than diminished
through their association with a “whore,” through the sexual double standard (see Simi 1983:79).
Thus, politics as a whore did not feminize or emasculate male politicians so much as point to the
corruption and immorality of their profession. Mirza, the man in Zenica who complained about
corrupt male politicians, took pleasure in referring to government functionaries (funkcioneri) as
“fuksioneri,” alluding to the term fuksa, or loose woman. In other words, politicians were to be
accorded as much respect as a whore.
Women, however, were doubly excluded from the realm of politics, both because they were
not male and because, as females, association with such immorality called their own moral
reputations into question. As the concern of Monika’s boyfriend suggests, politics was clearly no
place for morally respectable women.
The connection between politics and women’s sexual immorality was further underscored
by comments aimed at women politicians, especially those who had risen to positions of prestige.
Sabina, a woman in her mid-thirties and a member of the Federation House of Representatives, told
me that when she was first elected to parliament, the men in her party “questioned my abilities, my
authority and knowledge. They said, ‘if I were your husband I would have found another woman by
now,’ or ‘how does your husband let you do this?’” Later, Sabina told a gathering of women
activists, 
I know one man who commented, “if I had known my wife would go into politics I
wouldn’t have married her. A woman talking on the same level as a man about
politics?! And being gone from home so much?!” But women make good politicians.
Women are more sensitive to questions of family, children. We are the pillars of our
country. (emphasis added)
137 It would be interesting to investigate attitudes toward Biljana Plavši among both Serbs and Bosniacs in
the wake of her recent conviction for crimes against humanity at the Hague Tribunal.
207
As we saw in chapter 5, a woman who spent a lot of time away from home was often seen as
sexually suspect, even more so if she was known to spend time in the company of men. By the same
token, an unmarried and/or childless woman was also less respectable. This did not make her fit for
politics, however, as the many remarks I heard about two prominent single women politicians attest.
One acquaintance told me that Amila Omersofti, the leader of the Women’s Party and a former
highly ranked member of the SDA, was “in politics because she doesn’t have children or a family,
so she has nothing else to do and she decided to meddle into politics.” Biljana Plavši, the only
woman politician to have served in a major office in the post-Yugoslav period, was also derided for
not having children or a husband. In fact, Bosnians of various political orientations I talked to found
reasons for her failings precisely in the fact that she was unmarried and childless.137
These notions were beginning to change somewhat during my fieldwork as women,
especially those seen as respectable, were becoming increasingly visible actors in both political
discourses and formal politics. Still, the idea that politics are incompatible with female identity
remained strong, even among politically active women themselves. It is in this light that we can
understand Sabina’s counter to her male colleagues’ derogatory remarks– “Women are more
sensitive to questions of family, children. We are the pillars of our country.”– as an appeal to
women’s moral purity based on their domestic roles. Politically active women were caught in a
contradiction. They wanted to retain the moral purity ascribed to women who conformed to their
roles as passive victims and keepers of the home and family, yet they also sought to be taken
seriously as political actors. To maneuver themselves through this dilemma, women sought to
reshape both the definition of politics, as well as that of respectable womanhood. 
Gender in the Discourses of International Intervention
Another important part of the context in which women activists operated concerns the role
of the international community. By this I mean both international administrators and the international
NGOs and donors that influenced local NGOs’ approaches, strategies, and possibilities. In chapter
5, I outlined some of the overarching goals of international intervention, namely refugee return,
138 Nor were there any women involved in the peace negotiations. One woman, the head of the British
delegation to the talks, witnessed the signing (Lithander 2000: 20).
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ethnic reconciliation, and the creation of a stable, multi-ethnic Bosnian state. The urgency of these
goals colored international contact with local women activists, as we shall see.
The international community has only belatedly and unevenly turned its attention to gender
and the specific situation of women (Cockburn 2002; Lithander 2000; Rees 2002). At the time of
my fieldwork, women’s issues generally took a back seat to other issues that were seen (by donors
and by local male political elites) as more pressing. The Dayton Peace Agreement is a case in point:
there is no attention to women or gender, despite their importance to social and political
organization, which Dayton addresses at length (Rees 2002).138 At other times, women’s rights were
paid lip service under a more general rubric of human rights, but specific efforts to address gender
inequalities have been relatively rare. Moreover, many of the newer initiatives were kept separate
from general policy considerations as they were seen as serving a narrow, special interest (Cockburn
and Hubi 2002). 
Donors have especially targeted women for projects of ethnic reconciliation and the re-
establishment of cross-ethnic communication. This included existing women’s organizations and
individual women whom donors helped to establish NGOs, as well as, in separate projects, targeting
women in politics. Largely due to their gendered position as non-combatants and outside politics
(discussed in chapter 4), women were much more apt to engage in such reconciliation efforts. The
fact that women have dominated cross-ethnic contacts and anti-nationalist initiatives since the war
began (Cockburn 1998; Cockburn et.al. 2001) was a particular source of pride for these women and
one which donors and others promoting women’s role in reconciliation liked to emphasize.
Despite the low priority of women’s issues for most international community actors, support
and training provided for humanitarian relief, social service provision, and civil society building
dealt, from the beginning, substantially with women and women’s NGOs. One reason for this was
simply that women had a large presence in these areas. Some donors thus targeted women for the
accomplishment of goals having little to do with gender relations, while others specifically sought
to advance the cause of women’s rights or gender equality. The latter were often smaller,
independent INGOs formed out of women’s and peace movements abroad which channeled funding
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from their own donors to implement projects locally in the region (Kvinna til Kvinna from Sweden,
Medica Mondiale from Germany, and the STAR project from the U.S. were examples). There were
also many individuals within donor agencies and the international administration with feminist
sensibilities who pushed for varying levels of program commitment to gender equality even when
their employers paid little attention to these issues. Donors and women in the local NGO sector were
indeed responsible for many steps towards increased gender equality (see Lithander 2000; Rees
2002; Walsh 2000). Nevertheless, the ways in which the gender images that emerged from donor
discourses and practices often worked to counteract or undermine those changes.
This is not to say that all international discourses conveyed explicit ideas about gender, or
that patriarchal ideologies were always reflected in discourses which did make clear reference to
gender relations. To the contrary, there was often no reference to gender differences at all in donor
project descriptions. (This is problematic in itself, as gender inequalities were thereby erased.) Donor
projects which did address gender hierarchies, however, tended to be designed by development
officials working within liberal feminist or Women-in-Development paradigms (see e.g., Kabeer
1994; Visvanathan et. al. 1997). They were therefore consciously infused with the language of
gender equality and images of women in powerful, decision-making positions. An informational
bulletin from the U.S. Government initiated, UNHCR administrated Bosnian Women’s Initiative
(BWI) fund states:
The BWI offers opportunities for women in both urban and rural areas of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to become full participants in the economic recovery of their country
and to become decision-makers and leaders. (emphasis added) (Bosnian Women’s
Initiative n.d.: 2)
It goes on to list the “empowerment of women” as one of its key objectives. Like other donors
concerned specifically with improving conditions for women, the BWI declared its support for the
implementation of major international women’s human rights declarations, including the Platform
for Action formulated at the 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women. However, it was those
implementing these projects (who were seldom also involved in policy-making) and the officials
who publicly supported them (who were not necessarily concerned with improving gender equality)
who tended to fall back on essentializing, patriarchal gender imagery. 
139 A book by Swanee Hunt (2001) with a similar title, This Was Not Our War: Bosnian Women Reclaiming
the Peace, places more emphasis on specific women who have been active in reconciliation and women’s initiatives,
although the book also reproduces affirmative essentialisms of women as non-nationalist peacemakers.
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Thus, while there was a range of immediate donor goals concerning gender roles, the
message that emerged for local audiences was one which reinforced the primacy of women’s
domestic sphere roles as wives, mothers, and nurturers. Policy makers either did not or could not pay
attention to the way in which their projects were presented and received locally.
On the one hand, women were praised for their abilities to rise above ethnic differences, to
cross formidable ethnic boundaries which until recently were battle lines. The leading role women
have in fact taken in this field was praised, especially by donors, as a step toward the affirmation of
women in society and fuller gender equality.
On the other hand, however, the common explanation for why women play this role was
based on a stark, patriarchal division of gender roles and an essentialist, albeit positive, portrayal of
women– “affirmative essentialisms.” In this view, women were “naturally” more interested in peace,
more tolerant of (ethnic) differences, and more willing to engage in dialogue and compromise to
diffuse conflicts (Papandreou 1997; Ruddick 1989). Above all, it was stressed that women were
outside of politics, where men had made the decisions which led to war. Women were therefore
against the war and thus innocent (passive) victims, incapable of hatred and nationalism. The actions
of one group of women peacemakers was generalized to all women, just as men were generalized
as war-mongering nationalists on the basis of the actions of those (male) politicians and military
leaders who were responsible for waging war.
In a typical example, a book of testimonies from women war survivors in the city of Mostar
published by Cooperazione Italiana, an Italian NGO with funding from the Italian government, is
entitled, “This War is Not Mine” (Cacace et. al. 1996).139 The message is that war and politics were
the sole activities of men; all women were therefore against war and the nationalism which fueled
it. An introduction to this book by the Italian Foreign Minister at the time, Lamberto Dini,
romanticizes women’s war suffering and perceived innocence:
Reading the stories of the Mostarian women, the stories of mothers, wives, war
widows, one has a strange feeling: a message of hatred is never expressed by these
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incredible and marvelous women. (emphasis added) (ibid.: 5)
In the same book, Emma Bonino, then the European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid,
makes the case that women “can become, in the post-war period, one of the driving forces towards
reconciliation and rehabilitation” because, “compared to men, women show a greater inclination
towards peace rather than war. They, more often than men, reject ethnic, linguistic, or religious
barriers” (ibid.: 6). Assuredly, she goes on to explain that “they do so for very practical motives: they
want to continue cultivating the fields, maintain access to essential goods, and safeguard ‘mixed’
marriages and families,” thus tempering the argument that women are naturally inclined to peace.
However, the general tone of her essay, and of the others introducing the book, emphasizes women’s
vulnerability, victimization, and innocence. The result is an image of women as noble peacemakers
and nurturers who stand high above those who initiated and waged war.
At a meeting of NGO and political women organized by OSCE in the town of Ljubuški,
September 7, 2000, the regional OSCE representative, an older, American man, told the gathering
that the international community supported increased participation in politics by women because,
“women... typically bring up issues that go beyond ‘who’s a better Serb, Croat, or Bosniac’.” He
implored the women to force voters and the rest of their parties to concentrate on issues such as “the
economy, jobs, education, and health care” rather than those of national identity. While this was also
the OSCE’s and other international bodies’ hope for male politicians, it is clear here that women
were assumed a priori to be uninterested in national(ist) agendas and were being encouraged to think
of themselves this way.
Similarly, many attempts to explicitly recognize and lend value to women’s existing roles
and/or to encourage the full participation of women in all sectors of society nevertheless fell back
on generalizations supporting patriarchal gender stereotypes. Another BWI report quotes the
UNHCR’s Senior Coordinator for Refugee Women, Rita Reddy, addressing a multi-ethnic meeting
of NGO women organized by the BWI fund with these words:
Women perform most of the tasks which contribute to the economic strength of a
country, be it in the finance, business and administrative sectors, or through their
strenuous activities in rural areas. Yet their contribution is rarely given due
recognition, even by agencies providing funding for post-war recovery. ... Women,
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proved by research studies to be more predisposed to ensuring the continuance of life
and promotion of peace than their male counterparts, must be involved as decision-
makers and take the lead in the peace-building processes. (emphasis added) (Bosnian
Women’s Initiative 1996)
It is clear that this initiative was aimed at countering women’s relative powerlessness in society,
especially in politics and other decision making positions. But again it is implied that women as a
group are more peace-loving than men. Furthermore, this predisposition to peace promotion is linked
to that of “ensuring the continuance of life,” suggesting that women are inclined towards peace
(only?) because of their roles as mothers.
Women were in this way defined not as individuals, but in terms of their roles within a
patriarchal gender regime. The excerpt discussed above from the Italian book not only talks about
“women,” but adds, “mothers, wives, war widows” (Cacace et. al. 1996: 5). Women’s suffering is
thereby legitimated through these relationships to men, as wives and mothers (of sons-soldiers).
Other common formulations rested on a view of women as self-sacrificing mothers whose concern
for their children is what gives them the courage to cross borders. For example, the evaluation
material from one donor, written by a local Bosnian woman staff member, states:
In our working experience, women are much braver than men, and more practical.
They always dare what men do not. They are not afraid to go to another entity in
order to achieve their goals, to meet people on (the) “other side.” They understand
each other, they are clear that people can be only good or bad, and that no other
division matters. They do not look at people of another ethnicity as enemies but as
people that have gone through the same hardships and trauma. They all know that all
mothers have been equally crying, and that all of them have suffered a lot. (emphasis
added) (Savi 2000: 4)
Women’s participation in political decision making was here called for only on the basis of their
continued ties to the home and the (patriarchal) family. The objectives of Stope Nade, the Bosnian
offshoot of the British based Marie Stopes International, mixed this aim with the goal of female
empowerment:
The overall objective of the programme is to facilitate the return and reintegration of
213
returnee women and girls into viable family units and communities by promoting
participation, empowerment, self-organisation and self-reliance. (Stope Nade/Marie
Stopes International n.d.)
Donor discourses such as these, which specifically addressed the situation of women, thus combined
calls for gender equality (female empowerment, increased participation of women in politics and
decision making, social validation for women’s existing roles, etc.) with affirmative, often
romanticized, essentializations of women as (apolitical) peace-makers and anti-nationalists. In
contrast, while male NGO leaders and politicians have also been targeted in reconciliation initiatives,
the rhetoric about them is quite different; it does not refer to men’s natural dispositions toward peace,
connections to family, and the preservation of life.
Essentialisms Locally: “If Women Had Been in Power, There Wouldn’t Have Been a War”
Some of the more gender-critical (or feminist) local women activists took note of this
approach by donors. As Dženana of Medica complained, “The picture that men make war and
women make peace– that really annoys me. Women’s groups use this all the time.” Members of
Medica and the other self-described feminist organizations generally refrained from reproducing
such essentialisms, though they made use of them in other ways, as we shall see. Most Bosnian
women’s organizations, however, readily embraced these essentialist representations of women, as
was apparent through their own presentations of their work. This approach not only coincided with
donor discourses but also with local understandings of gender. During my fieldwork, I repeatedly
heard Bosnian women (and a few men) state that, “if women had been in power, there wouldn’t have
been a war.” Many similar statements were made at meetings of women active in NGOs and politics,
reinforcing the stereotype of peaceful women/aggressive men.
In lamenting women’s virtual absence from politics, especially during the years leading up
to the war, Irena Soldat-Jovanovi, a parliamentary representative from the Serb Republic speaking
on Bosnian television concluded:
Had women had a higher degree of participation in 1991, maybe it would not have
even come to this war, maybe we would have found, in some peaceful way, a
compromise in which women were very prominent, and through which the family
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would be preserved. (emphasis added)
As with donor discourses, these local activists often offered motherhood as the defining feature of
women’s peacemaking roles. At another cross-entity women’s NGO gathering I attended in the
eastern RS, the leader of Izvor, a women’s NGO in Serb-controlled Zvornik, concluded a
presentation about the need for women to get involved in politics by saying:
I wish to convey a message to all women and mothers of BiH [Bosnia-Herzegovina]
that they are an important factor in maintaining the peace in this region. We need to
bring up children in the spirit of tolerance, in valuing those who think and believe
differently and not in the spirit of hatred and intolerance.
Similarly, many Bosnian women have publicly embraced their roles as mothers, as another women’s
NGO did on T-shirts which read, “World Peace begins right here. I will not raise my child to kill
your child.” Again, the role of women and their connection to peace-making are defined strictly
through motherhood. Motherhood connotes not only the bearing, but also the raising of children, a
role which includes both moral guidance and the (less desirable) job of cleaning up messes as the
“sacrificing mother.” As Dženana further noted, “This is still the expectation of society. Women
smooth out what men have messed up,” in other words, conflict and war.
Examples countering such generalizations were readily visible, as has been shown in other
contexts (e.g., African Rights 1995; Lilly and Irvine 2002; Scheper-Hughes 1996). Several people
related stories of women calling for even more violent measures to be taken against ethnic others
than what was publicly advocated by the most extreme nationalist men. A few male ex-soldiers told
me how, during the war, their female relatives scolded them as they returned from the front for not
having killed more of the enemy. The men, in contrast, having experienced the carnage of the front
lines, shrank from the violent, aggressive behavior many of them had exhibited in the time leading
up to the war. Wartime reports, too, told of women taking part in blocking deliveries of badly needed
humanitarian aid to communities of other ethno-national groups (Borneman 1998: 295). And,
although it is difficult to know the precise motivation of such women from their brief mention in war
reports, other aggressive roles of women were also reported, such as the Serb woman who worked
at the infamous Serb-run “brothel,” Kod Sonje, where Muslim women were detained, raped, and
killed (Vjesnik, December 17, 1993: 11, cited in Žarkov 1999: Chap. 4: 22; and see Lilly and Irvine
140 Here I would exclude contact with feminist donors, with whom such criticism was encouraged.
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2002).
Indeed, the actions and words of many women NGO activists contradicted the image of
peace-loving women. As mentioned in chapters 4 and 5, many women’s organizations were formed
to work exclusively with women of “their own” ethnic group, or to support nationalist ideologies.
One women’s NGO leader told me that, in her view, it was women who were responsible, through
their “gossiping and blabbing,” for stirring up the hatreds which led to the war. I observed many
instances in which women involved in cross-ethnic NGO activities used language or other cues that
offended the women with whom they were supposed to be reconciling; in many cases, I also
witnessed hostile attitudes towards other ethnic groups expressed by women “peace-makers.” Even
the affirmative essentialisms used to cast women as morally pure mothers belied their implied
universalism. Implicit in the T-shirt slogan cited above is the suggestion that some (bad) mothers do
raise their children to kill other people’s children, namely the women belonging to hostile ethnic
groups (Serbs in this particular case).
Yet, those who acknowledged these inconsistencies or who were critical of gender
essentialisms generally made their criticisms in private conversations rather than public fora.140
Regardless of whether local women’s NGOs embraced this rhetoric of women as peace-makers, they
knew their categorization as “women’s organizations” helped them win funding, especially for
reconciliation projects. This was because they were seen as better able to engage in inter-ethnic
communication and carry out ethnic reconciliation projects, which, along with humanitarian aid,
charity, and other social services in which women have engaged during and since the war, constitute
feminized “clean-up work.” 
Strategic Use of Gender Essentialisms by Women’s NGOs
A key component of these essentialist representations is the women’s positioning themselves
outside of politics and the portrayal of politics as a (corrupt, immoral, and nationalistic) realm of
men. Somewhat paradoxically, this strategy is used to accomplish very political goals. Although
NGOs are not always regarded locally with favor, when juxtaposed with the formal political sphere
141 These groups were the only women’s groups that visibly protested anything on the streets, including
those groups that called themselves feminist and their activities political.
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they gain an air of legitimacy when they emphasize their non-governmental, even apolitical
character. As we have seen, women can more easily cast themselves as apolitical. They are also more
readily associated with victim identities, especially those stemming from the war. All of these
elements offered a reservoir from which women were able to draw considerable moral status in
public, post-war processes. I now turn to three examples of how local women’s NGOs made strategic
use of affirmative essentialisms of women in order to achieve their (political) goals. 
Women of Srebrenica
This connection between victim images, morality, and femininity has been made most
successfully in the Bosniac parts of Bosnia by groups of women survivors of the biggest massacre
of the war at Srebrenica in which an estimated 7,000 male Muslims were killed by Serb forces when
they overran the enclave filled with Muslim refugees, expelling the women and children, in July
1995 (Burg and Shoup 1999; Sudetic 1998). To be sure, these groups have successfully wielded such
feminized victim images because they were truly victims and had directly suffered a great deal. My
point is to call attention to the effect of their emphasis on their roles as mothers and wives, which
was underscored by their public appearance in traditional Muslim rural dress. The public protests141
of groups such as Žene Srebrenice (Women of Srebrenica) regularly drew sympathy and feelings of
disgust towards both the Serbs and the Muslim politicians widely believed to have sold the enclave
out. 
Women of Srebrenica was emphatic that, as they put it at the top of their website homepage,
“our task is not a fight for women rights” (sic), (a cause commonly understood as “political”) but the
search for (the bodies of) their missing family members and the campaign to bring their killers to
justice (Women of Srebrenica 2002). They specifically stated that they were not politicians and their
banners used in public protests typically emphasize motherhood: “Mothers ask, where are the
missing from Srebrenica?”and “Srebrenica Mothers want the truth.” 
Identification as a victim of the nationalist forces of opposing ethnic groups (or of western
interventions) also carried high moral value, and was one of the only acceptable kinds of identity one
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could espouse in post-war Bosnia. As chapter 4 detailed, women have been especially linked to
victim identities as bereaved mothers and victims of rape. Another organization of Srebrenica
survivors calls itself “The Association of Mothers and Sisters of Srebrenica and Podrinja”
(Udruženja majke i sestre Srebrenice i Podrinja), even though it is headed by a man. While women
made up a large majority of Srebrenica survivors, it is nevertheless significant that these
organizations emphasized not only a female identity, but that of mothers, sisters, wives/widows. The
stress was thus on female familial roles far removed from anything political and which invoked
images of victimhood by calling attention to the emotional bonds the survivors had with those who
had been killed. In this way, these organizations hoped to publicly shame the authorities they held
responsible for the massacre, just as movements like the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina
(Taylor 1994) and the Mothers’ Fronts in Sri Lanka (de Alwis 1998a; Samuel 2003) have done
through public performances of motherhood in the face of state violence.
Somewhat paradoxically, the Srebrenica women are acting in the public sphere on an
intensely political issue in which their missing male loved-ones are the ultimate victims, though the
women themselves have also suffered greatly. Nevertheless, the women’s emphasis on their
identities as women/mothers/victims adds moral authority and political clout to their message.
Feminization of the victim image combined with the male gendering of the political sphere allowed
women to more easily claim distance from “politics” and, therefore, from culpability for everything
negative– war, ethnic cleansing, poverty, corruption, unemployment, etc.– caused by politicians in
the recent past. 
Women of Podrinje and Kozarac
As we recall from chapter 5, Žene s Podrinja (Women of Podrinje) and Srcem do mira
(Through Heart to Peace) were made up of Bosniac DP women whose main goal was to return to
their former home towns after having lived through some of the most brutal cases of ethnic cleansing
of Bosniacs by Serb forces in the war. Both the Podrinje area of Eastern Bosnia (Srebrenica,
Bratunac, Zvornik, Vlasenica) and the area around Kozarac and Prijedor (in Northwest Bosnia)
where Srcem do mira was from were now populated by Serbs and controlled by nationalist
politicians who opposed the return of non-Serbs. Resistence by nationalist leaders to the return of
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displaced persons of different ethnicity was, of course, also a continuation of wartime ethnic
cleansing of territory (see Hayden 1996). Local Serb leaders did not want their control of these now
ethnically homogeneous territories to be threatened by the return of ethnic others, be they women,
children, men, or anyone. Their political power was based on their ability to get votes– votes from
members of the now-dominant ethnic group only; any increase in the population of ethnic others
directly threatened this power. The women’s goals of return were thus fundamentally political.
The women did not call their activities political, however, but humanitarian, a category
understood as apolitical. They portrayed themselves as working within women’s circles rather than
“meddling” into the male world of politics. Almasa of Srcem do Mira opposed her group’s
“humanitarian” activities to what she said was the more “political” nature of Serb NGOs operating
in her area. “Political” groups were, in her formulation, morally suspect. When I asked Zahida, the
leader of Žene s Podrinja, why her group only worked with women, she looked at me as if I was
asking the obvious. “We have to work with women,” she explained, “Because we are women. If we
tried to talk to the men there [in our towns] then it would be political.” Male activity is, in this
formulation, political, while female activity is not.
This approach conformed to the patriarchal gender divisions of affirmative essentialisms
which marginalized women from formal politics. But it was also somewhat effective politically,
precisely because women were seen as less threatening or politically consequential, and because they
actually did lack power in the formal political realm. The women were able to quietly circumvent
the spotlight without putting the public reputation of (male) officials directly on the line. In fact,
since 1998, Srcem do Mira had been instrumental in the reestablishment of a viable Bosniac
community in and around Kozarac. Ethnic relations there were far from smooth, but their goal of
return was achieved against strong odds and they continued to successfully push for improvements
in their community. Žene s Podrinja succeeded in October 2000, after several years of effort, in
holding a cross-ethnic meeting in Bratunac, one of the most politically hardline towns of the region
and the place where stones had been hurled at them to prevent them from entering a few months
before. They were continuing to work to achieve their return and to improve communication with
142 Neither of these cases was without serious problems and there was some question as to whether refugee
return would foster or complicate ethnic reconciliation. Indeed, as in the Kozarac case, return to many areas had
been easier because they had been relatively ethnically homogeneous before the war. Return to urban areas, which
were ethnically mixed before the war, was much more problematic and has been, for this and other reasons, much
slower to realize.
143 Women’s power was not only tied here to  the informal, family sphere, but also to  women’s sexuality,
though this quo tation was the only time I heard Zahida allude to this aspect.
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their Serb former neighbors.142
This quiet circumvention of public, political channels also drew on popular notions of hidden
female power, the “cryptomatriarchy” of the family sphere described in Chapter 3 (Simi 1983;
Hammel 1967). While such power is generally limited to the home sphere, women’s activists who
adhered to this more “traditional” idea of gender relations hoped to use this channel to accomplish
their political goals. Zahida explained how she envisioned this helping her achieve her goal of
holding the Bratunac meeting: 
Women can do a lot. Someone once asked me why I’m doing this through women
and not through politicians. I said, “today we’ll meet and I’ll say what we want.
You’re married to the mayor and  you’ll lay in bed tonight and tell him that we want
to meet in Bratunac and you’ll convince him to do it.” It’s much easier through
women.
Again, although she spoke of the mayor as being a man (which the mayor at that time, in fact, was),
she unquestioningly assumed the general category of “politicians” to be male and opposed it to the
category of women.143 She readily acknowledged to me that her goal was political and that she and
her organization were counting on the prejudices of local male politicians to allow them to achieve
their political goals through nominally non-political channels available to women. Zahida continued:
Women can make better progress, exactly on this path to reconciliation. The
authorities didn’t think we’d be able to do too much in Bratunac, and now when they
see how much we’re doing, they can’t do anything [to stop us].... They didn’t
imagine– [they said] “well, so what?, there’s a couple of women there, what can they
do?” But we criticize power and politics. But hey, we’re not politicians!!
Zahida delivered this last sentence with a big grin on her face and a twinkle in her eye. She was quite
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aware of the way she was playing with other people’s assumptions about women’s political
insignificance in order to achieve her very political goals.
At the same time, there was little guarantee that this strategy would be successful by itself,
largely because many decisions crucial to the return process were still made by men. As Almasa
noted, “[NGO work] is seen as humanitarian work and meaningless. But politics is serious and
thought highly of. It’s power.” For this reason (and because it was also being pushed by donors),
both Almasa’s and Zahida’s groups were active in campaigns to increase women’s participation in
formal politics and to support the female politicians who were there. Furthermore, Zahida was
ultimately successful in organizing her meeting in Bratunac by working yet another channel available
to her as a woman activist, that of the international community.
Indeed, none of these successes ultimately could have been achieved without support and
pressure from international institutions which assisted movements for return regardless of views on
gender. Return to Kozarac seems to have been allowed at least partly as a concession by the RS
government in exchange for international funds for the economically depressed entity. The Bratunac
meeting was also achieved through persistent pressuring of local Serb leaders by international
officials who held out the promise of donor funds being released to local (Serb) NGOs in desperate
need of assistance to help an even more desperate local population. In other words, significant
change was ultimately achieved on the male-dominated level of formal political structures. 
Feminists and “Strategic Avoidance”
Several of the Medica women expressed annoyance at donors and other NGO women who
so wholeheartedly embrace essentialist thinking. Nataša was irritated at suggestions like Zahida’s
that women should influence reconciliation through husbands and other men in positions of power:
It can’t work this way. I’m not thinking about women being active as someone’s
wife, influencing their husbands, but exercising direct influence on their own. When
all is said and done, it’s better to be in the margins than not at all on the page! At
least you have a chance at getting into the text that way.
Nataša’s metaphor pointed directly to the effective marginalization of women from the formal
political sphere created through the use of affirmative essentialisms of women.
144 This image did not completely protect the women from harassment by local nationalists, however,
especially in the RS. See Cockburn et. al. (2001: 106-126) for an account of the difficulties two Banja Luka women’s
NGOs had to endure for their cross-ethnic and cross-entity work.
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Despite their criticisms, however, even Medica and other like-minded activists made use of
these familiar gender essentialisms to some degree. While these activists did not actively promote
essentialist understandings of women’s roles, they often did not object when their activities were
publicly characterized in positive terms– as apolitical and humanitarian, or when they were included
in descriptions of nurturing, peacemaking women. This only bolstered their sense of moral purpose
as women helping women, not to mention their public image. As we have seen, Medica activists
consciously tempered their public statements so as not to appear too “aggressive” or “feminist” (a
term understood as political). This, they feared, might threaten their ability to influence change in
society, both in terms of improving gender equality as well as working toward ethnic reconciliation.
An image of apolitical, nurturing women in fact aided both these aspects of Medica’s efforts.
The cross-ethnic network of women’s activists, of which Medica was an active part, largely
relied on affirmative essentialisms to maintain its working relationships (see chapter 5). These
women, practicing “strategic avoidance” of potentially controversial “ethnic” issues, identified
themselves primarily as women concerned with “women’s issues,” rather than “politics,” though
they readily acknowledged to themselves that their goals were political. At times they allowed
themselves to joke and talk about ethnic differences to some extent, but this was based on the trust
they had built up through their years of working together. Their underlying assumption, which they
also often articulated, was that none of the women had been involved in, or had any sympathy for,
waging the war, promoting nationalisms, or the corruption of politics. Indeed, these women did share
a common rejection of both ethno-national and patriarchal ideologies. A public image as women and
outside politics, however, was ultimately helpful in allowing these activists to cross ethnic divides
and pursue their work.144 
The Dilemma of Women Politicians
Women activists had strategic reasons for distancing themselves from “politics,” especially
in their public image, in order to more effectively participate in political processes, broadly defined.
145 Ironically, the Bosnian name was formed with the masculine plural of the word “voters.” Šehida, one of
the Liga’s leaders, told me she had decided this was a mistake and wanted to change the name to the feminine Liga
Žene Glasaica. This would also have respected the insistence by many women activists on the use of feminine
grammatical forms when referring to females, or “female language” (ženski jezik).
146 This training program, entitled “Women Can Do It” (Žene to mogu) was adapted from a Norwegian
model and implemented in municipalities throughout Bosnia through OSCE-trained local (Bosnian) facilitators. I
attended one such training session in Zenica in November 1999.
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Women politicians, political candidates, and political party members, however, could not claim non-
involvement in politics. Instead, as I show below, they relied on similar affirmative essentialisms of
women to justify and promote their participation in politics. 
As a result of the new quota rules, however, women were becoming more and more visible
in the sphere of formal politics. Certain elements of the international community, too, promoted
women’s increased participation in politics. The OSCE led these efforts through its Women in
Politics program, part of its Democratization Department. The program organized training for
women in political skills, regular gatherings of women parliamentarians to cultivate solidarity across
party lines on “women’s issues,” and meetings of women politicians and NGO women designed to
foster cooperation among women and communication across all levels of government and
communities.
Other foreign donors also encouraged and funded efforts to increase women’s political
participation. A foreign contact had also been instrumental in the formation of the League of Women
Voters, or Liga Žene Glasaa.145 The “Liga” had been formed after Swanee Hunt, the former
American ambassador to Austria and a frequent advocate for women’s issues in Bosnia, had
described the American League to a group of NGO women in Sarajevo and suggested they start a
similar organization. The Bosnian League was locally run, though sporadically financed from abroad,
and, in contrast to the American League, it specifically encouraged women to vote, and for all voters
to vote for women candidates. Its members included women politicians and NGO leaders, including
Šehida from Zenica and Almasa from Kozarac, discussed in previous chapters.
Many women activists were worried that the sudden increase in women’s political
participation brought on by the quotas would render women little more than cosmetic dressing–
“ikebane,” or flower arrangements, for the table where men continued to call the shots. The Bosnian
facilitator at an OSCE sponsored training session for women politicians146 told a gathering of women
147 An unidentified woman’s voice in the OSCE sponsored television special on women in politics.
148 Amila Omersofti, president of the Women’s Party, during a televised candidates’ debate devoted  to
women candidates, broadcast October 26, 2000, on the Open Broadcast Network (OBN) just before general
elections in November 2000. In  an example of the denial of “feminism” discussed in chapter 6, Omersofti repeated
several times that she and her party were “not some kind of feminists” until the moderator pointed out that neither he
nor anyone else in the studio had mentioned the word.
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candidates for local elections, that once they got to parliament, “You’re not there to be silent. If you
are, they’ll think you’re a good woman but not a politician. You’ll just be an ikebana.” On another
occasion, three women politicians were scheduled to speak at an evening town tribunal (tribina)
following a day-long meeting of the League of Women Voters and an afternoon hike. When the hike
took longer than planned and it became clear that the group would have to go straight to the town
tribunal in our hiking clothes, the three women speakers, all involved in politics, decided they could
at least make their faces look presentable. They opened up their handbags and proceeded to put on
makeup and fix their hair as we waited in a meadow for the rest of the group. “Look what politics
demands of us!” joked one. “But we are real women!” countered another. How were women
politicians to act as both politicians and women?
While they sought to avoid the role of ikebana, female politicians and their supporters also
expressed concern that women politicians “remain women.” A woman activist ended a television
program on women in politics by saying:
To the women of BiH I especially recommend that they do not under any
circumstances cease to be women, that they remain women exactly the way they are–
gentle, mothers and wives, but that they don’t stop fighting [for their interests in
politics].147 
Women had to walk a constant line between being taken seriously as politicians and being perceived
as unfeminine or “some sort of feminists.”148 Most importantly, though this was not explicitly
expressed, to retain their moral authority they had to continue to be seen as women rather than as
following the model of aggressive, uncompromising, corrupt male politician against which they
defined themselves.
This dilemma was discussed regularly by women politicians and activists. Amela, a woman
who led her small party’s candidate list for the cantonal assembly, admonished her fellow women
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at a public presentation of female candidates gearing up for local elections in 2000 saying, “don’t
just use the refined influence of women over men– sons, brothers, husbands. Startle them. Go for
real male behavior– you won’t lose any of your femininity that way. Show them how professional
and capable you are, how much you know.” Later, Amela explained to me that women can do men’s
jobs, such as politics, but in a better way because they are women. A women needed to behave, “not
like a real man with boots but as a person with opinions.”
Velida, a League of Women Voters leader, expressed to me her frustration at the way in
which female politicians were presenting themselves. We had just attended another of the many
round table discussions organized by the League on the subject of women in politics. Senka Nožica,
a prominent Sarajevo lawyer, had spoken. While Nožica was generally recognized as elegant and
articulate, Velida found her too much of an elite, refined “lady” to be appealing to Bosnian voters:
Women in Bosnia have to decide what kind of woman politician they want, what
model they have in mind. Do we want a Margaret Thatcher? I don’t think so, that’s
just following a male model. But I don’t think we want the model that Senka Nožica
and [another female politician] follow either. This is so sweet and charming, nice,
proper. That’s not what Bosnian women are like. Senka may be nice to look at and
I think a lot of men like to talk with her because she is pretty and eloquent. She has
to be eloquent, that’s her job as a lawyer, words are her tools. You can like her but
in the way you like a Barbie doll, not a serious politician. This model of a woman
politician may work in the West but not here. Senka is an elite woman and has
always been presented that way, that’s how people will always see her. But she has
nothing to offer the average woman– or man... She’s like from another world. In the
last election the international community put a ton of money behind promoting
Senka, she was constantly on the TV, everywhere. But she got very few votes. And
[another woman] got many many more votes than Senka and she wasn’t ever on TV!
People just don’t identify with Senka. Bosnian women aren’t like that– they are tough
and direct and practical. We need a model of a style of woman politician who is still
feminine but effective and who can represent Bosnian women.
These comments should not be read entirely as a reflection of class or rural/urban differences, as
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Velida herself, though not from Sarajevo, was a prominent lawyer in her own city and an “elite”
woman. Indeed, she did not dispute that Nožica was both feminine and an effective politician.
Rather, Velida was bothered by Nožica’s image as too dainty and not sufficiently aggressive. For
these women activists, then, being feminine and distinct from male politicians was important, but
they also wanted female politicians to be assertive and to play a significant role in the political
process.
Women Politicians’ Discursive Strategies
In keeping with these aims, women politicians expressed their motivation for getting
involved in politics as an outgrowth of their identities as women and mothers and of the
extraordinary conditions of the times. The war had forced “politics” into everyone’s lives in a way
they could not ignore. With this claim, women infused their actions with a sense of moral duty,
denying the possibility that they had had any preconceived aspirations for personal power or
engagement with the disreputable realm of the political. As one woman candidate put the frequently
stated assertion, “I started engaging [baviti se] in politics because politics was engaging with me!”
One woman who was an SDA parliament member when I first spoke to her in 1997, stressed that her
political engagement was only temporary. “This is a time of crisis,” she explained, “a fight for
survival of the Bosniac nation... With the coming of the war I saw that politics wasn’t just about
power (vlast) but it now had a life dimension (životna dimenzija)... You couldn’t say anymore that
you’re not interested in politics.” She was answering the call of duty to her nation but when the
danger passed, she said she planned to return to devoting her full attention to her children and home
life– her feminine duties. Sure enough, when I looked her up in 1999, she had taken her name off
the candidate list for parliament saying that politics was not as important as her family and her work.
Interestingly, she had not mentioned the importance of her job as a distinguished university professor
when she had first discussed her duty to the nation, but only after she had retired from politics and
was devoting more time to her work.
Others cited injustice, by which they meant the abuses of the war and the economic
inequalities of the post-war period, products of inept, corrupt (male) politicians. Edisa, a member
of the Zenica cantonal assembly, a DP who had fled to Zenica when her town was ethnically
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cleansed, explained:
I didn’t choose politics, politics chose me. Politics started messing with my life.
People/men (ljudi) in politics, that is, people making decisions in the name of others.
It was a reflex for me to get involved– to defend myself. This reflex was not to be an
outside observer... Now I’m in politics out of need because some other people took
my life and the lives of my family and threw it in the air like a leaf into the wind. Our
lives are now without security. I don’t mean physical insecurity but the ability to plan
for the future for us and our kids. (emphasis added)
This was a time of extreme crisis which warranted extreme measures in which the normal rules of
social organization could be bent. Things were so bad that even women were feeling the need to get
involved in politics.
What was worse, even those politicians in power who were supposed to be protecting the
people were widely seen as incompetent or simply uncaring because they pursued their own personal
interests. Amela explained to a group of female candidates in the Zenica municipality why she had
entered politics:
For years I thought that a woman like me, a doctor by profession who does a highly
sophisticated job and also a mother and wife, has no need to enter into politics as a
classic male pursuit. But when I saw what kind of jerks (kreteni) were passing certain
laws, which led to certain changes and brought me and those closest to me into the
situation where we have to endure hardship because they’re either not responsible or
not intelligent, then I decided and I said I’m not going to just talk at home or over
coffee about how our salaries are small, how we walk along the street with three
centimeters of mud on our shoes, how there’s nowhere to go to hear some music,
how there aren’t anymore festivals here, the school curricula are pathetic, my child
is dissatisfied, etc., not to mention all the other problems you all know about already.
I decided, I’m going [into politics].
Amela makes it clear that she has been living up to her role as a respectable woman. It was the men
who have failed to live up to the duties of their gendered role as defined in this view.
In keeping with women’s emphasis on their female respectability, politically active women
149 Mediha Filipovi, prominent figure in the Stranka za BiH (Party for BiH), speaking in front of other
women activists and politicians at a round table sponsored by the League of W omen Voters.
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justified this extraordinary engagement through their roles as mothers and nurturers, again in an
effort to “remain women” and in opposition to the model of dirty, egocentric male politicians. As
Edisa’s comments reflect, rather than a bid for personal status, power, or gain, the impetus for
women’s involvement in politics was a noble sacrifice made on behalf of children and their future.
In this way, they rooted their political presence in traditionally womanly roles, especially the familiar
figure of the sacrificing, morally pure mother (cf. Simi 1983).
Comments to this effect were offered by women politicians and activists in many settings–
in televised debates, at public meetings, in small groups of activists, and in conversations with me.
As one woman politician speaking on television put it, “Women always think first of their own
families, so women would have the right perspectives and priorities in politics. They’re thinking
about the future of the country.” A candidate from the Women’s Party told a gathering of women
politicians, 
Motherhood was and has remained the strongest argument for women to engage in
politics, because she has a natural advantage in opting for and working towards
creating conditions for a better and more prosperous future for the generations [of
children] she brings to the world.
And a male political leader from Zenica (from a small opposition party which won very few votes)
declared on local television, “I advocate the equal participation of women in politics... because
women have endured the trials of giving birth and raising children for 18 years until they are adults.
If they don’t know something about life, who does? Women, mothers, know the needs in society.”
The implication was not only that all normal women become mothers, but also that only women
whose children have grown should enter politics. 
These assumptions rest on essentialist characterizations of both men and women. Women
claimed to have their own unique “female diplomacy,”149 to be interested in dialogue and a greater
good. According to Sabina, “Women are more honest, have more soul, and are more open in
conversation. They’re not as arrogant. It’s easier to communicate with women.” “Bosnian women
have a better feeling for justice,” claimed a woman member of another party, “so women would be
150 Mira Štic (D emocratic Socialist Party) and  Amila Omersofti (Women’s Party) during the October 2000
OBN debate (see above note).
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more honest. They are more emotional, but this is good. They will have more feelings for others.”
These characterizations implicitly, and often explicitly, portrayed men as incapable of dialogue or
compromise, more interested in personal gain and in one-uping their fellow male politicians. “Men
are constantly insulting and degrading each other in public, in the parliament,” asserted a woman
candidate in a televised debate with other women candidates. Another debate participant agreed:
“Women always put general interests first, common interests, while men are in it for personal
interests.”150
Women’s abilities managing the home, especially in dealing with children, husbands, in-
laws, and neighbors were cited as good training for women to be successful politicians: “We know
how to rule/take charge (vladati) because we do that at home, too,” declared a prominent leader in
the Women’s Party. Edisa pointed to men’s and women’s ways of getting things done: 
I don’t give myself tasks, or take them on, if I’m not sure I can carry them out. Men
do this all the time, but women finish one task to the end before taking on another
one... With men it’s often the case that they take on many jobs and don’t follow
through with any of them.
This kind of representation not only emphasized women’s practical skills and efficiency but also
their morality. At a League of Women Voters round table, Senka Nožica argued that,
Women are naturally responsible because of our duties towards our children. There
are so many small details we have to think of and take care of, and we have no
choice, we have to do these things. They are things that can’t be put off, they have
to be done everyday. We can’t stay in the kafana [café-bar] for another drink like
men can.
The kafana, like politics, was a place for men and profane (immoral) women– out of bounds for
respectable women (Simi 1983; c.f. Cowan 1991). Women had no time for such immoral pursuits
because they were busy with the far more noble, and for women more respectable, domestic and
nurturing tasks.
In these scenarios, men begin to sound like carefree, undisciplined children who need a
151 The “international community,” led by the OSCE was also pushing hard for nationalists to be voted out
of power. Indeed the OSCE’s publicity campaign to get out the vote featured the slogan “Vote for Change” (Glasajte
za Promjenu), which Bosnians generally understood as a not-so-hidden endorsement of non-nationalist parties. The
2000 elections did in fact result in some gains for the multi-ethnic, “civic” oriented Social Democratic Party (SDP),
which (with heavy international backing) formed a governing coalition called the Alliance for Change. After two
rocky years in power, however, the Alliance was voted out in 2002, in favor of nationalist parties. This move was
widely attributed to voters’ dissatisfaction with continued corruption, perception of the civic parties as puppets of the
west, and distaste for the SDP’s outspoken leader, Zlatko Lagumdžija.
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mother around to take care of necessary tasks, to think responsibly, and to keep them on their best
behavior. Indeed, Sabina, a school teacher by profession, told me that when male politicians behave
badly toward her, she said nothing, but in her head kept “giving them minuses, like in school.”
Mensura was famous in the Cantonal Assembly, where she was a representative, for admonishing
the male politicians for their bad behavior: “I get up and say ‘shame on you all for not being able to
agree!’ Just like that, like to small children... I actually educate men in parliament. And I’m not there
to attain some position of power at the top.” Whether to themselves or to the public, women
politicians consciously placed themselves in the role of mother to justify their involvement in politics
and to retain their respectability.
Votes for Women: A Force for Change
During the local elections of 2000, the League of Women Voters held a public forum in
Zenica at which women candidates from all parties presented themselves and their ideas. The theme
of the event was “Votes for women: A force for change.” The League and many of the women
candidates were promoting women as new faces who would change the dirty nature of male-
dominated politics. This was not only for the reasons outlined above– that women are moral,
nurturing, more capable of dialogue, more attuned to the needs of society– but also out of an unstated
assumption that women were less nationalistic. Coming at a time when national parties still held
undisputed control over the areas in which their ethnic group was in the majority, any suggestion of
voting for change meant voting out the ruling nationalist parties. In Zenica this meant the Bosniac
nationalist party, the SDA.151 Most people who wanted “change” were eager to vote the SDA out,
whether they were bothered only by its corruption or also by its nationalist ideology. Again, this
aspect of the political climate offered women a space in which their social position as non-
combatants and victims in the war, and as non-participants in political corruption, granted them
152 Young people, who shared with women the morally superior position of not having waged war or
engaged in political corruption, were also promoted by those advocating a change from national parties. Indeed, the
League of W omen Voters also added youth as another “force for change.”
153 As with the NGO donors discussed earlier, it was not so much the planners of OSCE’s programs for
women in politics who reproduced essentialist images but those promoting it in the community.
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moral superiority. Not only were women not among those who waged the war and now obstruct the
peace, this reasoning went, they are also less susceptible to the virulent ideologies  which produced
these terrible conditions in the first place.152 
For politically active women, the greatest evidence for this was their success in building
cooperation among NGO women and female politicians across ethnic and party lines. Most of this
activity involving politicians had been initiated by foreign donors, especially OSCE, which also
encouraged the idea that women are less nationalist, aggressive, and violent than men.153 Once the
women representatives had been brought together, however, their cooperation proved to be quite
successful, despite the antagonistic political views held within this group. Given the political parties
in power, there were inevitably women present from all of the most hardline nationalist parties. What
made this possible was also what enabled NGO women to work together to find common issues,
namely, their identities as women. In this case, this meant a marginal position vis-a-vis male
dominated political circles where real decisions were made.
As we have seen, women were able to cross politicized ethnic boundaries more easily and
sooner after the end of the war than men could because they were not counted as significant political
(or military) actors. Their political activity was also not taken as seriously, and was therefore less
of a threat to the established male political leaders. Furthermore, because women came together to
discuss “women’s issues,” their cooperation across ethnic and party lines was not as difficult. Sabina,
a Bosniac participant in these meetings marveled that, “many people at the beginning took this
cooperation with a great deal of skepticism... However, it was shown that women understand each
other very well, even without opening their mouths.” Female solidarity, she implied, was almost
instinctual and based on their common bond as women, mothers, and wives. She continued:
With women it’s a breeze (sa ženama je pjesma). There are no problems with women
of any age. The last Friday of each month we have our women’s meetings with
[OSCE]. Women of all parties are there, even from the SDS [the leading Serb
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nationalist party]. We’re still talking about our common interests but there are lots
of these– the labor law, maternity leave, social security/insurance, protection of
children, etc. But other laws will come along, and we’ll find agreement on that, too.
In other words, these women politicians were also practicing “strategic avoidance” in order to work
on “women’s issues.”
The tight working bonds and many sound political initiatives dealing with “women’s issues”
which these women developed were remarkable, especially given the overwhelming failure and
refusal by male politicians to come to agreement across party and ethnic lines. Outside of these
working sessions, however, the women still harbored many fundamental differences in ideological
outlooks, especially on the question of ethnic relations and the character of the Bosnian state. These
are, after all, the main sticking points which prevented the powerful male politicians from
cooperating. At the end of the day, no matter what the women agreed on, they were also compelled
to follow the directives of their parties. Sabina acknowledged in private that there were many of
these basic differences, but she insisted, “Women have to get together, help each other change their
opinions, get to know each other and understand each other, to talk.” It was on the basis of this belief
that the women representatives had come as far as they had.
Conclusion: Gender Essentialisms, Victimhood, and Moral Categories
The discursive strategies of politically active women and the way they were received by the
rest of their communities reveal much about the cultural construction of both gender roles and
“politics,” or the relation between state and society, in present day Bosnia. When women (or men)
cross the line of accepted behavior, basic common assumptions about gender and the political sphere
come into view. Because of (urban) women’s significant presence in higher education and
employment outside the home, many Bosnians (both men and women) insisted that women had been
“emancipated,” that they were perceived exactly the same by society (just as socialism claimed to
have achieved; see chapter 3). However, examination of how categories of gender and politics were
negotiated reveals a strong association of women with domestic roles and patriarchal concern for
women’s sexual purity. Women’s working outside the home was generally accepted, but their longer
absences farther from home and assumption of positions of authority were much less desirable (see
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chapter 5). Indeed, the commonly heard view that it was fine for women to enter politics once they
had raised their children to adulthood points to a strong concern with the control of female sexuality.
Women past their reproductive years could more easily step into male roles and mix with men other
than their husbands (cf. Simic 1983).
Women politicians who stressed their domestic roles and feminine respectability thus did
more to challenge definitions of “politics” than definitions of womanhood. While they challenged
the limits of womanly social engagement, the automatic association of women with domestic roles
remained firm. Indeed, they celebrated these roles and proposed to carry them into the sphere of
politics, whether through direct political participation or as civil society actors influencing formal
politics. They further reinforced the association between men and corrupt politics by drawing a
temporal line between the corrupt, nationalistic, and male-dominated politics of the past and the
nicer, more humane politics of the future when women would be more numerous participants– these
women were out to “clean up” politics.
Despite the ways in which women’s activities were marginalized, women nevertheless
wielded real, if limited, power through their identities as women and apolitical victims. Women
activists emphasized their female respectability associated with their roles as mothers and victims.
Noticeably, while they evoked certain victim identities, they seldom alluded to wartime rape, even
though this has been the most notorious category of women’s victimization in the war. Clearly, the
stigma of rape was worse for women than any moral status they may have acquired by evoking this
sort of victimhood. I return to this issue in the concluding chapter. Here I am concerned with the
effects of affirmative essentialist representations of women on campaigns for gender equality and
on reconciliation and return initiatives.
International intervention contributed to the view of politics as immoral, attacking political
corruption and nationalist parties, and championing the NGO sector as democratic and morally
upright. Although similar images were used by donors and local NGO activists, their motives
differed. Donors to local NGOs, concerned with promoting the multi-ethnic state, stressed women’s
supposed anti-nationalism as their motive for disengagement from politics. International officials
promoting women’s participation in politics likewise emphasized women’s alleged tendency toward
anti-nationalism and peace. Local women activists, however, seem to have been more concerned
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with their moral reputations as respectable women. 
The effects of international approaches on women’s activism presented a paradox for the
women they targeted. NGO women were charged with accomplishing the highly political goals of
reconciliation and return, while the images used to mobilize them effectively marginalized women
from the circles of real political power. Even initiatives aimed at increasing women’s participation
in formal politics, only somewhat coordinated with donor policies towards women’s NGOs,
effectively constructed women as less significant political players. In the immediate, portrayals of
women as (morally respectable) nurturers and outsiders to politics were helpful in getting women
elected by voters who were fed up with corrupt “politics as usual.” They were unhelpful, however,
in allowing women to be taken seriously as politicians. They encouraged women’s equal
participation in politics, as in civil society, but with the message that they should do so in the guise
of their home-sphere roles of mother and natural peacemaker, the one who cleans up messes. Men
continued to hold the vast majority of decision-making positions and to shut women out of their own
party processes, expecting women parliamentarians to stay silent and vote as the male leadership
instructs them. “Real” politics, therefore (where the messes are made), remained the realm of men.
Nevertheless, these affirmative essentialist representations of women resonated strongly with
women activists themselves. Even those who were critical of such portrayals took advantage of their
power, especially when dealing with the local public. This was a practical, effective, and often
conscious strategy in the moral and political climate of post-war Bosnia, whether the women
embraced the patriarchal implications of such conceptualizations or not. Despite the risks that
women be seen as abdicating any claim to full membership in the nation/state (Blagojevi 1994;
Ivekovi 1997; Spasi 2000), such portrayals may have been women’s most attractive option in
practical terms. Indeed, in some contexts, this form of women’s action may be the only way women
feel they can achieve their goals (see Aretxaga 1997; Ishkanian 2003; Samuel 2003). In Bosnia there
was little room between the dirty, unscrupulous realm of the political and the morally pure,
nurturing, domestic realm for women to position themselves as significant political actors.
Furthermore, the recognition of positive traits associated with women has also produced a
healthy move by women towards engaging in dialogue, non-violent communication, and caring for
the well-being of others (see Ruddick 1989). This emphasis is not necessarily and in all ways
154 While women were welcomed by socialist revolutionary movements into the military as fighters, they
were nonetheless expected to carry out traditionally prescribed female roles during and after the revolution, such as
caring for war orphans, cooking and cleaning for male soldiers, and providing sexual “comfort” to male soldiers
(Chinchilla 1997; Jancar-W ebster 1990).
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counter-productive of efforts to dismantle patriarchal gender norms. Over time these essentialist
positionings may actually position women activists to affect real changes toward increased gender
equality. The affirmative essentialisms being used in Bosnia resemble nationalist representations
from the late colonial period in India which Partha Chatterjee (1989) has described as narrowly
relegating women to domestic roles and thus excluding them from participation in the political
sphere. However, as I discussed in chapter 2, Richard Fox (1996) has argued that those discourses
also allowed Indian women to emerge in significant numbers onto the political scene, to play an
active role in the national struggle. This chance at involvement is what Chinchilla (1997) then argued
put women in the position to become conscious of gender hierarchies and women’s inferior status,
in short, by some definitions, to develop a feminist critique of society.154 These are the experiences
which lead to organic feminist movements and ultimately, though not necessarily, to gender change
from within a society (see also Basu 1999; Jancar-Webster 1990; Machado 1993; Taylor 1994). In
the case of Bosnia, it is already apparent that a core group of women NGO activists (at Medica, Žene
Ženama, Udružene Žene, and others) has begun to critically engage the rest of society on questions
of gender roles and relations where such challenges had grown virtually silent before the war and
international intervention.
The campaign for gender equality and women’s rights was at best a low priority in the
international project in Bosnia. The targeting of women for reconciliation and building multi-
ethnicity was often completely unrelated to initiatives to support gender equality and women’s rights.
In fact, youth, children, and in some cases the elderly, were also being targeted for reconciliation
projects. It therefore becomes clear that, despite the feminist-inspired discourse used to promote
women’s role in reconciliation, women were not initially targeted out of a desire to empower them,
but because, like youth, children and the elderly, they were not fighting-aged men. In other words,
they fell outside the category of potential (and potent) political and military adversaries. Affirmative
gender essentialisms neatly bolstered this representation of women.
Portraying women as apolitical peacemakers also suited the international community’s two-
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tiered approach to return and reconciliation which worked through both top-down (formal politics)
as well as local level (outside politics) processes (Belloni 2001). International officials put heavy
pressure on political actors to reform the system of governance while they targeted local actors using
alternative channels to alter realities on the ground. This was especially important given the
intransigence of political actors on many issues of concern to the international community such as
refugee return and the establishment of a multi-ethnic state. As I have shown, women’s NGOs were
particularly suited to bypass formal political structures on these issues, especially when they were
cast as apolitical and humanitarian. Moreover, while it was not always acknowledged by foreign
actors, women were uniquely positioned to play a crucial role in the success of reconciliation at the
community level. This was not only because in many populations of the displaced such as
Srebrenica, women were virtually the only ones left alive, but also because women were the principle
actors in the maintenance of community relations on a day-to-day, household-to-household basis
(Bringa 1995; Sorabji 1994). On the local level, therefore, gender essentialisms actually
complemented international efforts to encourage refugee return and ethnic reconciliation through
channels outside formal politics.
Nevertheless, constructing women outside of politics also had negative consequences for the
international project, even for those international actors not (primarily) invested in the promotion
of gender equality. Firstly, the kind of circumvention of formal politics practiced by women’s
organizations and encouraged by donors contradicted international community calls for
“transparency” in the workings of government at all levels (see Bose 2002). Secondly, however
successful women’s efforts towards community level reconciliation, their efforts remained dependent
on actions in the formal political sphere from which they were consistently marginalized. Although
women were able to make some progress by circumventing formal political channels and pressuring
politicians in various ways, it was ultimately up to decisions made by local politicians and
international actors as to whether return and institutional reintegration happened. Women working
towards reconciliation, or any other goal, would have been much more effective if they were
included and taken seriously as significant political actors.
On the other side of the same coin, the association of peaceful characteristics strictly with
females restricts males to roles as aggressors and nationalists, self-interested profiteers, and in all
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things incapable of dialogue or compromise. Given that men still dominated in social, economic, and
political positions of power, it is doubtful that encouraging such qualities in men would have brought
the international community or women activists closer to their professed goals of peace and
reconciliation. 
In sum, both international community approaches and the strategies of local women activists
were fraught with contradictions in the way they constructed gender roles. These positionings carried
real consequences not only for efforts to increase gender equality but also for reconciliation, return,
and the multi-ethnic state-building project itself.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS: GENDER, MORALITY, AND WOMEN’S ACTIVISM
In concluding this study, I return to where it began: with images of Bosnian women as
passive, silenced victims of rape and war. When I began this project, I had not wanted to focus on
wartime rape but to investigate other, active aspects of women’s roles and especially what they were
doing after the war’s end. Yet every aspect of “women in Bosnia” pointed me towards the issue.
Nearly every time I gave a paper or presentation to non-Bosnian audiences on Bosnian women in the
post-war period, someone who heard it would ask about rape. Most of these were legitimate and
logical questions– indeed, part of what this dissertation shows is how pervasive wartime categories
have been in the post-war period. However, in contrast to they ways in which Bosnian women
represented themselves, audiences outside Bosnia exhibited a preoccupation with wartime rape in
ways that mirrored the images being put forth in the press of Bosnian women as war and rape
victims. I also encountered assumptions that “Muslim women” must live in very circumscribed,
conservative communities (Žarkov 1995). This dissertation has endeavored to show a different side
of Bosnian and Muslim women, while keeping in view the power that such pervasive images have
had over these women’s lives and public activities. I have pointed to the different ways in which the
international press, local political discourses, as well as the discourses of foreign intervention have
constructed women as passive outsiders to political decision making and other significant national
arenas. We have seen how women activists both challenge and embrace various aspects of such
images, even making strategic use of them in their public activities.
In this concluding chapter, I discuss some of the implications of women’s representational
strategies, both for the Bosnian context and in terms of women’s activism in general. I outline the
reasons for women’s general avoidance of associations with rape and the implications for scholarship
of gender and women of the acceptance or dismissal of women activists who embrace (patriarchal)
affirmative essentialisms of women. I further explore the prospects for women’s activism in Bosnia,
pointing to some of the difficulties raised by international intervention and to the theoretical tools
which might be used to evaluate women’s activities.
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Gender, Victimhood and the Rape Image
As the previous chapter illustrated, women themselves made use of certain kinds of victim
images to promote their activities in the realm of the political. These self-representations make
evident the importance of moral purity to public identities in post-war Bosnia. Specifically, we see
various forms of victim identities as perhaps the only morally acceptable persona in post-war Bosnia
(see Bougarel 1997b, 1999b). To be sure, women do not hold a monopoly over claims to victimhood.
Recall that donors also target youth in a similar way as they do women, in terms of their non-
involvement in political processes up until the present. Indeed, the politicized ethnic identities which
have driven social and political processes in Bosnia for the past decade have been heavily based on
claims to victimhood, at the hands of other ethnic groups and/or Western interventions and other
foreign influences (Žarkov 1999). (Nor are such claims at all unique to the former Yugoslavia.)
However, women are more readily associated with victimhood, and with certain (gendered) kinds
of victimhood, due to the construction of female roles as apolitical, passive objects (victims) of male
action. This construction, in turn, means that victim identities are all the more acceptable for women
to embrace, as they pose little challenge to common expectations for respectable womanhood.  Thus,
women as public actors are targeted (by some donors, media, and politicians) and derided or ignored
(by other donors, media, and politicians) in specifically gendered ways. Likewise, the women I have
discussed in these pages cast themselves as innocent bystanders to war and nationalist chauvinism,
as outsiders to the corrupt world of politics, and as the noble, self-sacrificing mother whose only
wish is to protect her children and create for them a more peaceful world.
These women did not, however, stake much claim to the ultimate victim image, that of the
female rape victim. While they often invoked the burdens faced by women during the war, they more
readily emphasized women’s suffering through displacement, loss, and having to support families
under conditions of hunger, danger, and insecurity. Such predicaments were, to be sure, far more
immediate and visible in the post-war period. Furthermore, as we have seen, women in politics
strove to be seen as decisive, effective leaders– the opposite of what the common image of the
defeated, dishonored, passive and weak victim of rape implies. As several women activists stressed,
they were not “just old peasant women like the world media showed.” Mensura of the Women’s
Party told me she had entered politics to “show the dignity of Bosnian women to the world” in
155 Dani 10 September, 1999: 44. Making explicit the common feminization of territory/the nation and
masculinization of its actors/politicians (Verdery 1994), Balaševi further explained, “I can’t hate her because
Miloševi disgraced her, but can’t love her the  way I loved the old Yugoslavia.”
156 This friend, to his credit, quickly reevaluated his assumptions when he recalled the stereotypes he had
had to put up with as a DP in wartime Zenica. Because the DPs had lost everything, they were sent brand new
clothing from relatives who had fled to  places like Sweden, while Zenica residents, still in their own homes with their
own things, had to make do with their old clothes. The DPs had therefore failed to garner sympathy from the
population because they did not conform to the image of destitute refugees (see Drakuli 1993b).
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opposition to the CNN images of rape victims and refugees “with five scarves on their heads.” One
can only conclude from this that rape survivors and rural women were without dignity.
Indeed, there was a considerable social stigma against victims of rape, even wartime rape and
the rape of “our” women by “their” men. This was despite official appeals to the contrary, public
recognition of (certain, ethnic) raped women as national martyrs, and efforts by women’s
organizations to raise awareness about the plight of rape survivors (see Andri-Ružii 2003). The
attitude toward women rape survivors (not to mention the gendering of nations) was summed up in
a statement made about his country by the well-known Serbian anti-nationalist singer, oorpe
Balaševi, in the Sarajevo weekly magazine Dani: “With my country it’s like with a raped
girl(friend): you can’t hate her because another (man) disgraced her, but you can’t love her anymore
the way you once did.”155 His point was not about rape or women but about his feelings toward his
country (Yugoslavia). The Bosnian interviewer’s failure to comment on this choice of gendered
image indicates that it was a familiar and accepted one (see Gal 1994; Scott 1999).
I encountered similar attitudes toward such “disgraced” women as individuals, even though
they were “our” women raped by “their men,” ostensibly venerated as symbols of the nation’s
victimhood. A Bosniac male friend in Zenica, who lived near one of Medica’s residences for women,
assumed on the basis of Medica’s reputation that the young women he saw everyday had been raped.
In fact, they were not at the residence as rape survivors but as refugees from Srebrenica: Medica was
paying for their schooling. Nevertheless, my friend challenged their status as victims saying, “they
don’t look like raped women– they’re always giggling and smiling and going out (with boys/in
mixed company).” His implied expectation was that “raped women” should remain grieving and
isolated for the rest of her lives, “ruined” for any further contact with men, much the way rape
survivors were portrayed in the western press.156
157 Raped women are not, however, considered “true” šehids in the way that soldiers (mostly men) killed
fighting the enemy are; soldiers killed in battle are “first level šehids”, or “šehids in this world and in the other
world,” while other war victims, women who die in childbirth, and others are “titular šehids,” or “šehids in the other
world” only (Bougarel, personal communication 2003).
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As the book I Begged them to Kill Me, discussed in chapter 4, shows, the rape of “a nation’s
women” was still being used (in 1999) to underscore the victimhood of the nation itself. But when
it came to women’s identification with the category of “woman” for the purposes of eliciting public
acceptance for their actions as individuals, rape was not mentioned. This was especially true of
women vying for a place in the male-dominated political sphere since politics, as a whore, was
associated with female impurity just as rape was. In fact, though it was never explicitly stated in such
terms, Balaševi’s comments make clear that raped women, having been “dishonored,” made
impure, were thereby placed in the category of the whore. They were no longer seen as whole,
respectable women, a status that was also underlined by the move among Bosniac religious leaders
to refer to raped women as “šehids,” or martyrs to Islam/the nation (Andri-Ružii 2003). This
designation, though designed to recognize sacrifices made for the nation, effectively declared them
dead as (respectable) women, as šehid is most commonly a status conveyed upon men killed in
battle. Rather than their lives, the women had sacrificed their respectability and moral integrity,
though, conceptually, this was the same thing.157 
Given these associations, it is not surprising that women shied away from association with
both rape and with politics. The moral purity which politically active women achieve through their
identification as mothers (respectable women), therefore, may be jeopardized by association with
the rape victim identity. It also follows that many turned to images of motherhood to back up their
claims to morality and respectability: the whore is commonly opposed to the mother. In one stark
example from Kosovo during the last years of socialist Yugoslavia, Serb women demonstrated in
protest of statements by an Albanian male politician that alleged rapes of Serb women by Albanian
men (see Mežnari 1994; Žarkov 1999) would be solved by bringing in more non-Albanian women
as prostitutes. Taking this as an implication that Serb women were prostitutes, the demonstrators–
“thousands of women who were otherwise far from any political activism” (Žarkov 2000: 177)–
shouted and carried signs that said, “We are mothers, not whores!” (ibid.: 168). We might also be
reminded of other contexts in which the moral power of motherhood was wielded as a political
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weapon. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina chose this strategy as perhaps the only
possible way in which they dared to demonstrate against the ruthless regime that had “disappeared”
their children (Taylor 1994). As I outlined in chapter 2, mothers in Sri Lanka (de Alwis 1998a;
Samuel 2003), Kenya (Tibbetts 1994), and elsewhere have also used this strategy, as have the
Mothers of Srebrenica and other Srebrenica survivor groups discussed in chapter 7. 
This is not only a calculated strategy but a “natural,” cultural idiom to which many women
gravitate in contexts such as post-war Bosnia where moral purity is so important and female
respectability is defined through motherhood. The discursive strategies of politically active women–
the use of affirmative essentialisms– allowed them to walk the fine line between morality and
corruption, purity and impurity, weakness and strength, actor and victim. This is not to say that there
was no room for movement. Indeed, as these conceptual categories are malleable, politically active
women were pushing the boundaries of what is considered respectably female. They have drawn a
temporal line between (male, dirty) politics before, and (cleaner, more humane) politics after women
have been successfully integrated.
Transcending Wartime Identities
Women activists must balance their public images between respectable femininity and being
taken seriously as political actors. Their very presence in formal politics, and as participants in
political processes, challenges established gender ideals, yet their need to retain the moral status
attached to their identities as women leads them to utilize elements of more conservative female
roles and certain victim images. It remains to be seen whether women will succeed in shifting the
public persona of “Bosnian women,” of gender ideals and of perceptions of politics. Much will
depend on whether women’s identities can be distanced from the image of passive (rape) victim and
concern over women’s sexual purity to create new identities rooted in their present activities rather
than the events of the war period.
Medica Infoteka offered some hope in this area. Medica as a whole had never avoided
mention of rape. In fact, it was closely, and often exclusively, associated with it in the surrounding
community. It was now trying, along with other women’s NGOs in their networks, to tackle issues
facing women beyond their identities as war victims. In fact, at one point in my fieldwork, I felt that
158 She was referring to the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, as well as to the suit brought by the Bosnian
government against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the International Court of
Justice for genocide. Azra is counting on this judgement to “settle” the question of whether the war was aggression
on a sovereign state or a civil war (see chapter 1).
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by following the women’s activities I had been taken far away from concerns over ethnic difference
and associations with the war. As I described in several places in this dissertation, however, these
women were “strategically avoiding” issues of ethnic difference and wartime divisions in order to
build working cross-ethnic relationships and to concentrate on their goals as women. Ethnicity
remained a salient category of social interaction, yet these women activists were attempting to go
beyond them and thus to transcend a major cleavage associated with the war and its aftermath.
Infoteka activists even noticed a difference in their priorities compared with those of their German
donors at Medica Mondiale. As Nataša complained, “the way they raise money is like charity,
showing horrible pictures of war and relying on crisis.” Medica Mondiale had suggested several
times that Infoteka collect testimonies and evidence from wartime rape survivors. The Bosnian
women had turned to more pressing post-war problems, however, not wanting to dwell on the war
but to “go forward.” As Azra emailed me recently, after responding to a question I had about
Infoteka members’ stances on the war:
Oh dear Alisa, sometimes all these stories really make me tired. Why can’t I
somehow live for the future and not constantly return to the past, even though I know
it’s necessary in this region. That’s why I can’t wait for them to finish all that in the
Hague158 because then we can hopefully finish the past in our heads.
Many of the women activists I met felt this way. Many were in fact forced by the dire economic
situation to concentrate on immediate needs rather than dwell on the past.
The main issue with which Infoteka had concerned itself, however, was domestic violence.
In this way, their work remained focused on women’s victimhood, even though they stressed
women’s need for dignity and agency. This analysis of victimhood, furthermore, was not connected
to the victimhood of a national group. On the contrary, the victimizers were now “our men.” As I
argued in chapters 6 and 7, however, Infoteka used this association of victimhood with womanhood
strategically. They avoided coming across as “aggressive,” made a conscious effort to work with men
and male dominated institutions, and carefully selected the kinds of gender critiques, including the
159 Unfortunately, as of July 2003 , it appears that M edica , after over ten years of work, will have to sharply
curtail its programs and facilities in December for lack of funding. Their German donors have moved on to other
crisis zones in Kosovo and Afghanistan and adequate new ones have not been found. This shows the precariousness
of the Bosnian women’s scene, a predicament shared to some extent by women’s and other organizations in other
resource poor areas of the world.
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use of the term feminism, according to their audiences. In this way, they hoped to affect long term
change toward real gender equality.159
Women’s Activism and Gender Identities
One of my goals has been to show the variety of women’s active roles– roles outside the
home and family. Despite their marginalization, women activists have contributed in a variety of
ways to post-war social and political processes. At the same time, motherhood and nurturing have
continued to form strong parts of these women’s lives and sense of self-worth. In fact, many of the
married women I met were reluctant to give up the power and accompanying sense of importance
and moral rightness that went with their taking responsibility for household chores and various kinds
of kinwork (di Leonardo 1987). Others had a difficult time convincing husbands and children to take
over any of those duties. Many saw no use in trying to “change their husbands.” Most, however,
defensively argued that they enjoyed making their families dinner, bringing their husbands a glass
of water, and so on. The narrative of Lidija, a refined Sarajevan, grandmother, educated scientist,
and human rights activist who was also active in local politics, was typical of her generation of
women activists:
Women must fight for social awareness. Men accepted women in higher positions,
they accepted that women went to university, got Ph.D.’s. But after 15,000 years of
tradition in the east, women still rule the house even though she is mostly serving the
men and children (sic). Western, educated women got appliances, got their men to
do housework– the men could order takeout for dinner when the women couldn’t get
to the cooking. I don’t feel at all bad about serving my husband and children. I’m
happy to cook for them. This is what I’m used to.
Lidija rejected feminism, which she understood as aggressive and separatist. She felt that social
problems, including those of women, should be solved together on a “human” level rather than
160 Lidija in fact had  an on-going battle with a feminist from Belgrade who teased Lidija about her “lady-
like,” formal style of dressing whenever they saw each other. While Lidija was always in a skirt, heels, make-up, and
done-up hair, the Belgrade woman, a lesbian, favored jeans and shorts and wore no make-up– precisely the kind of
“feminist” to which Lidija objected.
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separating women out. And she insisted that women should remain feminine.160 (Note that she also
invokes the hierarchies of orientalist symbolic geography discussed in chapter 2).
However, Lidija, like a large number of women activists in Bosnia, belonged to an older
generation that had built their adult lives in socialist Yugoslavia. The women of Infoteka, all but one
of whom were in their 20's or 30's, were exceptions in an otherwise middle-aged community of
women activists. While there were some teenaged girls and young women in their early 20's active
in youth initiatives, only a handful of them had any sensitivity toward “women’s issues” or gender.
As a rule, however, Bosnians under thirty had little desire for NGO activities and even less for
anything political. This generation had seen only negative things come from politics and they were
much more preoccupied with their education, jobs (and the lack of them), material goods, and
opportunities for leaving the country (IBHI 2000). At the time of my fieldwork, the Sarajevo
women’s NGO Žene Ženama had been struggling since its inception to engage young women in its
activities but had attracted few apart from the handful of younger women recruited by one of the
organization’s founders, a former Medica activist in her mid 20's. Infoteka, too, had taken part in
several youth-oriented activities, including teaching the principles of feminism to groups of young
people. None of this has produced any sustained women’s activism among the young, however.
Essentialisms and Women
The use by women activists and donors of traditionalist, yet affirmative essentialisms of
women begs several questions, especially for feminist researchers and activists interested in how
women’s involvement in conflict situations can contribute not only to peace, but to improved lives
for women. Does the use of gender essentialisms only reaffirm patriarchal gender hierarchies or can
one extract a positive message for women from such representations? If the women activists using
“traditional” essentialisms and motherhood images are not themselves critical of patriarchal gender
hierarchies, should feminists condemn their activities? Are the successes women do achieve through
essentialist strategies doomed to eventual failure because positioning women outside the sphere of
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formal politics and power ultimately marginalizes them? Or, do such strategies make women
vulnerable to being coopted by larger, patriarchal power structures such as nationalist and militarist
states? 
In Bosnia, the essentialist approach by donors and local activists does little to further the
implementation of peaceful solutions among the men who wield power in the political and other
spheres. Such portrayals obscure women’s roles in the production and reproduction of chauvinistic
nationalisms and patriarchal gender constructions. As the Serbian feminist sociologist, Marina
Blagojevi writes, “Releasing women of any blame for the war and ‘crises’ would be another trap
of patriarchal narcissism. Where there is no guilt, there is no complicity and therefore no
subjectivity” (1994: 475). This lack of subjectivity means that women are not readily taken seriously
as political actors.
Despite this, I have tried to show that affirmative essentialisms offer women real possibilities
and power, at least in the short run. Local political and cultural meanings strongly affect the
possibilities of women’s activism and how they envision ideal gender roles and relations. Many
Bosnian women activists already acknowledge the tension between reproducing established,
patriarchal values in order to achieve practical goals, and forcefully initiating a public critique of
such power structures. The “Bosnian feminists” I met are keenly aware that they must balance the
expectations of their local communities and their foreign donors with their own feminist ideals (see
Ishkanian 2003). They may not always agree with other women activists who openly embrace the
gender essentialisms of motherhood and nurturance, but they do not harshly condemn them. Indeed,
as I have shown, they often allow themselves to be portrayed in affirmative essentialist terms. 
Gender essentialisms are not only meaningful to women and their communities, but have also
proved practical, especially in the short term (Samuel 2003). Over time, as I argued in chapter 2, this
women’s activism, initiated in response to violent conflict and its aftermath, may yet prove to be the
foundation for continued women’s activism that engages a wider population. Analysts of gender
dynamics and women’s activism must recognize these meanings rather than dismiss them for “not
being feminist,” even if they are to conclude that such strategies reinforce patriarchal hierarchies and
values (Žarkov 2000).
161 Of course, programs for women are also addressing “gender issues,” but this woman seemed to equate
“gender” with “women.” Considerable confusion reigned among women activists over the definition of “gender.”
Many women had never heard the term or, inferring from the target of donor-designed “gender projects,” took it to
mean attention to women’s issues. A large portion of women activists understood gender as “equality
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Assessing the Effectiveness of Women’s Activism in Bosnia
How are we to judge the women’s activism I have described in these pages? Have women
successfully articulated and fought for coherent goals? How “authentic” or democratic are women’s
NGOs? Are they merely the product of international intervention, or can we speak of a true
grassroots “movement”? Are women forging new identities or relying solely on those that reflect
wartime experiences? 
This dissertation has depicted a broad range of approaches to questions of gender, religion,
and ethnicity among women activists. This diversity I believe reflects a similar diversity in outlooks
towards gender roles and relations to be found among the rest of the population in Bosnia.
Differences in acceptance of established gender norms for women corresponds more to class
differences– education levels and rural to urban backgrounds– than to differences in ethnic and even
religious background. The sociological profiles of the women in this study reflect just such a pattern,
though they do not determine these differences. The influence of western donors has carried notions
of feminism, “women’s rights as human rights,” and gender equality to groups and individuals that
otherwise would not likely have encountered them. The general infusion of (human) “rights talk”
(c.f. Fraser 1989) into public discourses, largely as a result of international intervention but also as
part of wider global and regional trends, has aided this proliferation of ideas. Whereas Yugoslav neo-
feminism was barely known in Bosnia before the war, there are now women’s NGO activists in
remote villages and small towns all over the country who comfortably talk the talk of women’s
rights, reconciliation, networking, civil society, lobbying, and so on. The idea has been widely
circulated that women’s concerns matter on the political stage.
What local activists make of these discourses is another question. Inevitably they have “taken
what they can use” in their own lives, as several activists told me. They are not merely parrots of
international NGOspeak, though sometimes this appeared to be the case, as when a woman I met
from an NGO I was unfamiliar with explained that they “did gender issue” (mi radimo dženderišju)
even though her description was of standard small-scale income generating projects for women.161
(ravnopravnost) between men and women,” as a glossy UNDP brochure produced together with the Sarajevo NGO
Žene Ženama asserted. And a smaller group of women activists who were more academically-minded or had better
contacts with feminists abroad understood it in the standard social science sense of socially constructed roles
assigned to men and women (but see Scott 1990).
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These activists are also savvy actors making do with the resources available to them to achieve goals
as they define them. Medica Infoteka, for example, had become adept at tailoring grant proposals
and adding the proper jargon to take advantage of funding priorities, even as they continued to
approach their work the way they saw fit. This is a tactic that is all too familiar to academics
applying for research funding and jobs. As Nataša said of one of the proposals she had altered in this
way, “the project won’t change at all but the proposal will still be accurate because it’s all in there,
it just depends on how you frame it.” At the same time, Naš Most took on a wide variety of donor-
defined projects because its goal was merely to provide women with as many opportunities as
possible and to keep their organization afloat. That activists also work on donor-defined projects that
do not necessarily agree with their own priorities reflects their dependent position on donor money
and many donors’ failure to listen to the local activists they fund (see Gagnon 2002; Hemment 2000).
I therefore concur with other observers of “democratization” and other development efforts in Bosnia
and elsewhere that foreign donors continue to impose often inappropriate or inadequately adapted
agendas onto local activists (e.g., Hemment 2000; Ishkanian 2003; Smillie 1996; Stubbs 1995;
Wedel 2001). 
Nevertheless, international intervention has also had some positive results for women’s
equality and democratic processes. Even the pervasive image of Bosnian women as symbols of one
of the most notorious and well-publicized incidences of wartime rape mobilized many foreigners to
become involved with aiding Bosnian women. Despite the problems inherent in “east-west”
exchanges and donor-beneficiary relationships, western funding, support, and publicity has made
possible various kinds of crucial medical, psychological, and material help that has vastly improved
the lives of many women war survivors, among them some of the women activists I have discussed
here. Furthermore, the few individual feminists working for international organizations have
succeeded, in partnership with local women’s activists, in pushing for meaningful legal and
institutional changes toward women’s equality (Cockburn et. al. 2001; Rees 2002). Urged on by
certain foreigners, women’s organizations have pressured local governments to live up to the
162 In 1999, a  group of women’s NG Os published a “shadow report” on women’s human rights in Bosnia
(IHRLG  BiH 1999) to alert Bosnian government officials of their duty to produce periodic reports on their
compliance with CEDAW . In other countries, women’s organizations have taken to producing shadow reports to
balance the claims made by governments; in this case, the government had  not even issued a report.
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international treaties they signed when they signed the Dayton Agreement, including the Convention
on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and other major
human rights documents (which the U.S. itself has not signed).162 The OSCE’s gender quota for
election lists and the recently adopted law on gender equality also reflect the combined efforts of
local groups and powerful international actors. While these alliances have managed to put women’s
issues on the radar of local and international decision makers, they are still a long way from
“mainstreaming” gender awareness into all areas of policy. These efforts strike many Bosnians as
too “top down” to have any real impact. What’s more, most decision makers are too preoccupied
with balancing national, or ethnic, interests to pay attention to other axes of discrimination and
subordination such as gender (along with class, “race” [the Roma], age, etc.).
Julie Hemment writes of women’s organizing in post-socialist Russia that, “the contemporary
Russian women’s movement is rigid, hierarchical, and further away from the people than previously.
What is more, it is professionalized, bureaucratic, reliant on foundations, western oriented, and
irrevocably hitched to a neoliberal vision of development.” Much the same can be said for the
western-looking Bosnian women’s NGOs, including those that espouse feminist orientations (see
Cockburn et. al. 2001). Most of these groups relied on the charisma and direction of one or a few
central leaders. Several times upon visiting a new organization, I was told to return because the
women present could not tell me anything without their “President.” Likewise, from my experiences
among “ordinary,” non-NGO people of all socio-economic levels in various parts of Bosnia, it is
obvious that women’s NGOs are not valued by the “grassroots” constituencies they purport to
represent when they speak in Bosnia-wide or international fora. The infusion of donor money and
the lack of other kinds of employment opportunities has likewise flooded the NGO sector with
activists who are not necessarily committed to building the kind of democratic civil society or
women’s equality that foreign actors, or indeed some of the activists themselves, envision.
What is more serious for the development of democratic processes as well as the character
of Bosnian feminism(s) is the urban, secular, middle-class bias of this emerging women’s
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counterpublic. As we have seen, though there is a lot of talk about, and many programs aimed at, the
problems of poor and rural women, refugees, and even occasionally Romani women, few such
women have truly been incorporated into the high-level circles of women activists who lobby for
changes at the level of local government and international agencies. Furthermore, as the encounter
between Kristen and her Infoteka colleagues over race and the Roma reveals, discourses on women
rarely extended beyond the experiences of secular, urban middle class women. To be fair, I think
these failings can be expected for so young an activist network. As I indicated in chapter 6, Infoteka
has only expanded its scope of feminist analysis and the implicit subjects of Bosnian womanhood.
These are positive signs. 
Based on her study with Infoteka of seven local women’s NGOs in three towns, Cynthia
Cockburn has concluded that a Bosnian “women’s movement” “does not quite yet exist” (2001: 165;
and see Cockburn and Hubi 2002). Indeed, though there are many women’s organizations, only a
handful of activists are vocal in public or have the ear of officials in positions of power. As I
suggested in chapter 2, in the case of Bosnia, it is more useful to ask whether a women’s “subaltern
counterpublic” as described by Nancy Fraser (1997: 80-85) might be developing. In the sense that
there exists a space away from the dominant public sphere of discourse in which women formulate,
debate, and consolidate their goals and ideas about how to go about achieving them, such a
counterpublic is surely present. In fact, I would count several overlapping counterpublics of women:
those agitating for increased participation of women in politics, women working for refugee (DP)
return, separate spheres of religious and national identity oriented groups, and the network of anti-
nationalist political lobbyists, those most likely to embrace “feminism,” though “in the Bosnian way”
(i.e., the leaders of Medica, Žene Ženama, Udružene Žene, Lara, and others). As these counterpublics
develop, they will become more and more visible in the dominant discursive sphere and, in theory,
will have a chance at influencing it. In Fraser’s scenario, then, such a move would lead to more truly
democratic processes, even with existing levels of stratification. This is essentially what many
feminist donors were pushing women’s organizations to do. Donors organized countless meetings
of NGO and political women at which they encouraged NGOs to form links with government
officials and representatives, especially other women, in order to lobby (lobirati) for their interests.
While it may be too early to judge these links, they were having difficulty functioning smoothly. This
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was due to both inter-NGO competition (for donor resources and information) and to women
politicians’ ultimate loyalty to their parties.
Clearly, and most crucially, “woman” as a mobilized identity has not been made “politically
relevant” (Gal and Kligman 2000: 106). As Gal and Kligman advise, “not all historical
circumstances are auspicious for such mobilization” (ibid.). Bosnian post-war identities, especially
politically relevant ones, have been so dominated by ethno-national categories that the only space
for the construction of a universal “woman” has been within wartime experiences. In seeking to
transcend ethnic boundaries, then, women activists called on common female experiences of the war
that were not marked by ethnic belonging– women had suffered it all at the mercy of male
politicians, military commanders, and criminals. Ethnic differences were not thereby erased, but the
attempt was at appealing to a common subject position in the hopes that this category of identity
could be made politically relevant. While women activists have had some success, the political
relevancy of “women” has not (yet) been achieved.
Conclusion
These chapters have explored the discursive strategies of Bosnian women activists involved
in post-war social and political processes. I have sketched the historical and current experiences and
discourses that have shaped, constrained, and given possibility to the various strategies employed
by women. I discussed the pre-war and wartime antecedents of current models of womanhood,
sexuality, “domestic” and “public” roles, and of women’s organizing against which much women’s
activism in the post-war period has been modeled. In this sense, I argued that the socialist-era aktiv
žena model, built upon women’s social networks and ideas of mutual aid, has endured and
profoundly shaped the way in which women approach the formation of women-only groups. The
power of foreign officials and donors over local organizing was also explored in several aspects. In
its overarching effects, the international community has forced a “nation-ing” of gender discourses
as one of the unintended consequences of its intervention (see Ferguson 1994). Foreign actors have
also aided in the re-entrenchment of patriarchal values, even as some parts of the international
community champion “gender equality.” A failure to integrate gender concerns into international and
local policies has undermined initiatives toward both multi-ethnic state building and towards greater
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equality between women and men. 
I have focused on women activists’ genuine and strategic self-representation in opposition
to images of women put forth by local political discourses and by foreign actors. I have emphasized
Bosnian women’s agency in determining the parameters of their own participation in social and
political processes, even as they are constrained by public morality and practical/financial realities.
Women activists have taken a variety of approaches to questions of gender, ethnicity, and religion.
They disagree over women’s relationships to men, the family, sexuality, politics, and war, and their
actions have both challenged and reinforced dominant constructs affecting women’s lives. Yet the
share the passionate conviction that women and women’s perspectives matter, and that Bosnian
women deserve to viewed as dignified agents, rather than passive victims. This is especially
important for the many women of Muslim background discussed in this dissertation, in light of the
way in which “Muslim women” have become symbols of passive suffering and wartime rape. It is
also significant when read against the renewed importance of portrayals of “Muslim women” to
justify foreign interventions and move world events such as those surrounding the aftermath of
September 11th (see Abu-Lughod 2002).
Stepping back to consider the broader view of post-war Bosnia, or indeed any context of
social and political flux, this study shows that examining the strategies of women activists is not only
significant in terms of understanding gender dynamics or efforts to improve the position of women
in society. As the materials I present here make clear, assumptions about gender permeate and even
drive constructions of a variety of political identities on the levels of groups (nations, ethnic groups)
as well as individuals (politicians and public figures). As Gal and Kligman point out in their
theorizing of gender and postsocialism, “Attending to gender is analytically productive, leading not
only to an understanding of relations between men and women, but to a deeper analysis of how
social and institutional transformations occur” (2000: 3). The gendered analysis I have presented here
reveals some of the less noticed ways in which power is contested and asserted in post-war Bosnia.
The power of the international community (and the assumptions foreign actors bring to their
interventions), notions of masculinity and femininity, ideas about the relationship between politics
and society, understandings of public and private realms, and categories of morality and victimhood
all play significant roles. Notably, in sharp contrast with most popular and scholarly depictions of
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Bosnia since the break-up of socialist Yugoslavia, ethnic identity and nationalism may intersect with
these elements but they are not the only stakes upon which political debates turn.
APPENDICES
254
Appendix A
Abbreviations and Acronyms
BiH Bosna i Hercegovina: Bosnia and Herzegovina
BWI Bosnian Women’s Initiative
Cantons The ten administrative units that make up the Federation. Four are controlled by
Bosniacs, four by Croats, and two are mixed (but divided into ethnically marked and
controlled municipalities)
CRS Catholic Relief Services: an American humanitarian relief agency
Dayton The Dayton Peace Accords, signed in December 1995: ended the Bosnian war,
established a new constitution, and created international bodies to monitor and
implement the agreement 
DFID Department for International Development: the British government’s international
aid agency
DPs Displaced Persons
EU European Union
Federation Bosniac-Croat Federation: One of two entities making up the state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina which was created by the Dayton Peace Agreement, jointly controlled
by Croat and Bosniac parties, numerically dominated by Croats and Bosniacs
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Serbia and Montenegro after the dissolution of
socialist Yugoslavia
HDZ Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union): the dominant Croat
national political party (in Bosnia, it is the HDZ-BiH; in Croatia just HDZ)
IEBL Inter-Entity Boundary Line
IFOR Implementation Force: Post-war peacekeeping force under the auspices of NATO
INGO International Non-governmental Organization
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IPTF International Police Task Force: A UN policing body
LCY League of Communists of Yugoslavia (the Yugoslav Communist Party)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-governmental Organization
OHR Office of the High Representative: charged with overseeing the implementation of
the Dayton Peace Accords
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: charged with organizing and
monitoring post-war elections until 2002; also runs programs for democratization,
governance, and most recently, education reform
QUANGO Quasi-governmental non-governmental organization
RS Republika Srpska (Serb Republic): One of two entities making up the state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina created by the Dayton Peace Agreement, politically controlled by Serb
parties and numerically dominated by Serbs
SDA Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action): the dominant Bosniac
national political party
SDP Socialdemokratska Stranka (Social Democratic Party): the main non-nationalist,
“civic” political party
SDS Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serb Democratic Party): the dominant Serb national
political party
SFOR Stabilization Force: From 1997, the NATO-led peacekeeping force
SIDA Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
STAR Strategies, Training, Advocacy, and Reconciliation: a US based, feminist NGO and
donor
UN United Nations
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF UN Children’s Fund
UNPROFOR UN Protection Force: Peacekeeping force deployed during the war in Bosnia
USAID United States Agency for International Development
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Appendix B
Local Bosnian Women’s NGOs Discussed in this Dissertation
Zenica
Medica Zenica
Infoteka (Information and public initiatives branch)
Bosanka Bosnian (feminine form)/ Bosnian woman
Naš Most Our Bridge
Merjem (the Arabic name for Mary)
Sumejja (the first female martyr to Islam)
Kewser Spring/Source (Arabic)
Fatma
Centar za pravnu pomo ženama Center for Legal Aid to Women
Ilidža/Bratunac
Žene s Podrinje Women of Podrinja (Eastern Bosnia)
Prijedor area
Srcem do mira (Kozarac/Sanski Most) Through Heart to Peace
Mostovi prijateljstva Bridges of Friendship
Sarajevo
Žene ženama (udruženja grapanki) Women to Women (association of female citizens)
Unija ŽAR ŽAR Union of Women’s Associations
Liga Žene Glasaa League of Women Voters
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Organizations in other towns
Udružene Žene United Women Banja Luka
Lara Bijeljina
Žena BiH Woman BiH Mostar
Žene Srebrenice Women of Srebrenica Tuzla and other towns
Udruženja majke i sestre Association of Mothers and Sisters Federation
Srebrenice i Podrinja of Srebrenica and Podrinja
Forum F Posušje
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Appendix C
NGOspeak in Post-war Bosnia
Below are some terms and usages which have been introduced into the Bosnian language as a result
of international intervention and the accompanying prevalence of English. This list is not exhaustive
but reflects the major terms in use by the network of women’s NGOs I followed.
Bosnian/ “local languages” English
advokasi (or, polisi-advokasi) advocacy (policy-advocacy)
ciljane grupe target groups
civilno društvo / grapansko društvo civil society
dibrifing debriefing
diskriminacija discrimination
domai nasilje domestic violence
džender gender (sometimes gender equality)
dženderišju gender issues
implementirati, implementacija to implement, implementation
input input
lider, fem. liderica leader
liderstvo leadership
lobiranje / lobirati lobbying / to lobby
lokalni jezici local languages
(džender) mainstreaming (gender) mainstreaming
NVO (nevladina organizacija), pl. NVOi NGO (non-governmental organization)
pronounced: enveo, pl. enveoi, instr. enveoima
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ranjeve populacije vulnerable populations
seks haresment / uznemiravanje sexual harassment
trei sektor third sector
trefiking / trgovanje (ljudima) trafficking (in people)
trejning (pl. trejninzi) training (session)
umreživanje/netvorking networking
(javno) zalaganje, zagovaranje (public) advocacy
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Appendix D
Mujo and Fata in Post-war Bosnia: Gender in Jokes
 
Telling jokes is almost as important to Bosnian sociability as drinking coffee. In the former
Yugoslavia, standard jokes circulated in which each ethnic group conformed to certain stereotypes–
Montenegrins are lazy, Slovenians cheap, Croats snobs, etc. Bosnians in these jokes are notoriously
stupid, primitive country bumpkins who nonetheless often get the best of others in the end (see
Sorabji 1989: 236-7). In fact, there is a celebration of the ignorance and backwardness of the Bosnian
(Muslim) peasant, the marker for which is often extreme patriarchal behavior, hyper-sexuality, and
the use of violence (see Helms n.d.; Said 1978; Žarkov 1995). The stock characters have typically
Muslim names: male are Mujo and Suljo, or Huso and Haso; Fata is the female. Many jokes,
especially those dealing with the war, are told with the famous “Bosnian black humor.” 
The following is a sampling of reasonably translatable jokes dealing with gender roles and relations
which I collected during and since my fieldwork. The Bosnian original is provided for shorter jokes
and those I received over email, while longer ones I was told orally include only the original
rendering of key phrases. They are grouped by themes that recur in these jokes, though I have left
out another whole genre which would be rich fodder for gender analysis: the blond joke.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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The Ideal Bosnian Woman:
Looks thin but feels plump.
Doesn’t dare to bother her husband.
Knows how to cut hay and pass a driver’s test.
Has a job but is on sick leave or is laid off.
Should be tall but shorter than her husband.
Must be smarter than her husband but doesn’t
dare show it.
Should know how to make sweet coffee even
without sugar.
Should be able to nurse, cook, wash, and iron
at the same time.
Roots for the team her husband roots for.
Works more than her husband but earns less!
Idealna Bosanska Žena:
Na oko tanka, na opip debela
Ne smije da žulja muža
Da umije položiti sijeno i vozaki
Da ima posao, ali da je na bolovanju ili
ekanju
Treba da je visoka ali da je niža od muža
Mora biti i pametnija od muža ali to ne smije
pokazati
Treba da zna i bez šeera skuhati slatku
kahvu
Treba da je kadra u isto vrijeme i dojiti,
kuhati, prati i peglati
Da navija za koga i muž navija
Da radi više od muža ali da manje zarapuje!
Misogyny
Before religion class a son quizzes his father:
Daddy, what was the name of Adam’s
mother-in-law?
Father: Well, Adam didn’t have a mother-in-
law. It was paradise, my son.
Prije sata vjeronauka sin ispituje oca: 
Tata, kako se zvala Adamova punica? 
Otac: Pa Adam nije imao punicu. To je bio
raj, sine moj.
Fata is walking in front of Mujo and they run
into Haso. 
Haso: Mujo, it’s not in the Kuran for a
woman to walk in front of her
husband.
Mujo: It’s not in the Kuran but it is in a mine
field!
Ide Fata ispred Muje i naidju oni na Hasu.
Kaze Haso: Nije Mujo, po Kuranu, da žena
ide ispred muža. 
Odgovara Mujo: Nije po Kuranu, ali je po
minskom polju!
Mujo goes to a restaurant with his wife and
mother-in-law. The waiter comes and
asks for their order.
Mujo: I’ll have the steak.
Waiter: What about the mad cows?
Mujo: I don’t know, let them order for
themselves.  
Izlazi Mujo u restoran s ženom i punicom.
Dope konobar i pita šta e.
Mujo: ja u biftek.
Konobar: a lude krave?
Mujo: Ne znam. Nek’ one same kažu.
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Housework
Two women friends are talking over coffee. The first is telling the second about her grown kids. She
raves about her daughter’s wonderful marriage: “Her husband makes her coffee and brings it to her
in bed every morning! And he brings her flowers and helps with everything around the house. But
my son! What a miserable situation his marriage is. He has to make coffee for his wife and bring it
to her every morning!”
Mujo sends Fata to wash the clothes down at
the river (by the old method). Fata scrubs and
scrubs and beats the clothes until she slips and
falls. She hits her head on a stone and dies.
The neighbors ask Mujo what happened and
Mujo says, “Damn, that’s the third wash
machine that’s broken on me and all because
of stones.” (A play on the similar words for
stone and the small stones/grit that can ruin a
washing machine.)
Poslao Mujo Fatu da opere veš na rijeci ( na
stari nacin ). Fata lupala i lupala i - padne -
oklizne se te udari glavom od kamen i pogine.
Pitaju Muju - šta bi bolan Mujo i Mujo kaže:
Jebiga, ovo mi je ve trea veš mašina koja se
pokvarila i to sve zbog kamenca.
Mujo comes home, flops down on the couch
and calls out, “Fata! Bring me a beer before it
starts!” She glares at him but brings him a
beer. When he’s drunk the beer, Mujo calls
out again, “Fata, bring me another one– it’s
gonna start!” Fata’s getting angry but she
brings him another beer. Mujo drinks that, too,
and calls out, “Hurry! Another one– it’s gonna
start!” This sets Fata off: “What the hell is
your problem?! You come home, plant your
fat butt on the couch without even saying
Hello and you expect me to run around all day
like your slave?! Don’t you know that I’ve
been cooking, washing, ironing, and working
like a dog all day without your crap?!” Mujo
takes a deep breath: “Uf, it started...”
Dope Mujo s posla, baci se na kau, upali TV
i vikne : “Fato, donesi pivo prije nego što
pone!” Ona ga pogleda zbunjeno, ali donese
pivo. Kad ga je popio vikne opet: “Fato,
donesi jos jedno, poet e!” Ovaj put pomalo
ljuta, ali opet mu donese. Kad je i njega
zgotovio, vikne: “Brže, poet ce, još
jedno!!!!” To je totalno raspizdi: “Dobro,
koji je tebi kurac! Dojedriš doma, uvališ tu
debelu guzicu u kau, ne kažes mi ni dobar
dan, a oekuješ da cijeli dan trim oko tebe
kao rob! Jes’ti svjestan da ja po cijele dane
kuham, perem, peglam i da se naradim ko
konj i bez tvojih preseravanja!!!!” Mujo
uzdahne: “Uf, poelo je...”
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A Husband’s Infidelity
Huso: Haso, is it true you had a baby boy?
Haso: Yes, I’m really happy.
Huso: What about your wife?
Haso: She doesn’t know anything yet.
Huso: Je li istina da si dobio sina? 
Haso: Da, i presretan sam. 
Huso: A supruga? 
Haso: Ona jos ništa ne zna.
Fata’s Promiscuity
Mujo runs into Haso on the street and
complains to him:
“Man, you should’ve seen it– yesterday I
come home and find Fata naked in the
bedroom with a Japanese man and a
black man!”
Haso says, “Ugh, how horrible! What did you
do?”
Mujo: “Nothing– I took their picture and sent
it to Benneton. We’ll see if anything
comes of it.
Sreo Mujo Hasu, i zali mu se:
E, bolan Haso, da vidiš jucer, dojdem ja kui
i napem Fatu golu u spavaoj sobi sa
Japancem i crncem!
Haso: Uh nesree! I šta si napravio?
Mujo: Ništa, slikao ih, poslao u Benneton, pa
emo vidjeti hoe li šta biti.
Mujo tries to convince Fata to shave herself
down below.
Fata: Ih, you idiot! You want the whole
village to laugh at me?
Nagovara Mujo Fatu da se obrije dolje. 
Fata: Ih, budale! Pa da mi se cijelo selo
smije!
Fata goes to the doctor and says, “doctor, doctor, help me, I’m suffering from impotence.” The
doctor replies, “you mean your husband is, you can’t have impotence.” Fata says, “of course it’s my
husband who’s impotent but I’m the one who’s suffering!”
Mujo complains to his friend Suljo: 
“Oy, Suljo, I think my wife Fata is a fag!”
“How can Fata be a fag?” asks Suljo.
“She really loves men!” answers Mujo.
Mujo se žali svom jaranu Sulji:
“Joj, Suljo, mislim da je moja žena Fata
peder!”
“Ma, kako bolan to da je Fata peder?” kaže
mu Suljo.
“Puno voli muškarce!” odgovara Mujo.
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On their wedding night, Mujo and Fata are in
the bedroom, each lying on their own
side of the bed. Fata sees that
nothing’s happening, so she says:
“Mujo, I’m cold. Can I lean up against
you and warm up my back?”
Mujo: “Sure!” 
Fata snuggles up against him and waits and
waits... and nothing.: “Mujo, my chest
is cold.” 
Mujo stays lying where his is and gropes
around to warm up Fata’s chest.
Fata’s finally had enough: “Man are you
stupid, Mujo, can’t you see I’ve got a
hole between my legs?!”
To this, Mujo says: “Well there you are, girl,
where the draft (of air) is coming
from!!!” (to make you cold)
Prva brana no, Mujo s Fatom u spavaoj
sobi, svako na svojoj polovini kreveta.
Vidi Fata da se ništa ne dešava, pa
ree: “Mujo, meni je hladno, mogu li
se primai da mi griješ ledja?”
Mujo: “Mozeš!”
Prisloni se Fata uz njega, eka, eka ...I ništa.
“Mujo, hladno mi po grudima.” 
Mujo se onako ležei okrenu i protrlja Fati
grudi da ih ugrije. 
Fati više puko film: “Ja jesi glup, Mujo, pa
imam ja i neku rupu medju nogama!”
Na to e Mujo: “Pa eto, bona, odakle tebi
puše!!!”
During the siege of Sarajevo, Mujo was on the front lines fighting and came back home to find Fata
gone. He looked everywhere for her. He knew she had gone to get water near one of the etnik lines,
so he was very worried. After three days she came home and he said, Fata where have you been?!
Oh, don’t ask (ma, šuti, ne pitaj), she said sadly, I was getting water and the etniks captured me
and dragged me off. They raped me and said they would rape and beat me for seven straight days.
But it’s only been three days, Suljo said. Fata replied, Oh, I just came back to let you know where
I was (došla sam samo da ti javim).
Domestic Violence
At the first International Feminist Conference, women are taught how to coax their husbands into
doing their share of the housework and giving them more respect. The women go home and a follow-
up evaluation is done. First they call up the German woman representative and ask her how things
are going. She tells them, “Well, on the first day when I didn’t cook dinner, my husband yelled and
screamed and sulked and eventually went out and ate at a restaurant. On the second day, he actually
made himself some eggs. But by the third day, he even made dinner for me and the kids.” That
seemed to be going well. They called up the French woman, who reported, “Oh the first day was
tough because I didn’t iron my husband’s shirts, so he had to go to work with a wrinkled shirt. The
second day he had to get out the iron for himself and iron his shirts, although he grumbled a lot. The
third day he stopped complaining, ironed his shirts, and even ironed my things.” This sounded good,
too, but these were all European women. “Let’s call up one of the women from a more backward
265
place,” they said. So they called Fata in Bosnia. “Did you see any changes on the first day?” they
asked. “No, nothing,” Fata said. “What about the second day?” “Still nothing,” Fata said. “Did you
see anything on the third day?” they asked. She brightened. “Well, yes, by then I was just able to
open my left eye a slit.”
Fata puts up with Mujo’s beating her for years and years. Finally she can’t take it anymore. She goes
to the river, stands on the bridge and gets ready to throw herself in when a golden fish sees her and
cries, “Stop! Don’t jump! I’ll grant you three wishes if you don’t!” Fata says OK but the fish says,
“of course, since you haven’t caught me, whatever you wish for, I’ll have to give Mujo 10,000 times
more.” Fata thinks and says, “OK, I want 10 million marks.” “But,” the fish says, “you know that
Mujo will now get 100 billion marks?!” “Fine” (neka, neka) says Fata, and “Second, I wish to be
stunningly beautiful.” “But,” says the fish, “you know that Mujo will now be 10,000 times more
good-looking.” “Neka, neka” says Fata. “And for my third wish,” she says, “Let me get a teeny-
weeny, eentsy-weentsy little tiny heart attack.”
Masculinity and Homophobia
After months and months of war in Bosnia Mujo and Suljo each manage to get out, separately, and
they finally see each other in Zagreb. They’re so happy to see each other they kiss each other on the
cheek, then on the other cheek, and then a third time back to the first cheek. They pause and Mujo
leans in to kiss Suljo once more and explains, “Better that they think we’re fags (pederi) than Serbs!”
[Serbs greet each other with three kiss, while Muslims and Croats kiss only twice.]
Suljo goes to the Orthodox priest with a terrible secret. “I’ve sinned,” he says, “I slept with my
mother-in-law (punica).” The priest says, “this is terrible!” And he tells him what to do to repent and
earn forgiveness. “But there’s more,” Suljo says, “I slept with my sister-in-law (svastika), too.” “Oh
this is horrible! You must repent and never do this again!” says the priest. “And there’s one more
thing, says Suljo, I also slept with my wife’s cousin”. The priest says, “this is really too much, you’ll
have to really work hard to get over this one.”
Then Suljo goes to the Catholic priest and tells him the same thing and gets the same reaction
and a list of Hail-Mary’s and rosaries he has to say to be forgiven.
Then Suljo goes to the hodža (imam) who is sitting in his office on the floor drinking coffee
from a low table. Suljo starts to tell him what the problem is but the hodža says, “first drink coffee
with me.” So they do and when they’re finished the hodža says, “OK, now what’s the problem?
What did you do?” Suljo says, “I slept with my punica.” “Oh what an act of great sevap! (doing good
deeds that will in some way be returned to you),” the hodža says. Suljo is confused but he goes on–
“I also slept with my svastika”. “Ah, meraka!” (what pleasure) says the hodža. “And my wife’s
cousin!” “Mašala!” (God be praised) says the hodža.
Suljo is confused and says, “but how can you say this when the Orthodox and Catholic priests
told me this was a great sin, that I had to repent?”
The hodža says, “they said that? Fags!” (pederi)
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Mujo: Fata, would you like to be a man?
Fata: Sure, why not? And you, Mujo?
Mujo: Fato, bi li ti htjela biti muško?
Fata: Bi, što ne bi, a ti, Mujo?
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Appendix E
Suggestions for Further Research
This dissertation has examined women’s active roles in social and political processes as they
are performed through NGOs and political parties. These are only the most visible of women’s
activities; it should also be noted that women are prominent among journalists, judges, university
professors, and in the ranks of government bureaucracies, as well as in other professions, though they
rarely rise to top positions of authority or pay. Furthermore, women are active in various
institutionalized and informal ways in urban neighborhoods and villages as key actors in community
life. A thorough look at women’s changing public roles would include investigation of women’s
activities in these other spheres.
In terms of region, this study has focused on Bosniac spaces, though women activists from
Serb and Croat areas are also part of the women’s networks I explored. A similar study focusing on
women’s activism in Serb and Croat areas would be interesting for comparative purposes, especially
if it were to include mono-ethnic women’s organizations and those that support nationalist politics
and/or religious agendas. Similarly, for Bosniac areas, further investigation into Muslim religious
communities and women’s organizations would shed light on debates which invoke stereotypical
views of Islam, European-ness, and gender roles. In the whole of Bosnia, gender dynamics among
ethnic “others,” especially the Roma as a racialized outcast group, are also poorly understood (but
see Erickson 2003; Medica 2001).
On a broader level, many other avenues of women’s changing identities remain to be
explored. Gender roles within the family are undergoing profound pressures as many women were
widowed during the war, marriages fell apart, many men are not coping well, and state social
services have been sharply curtailed. In many cases, young women working for international
organizations are supporting whole extended families on their good salaries, potentially upsetting
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entrenched hierarchies of gender and generation. In urban areas such as Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja
Luka, it would be interesting to investigate the effects of the sustained presence of large numbers of
“internationals” on a variety of conceptions of gender, sexuality, materialism, family, and other
aspects of life.
As little substantive research as has been done on women in Bosnia, especially on subjects
other than women’s victimhood and peace activism, next to no attention has been paid to men and
masculinity. Given that men and their patriarchal roles have been “blamed” for much of women’s
subordination and marginalization in Bosnia, it seems critical to come to some understanding of how
male identities are being shaped and contested. 
In general, future projects could usefully focus on youth and the wide range of ideas, role
models, and identity discourses to which they are being exposed. Understanding these dynamics
might lead to a deeper understanding of Bosnia’s future and on the long-term legacies of socialism,
the war, and post-war international intervention.
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